Seventh Annual Acquisition Research Symposium Proceedings Volume II by Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports Faculty and Researcher Publications
2010
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual
Acquisition Research Symposium:
creating synergy for informed change,
May 12-13, 2010.







Approved for public release, distribution unlimited. 
 









Acquisition Research  
Creating Synergy for Informed Change
May 12 - 13, 2010 
 
Published: 30 April 2010 
 
 
Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 
1. REPORT DATE 
30 APR 2010 2. REPORT TYPE 
3. DATES COVERED 
  00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010  
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
Acquisition Research Creating Synergy for Informed Change.
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Acquisition Research Symposium
Thursday Sessions. Volume II 
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b. GRANT NUMBER 
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 
5e. TASK NUMBER 
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School,Graduate School of Business & Public
Policy,Acquisition Research Program,Monterey,CA,93943 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
14. ABSTRACT 
 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 













c. THIS PAGE 
unclassified 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 

























The research presented at the symposium was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, please 
contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
E-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu   
 
Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our website 
www.acquisitionresearch.net .  
 ===================
     ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ== i=
=
Preface and Acknowledgements  
One needs no powers of prophecy to predict that perilous economic times lie ahead for our 
nation and the rest of the world.  While uncertainty surrounds the global economic crisis—
how long it will last, for example, and whether conditions will worsen further before they 
improve—there can be little doubt that national budgets for defense acquisition will 
experience considerable pressure and quite possibly decline in the coming years. 
Under such conditions, we may be tempted either to accept with fatalism some reduced 
level of expectations for acquisition outcomes or, alternatively, to embrace trite exhortations 
to do more with less.  Neither of these is, of course, a tenable position for serious scholars 
of acquisition.  Rather, we ought to continue to seek the best possible understanding of 
acquisition that will lead to the best possible outcomes given available resources.  This 
entails continued work on what Don Kettl has termed the “smart buyer” problem: knowing 
what to buy, who to buy it from, and how to assess its quality.   
Nor can the “how to buy” problem be neglected, as new laws, regulations, and other policies 
continue to subject acquisition processes to what many see as excessively “bureaucratic” 
requirements.  While these new structures often have worthy goals to increase 
accountability, transparency, and social equity, their economic costs can’t be ignored.  
Acquisition scholars should find ways to, paraphrasing Aaron Wildavsky, “speak scientific 
truth to power” so that policy-makers’ decisions are informed by the best possible research 
on their costs and benefits. 
Currently, DoD investments in acquisition research represent about one one-thousandth of 
one percent of the total defense budget, yet we believe they have the potential to lead to 
considerable savings, both in the near and long term.  We see strong evidence that this 
potential is being realized through the products of the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Acquisition Research Program. 
Our goals remain the same, with recent highlights noted below: 
1. Position the ARP in a leadership role to continue to develop the body of knowledge in 
defense acquisition research 
• Over 450 published works since inception, 
• All completed research is published in full text on the ARP website, 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, allowing ready access by any and all parties 
interested in the DoD acquisition process, 
• Sponsoring our 7th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, the first of which 
was held in May 2004, draws thought leaders of the DoD acquisition community, 
academia and industry. 
2. Establish acquisition research as an integral part of policy-making for DoD officials. 
Some processes informed by this research include: 
• Open Architecture implementation practices and policies to include 
software/hardware reuse repository characteristics such as ontology, search 
engines, licensing issues and testing requirements; Creation of the concept of 
Integration Readiness Levels paired with technology readiness levels to create a 
System Readiness Level scale; 
• Development of logistics resource strategies for selecting among Contracted 
Logistics Support, Organic Logistics Support or Blended Logistics Support; 
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• Identification of the scope and causes of bid protests and recommendations for 
reducing same; and 
• Creation of a database of key contracting workforce demographics for the Army 
Contracting Command. 
3. Create a stream of relevant information concerning the performance of DoD 
acquisition policies with viable recommendations for continuous process 
improvement.   
• The body of knowledge on the DoD acquisition process continues to increase by 
over 140 research products a year. 
• Faculty researchers routinely give multiple presentations, in both national and 
international fora, featuring their research work—thereby increasing exposure to 
a broader audience. Typical audiences include the London School of Economics, 
the Federal Reserve, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the 
Western Economics Association International Conference, the International 
Procurement Conference and the National Contracts Management Association. 
At a minimum, over 90 presentations of sponsored research results were made 
in 2009. 
• The International Journal of Defense Acquisition Management is the ARP’s 
initiative to promote defense acquisition research in the peer-reviewed literature.  
All published articles can be freely downloaded from the journal’s website. During 
2009, three more articles were published in the journal from authors in the US, 
Australia, and the UK, bringing the total to six since the journal was founded in 
May 2008.  There are also seven articles currently under review. The journal 
substantially increases the “reach” of our research products. 
4. Prepare the DoD workforce to participate in the continued evolution of the defense 
acquisition process.  
• The ARP plays a major role in providing a DoD-relevant graduate education 
program to future DoD officials. Synergy between research conducted and 
course content delivered enhances both the teaching and learning processes. 
• The number of students engaged in focused acquisition research for their MBA 
projects continues to grow.  These students have the benefit of being able to 
immediately apply their newly acquired acquisition skills to real-world issues. 
• Student projects on the economics of the shipbuilding industrial base and 
services contracting are expected to contribute significantly to the body of 
knowledge and decision-making process for these two very important and timely 
subjects. 
5. Collaboration among universities, think tanks, industry and government in acquisition 
research.  
• Over 60 universities/think tanks have participated in the annual Acquisition 
Research Symposium or the Acquisition Research Program as a result of a 
focused effort to create a Virtual University Consortium.   
• Emerging collaborative research efforts continue to bring new scholar and 
practitioner thought to the business issues facing the DoD, as was demonstrated 
by the large response to our fourth Broad Area Announcement (BAA) in support 
of the OSD-sponsored acquisition research program. As we write this, our fifth 
BAA is being prepared for release. 
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• The International Journal of Defense Acquisition is attracting scholars from the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Nigeria, Singapore, The Netherlands, the United 
States and Australia.  
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, whose 
foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition Research 
Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, US Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio 
System 
• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
• Office of Naval Air Systems Command PMA-290 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Director, Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business 
Transformation Agency 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its generous 
contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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The Acquisition Research Program Team 
Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr. USN (Ret.)—Acquisition Chair, Naval 
Postgraduate School. RADM Greene develops, implements and oversees the Acquisition 
Research Program in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. He interfaces with 
DoD, industry and government leaders in acquisition, facilitates graduate student research 
and conducts guest lectures and seminars. Before serving at NPS, RADM Greene was an 
independent consultant focusing on Defense Industry business development strategy and 
execution (for both the public and private sectors), minimizing lifecycle costs through 
technology applications, alternative financing arrangements for capital-asset procurement, 
and “red-teaming” corporate proposals for major government procurements.  
RADM Greene served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) 
in the Pentagon from 1991-1995. As Assistant Deputy, he provided oversight, direction and 
budget development for worldwide US Navy logistics operations. He facilitated depot 
maintenance, supply chain management, base/station management, environmental 
programs and logistic advice, and support to the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of his 
focuses during this time were leading Navy-wide efforts to digitize all technical data (and, 
therefore, reduce cycle-time) and to develop and implement strategy for procurement of 
eleven Sealift ships for the rapid deployment forces. He also served as the Senior Military 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from 1987-1990; as such, he 
advised and counseled the Under Secretary in directing the DoD procurement process.  
From 1984-1987, RADM Greene was the Project Manager for the AEGIS project. 
This was the DoD’s largest acquisition project, with an annual budget in excess of $5 
billion/year. The project provided oversight and management of research, development, 
design, production, fleet introduction and full lifecycle support of the entire fleet of AEGIS 
cruisers, destroyers, and weapons systems through more than 2500 industry contracts. 
From 1980-1984, RADM Greene served as Director, Committee Liaison, Office of 
Legislative Affairs followed by a tour as the Executive Assistant, to the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics). From 1964-1980, RADM Greene served as a 
Surface Warfare Officer in various duties, culminating in Command-at-Sea. His assignments 
included numerous wartime deployments to Vietnam, as well as the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf.  
RADM Greene received a BS in Electrical Engineering from Brown University in 
1964; he earned an MS in Electrical Engineering and an MS in Business Administration from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in 1973.  
RADM Greene received the 2009 Richard W. Hamming Annual Faculty Award for 
Achievement in Interdisciplinary Activities. The selection is based on his work in leading 
and administering the Naval Postgraduate School's Acquisition Research Program. 
Dr. Keith F. Snider—Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management 
in the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition management. 
He also serves as Principal Investigator for the NPS Acquisition Research Program and as 
Chair of the Acquisition Academic Area.  
Snider has a PhD in Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, a Master of Science degree in Operations 
Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
United States Military Academy at West Point. He served as a field artillery officer in the US 
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Army for twenty years, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He is a former member of 
the Army Acquisition Corps and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the 
Defense Systems Management College.  
Professor Snider’s recent publications appear in American Review of Public 
Administration, Administration and Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Journal of Public 
Procurement, Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.  
Dr. Snider received the 2009 Richard W. Hamming Annual Faculty Award for 
Achievement in Interdisciplinary Activities. The selection is based on his work in leading 
and administering the Naval Postgraduate School's Acquisition Research Program. 
Karey L. Shaffer—Program Manager, General Dynamics Information Technology, 
supporting the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business & Public 
Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. As PM, Shaffer is responsible for operations and 
publications in conjunction with the Acquisition Chair and the Principal Investigator. She has 
also catalyzed, organized and managed the Acquisition Research Symposiums hosted by 
NPS.  
Shaffer served as an independent Project Manager and Marketing Consultant on 
various projects. Her experiences as such were focused on creating marketing materials, 
initiating web development, assembling technical teams, managing project lifecycles, 
processes and cost-savings strategies. As a Resource Specialist at Watson Wyatt 
Worldwide in Minneapolis, Shaffer developed and implemented template plans to address 
continuity and functionality in corporate documents; in this same position, she introduced 
process improvements to increase efficiency in presentation and proposal production in 
order to reduce the instances of corruption and loss of vital technical information.  
Shaffer has also served as the Project Manager for Imagicast, Inc., and as the 
Operations Manager for the Montana World Trade Center. At Imagicast, she was asked to 
take over the project management of four failing pilots for Levi Strauss in the San Francisco 
office. Within four months, the pilots were released; the project lifecycle was shortened; and 
the production process was refined. In this latter capacity at the MWTC, Shaffer developed 
operating procedures, policies and processes in compliance with state and federal grant 
law. Concurrently, she managed $1.25 million in federal appropriations, developed 
budgeting systems and helped secure a $400,000 federal technology grant. As the 
Operations Manager, she also launched the MWTC’s Conference site, managed various 
marketing conferences, and taught student practicum programs and seminars.  
Shaffer holds an MBA from San Francisco State University and earned her BA in 
Business Administration (focus on International Business, Marketing and Management) from 
the University of Montana.  
A special thanks to our editors, Adrianne Malan, Jessica Moon, Steve Williams, and 
Lyndsee Cordes, for all that they have done to make this publication a success, to Shellee 
Dooley and Tera Yoder for production support, and to the staff at the Graduate School of 
Business & Public Policy for their administrative support. Our program success is directly 
related to the combined efforts of many.  
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Announcement and Call for Symposium Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 8th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 11-
12, 2011 in Monterey, California.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and 
the exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public-sector acquisition.  
We seek a diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, 
and industry who are well placed to shape and promote future research in 
acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers 
from academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of 
acquisition.  The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential 
research areas of interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement 
policy, supply chain management, public budgeting and finance, cost 
management, project management, logistics management, engineering 
management, outsourcing, performance measurement, and organization 
studies.   
Proposals must be submitted by November 5, 2010.  The Program Committee will 
make notifications of accepted proposals by December 10, 2010.  Final papers must 
be submitted by April 1, 2011. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, 
contact information and short bio for the author(s).  Proposals for papers plan for a 
20 minute presentation. Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) should 
include the same information as above as well as a description of the panel subject 
and format, along with participants’ names, qualifications and the specific 
contributions each participant will make to the panel.   
Submit paper and panel proposals to www.researchsymposium.org  
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Call for Research: Broad Agency Announcement 
 
GRANTS.GOV -- NPSBAA10-002 
The Acquisition Research Program 
Open until 5:00 p.m. PDST 18 June 2010 
 
Primary objective is to attract outstanding researchers and scholars to 
investigate topics of interest to the defense acquisition community. The 
program solicits innovative proposals for defense acquisition management and 
policy research to be conducted during fiscal year (FY) 2011 (1 Oct 2010 - 30 Sep 
2011).  
Defense acquisition management and policy research refers to investigations 
in all disciplines, fields, and domains that (1) are involved in the acquisition of 
products and/or services for national defense, or (2) could potentially be 
brought to bear to improve defense acquisition.  It includes but is not limited to 
economics, finance, financial management, information systems, organization 
theory, operations management, human resources management, and marketing, as 
well as the “traditional” acquisition areas such as contracting, program/project 
management, logistics, and systems engineering management.  
This program is targeted in particular to U.S. universities (including U.S. 
government schools of higher education) or other research institutions 
outside the Department of Defense.  
The Government anticipates making multiple awards up to $120,000 each for a 
basic research period of twelve months.  NPS plans to complete proposal 
evaluations and notify awardees in mid-August 2010. The actual date of grant award 
will depend on availability of funds and the capabilities of the grants office.  Prior 
year awards occurred in the August – January timeframe. Awardees may request 
approval of pre-award costs (up to three months), or they may request adjustments 
in the grant period of performance. 
Full Text can be found at www.grants.gov  
To locate the call quickly: 
1) Go to www.grants.gov 
2) Use Quick Links on the far right hand corner under FOR APPLICANTS, 
Grant Search. 
3) Type in NPSBAA10-002 under Search by Funding Opportunity 
Number. 
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Keynote: Lieutenant General Thomas J. Owen, US 
Air Force, Commander, Aeronautical Systems 
Center 
Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Owen is Commander, Aeronautical 
Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 
As ASC Commander and Program Executive Officer for 
aircraft procurement and modernization, he leads the Air 
Force's Center of Excellence for Development and 
Acquisition of Aeronautical Systems. The center is 
responsible for the management of more than 556 Air 
Force, joint and international programs, executes an 
annual budget of $23 billion, and employs a work force of 
approximately 10,000 people located at Wright-Patterson 
AFB and 38 other locations worldwide. 
General Owen entered the Air Force in 1978 as a graduate 
of the US Air Force Academy. Early in his career he 
worked on B-52 Stratofortress, KC-135 Stratotanker and 
F-15 Eagle aircraft. The general has commanded an 
aircraft generation squadron maintaining F-16 Fighting Falcon and OA-10 Thunderbolt II 
aircraft; a maintenance squadron performing intermediate level aircraft and munitions 
maintenance; and a combat logistics support squadron providing F-16 and F-4 Phantom 
aircraft battle damage repair, supply and transportation support. He's been assigned to 
Headquarters US Air Force in the Pentagon two times.  
General Owen was the first logistics group commander for the first and only wing 
operating E-8C Joint STARS aircraft. For more than three years, he was Director of the C-5 
System Program Office at San Antonio and Warner Robins Air Logistics Centers. He has 
also served as Director for the C-17 and F-22A System Program Offices at the Aeronautical 
Systems Center, and Director of Logistics, Installations and Mission Support at 
Headquarters Air Education and Training Command. He was Commander of the Warner 
Robins ALC. Prior to assuming his current duties, he was Director of Logistics and 
Sustainment, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command. General Owen holds Department 
of Defense Acquisition Corps Level III certifications in Program Management and Life Cycle 
Logistics.  
General Owen also holds an MA in national security strategy from National Defense 
University and an MA in political science and international relations from Troy State 































Panel #14 – Economic Impacts of the Defense 
Industrial Base 
 
Thursday, May 13, 2010 
9:30 a.m. – 
11:00 a.m. Chair: James E. Thomsen, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition) 
Discussant: Rear Admiral David H. Lewis, US Navy, Vice Commander, 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
An Analysis of the Impact of Consolidation Activity in the US and 
European Defense Industrial Bases  
Nayantara Hensel, Office of the Secretary of the Navy 
An Economic Analysis of Investment in the United States Shipbuilding 
Industry 
LT Nicholas A. Meyers, US Navy, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Chair: James E. Thomsen, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Research, Development & Acquisition) 
Mr. Thomsen is currently the Principal Civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary (RD&A). His 
responsibilities include leadership of the acquisition workforce and systems engineering.  
Previously, Mr. Thomsen served as the Program Executive Officer for Littoral and Mine 
Warfare. As PEO LMW, he had life cycle responsibility to design, produce, field, and support 
war fighting capability for the littoral battle space and for the global war on terrorism. Mr. 
Thomsen led seven program offices that comprised 224 programs ranging from ACAT I 
through ACAT IV and included several developmental programs that addressed urgent war 
fighting needs for OIF and OEF. In 2003, Mr. Thomsen was selected as the Executive 
Director for the Program Executive Office, Littoral and Mine Warfare where he executed the 
Navy’s material acquisition programs for Integrated Undersea Surveillance, Naval 
EOD/JCREW, Naval Special Warfare, Mine Warfare Surface and Aviation, Unmanned 
Maritime Vehicles, Naval Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Ashore and Afloat, and LCS 
Mission Modules for ASW, Mine Warfare, and ASUW.  
Prior to this position, Mr. Thomsen was assigned as Head of the NAVSEA Dahlgren 
Division’s Weapons Systems Department, directing over 550 scientists, engineers, 
technicians, and advancing key technical achievements in Naval Surface Weapons 
systems.  
Mr. Thomsen was selected as a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES) in 
November 1998 and then named as Head, Coastal Warfare Systems Department directing 
all of the Littoral Warfare RDT&E programs at Naval Surface Warfare Center (Panama City) 




Prior to November 1998, Mr. Thomsen served as Program Manager for Mine Warfare 
programs, for which he was awarded the NDIA Bronze Medal for his achievements in Mine 
Warfare; Senior Systems Engineer for the Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures program; 
Project Manager for the ACAT 1D Joint US/UK Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) 
program for which he received the Commanding Officer/Technical Director Award for special 
achievement in technical management; and Head, Torpedo Defense Systems Development 
Branch and served as the System Integration Agent in Submarine Torpedo Defense 
Countermeasure programs for PMS 415.  
In the early years of his 27 year career, he held engineering positions including design 
engineer, test engineer, project engineer, and systems engineer for several undersea 
warfare programs at Carderock, Panama City, and NAVSEA Headquarters.  
Mr. Thomsen received his Bachelor’s degree in Ocean Engineering from Florida Atlantic 
University in 1981 and his Master of Science degree from Florida State University in 1986.  
Discussant: Rear Admiral David H. Lewis, US Navy, Vice Commander, Naval Sea 
Systems Command  
Rear Admiral Lewis is currently assigned as vice commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command. 
Born at Misawa Air Force Base, Japan, Lewis was commissioned in 1979 through the Navy 
ROTC Program at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln with a Bachelor of Science in 
Computer Science. 
At sea, he served aboard USS Spruance (DD 963) as communications officer, where he 
earned his Surface Warfare qualification, USS Biddle (CG 34) as fire control officer and 
missile battery officer, and USS Ticonderoga (CG 47) as combat systems officer. 
Lewis’ shore assignments include assistant chief of staff for Maintenance and Engineering, 
commander, Naval Surface Forces, where he also served as a Charter member of the 
Surface Warfare Enterprise. Other ship maintenance and acquisition assignments ashore 
include the Navy Secretariat staff, commander, Naval Sea Systems Command staff, Aegis 
Shipbuilding Program Office, supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bath, and Readiness Support 
Group, San Diego. His major command assignment was Aegis Shipbuilding Program 
Manager in the Program Executive Office Ships, where he helped deliver seven DDG 51 
class ships and procured another 10 ships. 
Upon selection to flag rank, Lewis was serving as executive assistant to the assistant 
secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. 
Lewis earned a Master of Science degree in Computer Science from the Naval 
Postgraduate School. He completed the Seminar Course at the Naval War College 
Command and Staff School, and received his Joint Professional Military Education 
certification. He is a member of the Acquisition Professional Community with Level III 
certifications in Program Management and Production Quality Management and has 
completed his civilian Project Management Professional certification. 
His personal awards include the Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy and 
Marine Corps Commendation, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, National 




An Analysis of the Impact of Consolidation Activity 
in the US and European Defense Industrial Bases  
 Nayantara Hensel—Dr. Nayantara Hensel is the Chief Economist for the Department of the Navy. 
She provides economic guidance on growth projections, the federal budget, interest rates, 
unemployment, exchange rates, inflation, and the financial health of defense contractors, as well as 
trends in the broader economy and in the defense sector. Dr. Hensel received her BA, MA, and PhD 
from Harvard University, where she graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa and 
specialized in finance and economics. She has taught at the US Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Harvard University, and the Stern School of Business 
at New York University (NYU). In the private sector, Dr. Hensel previously served as Senior Manager 
and Chief Economist for Ernst & Young’s litigation advisory group, managing economist for the New 
York City office of the Law and Economics Consulting Group (LECG), and as an economist in the 
economic consulting arm of Marsh & McLennan. Dr. Hensel has written over 30 articles and research 
reports. Her recent research has focused on globalization and the US Defense industrial base (the 
USAF tanker competition), the role of defense mergers in improving weapons systems’ cost 
efficiency, efficiency in IPO auctions relative to traditional processes, the factors impacting discount 
rates for US Marine Corps personnel, and market structure-specific and firm-specific factors 
impacting economies of scale and density in European and Japanese banks. She has published in 
the International Journal of Managerial Finance, the Review of Financial Economics, Business 
Economics, the European Financial Management Journal, the Journal of Financial Transformation, 
and Harvard Business School Working Knowledge. She is the Chair of the Financial Roundtable for 
the National Association of Business Economists (NABE) and is one of 34 elected members to 
NBEIC, a group composed of the top corporate economists in the US. Dr. Hensel has given seminars 
at a number of institutions and has appeared on CNBC, Bloomberg Radio, and CNNMoney. 
Executive Summary 
The defense industrial base in the US has witnessed many changes over the past 
twenty years, following the end of the Cold War, and has been reshaped by a variety of 
significant forces. This project examines the impact of macroeconomic conditions (the 
federal budget, labor market conditions) and the recent shift in defense priorities toward 
irregular warfare, on the defense industrial base, as well as the globalization of the defense 
sector. First, the analysis examines trends in the federal debt and deficit, as well as defense 
spending, over the past fifty years, and assesses the possible pressure placed on future 
defense spending by fiscal austerity in the coming years, including  the emphasis on certain 
areas of the defense industrial base in the recent budgets and in the Quadrennial Defense 
Review. Second, the project examines the impact of stagnant regional labor markets on 
Congressional concerns over cutbacks in particular defense programs. Third, the project 
assesses concerns over the reduction in skill sets in certain areas of the defense industrial 
base, due to possible reduced procurement rates, as well as the shift in defense priorities 
toward irregular warfare. The analysis examines several areas, including the solid rocket 
motors defense sub-sector, as well as the impact of shifts in recent USN thirty-year 
shipbuilding plans on the shipbuilding industrial base. Fourth, the analysis examines areas 
of growth in the defense industrial base due to the shift in priorities toward irregular warfare. 
Fifth, the project assesses the involvement of foreign defense contractors in the US defense 
industrial base and the success of global supply-chain alliances between foreign and US 
defense firms. Finally, the project analyzes the continued demand from foreign markets for 
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Amidst the global economic recession of recent years and sizeable injections of 
federal stimulus packages, the Navy’s budget for ship construction (SCN) has experienced 
only modest real growth.  While both the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 30-
year shipbuilding plan have reaffirmed a fleet size goal of 313 ships, some suggest that $20 
billion or more per year is needed to attain these fleet numbers.  This research has analyzed 
the United States’ shipbuilding industry as a potentially rewarding source of economic 
stimulus and benefit through similar or identical measures used by economists at Oxford 
Economics.  First, direct and indirect (supply-chain) monetary impacts from the “shipbuilding 
and repair” sector were analyzed using US Bureau of Economic Analysis input/output data 
and a Carnegie-Mellon University model of a Leontief inversion process.  This sector was 
then compared with five alternative investments.  Second, the direct and indirect benefits of 
the shipyard-related labor market was analyzed using data collected from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Naval Sea Systems Command, and the American Shipbuilding 
Association.  Finally, measures of Capital Intensity and Capacity were applied to the 
financial statements of the nation’s largest private owners of shipyards— General Dynamics 
and Northrop Grumman.  The results suggest that US shipbuilding generates benefits 
comparable to alternative investments, while supporting more labor, and highly skilled jobs, 
than alternatives.  In addition, high levels of capital intensity in shipbuilding suggest that a 
decline in demand may yield a permanent loss of US productive capacity.  Finally, excess 
capacity throughout the industry shows a clear ability to absorb an increase in demand, 
providing prompt and immediate impact on sustained economic recovery. 
Introduction 
Purpose of Study 
In 2008 and 2009, the United States’ economy has struggled with what has widely 
been described as “the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.”  Specifically, the 




measured in constant 2005 dollars, since the beginning of calendar year 2008 (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2009).  Although this contraction may seem slight, this is the first six-
quarter period since 1982 that the national GDP growth has been negative.  Now, with the 
nationwide unemployment rate near 10%, the United States has lost over 7.3 million jobs 
since the start of the damaging recession (Homan, 2009).  Some economists are predicting 
recovery in 2010, but national leaders and decision-makers continue to look to federal 
government spending as a means of stimulating job growth, injecting stability, and 
sustaining recovery. 
In a series of efforts to mitigate drastic economic decline, the US Congress passed a 
$700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) package in October of 2008, followed by 
a $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on February 13th, 2009 
(Recovery.gov, 2009).  Of the initial TARP package, about $550 billion has been committed 
to various financial firms, banks, and institutions throughout the country; so far, $70.1 billion 
has been returned to the Treasury (Ericson, He & Schoenfield, 2009).  The Federal Reserve 
and the White House continue now to seek proper locations for depositing large sums of 
federal dollars as a means of ensuring continued consistent recovery of our national 
economic forecasts.  Just as recently as December of 2009, the New York Times featured a 
front-page article in which White House economist Jared Bernstein suggests that the 
administration is considering an additional $150 billion in stimulus spending, of which $50 
billion could be invested “in infrastructure projects alone such as roads, bridges, and water 
projects” (Pace, Taylor & Elliott, 2009).  Clearly, national leaders are convinced that 
boosting federal spending is one of the best tools for ensuring that America’s $14.3 trillion1 
economy remains healthy and growing at a stable, sustainable pace.  The questions now 
being discussed in various offices and conference rooms throughout Washington, DC, and 
the country as a whole include robust debates about where to invest these funds.  What 
effects would a $1 trillion health care package have on our weakened economy?  Where are 
the benefits of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; where have they manifested?  
The executive branch claims to track every dollar spent under this $787 billion umbrella, but 
how is that spending really benefiting the economy?  Other, perhaps equally important, 
questions exist for industries and sectors yet to benefit from federal spending packages and 
stimulus measures—what could investments in those sectors be doing to improve the 
economy? 
One important industry that has not received direct funding from government 
intervention in the current recession has been the US shipbuilding sector.  A website search 
for “shipbuilding” at the federal government’s website designed to provide transparency to 
American citizens reveals that a mere $132,000 of the $787 billion package has been 
allocated to a company called Horizon Shipbuilding in Alabama (Recovery.gov, 2009).2  This 
$132,000 payment from the Department of Transportation is the only search result; clearly, 
the outcome demonstrates that not even one tenth of one percent of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act has been invested in shipbuilding companies.   
Those with an interest in the US shipbuilding industry believe that their particular 
sector of manufacturing has a significant ability to provide economic stimulus, or substantial 
                                                
1 Based on gross domestic product (GDP), seasonally adjusted, annualized amount for 3rd quarter 
2009, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov) 
2 Search was conducted at www.recovery.gov, whose stated mission statement is to “provide easy 
access to data related to Recovery Act spending and allow(s) for the reporting of potential waste, 




return-on-investment for national decision-makers and taxpayers alike.  The purpose of this 
thesis study is to determine, what is the return or benefit to the US national economy for 
federal expenditures in the shipbuilding sector?  Common economic models, discussed in 
detail in the pages that follow, will be applied to pertinent sector data in order to answer this 
important question.  As politicians seek to stimulate and sustain US economic growth, they 
hope to create or maintain jobs, expand national gross domestic product, and provide a 
lasting resource for future economic potential; investments in shipbuilding ardently 
accomplishes all three goals, as this study will seek to demonstrate. 
Problem 
Problem 1: US Navy Fleet Size: An Uncharted Goal 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has repeatedly affirmed a commitment to a 
United States’ naval fleet of at least 313 warships (McIntire, 2009).  However, in the FY 
2011 30-year shipbuilding plan, the US naval fleet does not include 313 ships until the year 
2020 (Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), 2010).  One profound problem is the 
sharp discrepancy between these CNO estimates of national needs for our naval fleet, 
versus the projected fleet decline if funding for ship construction remains constant in real 
dollars.  An estimate from the American Shipbuilding Association suggests that our fleet 
could reach a mere 180 ships total if additional funding for ship construction is not received.3  
Another study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), suggests 
that the Congressional appropriation for “Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)” would 
have to be funded to levels of about $20.4 billion in order to achieve the Navy’s desired 
force structure in future years (Work, 2009).  Moreover, the same CSBA study references 
recent Congressional Budget Office estimates that a total of $22.4 billion per year would be 
required to reach a fleet size of 313 ships.  In stark contrast to these projected levels for 
achievement of the CNO’s fleet size goal, $12.7 billion was the total funding of the fiscal 
year 2009 SCN account; based on CSBA estimates, the effort was underfunded by about 
35% (Department of the Navy, 2008).  Additionally, throughout 2040, “to be consistent with 
expected future defense budgets, the Department of the Navy’s annual shipbuilding 
construction (SCN) budget must average no more than $15.9 billion per year in FY2010 
dollars” (Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), 2010). 
                                                
3 The prediction is captured in the “unilateral Navy trends” graph, acquired from the American 





Figure 1. Unilateral Navy Disarmament 
In summary of the first disconnect between projected fleet needs and recent funding 
of ship construction, the ostensible likelihood is that, barring any geopolitical events that 
may punctuate the national security equilibrium, the United States Navy is not likely to reach 
a fleet of 313 ships before the year 2020.  In addition, the academic and practical arenas of 
shipbuilding cost growth and projected fleet size funding estimates have been thoroughly 
explored by talented minds with reliable experience.  For these reasons primarily, this thesis 
study will not explore issues of (1) appropriate fleet size to meet national security needs, or 
(2) the rising costs of ship construction as it impacts efforts to reach projected needs.  
Although both of these issues are considered important, thorough and credible studies by 
congressional experts such as Mr. Ron O’Rourke4, RAND, and others have been and 
currently are being conducted within these arenas; this thesis will focus elsewhere. 
Problem 2:   What Does Shipbuilding Do for the Economy? How? 
A second important problem exists within these topics of US naval fleet size, national 
economic woes, and ship construction—one more obscure, and perhaps with a solution 
more potentially rewarding.  The question referred to is this:  what are the economic benefits 
of building ships?  When comparing alternative options for investment of federal taxpayer 
dollars, building highways versus bailing out banks for example, several important questions 
appear at the forefront of consideration.  First, what is the health and capacity of the industry 
being considered for receipt of billions of dollars?  Could the sector accept the billions of 
dollars of additional funding and apply them in some meaningful manner to an economic 
benefit of others?  Are there vendors or resources whose financial health depends upon the 
sector considered?  For instance, building highways requires not only large pools of 
available labor, but also purchases from blacktop/concrete producers, perhaps equipment 
rentals for steamrollers and forklifts, and other suppliers who would benefit from increased 
demand of their products.  Are there similar supply-chain benefits for the builders of ships?  
                                                
4 Mr Ronald O’Rourke is a “specialist in naval affairs” with the Congressional Research Service, and 
has published numerous studies regarding the rising costs of Navy ships for the US Navy, as well as 




Investments of federal tax dollars should be allocated to the sectors where it would 
economically benefit the most people, or maximize the return-on-investment for the federal 
government. 
When evaluating a particular industry for its ability to benefit national economic 
recovery and growth, one should consider the channels through which the benefits manifest.  
In determining channels of impact, quantitative multipliers may be calculated.  Once a 
trusted and scrutinized economic multiplier is available for each investment option, public 
sector decision-makers could be as well informed as private sector investment bankers or 
venture capitalists, who seek to deposit their wealth where it will multiply the greatest, earn 
the most rewards, and pay dividends to their stakeholders for future periods.  The national 
politicians seeking stabilization and growth of the US economy could evaluate their problem 
of economic return for various courses of investment using a similar framework; their 
stakeholders are all US citizens, and their wealth is the measure of national GDP.   
Organization of Thesis Study 
What’s Not Included, and Why? 
In both quantitative and qualitative analysis, this study will consider only the “US 
shipbuilding industry” investment option available to policymakers.  One aspect of the 
study’s contribution to national information regarding economic investment in shipbuilding 
will be found in its analysis of the lifecycle benefit of a vessel’s national economic impact.  
Much detailed research has been conducted already in an effort to capture and quantify 
lifecycle costs of ship procurement programs.  Thus, issues of rising construction and 
procurement costs of Navy ships will not be a focus of this study.  Rather, lifecycle benefit to 
the regional and national economy will be explored, quantified where possible. 
Both the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Navy’s 30-year 
shipbuilding plan were completed in February of 2010.  The mix of vessels to be procured 
has been planned, and evaluation of shipbuilding costs is being thoroughly scrutinized by 
national authorities on the subject such as Ronald O’Rourke, with the Congressional 
Research Service.  With the QDR and the 30-year shipbuilding plan both published along 
with the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget in February, much light has been shed on the 
path ahead for US shipbuilding and naval fleet size.  This thesis study will not attempt to 
make a contribution to the analysis of rising ship costs, proper mix and type of vessels to be 
procured, or consideration of the national funds available for ship construction.  Rather, the 
study will focus on (1) in what ways, and (2) how the shipbuilding industry benefits regional 
economies and the national economic health. 
Methodology 
General Approach 
In a September 2009 study entitled The Economic Case for Investment in the UK 
Defense Industry, researchers and economists at Oxford Economics in London developed a 
detailed framework for analyzing the economic contribution of various industries (Oxford 
Economics, 2009).  This study will use much of the Oxford study’s framework as it analyzes 
the economic returns of the “shipbuilding and repair” sector through at least four lenses: 
Monetary impact – using input/output analysis to analyze the direct and indirect channels of 




Labor market impact – jobs supported by US shipbuilding, and the relative skill levels of 
those jobs; the regional distribution of those jobs throughout the country 
Capital Intensity – “sectors that invest the most in capital and labor present the largest 
potential for losses if they fail” (Oxford Economics, 2009). 
Capacity measures & a rapid return? – “in order for an increase in Government procurement 
to have an immediate impact on the economy a sector must have sufficient spare capacity 
to absorb the additional demand” (Oxford Economics, 2009). 
In order to best understand the methodology used by Oxford Economics, meetings 
were held at the London Office in December of 2009, with the two economists who were 
mainly responsible for the study’s content—Mr. Andrew Tessler and Mr. Pete Collings.  
Additionally, interviews were conducted with US acquisition professors, shipbuilding industry 
leaders, and several distinguished economists both within and outside of the US 
Department of Defense. 
“Free Market” Concerns 
In several months of research and interviews with various economists, some have 
expressed fundamental ideological concerns regarding the use of government spending as 
a means of stimulating the economy.  The idea that government spending creates a 
multiplier effect for economy benefit was based on the economic theory of John Maynard 
Keynes, and published by Richard Kahn in 1931 (Kahn, 1931).  Much academic debate and 
theory continues to permeate today’s economics.  In today’s environment, a prominent 
professor of economics at Harvard University, Mr Robert Barro, has conducted research 
demonstrating that there is “no evidence of a Keynesian multiplier effect” for stimulus 
spending, and has published his view that “defense-spending multipliers exceeding one 
likely apply only at very high unemployment rates, and nondefense multipliers are probably 
smaller” (Redlick, 2009).  Still other prominent economists disagree about the beneficial 
effects of Keynesian spending.  The Journal of Post Keynesian Economics exists where 
scholars can publish their research and works based on the theories of Keynesian 
multipliers and Keynes’ ideas of stimulus. 
One distinguished economist with Stanford University’s Hoover Institute and others 
with the Naval Postgraduate School have suggested that the United States Government 
could acquire ships more efficiently (at a lower cost) by allowing them to be produced 
overseas, where there may be a comparative advantage for ship construction.  Although 
perhaps economically sound, national decision-makers widely agree that US national 
security requires maintaining the ability to build warships on American soil. Once agreed 
that the capability to produce US warships on American soil is vital to US national security 
interests, the benefits, or economic returns of doing so ought to be well known. In the 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, findings published in 2005/2006 reveal that “a rise in 
defense spending had a favorable impact on GDP and employment, but led to larger trade 
and budget deficits” (Atesoglu, 2005-6).  Although there is much political and economic 
debate on the merits of government spending and investment, this research will build upon 
the work of credible, established Nobel laureate economists5, and closely follow the 
methodology employed by researchers at Oxford Economics. 
                                                
5 Wassily Leontief received “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 




Monetary Impact—Multipliers: Direct, Indirect, Induced 
Input/Output Analysis 
Input-output economic analysis is a Nobel Prize-winning analytical framework 
developed by Professor Wassily Leontief in the late 1930s (Miller & Blair, 1985).  All 
economic activity within a country is divided into sectors or industries.  In the United States, 
those sectors are identified using the North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) codes.6  Inter-industry transactions are then measured for a specific time period 
(one year) in constant monetary terms (the US dollar).  The results, known as benchmark 
data, are represented in a matrix consisting of outputs listed in rows, and inputs listed in 
columns.  The format allows analysis of how one industry’s outputs are dependent upon 
inputs from all other sectors of the economy.  The United States’ Bureau of Economic 
Analysis last collected such economy-wide benchmark data for the US economy in 2002; a 
revised version was last published in April 2008 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008). 
Once in possession of benchmark economic data for the economy as a whole, a 
series of specific steps may be performed in order to identify a specific sector’s impact on 
the economy.  First, the flow from sector i to sector j is defined as zij.  Next, the variable Xj  is 
chosen as the total gross output of the individual sector j in the given year.  From these 
variables, a technical coefficient, a ij is calculated as: 
 
The resulting coefficient then represents the dollar value of inputs from sector i 
required for every dollar of output from sector j.  The system is designed as to provide 
constant returns to scale.  In other words, a ij is a fixed relationship; when output from sector 
j is doubled, it is assumed that the inputs required from sector i would also be doubled.  
Economies of scale in production are thus ignored; the Leontief system is strictly a linear 
model.  Furthermore, the inter-industry flows from i to j for a given year depend entirely and 
exclusively on the total output of sector j for that specific year (Miller & Blair, 1985). 
Rather than manually performing the matrix algebra required to analyze the impacts 
of a certain sector, a software model developed by researchers at Carnegie Mellon 
University performs a Leontief inverse on the portion of the larger matrix pertinent to the 
sector chosen.  The model, originally created in 1995, is called Economic Input-Output Life 
Cycle Assessment (EIO-LCA), and is “comprised of national economic input-output models 
and publicly available resource use and emissions data” (Carnegie Mellon, 2008).  Only the 
economic results will be used in this study; the environmental impact will not be considered.   
With a credible reputation based on the Nobel Prize winning theory of Wassily 
Leontief and reliable data from the BEA, “the EIO-LCA method has been applied to 
economic models of the United States for several different years, as well as Canada, 
Germany, Spain, and select US states.”  The on-line tool has been accessed over 1 million 
times by researchers, LCA practitioners, business users, students, and others.”  Additionally, 
the input-output analysis method has been “used extensively for planning throughout the 
world” (Carnegie Mellon, 2008).  
                                                
6 NAICS is the “standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the 




Direct & Indirect Multipliers 
By considering various channels of impact, economic multipliers may be calculated 
for three distinct areas of the shipbuilding industry’s overall economic impact:  direct effects, 
indirect effects, and induced effects.  Direct impacts are employment and activity in the 
sector itself—US shipbuilding.  Indirect impacts are defined as “employment and activity 
supported down the supply chain, as a result of a sector’s companies purchasing goods and 
services from” suppliers (Oxford Economics, 2009).  For example, when a shipyard is 
building a new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), it may order a fire-control system to be installed 
that was designed in California.  That same system may have been built with components 
from Washington State.  The purchase of various equipment and supplies from vendors, as 
well as jobs and sales at those vendors’ offices may be quantified as indirect impacts for 
investment in the shipbuilding industry.  Finally, induced impacts are also of economic 
importance to the study of ship construction.  Oxford Economics defines induced impacts as 
“employment and activity supported by the consumer spending of those employed in the 
sector or in its supply chain.”  For instance, the manufacturer of a component ordered by the 
shipyard for construction of a new vessel has additional revenue from the sale of that 
component; he spends this revenue in his local economy buying everyday goods and 
services, which increases benefits to local economic growth.  This induced analysis 
considers a wide variety of industries and activities throughout the United States, and relies 
on creation of an economic multiplier for its quantification.   
Other Sectors to be Compared 
The “shipbuilding and repairing” sector will henceforth be referred to simply as the 
“shipbuilding” industry.  Per NAICS labeling, shipbuilding is a sub-sector of the (336xxx) 
group labeled “vehicles and other transportation equipment.”    Comparisons of Leontief 
model output will be analyzed and contrasted with five other sectors of the US economy: 
 Automobile manufacturing (336111) 
 Aircraft manufacturing (336411) 
 Military Armored Vehicles and tank parts manufacturing (336992) 
 Nonresidential manufacturing structures (230102) 
 Health care:  offices of physicians, dentists, health care practitioners (621A00). 
These five sectors were chosen to include three other subcategories of 
manufacturing transportation vehicles, a more general manufacturing alternative, and also a 
service-based industry for comparison. 
Estimation of Induced Multipliers 
In addition to the direct and indirect economic effects to be calculated using the 
Carnegie Mellon model, induced effects should also be considered and quantified.  The 
induced impacts of activity within a sector are “employment and activity supported by the 
consumer spending of those employed in the sector or in its supply chain.  This helps to 
support jobs in [US] industries that supply these purchases and includes jobs in retail 
outlets, companies producing consumer goods and in a range of service industries” (Oxford 
Economics, 2009).  Since the induced effects are the most difficult to quantify, data from 
previous studies of US and UK shipbuilding industries will be reviewed.  Based on the 
recommendation of economist Andrew Tesller at Oxford Economics, the induced multiplier 
for US shipbuilding will be estimated as a fraction of the indirect multiplier.  Based on the 




consumption multiplier, this research will lead to an inference about a reasonable range of 
an induced multiplier for US shipbuilding. 
Estimations of Employment Supported 
 Based on the work of Garnick and Drake in the 1970s, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) has published a handbook for users of its Regional Input-Output Multipliers 
System (LECG, LLC, 2002)7.  The process of using the BEA’s system to derive regional 
multipliers is summarized concisely in the 2002 LECG report for the American Shipbuilders 
Council: 
The RIMS II method for estimating regional Input-Output multipliers can be viewed 
as a three-step process.  In the first step, the producer portion of the national Input-
Output table is made region-specific by using four-digit SIC location quotients (LQ's). 
The LQ's estimate the extent to which input requirements are supplied by firms within 
the region. RIMS II uses LQ's based on two types of data: BEA's personal income 
data (by place of residence) are used to calculate LQ's in the service industries; and 
BEA's wage-and-salary data (by place of work) are used to calculate LQ's in the 
nonservice industries. 
In the second step, the household row and the household column from the national 
Input-Output table are made region-specific. The household row coefficients, which 
are derived from the value-added row of the national Input-Output table, are adjusted 
to reflect regional earnings leakages resulting from individuals working in the region 
but residing outside the region. The household column coefficients, which are based 
on the personal consumption expenditure column of the national Input-Output table, 
are adjusted to account for regional consumption leakages stemming from personal 
taxes and savings. 
In the last step, the Leontief inversion approach is used to estimate multipliers. This 
inversion approach produces output, earnings, and employment multipliers, which 
can be used to trace the impacts of changes in final demand on directly and 
indirectly affected industries. 
Rather than manually performing the matrix algebra and Leontief inversion, the 
results of the Carnegie-Mellon Economic Input-Output Life Cycle Assessment model will 
once again be utilized.  The process allows for a distinct number of jobs to be calculated for 
each dollar amount of increased output from a sector. 
Labor Market Impact 
Highly Skilled Jobs 
Many of the workers involved in ship construction, and modernization have been 
training for years to earn the specific qualifications necessary to perform those tasks.  To be 
a nuclear plant welder in the United States, for example, “one must be cleared by the FBI, 
undergo drug and alcohol testing, and pass a psychological screening. These criteria are 
above and beyond welding certification, diving certification, and special training required of 
all nuclear plant personnel (Hancock, 2003).”    The nuclear welders and construction 
personnel who build our aircraft carriers and submarines are not an immediately renewable 
                                                





resource.  In other words, if they are eliminated from the workforce due to drastic drops in 
demand for their services at the “big six” shipyards, then there are at least two formidable 
and unfavorable results.  First, if the US military suddenly has an increased demand for 
specialized labor in nuclear or conventional ship construction (war), then we will not have 
that capacity available to be utilized.  We may have to actually outsource those jobs to other 
country, which is particularly dangerous and difficult in matters of national security and 
weapons systems construction.  Secondly, the atrophy of the workers’ skills in industry 
combined with the graying of the workforce may actually lead to a regression of the 
“knowledge economy” of this sector of the US defense and shipbuilding industries, leading 
to a larger-scale contraction (National Defense Research Institute (RAND), 2006).  The 
principle of a knowledge economy is, in brevity, explanation of the use of knowledge itself as 
a product or tool producing an economy benefit (Drucker, 1992).  For instance, the training, 
experience, and skill-level of an individual welder or shipyard worker has some inherent 
economic value, which can be quantified in calculating the sum of the industry or activity’s 
economic worth. 
Capital Intensity and Excess Capacity—“What If?”  
In researching the unique aspects of the US shipbuilding industry as it compares to 
other defense activities, Dr. Nayantara Hensel, a former professor at The Naval 
Postgraduate School and currently Chief Economist in the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Financial Management & Comptroller Office) highlighted the high capital intensity and sunk 
investments of infrastructure existing within the shipbuilding sector.  The facilities and 
infrastructure themselves become “economic waste” if the existing capacity is not utilized by 
providing an appropriate demand signal (Hensel, 2009).  The same principle is summarized 
nicely in the Oxford Economics report on investment in the UK defense industry:  “sectors 
that invest the most in capital and labour present the largest potential for losses, if they fail.”  
In summary, unlike shopping malls and retail centers, shipyards (as they are highly both 
capital and labor intensive) are unable to be readily converted to some other economic 
activity, if they fail.  Rather, they become “waste.”  There is, therefore, an inherent 
opportunity cost of failing to utilize the existing capacity—the current market values of the 
facilities and technology themselves.  Acceptance of this principle that irrevocable waste 
results from failure to utilize sectors with high capital intensity, combined with the clear 
evidence of the shipbuilding industry’s investment in capital plants and equipment, supports 
the claim that basic funding levels to sustain the industry’s existence at current levels is 
economically viable and preferable (Booth, Colomb & Williams, 2008).   
Using public data from the released “10k” financial statements, capital intensity will 




This ratio provides “a measure of a firm's efficiency in deployment of its assets, 
computed as a ratio of the total value of assets to sales revenue generated over a given 
period. Capital intensity indicates how much money is invested to produce one dollar of 
sales revenue.”   Moreover, “a decline in a capital intensive industry may mean a permanent 
loss of productive capacity” (Oxford Economics, 2009). 
Capacity Measures and a Rapid Return? 
 “In order for an increase in Government procurement to have an immediate impact 
on the economy a sector must have sufficient spare capacity to absorb the additional 
demand” (Oxford Economics, 2009).  Published data from the US Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and corporate “10k” financial statements will be 
collected and analyzed in order to determine if the US shipbuilding industry could absorb an 
increase in demand and provide a timely return for investment. 
Results 
Input/Ouput Multiplier Analysis 
Carnegie Mellon University’s Economic Input-Output Life Cycle Assessment (EIO-
LCA) model was used to perform a Leontief inverse solution based on 2002 US Benchmark 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), with the following results obtained 
(Carnegie Mellon, 2008).  First, it should be noted that the latest United States Benchmark 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is 2002 data that was last updated in 2008.  The 
model’s software calculates a coefficients matrix based on the input-output data for the US 
economy.  By isolating a single sector of the economy, and choosing a given level of output 
or production from that sector, direct and indirect economic activity estimates are generated.  
The “shipbuilding and repair” sector (NAICS code 336611) was selected for analysis, with a 
presumed increased production from that sector of $100 million.  In other words, an injection 
of $100 million was entered into the model.  One possible source of an additional ship 
production demand of $100 million would be government orders for US Navy vessels.  
However, this particular model makes no distinction between military and civilian contracts, 
nor between Navy and commercial shipbuilding.  If the market were to demand an additional 
$100 million in commercial ship construction, the economic activity estimates would be the 
same.  Since the Leontief function is a linear model, output results will vary proportionally 
with those generated below.  Indeed, Leontief models are always linear (Leontief, 1966).  
For instance, entering a $1 billion increased demand output in to the model will yield results 
that are ten times higher than those below, while inputting $50 million will yield results that 




Table 1. Total and Direct Economic Effects of $100 Million Output from “ShipBuilding 
and Repairing” Sector 
NAICS 






($ mil)   
 Total for all sectors 209. 157. 
336611 Shipbuilding and repairing 99.9 99.9 
420000 Wholesale trade 6.7 3.6 
550000 Management of companies and enterprises 6.5 3.4 
333618 Other engine equipment manufacturing 5.6 4.9 
331110 Iron and steel mills 3.3 1.7 
533000 Lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets 3.1 2.4 
541610 Management consulting services 2.5 1.8 
52A000 Monetary authorities and depository credit intermediation 2.4 1.2 
523000 Securities, commodity contracts, investments 2.18 1.33 
531000 Real estate 2.15 0.407 
Direct Economic Effects 
In the first row of the above Table 1, labeled “total for all sectors,” direct economic 
effects of $157 million represent the dollar amounts of purchases made by the “shipbuilding 
and repairing” sector in order to manufacture its final product (a ship).  This $157 million 
includes the input value of $100 million increased economic activity for the shipbuilding and 
repairing sector, which is shown (minus rounding error of 0.1) in the second row of the table.  
So, the sector purchases $57 million worth of products (goods and services) from other 
sectors in order to make $100 million worth of output.   
The shipbuilding and repair sector ranks third of the six sectors considered, when 
ranked by direct economic effects, as shown in table IV-2 below: 
Table 2. Direct Economic Impact of an Additional $100 Million Output from Sector 
Sector # Sector Description 
Direct Economic 
Impact 
336111 automobile manufacturing $174 
336411 aircraft manufacturing $165 
336992 
mil. Armored vehicles & tank parts 
manufacturing $160 






offices of physicians, dentists, health 





The difference between the $100 million output from shipbuilding and the $57 million 
of inputs it requires is the value added by the “shipbuilding and repairing sector” itself.  The 
value added represents “compensation of employees, taxes on production and imports less 
subsidies, and gross operating surplus.  Value added equals the difference between an 
industry’s gross output ($100 million) minus the cost of its intermediate goods that are 
purchased (such as energy & raw materials)” (Carnegie Mellon, 2008).  For instance, once 
the raw materials and services are purchased from other sectors, the value of the skilled 
labor and contribution from the shipyards themselves totals $43 million.  Stated differently, 
the $43 million in value added is one (direct) component of an increase in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) as a result of the additional $100 million of output. 
Table 3 and Figure 2 below show the value added (contribution to GDP) by sector of 
the US economy considered, for a $100 million increased output from that sector.  The 
shipbuilding sector ranks fourth of the six sectors considered, when ranked by economic 
value added. 
Table 3.  









336111 automobile manufacturing $100 $74  $26 
336411 aircraft manufacturing $100 $65  $35 
336992 
mil. Armored vehicles & tank parts 
manufacturing $100 60 $40 
336611 shipbuilding and repairing $100 $57  $43 
230102 
nonresidential manufacturing 
structures $100 $41  $59 
621A00 
offices of physicians, dentists, 





Figure 2. Economic “Value Added” or GDP Contribution, for $100 Million Increased 
Demand from Sector 
In these analyses, shipbuilding and repair “stands out” as a sector which is a very 
nearly split between the two main factors of production needed to generate additional 
output—materials and labor (purchases and value added).  Whereas automobile and aircraft 
manufacturing are ranked number one and number two respectively in terms of direct 
economic effects, this ranking reflects a high degree of automation in their manufacturing 
processes.  Most of the generated direct activity is due to purchases of materials these 
industries must make in order to manufacture their finished goods. 
When the results are analyzed in terms of value added by the industry itself, the 
ranking of the six sectors considered is nearly inverted.  In other words, “offices of 
physicians, dentists, and health care practitioners” which is first when ranked by value 
added, was last in total direct effects.  Shipbuilding remains in the middle of the group when 
ranked by value added, since, as a sector, it requires about 57% of materials ($53 
million/$100 million), and 43% labor as components of the additional $100 million output.  
One may conclude that shipbuilding represents a “healthy balance” between these two 
contributing factors of production, providing stimulation of the economy through both 
purchases and wages. 
Total Economic Effects 
For “shipbuilding and repair” a total economic impact of $209 million, as presented in 
the first row of Table 1 above, represents the total purchases by all other sectors of the 
economy resulting from an additional $100 million output from shipbuilding and repairing.  
The $209 million includes the direct purchases made by the shipbuilding and repair sector 
itself, and also the indirect purchases further up the supply chain;  the materials and 




within the $209 million of activity is the $100 million of increased final output from 
shipbuilding.  Figure 3 below shows how the total $209 million is divided. 
 
Figure 3. Graphical Representation of the Total and Direct Economic Effects 






Figure 4. Economic Effects of $100 Million Increased Output 
The shipbuilding sector ranks third of the six sectors considered, when ranked by 
total economic effects, with a multiplier of 2.09 ($209 million/$100 million).   Regional 
economic multipliers for each of the “big six” shipyards may actually be much higher.   
Induced Economic Effects 
Since $209 million of total economic activity occurs for every $100 million increased 
output from shipbuilding, the output multiplier, when considering only the impacts within the 
sector (direct) and the supply chain (indirect) is 2.09.  Economists refer to this as a “type I 
multiplier” (Tessler, 2009).  For every $1 of increased output from shipbuilding, about $2.09 
of direct and indirect activity occurs. 
What this analysis leaves out is the induced effects from the $209 million of activity 
throughout the economy.  The induced impacts are “employment and activity supported by 
the consumer spending of those employed in the sector or in its supply chain.  This helps to 
support jobs in [US] industries that supply these purchases and includes jobs in retail 
outlets, companies producing consumer goods and in a range of service industries” (Oxford 
Economics, 2009).  The induced multiplier is the most difficult to calculate or estimate, and 
the least credible for any industry or sector.  Multipliers which include induced effects, 
economists call “type II multipliers” (Tessler, 2009).   
Since the Carnegie-Mellon software does not include induced effects in generating 




inversion process.  However, the constant that relates the “Type I and Type II multipliers in 
an input-output model [has been] proven to be exactly the consumption multiplier for the 
household sector” (Katz, 1980).  The basic consumption multiplier is based on the Marginal 
Propensity to Consume (MPC) and the tax rate (t), and may be calculated as: 
 
An average tax rate of 35% was used, including federal income tax, social security, 
medicare, and possible state taxes.  Assuming a national average marginal propensity to 
save (savings rate) of 7%, then MPC =  1 – MPS = 93%.  The result shows: 
 
The result of using this consumption multiplier estimate to produce type II multipliers 
is included in Table 4 below. 











result -- type 
II multiplier 
336111 automobile manufacturing 2.71 1 2.5 4.28 
336411 aircraft manufacturing 2.33 1 2.5 3.33 
336992 
mil. Armored vehicles & tank parts 
manufacturing 2.2 1 2.5 3.00 
336611 shipbuilding and repairing 2.09 1 2.5 2.73 
230102 
nonresidential manufacturing 
structures 1.8 1 2.5 2.00 
621A00 
offices of physicians, dentists, health 
care practitioners 1.6 1 2.5 1.50 
In reality, differences exist in consumption multipliers between various sectors, but a 
realistic range is between 2.0 and 3.0, based on tax rates varying by region and MPC 
varying by profession or trade. 
Labor 
Using the Carnegie Mellon EIO-LCA Model 
Using the Carnegie Mellon EIO-LCA model, the numbers below represent the 
complete number of employees needed across the supply chain of purchases in order to 
produce the level of output of $100 million.  The US economy-wide benchmark data used for 
this section is the 1997 benchmark data, since the 2002 model did not include the labor 
output functionality.  Here the shipbuilding and repair sector ranks 1st of the six considered, 
with 1670 additional employees needed throughout the supply chain in order to increase 
shipbuilding output by $100 million.  Again, the model used is a linear model, so an 
increased output of $1 billion would support 16,700 employees.  The next most labor-
intensive sector of the six considered is “military armored vehicles manufacturing,” which 
would utilize 1530 additional employees.  Of the six specific sectors considered here for 




“shipbuilding and repair” will create or support the highest number of jobs.  The 
results are shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5. Number of Direct and Indirect Employees in Order to Produce $100 Million 
Output from Sector 
Of the 1,670 jobs created or supported by the shipbuilding and repair sector in order 
to create an additional $100 million of output, the EIO-LCA model suggests that 918 of those 
jobs would be within the shipbuilding sector itself, while the remaining 752 would be 
throughout the supply chain (part of the indirect benefit). 
Several assumptions and limitations are associated with the use of the EIO-LCA 
model to estimate increased employment based on a larger output demand.  First, the data 
is old (1997 benchmark8).  However, the industries selected are mature industries.  Use of 
the model for information technology or telecommunications estimates would be much less 
reliable, as these sectors have experienced more widespread growth than shipbuilding, 
auto/aircraft manufacturing, or health care services.  Secondly, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis compiles benchmark data through surveys and forms submitted by US corporations 
to the federal government.  Uncertainty in sampling, response rate, and errors in form 
completion are just a few of the potential sources of discrepancy between the data input and 
reality. 
                                                
8 The Carnegie Mellon model does not support labor analysis for the 2002 benchmark data.  The next 




In addition, the EIO-LCA is a producer price model—“the price a producer receives 
for goods and services (plus taxes, minus subsidies), or the cost of buying all the materials, 
running facilities, paying workers, etc.”  The alternative pricing method, “purchaser price,” 
would  includes the producer price plus the transportation costs of shipping product to the 
point of sale, and the wholesale and retail trade margins (the profit these industries take for 
marketing and selling the product).  For many goods, the producer prices can be far less 
than what a final consumer would pay (e.g., the producer price for leather goods in US is 
approximately 35% of the final purchaser price)” (Carnegie Mellon, 2008).  
NAVSEA 05C Labor Data Trends 
The “05C” office of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) provided data for the 
employment of workers at private shipyards throughout the United States, over the last 
several decades.  The data are presented in Figure 6, which shows a declining trend in the 
labor force levels at shipyards.  As of the beginning of 2009, the nation’s “big 6” shipyards 
directly employed a total of over 56,000 workers.  Twenty years ago, in January of 1990, the 
same yards employed over 80,000 people.  In 2000, shipyard labor force levels were even 
lower than today, reaching about 67% of the 1990 levels.  Today, 70% of the number of 
employees in 1990 are employed throughout the six private shipyards. 
 
Figure 6. Number of Employees at US Shipyards, 1985-2009 




Figure 7 was produced by NAVSEA 05C’s Portfolio Assessment Team, and shows 
the contribution to state GDP per shipyard worker, compared to the average worker in the 
state.  The results show that in Maine, where Bath Iron Works employees over 5400 
workers, on average they contribute more than nine times the income of an average Maine 
worker.9 




































Figure 7. Total Contribution to State GDP 
The results of the NAVSEA team’s study suggest that shipyard workers contribute 
between 6 to 9 times more, on average per employee, than the average state worker. 
Capital Intensity 
Excess Capacity 
The sections on Capital Intensity and Excess Capacity are still under development, 
and will be published upon completion of thesis research in May 2010.  Thesis will be 
available online at http://www.nps.edu/Library/.
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Abstract 
This paper explores vendor selection decisions where competing vendors offer similar products with 
multiple non-price attributes.  Traditional “multi-attribute auctions” such as the USAF Air Tanker 
competition include prices alongside other attributes in vendor proposals.  Buyers generally select 
winning bidders using a weighted average of price and non-price attributes.  A different approach is 
recommended here: to embed vendor prices directly in the buyer’s budget constraint.  A first step is to 
conduct a simple multi-attribute auction with a fixed budget.  The government buyer only evaluates 
vendor proposals that satisfy the budget constraint, choosing the proposal (non-price attribute bundle) 
which offers the greatest “value for money” (i.e., budget).  The next step is to address budget 




results, including that the traditional practice, and classroom technique, of eliminating dominated 
alternatives can lead to sub-optimal decisions.  Improving public procurement decisions requires 
forecasting a range of future budgets, and soliciting information from vendors that allows procurement 
alternatives to be defined as functions of the value offered by each vendor over a range of budgets, 
rather than as a single point in budget-value (cost-effectiveness) space.  Under more realistic budget 
scenarios, different vendor selection decisions will occur that benefit both troops and taxpayers.  
Background and Introduction 
This paper offers a model to guide public procurement decisions in severely 
constrained budget environments.  The global financial crisis swiftly evolved into a debt 
crisis that increasingly constrains government spending.  The US is not immune.  The 
federal debt, at roughly 80% of GDP and rising, is set to seriously constrain discretionary 
federal spending.  Today, mandatory expenditures on Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, 
Interest on the Debt, etc., make up over 60% of the federal budget, and continue to grow.  
By far the largest component of the corresponding, and shrinking, discretionary budget 
(more than half) is spent on national defense.  The challenge then, is to develop an 
approach to accommodate the future budget uncertainties that will increasingly face federal 
agencies, and in particular, the US Department of Defense (DoD).  
This paper explores vendor selection decisions where competing vendors offer 
similar products (computers, logistics packages, weapon systems, etc.) that incorporate 
multiple non-price attributes.  In most multi-attribute auctions, vendor prices are included 
alongside other attributes as part of the vendor’s proposal.  Along with political 
considerations, a weighted average of price and non-price attributes is generally used by 
governments to help select the winning bidder.  The approach recommended here is 
different.  In the spirit of “Cost as an Independent Variable” (CAIV), the proposal is to 
incorporate vendor prices in the buyer’s budget constraint.  
A first step is to conduct a simple multi-attribute auction with a fixed budget (point 
estimate) for the program (product or service).  In this case, the government buyer chooses 
from a set of vendors that each submit their best offers—non-price attribute bundles that fall 
within the specified budget.  The next step is to address the political realities of budget 
uncertainty.  This requires an expansion of the model that incorporates a range of possible 
budgets (e.g., optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely).  This leads to several interesting 
results.  Perhaps the most surprising is that the traditional practice, and classroom 
technique, of eliminating dominated alternatives can easily lead to sub-optimal decisions.  
Finally, the model is generalized to capture budget uncertainty through the 
specification of a probability distribution (density function) over the range of possible 
budgets.  The dual fundamental insights of this paper are that public procurement decisions 
can be improved if: i) interval estimates (ranges) of future budgets (and corresponding 
probability distributions) are forecasted, and ii) information from vendors is solicited that 
allows procurement alternatives to be defined as a function of value (non-price attributes) 
over a range of possible budgets, rather than as a single point in budget-value (cost-
effectiveness) space.  
Over the next five years, the US Department of Defense (DoD) plans to spend more 
than $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs).  According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2009), the 
DoD’s goal is to “achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are affordable” [emphasis 




proposed that extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition takes place 
exclusively over specific bundles of desired non-price attributes or characteristics. 
In this model, prices/costs do not appear in the buyer’s value function.  Instead, in 
the spirit of "cost as an independent variable" (CAIV), prices/costs are incorporated in the 
buyer’s affordability constraint.  Larsen (2007) provides the following explanation of CAIV: 
All acquisition programs/issues consist of three fundamental elements: cost, 
performance and schedule.  Under CAIV, performance and schedule are considered 
a function of cost.  Cost and affordability should be a driving force not an output after 
potential solutions are established. 
Michael and Becker (1973) and others also discuss the importance of separating prices from 
multi-attribute measures of value.  This is especially important for agencies that face budget 
uncertainty.  
For example, given the growing pressure on defense budgets from expanding 
federal deficits, the military’s “bow wave” of planned procurement contracts and operating 
cost commitments is not affordable, and has recently threatened several MDAPs. [e.g., the 
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) and the Air Force Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program]  
An important lesson is that different optimal vendor selections likely would have taken place 
under more realistic budget scenarios, and that this would have benefited both troops and 
taxpayers.  
This paper explores vendor “performance competition” under alternative budget 
scenarios. Given a target budget for the program (e.g., computers, vehicles, weapons, 
logistics packages, etc.), competing vendors generate multi-attribute (performance) offers 
based on their individual costs, technology, productivity, production processes, supply 
chains, etc.  Each vendor (seller/bidder) is provided the same budget authority guidance 
from the procurement agency’s projected funding forecast (a point estimate).  Vendors 
respond by offering their best possible non-price attribute bundles.  
In the model, a vendor's proposal (offer) depends on the buyer's budget, and the 
individual vendor's costs of supplying each attribute along with the production technology 
they have available to combine those attributes.  Competition between vendors takes place 
exclusively over product performance (collections of non-price attributes) for a given budget.  
The government buyer’s value function facilitates the evaluation vendor proposals (bundles 
of non-price attributes) and the selection of a winner.10 
                                                
10 Consider a simple example. Suppose a dozen impact resistant notebook computers are required 
for a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) heading to Afghanistan. The team believes the most likely 
budget available for these computers will be $20,000, and it reveals this to the competing vendors. 
For this particular budget, each vendor offers a different combination of components, attributes and 
quality characteristics based on its technology, its capital and labor productivity, and the fixed and 
variable costs embedded in its supply chains. Given the different sets of a dozen computers offered 
by the each vendor, the team then selects the vendor that offers the best value (mix of attributes) for 
their budget, or the one that maximizes their private value function. With the funding uncertainty 
inherent in defense programs, this paper suggests that vendors be asked to provide offers for more 
than one budget level (say an optimistic budget of $25,000 and a pessimistic budget of only $15,000). 
In general, the recommendation is that each competing vendor’s proposal be re-defined as a function 
of the bundle of multiple (non-price) attributes they can offer over the range of possible budget levels 




A straightforward extension is to allow the buyer to offer a range of possible budgets. 
However, this involves a more complex solicitation, inviting proposals from different vendors 
for each possible budget.  The significant benefit is that it provides a more robust view of a 
vendor’s ability to provide performance.  The “expansion path” generated for each vendor 
shows how that vendor’s proposal changes as the budget increases or decreases.  
     This approach can be thought of as a strategic choice of auction mechanism for a 
buyer when possible overall budget authorities for the program can only be 
estimated/forecasted, and the products/services are highly differentiated and complex.  It 
combines the competitive advantages of auctions with the flexibility of a decision based on 
multiple attributes of the product.   
In our formulation, both seller and buyer suffer from imperfect and asymmetric 
information.  The seller does not know the relative weights the buyer assigns to the 
attributes. Meanwhile, the buyer does not know the sellers' costs of producing a particular 
attribute, nor the technology (production functions) that combines those attributes into the 
desired products. Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) explain this asymmetry in the case of a 
seller’s private information:  "[S]eller costs can be expected to depend on [the] local 
manufacturing base and sellers can be expected to be well informed about the cost of 
(upstream) raw materials."   
Loerch, Koury, and Maxwell (1999) discuss a "Value Added Analysis" approach that 
is similar to ours in employing multi-attribute preferences in weapon systems acquisition 
decisions.  Our approach differs from theirs in that we incorporate the vendors' decision-
making explicitly into the model, and capture the issue of asymmetric information.   
Blondal (2005) discusses a two-stage11 bidding process similar to ours, in which the 
procuring agency issues a general request, and then later issues a more detailed request 
based on the responses received.  The US Federal Acquisition Regulations (2005) provide 
guidance in subpart 14.5 on another two-step process for government agencies: 
Step one consists of the request for, submission, evaluation, and (if necessary) 
discussion of a technical proposal.  No pricing is involved.  Step two involves the 
submission of sealed price bids by those who submitted acceptable technical 
proposals in step one.  Invitations for bids shall be issued only to those offerors 
submitting acceptable technical proposals in step one.  An objective is to permit the 
development of a sufficiently descriptive and not unduly restrictive statement of the 
Government's requirements especially useful for complex items. 
The approach proposed in this paper is similar, but differs from this two-step bidding process 
in that the competition is over non-price attributes, and the price is captured in the budget 
authority (or affordability) constraint. 
 
Much of the multi-attribute auction literature (Che, 1993; Beil & Wein, 2003; and 
Parkes & Kalagnanam, 2005; etc.) either implicitly or explicitly includes price alongside non-
                                                
11Blondal defines a "stage" differently than we do in this paper.  We use the term to refer to a decision or set of 
decisions that depends only on exogenously given parameters and previous decisions.  For example, Blondal 
considers a government agency's solicitation and the vendor offers in response to be a single stage, whereas we 




price attributes in the buyer's (auctioneer's) value/utility function.12  While this approach is 
appropriate in some contexts, it can generate complications in evaluating alternative 
defense investments.  Unlike private sector decision makers that maximize profits 
(Revenues minus Costs), the government cannot simply subtract prices (or costs) from non-
price attributes and generate an equivalent “profitability” metric to evaluate alternative 
investment options.  
Interestingly, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a firm to maximize profits 
is for it to maximize the value of its output for the costs it incurs (or in the dual: to minimize 
the costs of producing its output).  Interpreting the firm’s costs as its budget, this 
corresponds to maximizing output for a given budget, and is analogous to our proposal for a 
government activity to maximize its value function (of non-price attributes) for a given 
affordability (budget) constraint.  In fact, the proposal is to promote an approach where 
government decision makers maximize their value function (over a set of non-price 
attributes) for a range of budgets they think they might be allocated, but that might not be 
revealed with certainty within the window of that decision process. 
However, historically (and even today) budgets for specific defense products and 
services were generated by the low cost (or best value) vendor among those responding 
with price quotes, for the requirements set by the military branches to support warfighters.  
Given current fiscal deficit projections that promise increasingly tighter budget constraints, it 
is not likely this approach will survive much longer.  Traditional “bottom-up” budgets 
historically generated by the military services in cooperation with vendors to purchase force 
requirements, are likely be subjected to greater top-down budget guidance.13  
Two widely cited pioneers in defense economics, Hitch and McKean (1967), 
advocate an approach similar to that proposed in this paper: To determine the “maximum 
effectiveness for a given budget” and to examine how each alternative fares for several 
different budget levels. 
The Model 
The model consists of three stages, illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                                
12Note that in defense procurement, value functions generate "measures of effectiveness" 
(MOEs). The term “MOE” is used in a few different ways.  It may describe a single-attribute value 
function, or a multi-attribute value function which might incorporate the whole objectives hierarchy, or 
only a portion of it.  For a detailed discussion of MOEs, see Sproles (2000). 
13 Some evidence of tighter fiscal guidance appears in the new emphasis on fiscally informed 
“Planning” that involves more up-front military investment trade-offs, and correspondingly stricter 
fiscal guidance to the Military Services, in DoD’s over-arching “Planning, Programming, Budgeting 





Figure 1. The Three-stage Procurement Model 
In the first Stage, the procurement agency (buyer) solicits offers from vendors 
(sellers), specifying a set of attributes A and a budget level B.  There are n vendors, each of 
whom responds in the second stage with a bid.  In this case, a “bid” is simply a set of non-
price attribute levels a vendor offers to produce for the budget, B.  We express vendor i's bid 
as [ ]1, ,i i imA a a= K  for 1, ,i n= K , where ija  is the level of attribute j offered by vendor i. In 
the third stage, the buyer's decision is to select a vendor, [1, ]i n∈ , and thus a set of attribute 
levels [ ]1, ,i i imA a a= K , that maximizes the “measure of effectiveness” (MOE), which we 
express as the value function ( )iV A . We assume ( )iV A  is an additive multi-attribute value 
function, though as we will observe later, our conclusions do not require ( )iV A  to be 
additive.  The use of additive multi-attribute value functions requires that preferential 
independence be satisfied (Dyer & Sarin, 1979; Kirkwood & Sarin, 1980)14.  We assume for 
simplicity that the single-attribute value functions are linear, and that attributes are 
                                                
14 See Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Kirkwood (1997) for further discussion of additive multiattribute value 





measured on the same scale15.  Thus, we will refer simply to ija  rather than using the 








V A w a
=
= ∑ ,                                  (1) 
 
where jw  is the weight the buyer places on attribute j.  We assume the buyer has an 
understanding of the range of attribute levels when determining the weights, and that these 
weights are private information to the buyer.  Asker and Cantillon (2007) refer to this as a 
“secret scoring rule.”  The final stage of the model is the application of (1) to the set of bids, 
and the selection of the vendor yielding the highest value. 
Given A and B, each vendor chooses an attribute bundle which meets the budget 
constraint revealed by the buyer.  A vendor has private information regarding production 
capabilities and costs, but must somehow form beliefs about the likelihood of a bid being 
accepted.  We facilitate formulation of these beliefs by having each vendor generate a "best 
guess" at the weights of the buyer's (additive) value function, which we can express 
as ( )1, ,i i imW w w= K .  We refer to this hypothetical value function as ( )iQ A .  A higher ( )iQ A  
indicates a greater probability with which the vendor believes the bid will be accepted.  Only 
the ordinal rankings imposed by this value function are relevant, since vendors in our model 
will simply choose the attribute bundle (s)he believes has the highest probability of being 
chosen. 








Q A w a
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= ∑ , 1, ,j m= K  





TC c a B
=
= ≤∑ ,                                   (2) 
 
where the total cost iTC  is an additive function of the costs of firm i to produce each 
attribute level.  The total costs for a particular vendor of generating its (non-price attribute 
bundle) offer cannot exceed B.   
The individual attribute cost functions are given by ( )ij ijc a , and each one is 
increasing in aij.  Because the objective function of (2) is linear, a unique solution exists, 
provided that ( )ij ijc a  is strictly convex for 1, ,j m= K .  This is reasonable, since it simply 
corresponds to decreasing returns to scale from investment in improving an attribute level. 
For purposes of illustration and ease of exposition, the remainder of the study 
focuses on only two vendors, and two (non-price) attributes measured on the same scale.  
Assuming each vendor has a different technology (production process) to combine the two 
                                                
15The structure of the single-attribute value functions is not germane to the purpose of this paper.  The same 
results can be obtained without these assumptions, but we believe that some of the subsequent examples will be 
more illustrative when shown in attribute space rather than value space.  Some clarity might be provided by 




attributes and faces different attribute cost functions, the Lagrangian function for the 
vendor’s problem is given by: 







∂ > 0 for both attributes, we can assume each vendor will use the 
maximum available budget B to produce the attribute bundle proposal.  The first order 
necessary conditions for an optimum are given by: 
 ( )




i i i ia w c aλ ′∂∂ = + =                              (4a) 
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i i i ia w c aλ ′∂∂ = + =                             (4b) 
( ) ( )1 1 2 2 0iiL i i i iB c a c aλ∂∂ = − − = ,                        (4c) 
 
where 4(c) simply asserts that the entire budget is being used.  Solving (4a) and (4b) yields: 
( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 2 2
i i
i i i i
w w
c a c a
′ ′= ,                                  (5) 
 
meaning each vendor should choose a bid that uses the entire budget, and for which the 
two attributes have equal ratios between the (subjective) belief of the weight placed on the 
attribute by the buyer, and the vendor’s private marginal costs16.  The solicitation for bids 
results in two vendor offers ( )11 12,a a  and ( )21 22,a a  for the buyer to evaluate. The buyer 
simply selects the vendor whose bid maximizes V.   
In general, ijw  and ijc , are likely to differ between vendors.  Multi-attribute auctions 
allow vendors to differentiate themselves in the auction process and to bid on their 
competitive advantages (Wise and Morrison 2000). 
Multiple Budgets and Expansion Paths 
With the preliminary model in place, the next step is for the buyer to more fully 
explore differences between vendors.  Rather than the buyer specifying a budget B, the 
buyer now specifies a set of (increasing) possible budgets: 1, , kB BK .  Each vendor will go 
through the process described in section 2, k times, and produce a bid satisfying (5) for 
each of the k possible budgets.  This set of bids from a vendor constitutes an “expansion 
path.”  It reveals to the buyer precisely how a vendor’s bid will improve as the budget 
increases. 
For purposes of illustration, it is helpful to consider a particular functional form: 
                                                
16Note that (5) has a unique solution for each vendor when the entire budget is being used.  Since both cost 
functions are increasing and strictly convex, as we move along the budget constraint curve, one marginal cost is 




( ) ij ijaij ij ijc a eβα= , , 0ij ijα β >  for 1, 2i = , 1, 2j = .                    (6) 
 
Note that the functions described by (6) are strictly increasing and convex.  The exponent ijβ  
defines the convexity of each cost function.  Although the insights and conclusions that 
follow do not depend on this particular functional form, it simplifies the analysis to use these 
cost functions throughout the remainder of the paper.  
There are three reasons the expansion paths observed by the buyer might differ 
between vendors: i) the parameters of their cost functions could differ ( ,ij ijα β ), ii) their 
beliefs about the buyer's value function could differ ( ijw ), or iii) both the cost functions and 
the beliefs could differ. 
First, consider the case in which both vendors believe the buyer places equal weight 
on the two attributes, but the vendors differ in their capabilities of producing those attributes.  
Specifically, suppose: 
11 12 11 12 21 22 21 22 11 212.0, 0.6, 1.0, 1.0, 0.7, 0.7w wα α β β α α β β= = = = = = = = = = .      (7) 
 
Note that (7) reflects symmetry between the two attributes in the sense that neither vendor 
“specializes” in producing a particular attribute.  For simplicity, we use cost functions with 
these properties throughout this section, and also to emphasize that asymmetry between 
attributes is not required to realize the benefits of this expansion path approach.  Applying 





Figure 2. Expansion Paths for Two Vendors with Differing Cost Functions as the 
Budget Increases from 5 to 30 (the Markers of Increasing Size Show Each 
Vendor’s Proposal as the Budget Increases in Increments of 5) 
Alternatively, vendors could face the same cost functions, but express different 
beliefs about the buyer’s attribute weights.  Specifically, suppose the vendors have the 
following parameter values: 
11 12 21 22 11 12 21 22 11 212.0, 0.6, 0.5, 0.7w wα α α α β β β β= = = = = = = = = = .       (8) 
That is, vendor 2 believes the buyer will place a slightly greater weight on attribute 1, while 
vendor 1 believes the weights on attribute 1 and attribute 2 will be equal.  This results in the 
expansion paths shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Expansion Paths for Two Vendors with Differing Beliefs on Attribute Weights as 
the Budget Increases from 5 to 30 (the Markers of Increasing Size Show Each 
Vendor’s Proposal as the Budget Increases in Increments of 5) 
While (7) and (8) are interesting special cases, it is also possible the two vendors will 
differ in both their costs and their beliefs.  Consider two vendors with parameter values: 
11 12 11 12 21 22 21 22 11 212.0, 0.6, 1.0, 1.0, 0.5, 0.7w wα α β β α α β β= = = = = = = = = = .       (9) 





Figure 4. Expansion Paths for Two Vendors with Differing Costs and Beliefs on 
Attribute Weights (the Markers of Increasing Size Show Each Vendor’s 
Proposal as the Budget Increases in Increments of 5) 
For a high budget (e.g., 20), vendor 1 dominates vendor 2.  Regardless of the 
buyer's preferences (provided value is monotonically increasing in each attribute), (s)he will 
select vendor 1.  In a static comparison that assumes a fixed budget of 20, vendor 2 would 
be eliminated from further consideration.  However, if the buyer must proceed knowing that 
a budget cut is possible, a dominated alternative may in fact become the preferred one.  The 
reverse phenomenon can also occur.  Notice in Figure 4 that vendor 2 dominates vendor 1 
at a budget level of 5.  A static comparison assuming a fixed budget of 5 would eliminate 
vendor 1 from further consideration. 
To more clearly illustrate this phenomenon, we first assign attribute weights to the 
buyer's value function.  Let the buyer assign a weight of 0.7 to attribute 1, and 0.3 to 
attribute 2.  Instead of operating as before in attribute space, we now plot the two vendors' 





Figure 5. Value Provided by Each Vendor's Bid for Various Budget Levels 
It is clear from Figure 5 that vendor 2 dominates the competition for any positive 
budget below the switch-point, B<B’, while vendor 1 dominates for any budget above the 
switch-point, B>B’.  This suggests rethinking the typical definition of dominance in the 
literature, a concept routinely used in classroom illustrations and real-world applications to 
eliminate vendors that refers to points (not functions) in cost-effectiveness space.   
In fact, viewing alternative vendors as functions in budget-value space reveals that 
the traditional definition of dominance can be misleading.  For example, consider offers from 
vendor 1 and vendor 2 based on a very optimistic budget above B’.  The traditional 
technique that focuses on points and not functions would likely eliminate vendor 2.  Yet it is 
clear from Figure 5 that eliminating vendor 2 prematurely could lead to a less desirable 
outcome if the budget turned out to be wildly optimistic and the real budget was actually 
somewhere in the range of 0<B<B’. 
     This phenomenon can occur whenever any two vendors’ expansion paths are 
shaped differently, and there is nothing unique about the particular functions chosen in our 
example; they were only selected for ease of exposition.  Moreover, the same result can 
easily occur in the case of non-additive forms of the buyer’s value function, and any non-
linear interactions between attributes is likely to further magnify the effect17.  Our conclusion 
is that this is a basic result that can arise in a wide variety of defense acquisition decision 
environments. Addressing this issue explicitly with this simple new approach could greatly 
benefit both our troops and taxpayers. Given the growing US federal deficit, future budget 
                                                
17For example, consider a multiplicative value function for the buyer, and suppose that one vendor has to incur a 
large cost to provide anything above the minimum level for one particular attribute.  This vendor will offer bids 
of little to no value for low budgets, but depending on cost functions and beliefs, may offer very attractive bids 




challenges may make it imperative for our government, and in particular the Department of 
Defense, to adopt an approach similar to the one proposed in this study. 
Conclusion 
We have described a simple three-stage multi-attribute procurement process for 
defense acquisitions.  It allows the buyer to incorporate preferences over multiple attributes, 
and it allows each vendor to offer their best possible bid based on the budget provided, and 
the vendor's private cost structure and beliefs.  Unlike most current methods, our model 
applies the spirit of CAIV; we do not include costs or any related price attributes in the 
buyer's value function.  Instead, cost enters the model as part of a budget constraint. 
The basic model is easily extended to allow vendors to submit bids for multiple 
potential budget levels.  This leads to the generation of expansion paths for each vendor, 
which illustrates to the buyer precisely how a particular vendor's bid will improve under more 
optimistic budgets or slip under progressive budget cuts.   
Interestingly, it can easily turn out that a vendor whose bid is "dominated" at an 
optimistic budget level is actually the most desirable choice at a more realistic (pessimistic) 
budget level.  As a consequence it is vital for procurement agencies to reset their vendor 
evaluations, and to begin viewing each alternative (vendor) as a curve in budget-value 
space, rather than as a single cost-effectiveness point.  Given future budget realities, this 
expanded view will prevent a vendor from being prematurely eliminated from consideration 
when budgets are likely to change over time. 
The dual fundamental insights of this study are that public procurement decisions 
can be improved if: i) interval estimates (ranges) of future budgets (and corresponding 
probability distributions) are forecasted, and ii) information from vendors is solicited that 
allows procurement alternatives to be defined as a function of value (non-price attributes) 
over a range of possible budgets, rather than as a single point in budget-value (cost-
effectiveness) space. The key implication is that different vendor selection decisions are 
likely to occur under more realistic budget scenarios, and that this can benefit both troops 
and taxpayers.  
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Abstract 
This paper discusses the applicability of prediction markets in Defense Acquisition 
projects, specifically in estimating their cost and schedule.  
Several temporal and political factors can sometimes limit the effectiveness of 
traditional methods of project tracking and cost estimation, which may be overcome by using 
prediction markets. A prediction market provides an environment for traders to buy and sell 
contracts whose values are tied to uncertain future events. Efficient prediction markets have 
been shown to outperform available polls and other forecasting mechanisms.   
There are various prediction markets based on different models and algorithms. Our 
focus is not to analyze these models, but to identify the design principles of implementing a 
proven prediction market model in a defense acquisition project. Some pilot studies have 
been carried out that provide insight into the behavior of the market participants. We found 
increased involvement of participants and greater interest in the projects to be major 
benefits. The areas that need to be considered in the design and implementation of markets 
are related to the participants (like, which traders to include); the information to be collected, 
or the stocks; the marketplace to be used; and the incentive structure to keep the 
participants motivated to trade. 
Introduction 
Historically, defense programs for weapons acquisition have taken longer, cost more 
and delivered fewer quantities and capabilities than planned (GAO, 2006). 
Some of the reasons for such discrepancies include: 
 Lack of discipline in estimation. Sometimes all the required factors or 
experienced people are not consulted during the estimation process. There is 
also a lack of transparency and accountability (GAO, 2006). 
 Unrealistic expectations. The estimates can sometimes be too optimistic (GAO, 
2008). 
 Initial estimates tend to “anchor” expectations (Aranda & Easterbrook, 2005). 
Initial figures of estimates set too high expectations from the start, which is 
difficult to meet later on. Also, it is later on difficult to incorporate any 
modifications. 
A recent study by RAND involved an analysis of data in the Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs) for a sample of 68 completed programs. The results showed that the 




was 46% over the baseline estimate made at Milestone B and 16% over the baseline 
estimate at Milestone C. While cost growth occurred earlier in acquisition projects, the 
development cost growth at completion for programs initiated in 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
remained relatively steady (Arena, Leonard, Murray & Younossi, 2007). 
It is also worthwhile to note that of the 23 programs assessed in the GAO report 
(GAO, 2006), around 10 are expecting development cost overruns greater than 30%, or 
have delayed the delivery of initial operational capability by at least 1 year. The impact of 
such conditions is the reduction in the value of the DoD’s defense dollars and lower return 
on investment (ROI) (GAO, 2006). See Table 4 in the Appendix for more details. 
The key recommendation for the executive action from the report is to ensure that 
appropriate knowledge is captured and used at critical junctures, specifically at the following 
key points: 
 Program start, 
 Design review for transitioning from system integration to system demonstration, 
and 
 Production commitment. 
An effective way to capture knowledge and utilize collective intelligence of all team 
members is to use prediction markets or information aggregation markets. Such markets 
can be used as a supplement to existing estimation methodologies in generating more 
accurate cost and schedule estimates. 
Prediction Markets: History and Purpose 
Prediction markets are emerging as a promising forecasting mechanism for 
efficiently handling the dynamic aggregation of dispersed information among various agents 
(Tziralis & Tatsiopoulos, 2007). Various terms such as “information markets,” “decision 
markets,” “electronic markets,” and “virtual markets” can be used to describe this. In 
essence, prediction markets are speculative markets created for the purpose of predicting 
the outcome of an uncertain future event. They provide an environment for traders to buy 
and sell contracts whose values are tied to uncertain future events. 
In the late 80s, some academics at the University of Iowa’s business school came up 
with idea of giving students hands-on experience in trading markets, such as stock and 
commodities. Instead of using play money, they created a real market in which anyone 
could bet modest sums on the outcome of future events—e.g., the next president of the 
United States. The Iowa Electronics Markets (IEM) is now a thriving nonprofit enterprise 
(Tetlock, 2006). 





Figure 1. A Sample Prediction Market 
(Intrade.com, 2010) 
The theoretical foundations of prediction markets lie in the efficient market 
hypothesis, which states that a sufficient number of marginal traders with rational 
expectations, who maximize utility through maximizing profits, drive prices in the market in 
such a way that there is no opportunity for arbitrage (Shvarts & Green, 2007). 
It is believed that if the market is well functioning, then contract prices reflect the 
collective wisdom of market participants. There are three primary types of prediction markets 
(Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004): 
 Winner Takes All Market: In this, the contract pays a specified amount if and only 
if the world achieves some specific conditions, with the price of the contract 
reflecting the market’s assessment of the probability of that occurrence. 
 Index Market: In this, the contract pays an amount reflected in some condition of 
the world, such as the percentage of the vote a candidate receives or the inches 
of cumulative snowfall in a city. 
 Spread Market: In this, contracts specify the cutoff that determines whether an 
event occurs (such as win margins in football).  These basic contract types can 
be extended to generate additional predictions and measures of market 





Table 1 illustrates some examples for each: 
Table 1. Types of Prediction Markets 
(adapted from Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) 
 
Prediction markets are most notably used today for predicting election outcomes, 
movie box office returns, terrorist attacks and sporting events (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). 
Information markets have also been deployed at Hewlett-Packard Corporation for making 
sales forecasts and were found to be more effective than traditional methods. “Not only did 
the market predictions consistently beat the official HP forecasts; the outcomes predicted 
are consistent with the probabilistic predictions of the IAM (Information Aggregation Market)” 
(Plott & Chen, 2002).  
Google also launched an internal prediction market in April 2005. The Google 
markets are similar to Iowa Electronic Markets, and have survey questions like “How many 
users will Gmail have?” Common type of markets included those forecasting demand 
(Masse, 2008). “Google’s prediction markets are reasonably efficient, but did exhibit four 
specific biases: an overpricing of favorites, short aversion, optimism, and an under-pricing of 
extreme outcomes. New employees and inexperienced traders appear to suffer more from 
these biases, and as market participants gained experience over the course of our sample 
period, the biases become less pronounced” (Masse, 2008). 
Some of the factors that are involved in prediction markets are: 
 Illiquidity: Prediction requires enough buyers and sellers making enough 
transactions to produce a clear market price that summarizes the market 
prediction.  In “thin” markets where buyer, sellers and their trades are few, the 
prediction market can sometimes be ineffective. Some research suggests 
prediction markets can be effective with as few as sixteen active traders 
(Christiansen, 2007). 
 Rationality: While prediction markets have been strikingly accurate when they 
meet the criteria for effective markets, scholars have noted some deviations from 
“perfect” rationality.  First, while traders’ preferences may bias their trades, such 
as when partisans buy political futures contracts for their favored candidate 
(Forsythe, Rietz & Ross, 1999), the prediction market price of contracts will 
remain accurate so long as the enough marginal traders remain objective (e.g., 
their profit motives outweigh their preferences).   Prediction markets do not 




by rational traders (Gruca & Berg, 2007; Tziralis & Tatsiopoulos, 2007). Second, 
as in horse racing, prediction markets participants exhibit over price long shots 
(so that contract holders receives a smaller payoff relative to the true probability 
of the event occurring) and under price high probability events, though Cowgill, 
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2009) suggest that precisely the opposite biases occurred 
when Google employees traded in internal company prediction markets 
forecasting Google’s future.  Moreover, prediction markets may be less effective 
at accurately predicting extremely likely or unlikely events (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 
2004). 
 Manipulation and Bubbles: A sufficiently endowed and motivated trader might 
attempt to manipulate a prediction market by purchasing contracts in desired 
directions.  A candidate for elected office, for example, might purchase contracts 
on himself to generate apparent momentum and publicity.  Speculative bubbles 
are possible in prediction markets, a non-trivial concern in light of recent 
macroeconomic events.  Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) propose that a speculative 
bubble occurred in political prediction markets on whether Hillary Clinton would 
win the 2004 Democratic presidential primary, and bubbles may have occurred in 
experimental prediction markets reported in Plott and Sunder (1988).  To some 
extent, markets may self correct manipulation and bubbles (Strumpf, 2004).  The 
best defense against manipulation is sufficient liquidity so that profit seeking 
traders, recognizing that the manipulated market prices are inaccurate trade for 
contracts to bring predictions back into line.   
Prediction Markets for Defense Acquisition Projects 
The DoD’s ability to meet its acquisition targets is becoming increasingly critical as 
defense budgets are reduced and expectations to deliver on time and on budget remain 
high. Costs overruns are one aspect of this issue. Please refer to Table 5 in the Appendix 
for a sample of cost overruns in large federal projects. 
A recent GAO report (Edwards, 2009) concluded that “weapon programs are taking 
longer, costing more and delivering fewer capabilities than originally planned.” It also noted 
that “systematic problems both at the strategic and at the program level” (GAO, 2008) were 
to blame. The GAO also noted that military branches “overpromise capabilities and 
underestimate costs to capture the funding needed to start and sustain development 
programs” (GAO, 2008). 
In 2008, the GAO reviewed cost and schedule of 72 weapons programs and found 
that the average cost overrun for systems development was 40% (GAO, 2008) and 
concluded that “DOD’s acquisition outcomes appear increasingly suboptimal” (GAO, 2008). 
A study by Deloitte consulting also agrees that defense cost overruns are getting worse 
(Irwin, 2009). 
Table 2 gives a brief comparison between existing cost estimation techniques and 
the prediction markets. The goal here is to compare the probable shortcomings of the former 




Table 2. Value Propositions of Prediction Markets 
Probable limitations of existing cost 
methods 
Possible value propositions of prediction 
markets 
• Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) 
based on technical factors rather than 
programmatic “soft” factors. 
• Shift of focus from estimating by 
individuals to groups. 
 
• Not dynamically updated as a program 
evolves, making the original estimate 
outdated as soon as the climate 
changes. 
• Provide way to leverage information from 
diverse sources. 
 
• Manifestation of a few decision-makers, 
under tremendous time pressure, 
working with limited and perhaps biased 
information. 
• Mitigate biases stemming from pressure 
to “price to win” or hide damaging 
information. 
 
 • Enable frequent sampling of information. 
 • Incentivize traders to seek out quality 
information that will help them do better. 
Prediction markets are a judgmental forecasting method (Graefe, 2009) in which the 
price mechanism of the market automatically aggregates all the dispersed information 
among participants. Various aspects of the prediction markets are also discussed in further 
sections. 
Design Principles of Prediction Markets  
As with any markets, prediction markets may fail—and produce inaccurate 
forecasts—if not properly designed and executed. They should follow specific mechanisms, 
contracts and contexts to ensure participants are adequately incentivized to participate. 
Some other factors to be incorporated are (Suda, 2009): 
 Should require unbiased tacit knowledge of crowd, 
  Should be designed in well-incentivized environments, 
  Should be designed for a non-hierarchical environment, 
  Generally not suitable for idea generation process, 
  Should have well-defined end dates or closing criteria, and 
  Choices should be mutually exclusive and have a definitive  outcome.  
Pilot Studies on Prediction Markets 
In order to study the prediction markets, we conducted some simulations on a group 
of students at MIT to study the effectiveness of prediction markets, and some interesting 
observations were noted. Details of the study are given below. 
Pilot Study 1: Predicting Ratings for Sunday Night Football 
A group of 17 participants (N=17) were asked to participate in a private marketplace 
for predicting the Nielsen Rating (NBC – USA) for Sunday Night Football (Oct 25). Please 
refer to Figures 8, 9, and 10 in the Appendix for the screenshots of the market. The following 




 Time duration for trading was 5 days, with the market set to close 30 minutes 
prior to game start. 
 Each participant was allotted an initial amount of $5,000 for trading (play money). 
  Winning Criteria was generating maximum worth.  
  Incentive—Points for class participation grade and a popular book for winner. 
  Minimum of four trades per person (tied to the incentive of class grade), with no 
maximum limit on trading. 
  11 rating ranges were presented as choices or contracts for participants to trade 
on, with each rating range being assigned equal probability (9.09% each) to start 
with (See Figure 2). 
 Participants could “buy” or “sell” shares of the choice or contract they found most 
likely to occur. Every time a user bought a share for a particular idea, the price 
went up. Similarly, each time users sold a share, the price went down. The user’s 
account was also credited or debited based on his/her choice. 
 There was a direct correlation between price and probability—share price of 
$9.09 indicated 9.09% chance of that particular rating range. 
 The buy and sell transactions were managed by an automatic market maker. 
Results 
Around 236 trades were conducted in total by 17 participants.  
The highest rating range predicted was of (9.6-10) with a 19% likelihood prediction, 
followed by range (9.1-9.5) with a 17.3% chance (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2. The Stocks in the Prediction Market 
(Inklingmarkets.com) 





Figure 3. Results at the Close of Prediction Market 
A probability distribution function (Pdf) for the result is shown in Figure 4, which 
demonstrates how close the predicted result was to the actual result.  
 
 
Figure 4. Pdf of the Prediction Market Results 
Although market predicted range was close, there can be two reasons why the 
market forecast was not absolutely accurate: 
 On the day of the game, a World Series game ran into overtime—overlapping 
with the football game and impacting the expected ratings for the Sunday night 
football. It turns out that there were no baseball fans in the participating traders, 
and hence this information was not captured. 
 In a study on markets on NFL football games from tradesports.com, there was an 




sporting markets. This was due to a behavioral bias known as disposition effect, 
which is the tendency of investors to sell stocks that have risen in value and hold 
on to stocks that have fallen in value, with the objective of earning maximum 
profit. Thus there might be mispricing in such scenarios and the hypothesis that 
the prices in prediction markets reveal unbiased estimates of true probabilities of 
the event happening might not be true.  
Pilot Study 2: Predicting Ratings for Monday Night Football 
Based on the previous pilot study feedback, the structure of the next market was 
modified. The participants (N=13) were asked to predict the Nielsen Rating (Cable TV - US) 
for Monday Night Football on ESPN.  Instead of providing range choices to participants for 
bidding, they were asked to bid on an indexed market. Rules were similar to the last market, 
except for the following changes: 
 Instead of ranges, participants now saw only one rating. They had to predict if the 
rating as per their opinion was to be higher or lower. Based on their responses, 
the price or rating was adjusted automatically. 
 The initial rating set was 10. 
 The price and rating scale was 1:1, i.e., a price of $10.00 meant the current 
projected value of rating was 10.00 (see Figure 5). 
Results 
Around 116 trades were conducted by 13 participants. The final rating predicted by 
the market was 10.00 (see Figure 6). 
 






Figure 6. Graph Showing Change in Value of the Stock upon Trading 
There was a huge variation in the ratings predicted, with the highest value being 33.1 
and the lowest value being 0.6. 
The actual rating turned out to be 7.7, which was different from the market value. 
The major reason for this was that market place was too volatile. A single participant could 
buy a large number of shares and alter the rating to a great extent, which is not a good 
design principle for prediction market. 
Observations 
Behavioral Observations of Participants 
The participants comprised a mix of people with football knowledge and others with 
no knowledge at all. The actual result of the rating was quite close to the rating range that 
the test market predicted. But the main benefit was observed in the behavior of the 
participants. An unbiased, incentivized market piqued their interest and motivated them to 
remain involved throughout the market duration. Some other observations were: 
 Increased participation due to internal competition, 
 Attempts at market gaming, 
 Trying to make use of First mover advantages, 
 Forming alliances to manipulate the market, 
 High incentive to participate led participants to gain more knowledge on the 
subject, and 
 Use of statistical models by some participants to forecast ratings. 
Other Useful Insights from Pilot Studies for Implementing Prediction 
Markets 
 Ensure enough liquidity. Research done on prediction markets (Christiansen, 
2007) suggests at least 16 participants for an effective market. Based on the two 
pilot studies, the number of participants was lesser in the second study, 




 Avoid volatility by choosing the right scale for trading in market. The market 
needs to be less volatile, so that it is not easily influenced by a single trader. 
 Ease of use. The prediction market should be easy to use, as many participants 
were initially reluctant to trade due to perceived complexity. 
 Ensure regular information update. In both the studies, there were not enough 
“happenings” regarding the game ratings, during the trading duration to sustain 
participants’ interest. The market is expected to fare even better is some new 
knowledge is available throughout the trading duration. 
 Leads to increased awareness and interest. A significant contribution of 
prediction markets in the field of cost or schedule estimation is to keep the 
participants involved and make the process exciting. Traders with no knowledge 
of football got involved by researching more on the subject. 
 Align incentives with the participants’ interests. Some people just executed the 
minimum required four trades and stopped. Although there was high trading, 
some people did not care to do all the research. One reason for this was due to 
incentives not aligning directly with the objectives of these participants. 
Designing Prediction Markets for Defense Acquisition Projects 
There are various components of a market that need to be considered prior to 
designing and implementing a prediction market for a project. A prediction market is 
composed of the following: 
 Stocks: These are the outcomes or possibilities of the market that are 
collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive. These act as stocks and 
securities for the traders to trade against, with a “buy” indicating a belief of 
occurrence of that particular outcome and a “sell” indicating a belief of non-
occurrence. 
 Marketplace: This refers to the software environment that contains the market or 
the questions for trading. It also encompasses the market manager that 
facilitates trades among the traders and manages the information distribution 
process.  
 Traders: These are the participants or team members in a project that will be 
trading information in the form of stocks in the market. 
 




There needs to be a continuous flow of information for the traders to base their 
decisions on and trade throughout the market duration. 
Incentive structure is another important factor that should be considered during 
market design, as it acts as the motivating factor for the traders. 
The success of the project hinges on identifying an acquisition program willing to 
participate. The ideal characteristics of the program are: 
 uncertain cost and schedule components that can be specified clearly in a 
contract, 
 a sufficiently large program community to ensure a liquid market, 
 ample “soft” relative to “hard” information and information is broadly and 
unevenly held by diverse actors, 
 one-of-a-kind program or a program with limited relevant historical information, 
and 
 susceptible to performance impacts as a result of external events (i.e., political 
landscape, policy changes, personnel attrition, technology maturity, design 
modifications). 
Based on initial pre-screening, we identified “Shallow Water Combat Submersible” 
(SWCS) as a suitable project, with a plan to implement the prediction market for duration of 
3-6 months. 
Below is some of the discussion on the design components for the prediction market. 
1. Stocks: The stocks or the outcomes traded in the prediction market form the 
most important component of the market. The stocks traded will give us an 
indication of the beliefs of the participants, and the number of stocks traded 
will show us the level of confidence in their beliefs.  
Hence, the questions that are asked in the market are very important. 
There are mainly two categories of questions that can be asked. 
 Type I questions: Asking these questions can directly provide the required 
information. Q1 ÆA 
 Type II questions: Asking these questions can indirectly provide the required 
information, and a series of questions might be required for getting the 
information directly. Q2 Æ Q’ Æ Q’’ Æ A 
This is similar to another perspective, as per which the state of the world can be 
divided on basis of two dimensions (Healy, Ledyard, Linardi & Lowery, 2009). Some 
questions can based on an unobservable factor whose value can impact realization in 
second dimension, e.g., the underlying monetary policy of a central bank .While some 
questions can be based on a directly observable factor, e.g., interest rate each quarter. 
The latter type of questions correspond to Type I questions, while the former 
compare to Type II questions. 
Handling Type II Questions 
The distinction of questions based on these categories is important because these 
allow us to focus more carefully on the “stocks” or outcomes of Type II questions, so that the 




 The suitable approach with the Type II questions is to ask multiple questions in 
the first round of prediction market, and, subsequently, drill down to specific 
questions in further rounds. 
 If we consider a single question as a single market, then one of the approaches 
can be to run multiple markets at a given time, and then to add follow-up 
questions based on the responses. New markets (i.e., questions) can be run 
every week, and old questions can be updated weekly based on new information. 
The important factor with this approach is to decide which questions need to be 
deployed first. 
Designing Questions for the Market 
There is a lot of information that can prove useful in case of a defense acquisition 
project. This information can be either related to any factors impacting the cost or schedule 
of the project, or can be related to the current or future decision processes within the project. 
Based on the type of information required, we have further categorized the market 
questions. 
 Questions of the First Order: These are the questions that give us the information 
about the program of interest. Some examples of questions for the pilot project 
are: 
o Will SWCS be certified by August 1, 2010? 
o The cost of the first unit will be $x. 
o The final cost of the program will exceed the baseline estimate by x%. 
 Questions of the Second Order: These are the questions that give us the 
information about traders and the trading process. For the pilot project, some of 
the questions are: 
o What is your motivation for trading (e.g., to win/to solve the problem/to 
validate my knowledge)? 
o What is your role in the Organization? 
o What are useful sources of information about the project? 
 Questions of the Third Order: These questions give us information of the 
behavior outside of the prediction markets. Some of the questions are: 
o How have you used the prediction market in your job?  If you notice a change 
in a contract price, how have you used that information?  
o Did trading improve your confidence in your opinion? 
The First Order questions will be asked in the prediction market for trading. The 
Second Order and Third Order questions are more of profiling questions, which can help 
decide how to improve the markets, or how the participants are gaining from the market 
information. These questions can be sent to the participants as a survey and can be tied to 
incentives so as to encourage them to participate. Incentive can be additional bonus money 




The above factors helped to shortlist some of the questions to be used in the 
prediction market for the pilot defense project (SWCS). A risk mapping, showing the risk 
covered by a specific question of the First Order, along with the modified version of the 
question, is shown below. Note that the first four questions are of Type I, while the last 
question is of Type II. 
Table 3. Risk Mapping for First Order Questions 
 
Another important aspect is to mix some fun questions (like, who will win the Monday 
night game, etc.) along with serious questions to keep the participants involved. 
 Marketplace: There are two important aspects of design for the marketplace—
the software environment in which the participants perform trades and the market 
manager who facilitates the trading process. 
Considerations for the Software Environment 
The following are the design considerations for the software environment, based on 
observed behaviors in pilot simulations and requirements for a defense environment: 
 The software environment will be easy to access and use. 
 The software environment will be commercially available, with prior success in 
defense related environment. 
 The environment will satisfy the IT security considerations—like secure login, 
user access rights, data security, etc. 
 The software environment will have dashboard and administrative capabilities to 
analyze the data and generate reports based on the user behavior. 
 It will be possible to share new information with the traders and/or close or open 




Considerations for the Market Manager 
The matching mechanism in prediction markets has most often been a continuous 
double auction in which computer software matches buyers offering bids with sellers and 
their asking prices. Prediction markets have been successful using real-world money, purely 
“play money,” with no economic value (beyond the satisfaction of “winning), and “prize 
money” that can be exchanged for prizes and entries in prize drawings. We will establish 
prediction markets with play and prize money and will establish contracts for the cost and 
duration of particular features of the acquisition program. This is more realistic than focusing 
on the entire program completion, given the limited time we have to run the market. Fully 
specified, clear and enforceable contracts in prediction markets require the future state of 
the world (or events) on which the contracts can be easily adjudicated. 
Market Scoring Rule, invented by Professor Robin Hanson at George Mason 
University, will be used in the prediction market. This will ensure that fewer traders can be 
present in the market, and lot of concepts related to stock markets that are difficult to 
understand (like bid-ask spreads, etc.) can be avoided (Siegel, 2010). The price of the stock 
represents whatever the last trader was willing to pay for shares and is set automatically 
according to the volume and sentiment in the question. For example, if someone buys 10 
shares of an answer, the price of the share will be increased automatically according to an 
algorithm. 
To ensure sufficient liquidity, we will use a prediction market with automated market 
maker, which means that the buying and selling of stocks will happen between traders and 
the market and not between the traders themselves. 
 
 Traders: While prediction markets require some disagreement among potential 
traders over forecast, (else no trades would occur) excessive information 
heterogeneity can be harmful to the markets functioning. If some traders posses 
significant private information (and hence become insiders), the outsiders may 
refuse to participate, ultimately killing the market. Prediction markets are most 
likely to be successful if traders hold sufficiently balanced information about the 
event but have differing beliefs about the meaning of common information. It is 
also critical that when new information becomes available, it will be widely 
known.  
We will recruit market participants from those employed in the Acquisition program or 
those surrounding the Acquisition program (i.e., subcontractors, end users, consultants). 
The traders in the defense project comprise of the different team members across different 
cross-functional areas. There will be many people in a project who will have limited 
information as to what is going on with a program at large, and they might be biased to their 
individual projects.  Hence, it will be ensured that participants from all smaller projects, as 
well as people from other departments are included in the trading process. The acquisition 
project will have sufficiently broad following to attract participants from inside and outside 
the government. These can include administrative personnel, sub-contractors, engineers, 
end users, consultants, etc. The markets will be implemented for duration of 3 to 6 months, 
giving ample trading time to the participants. 
Sometimes, due to fear of hierarchy or work environment pressures, people do not 
reveal uncomfortable information related to the project. In the prediction market, anonymity 





 Incentives: The incentive structure is perhaps the most important component of 
prediction market in the DoD environment. Incentives should be such that they 
are non-biased and encourage participation independent of any hierarchical 
considerations. “As with any business incentive system, a considerable challenge 
exists in choosing incentives that motivate the right behavior. . . With information 
markets, incentives must serve a dual role: to motivate participation and to 
motivate participants to provide truth-revealing opinions. Incentives that satisfy 
both criteria can be difficult to define” (LaComb, Barnett & Pan, 2007).  
Performance-based incentives in the project can be provided in various ways. For 
example, participants can be rewarded based on the portfolio value at the closure of the 
market. Awards can also be given to the most active traders, or the traders contributing the 
most valuable information. 
Non-monetary awards can be as effective as monetary awards when used as 
incentives. For example, Google found that in their internal markets, participants cared more 
about non-cash prizes like t-shirts rather than cash prizes (Coles, Lakhani & McAfee, 2007). 
Similarly, by announcing user rankings, the play-money markets in Christiansen’s field 
experiment (2007) were successful, even without monetary incentives. 
Other factors like social competition, recognition and opportunity to contribute 
towards the project can also act as important motivating factors. 
For the pilot defense acquisition project, we feel the following incentives will 
encourage participation: 
 Declaring winners based on the maximum portfolio value at market closure, 
 Maintaining a leadership board displaying the top players, and 
 Including results of the prediction market in regular status reports to track any 
new or less visible information. 
Conclusion 
In his book The Wisdom of Crowds, James Surowiecki (2005) argued that if we take 
a crowd of diverse people and correctly aggregate their judgments, we will be able to get 
more accurate results based on the collective intelligence of the crowd. This wisdom of 
crowds can be seen in action every day (Coles, Lakhani & McAfee, 2007) with the collective 
intelligence also driving Wall Street—the probabilities generated from the market displayed 
through the stock prices. 
The prediction markets can be implemented for defense acquisition projects to 
aggregate the dispersed information across different functional areas. This information can 
help keep track of any cost or schedule variances, and also identify any potential risks that 
can impact the project. We anticipate prediction markets can outperform existing Defense 
Acquisition estimation techniques (i.e., parametric, analogy, activity-based (Boehm, Valerdi, 
Lane & Brown, 2005) in cases where there is ample “soft” relative to “hard” information and 
information is broadly and unevenly held by diverse actors. 
Markets need to be compatible with the political and regulatory contexts in which 
they operate. For example, federal regulations permit play and prize money prediction 
markets but have restricted real money markets. Perhaps the most notorious prediction 
market was the ill-fated DARPA sponsored policy prediction markets (Hanson, 2007), which 
collapsed from a political firestorm over the (quite illogical) proposition that terrorists might 




Based on the various case studies and literature available on prediction markets, our 
observations through simulations of markets, and discussion on various aspects of defense 
acquisition projects, we consider the following design principles: 
 The acquisition project should have a sufficiently broad following to attract 
participants from inside and outside the government. These can include sub-
contractors, end users, consultants, etc. 
 Although play money should be used for participation in the markets, the traders 
can be incentivized based on their constant participation and ability to predict 
accurate results.  
 Ample historical data should be available on similar projects, so that participants 
who are new to the project have some basis of gaining knowledge and 
predicting. 
 The questions for the market should be very carefully designed so that the 
required information can be revealed. “Fun” questions should be mixed with 
“hard” questions so that the participants remain involved. 
 To ensure sufficient liquidity, prediction markets with automated market makers 
should be used, and at least 15-16 participants should be targeted for trading 
(Christiansen, 2007). 
 Results of the prediction markets should be carefully studied and reported as part 
of regular status reports.  
 Anonymity of participants with respect to responses should be maintained to 
encourage information-sharing. 
 The length of the market and closure of each specific question need to be given 
proper consideration while designing the market. The support of senior 
management in Defense projects is essential for starting the prediction market. 
 Markets need to be compatible with the political and regulatory contexts in which 
they operate. 
As part of the ongoing research project, the observations and feedback from 
preliminary and literature research will be used to run the field trial with the DoD 
(Department of Defense) acquisition programs for a fixed duration (up to 6 months). The 
prediction market for the selected pilot acquisition project still needs to be implemented, and 
other design and implementation factors will be added or the current ones revised based on 
new information.  
If prediction markets improve in forecasts in the defense arena, as they do in other 
venues, our aim will be to assist in implementing and then studying additional markets, 
including those over the longer term and a wider variety of programs. It is clear from our 
research that a significant contribution of prediction markets in the field of cost or schedule 
estimation is to keep the participants involved and make the process exciting. Used with 
right implementation guidelines, these markets can prove to be helpful in capturing the 





Table 4. Development Cost Overruns by Decade 
(GAO, 2006) 
  







Figure 8. Screenshot 1 from the Prediction Market Simulations 
(inklingmarkets.com) 
  
Figure 9. Screenshot 2 from the Prediction Market Simulations 
(inklingmarkets.com) 
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Abstract 
Prediction markets are information aggregation mechanisms that have received 
increasing attention in the civilian sector. Prediction markets, sometimes called information 
aggregation markets, idea markets or event futures, are essentially small-scale electronic 
markets that tie payoffs to measurable future events. They are similar to stock markets, 
where the “stocks” are outcomes or events rather than shares in a company. This research 




recommendations on how prediction markets might be used to address acquisition-related 
issues such as program cost, schedule or performance estimates, prospects for successfully 
completing project milestones or meeting performance criteria in system tests, etc. (although 
these securities clearly need to be better defined).  
Research Issue—The maxim that “the devil is in the details” is especially true for 
designing and implementing such markets. In particular, significant research, testing, and 
calibration must be conducted prior to execution to be confident that the forecasts produced 
by any prediction market are (1) actually forecasting the measure intended and (2) providing 
the most accurate forecasts achievable via this methodology. This research will use a 
literature survey and a pilot prediction market test and experimental analysis to address 
prediction market design in an acquisition environment.  
Research Result—Preliminary results regarding prediction market design issues. 
This research will be in-going throughout FY2010, but preliminary results will be available. 
Keywords:  Prediction Markets, Information Aggregation Markets, Idea Markets, 
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Abstract 
This proposal reports the findings of an NPS-funded research effort on the goals, 
objectives, and properties of the AV SOA system. Every academician and graduate student 
knows all too well that scholarly research is often limited by the availability of data. Without 
data, hypotheses remain untested, theories remain unproven, and understanding is 
thwarted. Nowhere is this more true than the DoD acquisition enterprise. Institutional 
incentives and fractured priorities have undermined efforts to gather timely, valid, complete, 
and authoritative data on defense acquisition activities. The resulting isolated, incomplete, 




formed by anecdotal evidence, untested across the broader DoD experience base. 
Management theories developed in the 1960s are assumed to be equally valid in the 21st 
century. Even when objective evidence suggests something may be profoundly wrong, the 
lack of data and corresponding research obscures the path forward. 
To address this crisis, AT&L ARA, first with the Defense Acquisition Management 
Information retrieval (DAMIR) system and, more recently, with the Acquisition Visibility 
Service-Oriented Architecture (AV SOA) and other initiatives, seeks to make authoritative, 
current, and complete acquisition data more visible to the community than ever before. 
This paper describes the suite of data, business intelligence tools, and other 
products now available to the acquisition research community. The authors will outline the 
research objectives and analytical methods that may be developed through the use of these 
resources and provide examples of the striking insights these data can provide when used 
in thoughtful research.  
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Abstract 
This paper argues that proper cost-benefit analysis of service-oriented architecture 
projects is not possible without explicit identification of SOA-specific tasks in the work 
breakdown structure (WBS), so that those costs are explicitly estimated in the budget, are 
explicitly in the integrated master schedule, and appear on earned value and other reports. 
It deconstructs the traditional stories for financially justifying SOA and identifies SOA-specific 
activities that should be added to WBSs to enable tracking of costs and schedules. It also 
identifies specific research questions that can only be answered with data gathered through 
such task-level cost accounting.  
Introduction 
The central point of this paper is quite simple: You cannot do proper return on 
investment (ROI) or earned value analysis (EVA) of a service-oriented architecture (SOA) 
project without a work breakdown structure that explicitly identifies SOA-specific activities in 
a way that facilitates comparing investments and benefits. This often does not happen 
because SOA has additional steps in development and operation that either do not exist or 
are less important in traditional development. This paper deconstructs the traditional 
arguments for SOA to identify these activities and shows how those costs come to be 
commingled with other development and maintenance activities. The paper argues that this 
comingling impairs the ability to diagnose problems and recommend best practices. It 
recommends that acquisition professionals require inclusion of important SOA tasks in the 
work breakdown structure and the integrated master schedule, as well as requiring reporting 
on a range of SOA cost issues.  
Service-Oriented Architecture Review 
SOA is a term with multiple meanings. It refers to both an architectural style and to 
web services technology. The architectural style calls for dividing needed functionality into 
separately built business function-related services. Applications are composed of such 
loosely coupled services, which usually communicate with each other via a web-service 
interface. The underlying idea is that it would be cheaper and faster to build or modify 
applications by composing them out of limited-purpose components that can communicate 
with each other because the components strictly adhere to interface rules. There are three 
standard arguments for why this would result in financial savings and be a positive net 




 Interfaces: SOA replaces m*n point-to-point interfaces with m+n service 
interfaces. In exchange for an upfront investment in defining a common 
vocabulary and common interfaces and a continuing cost in governance and 
ESB maintenance, this would save maintenance costs over time. The savings 
would come from: 
o Having fewer interfaces to maintain 
o Reduced “information archeology” costs when making changes due to 
the tighter configuration management needed to get services to work 
o Reduced certification and accreditation costs due to fewer and better 
documented interfaces and services 
o The hiding of connection details by the enterprise service bus, if one 
were used18.  
 Authoritative databases: SOA stores data once and publishes it as a service 
for all the applications that need it. This reduces costs by: 
o Only storing one version and, 
o Indirectly through separating application code from the data and, 
o Indirectly through better data quality – if you have multiple versions 
either they are all the same or something is wrong. 
 Reuse: Money is saved to the extent that new applications and changes are 
accomplished through reusing existing services. An example would be reusing a 
security service in all applications that required authentication before use. 
Cost Accounting Issues 
As managers, we would naturally be interested in projecting these costs when 
planning and in gathering actual data in production to see how accurate those estimates 
were. There are also a number of more narrow SOA cost-accounting issues we would like to 
drill down to. These include: 
 Governance overhead: A central part of SOA doctrine is the absolute 
requirement of a centralized governance organization that creates local 
standards and enforces both those and other applicable standards to ensure 
interoperability and architectural conformance.  This review layer adds cost and 
time, but what the appropriate share of budget should be is not well understood.  
 Vocabulary synchronization cost: It is also SOA doctrine that legacy systems 
can be made available as services by building an interface layer that maps the 
existing vocabulary to the ontology. It is quite possible than a “market analysis” of 
the demand for potentially-sharable information could lead to savings from not 
sharing information that is in little demand. 
 Timing of ESB and registry installation: Enterprise service busses and service 
registries play a valuable role in masking connection complexity and in making 
developed services findable. However, due to rapid technological evolution of 
                                                
18 Applications that read from flat files need to be changed if the record size or layout changes, 




COTS offerings, there is some question as to the value of introducing their use 
before a critical mass of available services is achieved. 
 Certification & accreditation relationship: The standardization and tighter 
configuration management associated with SOA should drive down C&A costs.  
 Software best practices support services: It is tacitly assumed that web-
services interfaces are both well documented and stable, so that third parties can 
successfully use them by following the instructions. While good documentation 
and configuration is considered a best practice whether doing SOA or not, the 
possible damage is greater in SOA deployments.  
The Work Breakdown Structure Problem 
A work breakdown structure (WBS) is a hierarchical decomposition (tree structure) of 
the work required to accomplish a goal. It should be developed by starting with the end 
objective and successively redividing it into manageable components in terms of size, 
duration, and responsibility. However, it is often done as a modification of an existing WBS 
for a similar project. It is a required part of the DoD acquisition process. 
The WBS is an essential starting input to both estimation and to scheduling. In 
essence, it provides the chart of accounts for a project. To get to a schedule, each task will 
have a duration, labor hours, and predecessor and successor tasks assigned to it. Pricing 
that labor gives a budget, not including materials. Each task in the WBS has hours, labor in 
labor categories and a duration. All earned value reports, all scheduling and all progress 
payments are keyed to the WBS. All work has to belong to and be “billed” to one of the tasks 
defined in the WBS.  It follows that if you want to know what something costs, it needs to 
exist as a task in the WBS.  
In large projects, the WBS is quite complex and can be as much as five or six levels 
deep. Usually, items at the same level of hierarchy are in the order they are executed, 
although this is not required. Traditionally, definition of the WBS is left to vendors with the 
integrated master schedule and price proposal based upon it included as part of the RFP 
response. More often than not, the organization of the WBS in software development follows 
the traditional “waterfall” method of system development. The primary constraint is that the 
WBS fulfills the requirements of the statement of work. In the Defense context, the 
foundation for WBSs is in DoD Directive 5000.1 and in MIL-HBDK-8881A. The latter became 
a military standard on 1/9/2009. The Project Management Body of Knowledge published by 
the Project Management Institute (the basis for the PMP exam) also emphasizes the 
importance of the WBS in project management. 
Since the development of the software WITHIN services is about the same as 
traditional development, we suggest that the distinctive feature of SOA from a WBS 
perspective is the tasks associated with developing the interfaces BETWEEN individual 
services. Unfortunately the practice of using project managers without a background in 
enterprise architecture has led to the development of WBSs that look more like traditional 
“waterfall” development, which leaves implicit the governance and common interoperability 
infrastructure, which is independent of any single service’s development and support team. 
It follows that the most helpful approach is to: 
 Divide the work into interfaces and services: In SOA development there is a 
whole series of activities, such as ontology and interface development, whose 
function is to enable communication between services. These SOA-specific 




 Explicitly account for non-SOA activities that are critical for SOA: While 
such activities as configuration management and technical documentation are 
not SOA activities per se, they are so important to SOA success they should be 
separately trackable as well.  
 See that the operations WBS is consistent with the development WBS: 
Operations is often done by a different contractor and/or a different solicitation. If 
the idea is that, say, investment in web-service interfaces in development pays 
off in reduced cost of maintenance and change later, it would be helpful if the two 
WBSs facilitated that comparison. 
 Define relevant reports: Because the value chains implied by the SOA benefit 
stories are fairly complex, some creativity is needed to define meaningful reports 
that aggregate associated things. For example, the cost of making changes to a 
service pursuant to a change order will involve governance review, coding, 
testing, independent validation, and certification and accreditation. In a mature 
SOA environment, this will involve not only aggregating managerial across 
different services maintenance organizations; it is also likely to involve different 
contractors. Understanding the complete cost impact and aggregating the 
information may be a challenge. 
While there are not hard and fast rules for constructing a WBS in information 
technology development, the most common approach is to have tasks at the same level of 
hierarchy appear in order of start. Thus, in a number of WBSs examined anecdotally for this 
paper, at the top level they started with Enterprise Architecture and ended with Post-
Deployment, with Development having the deepest structure and the largest number of leaf 
nodes.  
Enterprise Architecture and Development are the two top-level activities most 
affected by SOA. To be consistent with the separation suggested above, this paper 
suggests the following new activities:  
 Enterprise architecture: Enterprise architecture (EA) includes a diffuse range of 
engineering planning activities, which are bunched at the beginning of 
development but continue throughout development and into operations. EA is 
responsible for governance—the establishment of standards and subsequent 
review for compliance, which is essential to SOA success. Specific SOA tasks 
that would fall under governance involve: 
o Planning  
– Ontology: the development of controlled vocabularies for data 
interchange. 
– Interface standards: The standards that XML schemas and 
other technical artifacts are to follow. These are needed to 
implement standardized interfaces and their associated 
management and error correction protocols. 
– Configuration management practices: If future development 
and maintenance are to be able to connect to a service based 
solely on the technical documentation, configuration 
management and change management practices need to be 
very well controlled. EA needs to review and publish the 
definition of what a service is supposed to do and the service 




o Development review 
– Governance review: The governance entity will need to 
review the interoperability artifacts and service contracts 
produced by the development team. 
o Run-time review and enforcement: The governance entity needs to 
review the monitoring of service-level agreements and take 
appropriate corrective action in case of violations. Governance should 
be added. Also, configuration management should be increased. 
 Development: By far the largest time and cost in any project is actually doing the 
development. This is typically subdivided into:  
o Requirements and Design: Specification and design the technical 
artifacts to implement planned interfaces. In addition, if a service is to 
be done by wrappering an existing capability, the vocabulary in that 
legacy system needs to be mapped into the ontology standard.  
o Code and Unit test: Implements the SOA-specific activities designed 
above. 
o Integration test: Independent verification and validation.  
Conclusion 
There is an old saying that you cannot manage what you cannot measure. By 
increasing the number of “moving pieces” in IT solutions, SOA increases the number of 
pieces that require measurement. Given the relative immaturity of the SOA paradigm, it is 
particularly important now, when best practices have not yet been established and the 
understanding of cause and effect is limited. Indeed, the inability to collect cost and 
schedule data at the task level may be part of the reason why so many case studies in SOA 
only present project-level estimates of averted cost. 
It is well within existing authority for acquisition to require the WBS to make explicit 
anything that acquisition and the PMO would like to monitor. This will, in turn, assure that 
those SOA tasks appear explicitly in the integrated master schedule and on EVM reports. It 
is also possible for acquisition to standardize the terminology of WBSs across contracts in 
the same program, which could help assure tying investments made in development to their 
hoped-for payoff in operation. We recommend this happen and that acquisition also require 
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Abstract 
Mobility plays a central role in the support of military staff of the German Federal 
Armed Forces. This demand most often is fulfilled by a central organizational unit which 
allocates needed vehicles out of a local car pool of the military facility.  
One essential maxim is to meet the “approved” demand for mobility for any military 
employee of that facility at any time.  
This paper is based upon the experience out of an optimization project that has been 
conducted at a large German military facility with about 3000 employees.  
The optimization effort aimed at two dimensions: 
− Optimization at business process level (qualitative)  
− Optimization at the cost level (quantitative) 
A short introduction is given into the overall process from the application for a vehicle 
to the allocation of the needed vehicle. After analyzing the old process and its inefficiencies, 
a proposal for an improved process design supported by a service oriented software 
approach is given.  
The second part of this paper is focused on potential mathematical optimization 
approaches that can be chosen to reduce cost and make “intelligent” allocations to the given 
demands. 
The demanding goal was a user-friendly decision support system that is able to 




Description of Former Global Car Demand Process 
 
Figure 1. The Former Inefficient Process 
The overall application process for a car starts with an application form (yellow 
document icon in Figure 1) that has to be filled out by the demanding person (a). Each 
department has an authorized person (b) who decides if the need for the car is appropriate 
and if the application can be granted. After having granted the application form, person (b) 
transfers the application form to the cost center (c) to ensure the funding of the car demand. 
If the funding is ensured the form is transferred to the local car pool management 
department (d). Here, the allocation of the car is conducted which includes the creation of a 
driving order (green document icon in Figure 1) and a checklist (red document icon in Figure 
1). 
The local car pool consists of a number of vehicles in short term and long term rent; 
if the request for a car cannot be satisfied out of the local car pool, (e.g., because of the 
unavailability of the same or a higher classed car), the request is escalated to a 
decentralized mobility centre which has access to a larger car fleet. Only if this mobility 
centre is not able to answer this demand either, an external car rental company is contacted 
to provide the desired car.  
The driving order is the official document to certify that a certain typed vehicle has 
been assigned to a certain driver respectively group of drivers. This document is sent to the 
driver and confirms him officially to receive a car from the local car pool. On the day when 
the rental period starts, a person from (d) hands over the car to (a) and completes a 
checklist that contains information about the mileage, fuel tank level, potential damages, and 
additional equipment inside of the car. The driver’s obligation is to document each (sub-) trip 




form (green document icon, Figure 1) and contains information about the driver (important 
when a group of drivers are given), the number of kilometers, and the starting and end time 
of the trip. When the car is returned by the driver, a person from (c) checks the car for 
damages, mileage and fuel level and completes the checklist. The driving order which 
contains information about the trips made as well as the checklist remains with the local car 
pool department. The global process ends when the car is returned and the complete and 
consistent documents were handed in to the local car pool department.  
One essential process step is the allocation of the car. Here, several parameters 
have to be taken into account in order to facilitate a cost-efficient and “intelligent” allocation 
that considers a balanced utilization of the car pool in terms of e.g. rental time and mileage. 
The task of “intelligent” allocation is fulfilled by a person of the car pool department (d) and 
is based on his experience in this field. The only it-based support so far consisted of an 
Excel-sheet that listed all the different types of vehicles with their corresponding 
performance-/statistical data (type, mileage …) and a software tool which generated the 
driving order. When the car is returned, the Excel-sheet is updated with the trip data that has 
been collected by the driver on his driving order. 
A more detailed reflection on the quantitative optimization methods that are needed 
for an intelligent disposition of a car as well as for the optimal mixture of rental types (short-
/long term) is given in the second part of this paper. 
Looking at the global process in Figure 1 in terms of process efficiency and usability, 
it becomes clear that this process is neither efficient nor user-friendly; documents are only 
handled manually, they are sent by internal post mail or they are faxed, (equal) data is 
gathered at several points of the process and very often redundantly, and the quality of data 
is very poor. All these factors lead to a very inefficient, time-consuming, and error-prone 
process. 
Assuming that each postal service step (depicted by the brown envelopes in Figure 
1) needs approximately two working days to reach its destination, the overall processing 
time consumes up to two weeks in order to provide the official driving order to the person 
requesting a car. This implies that urgent and short-term requests have nearly no chance to 
be granted in time so that induced by the given inefficiencies the requesting person might 




Description of Improved Global Car Demand Process 
 
Figure 2. The Improved Process 
In order to improve the process efficiency and the usability, it is indicated to introduce 
a software-based approach with a centralized data management and to define a workflow 
that supports the overall process from the application for the car until the return of it.  
Central objectives should be a user-friendly, non-hardcopy document handling as 
well as a short processing time and an increased data quality in order to establish optimized 
decision making.  
The introduction of a central database (“1” in Figure 2) that can be accessed by all 
organizational units that are involved into the global process, hard-copy documents become 
superfluous and the processing time can be minimized through the elimination of the postal 
document handling. The central data management minimizes redundant data collections 
which can now be stored in a controlled way into the database.   
Another improvement, which leads to an increase of the data quality, is the 
introduction of a mobile device (as e.g., PDA or Smartphone) combined with an integrated 
gps-component and an optional GSM- or WiFi-module (“2” in Figure 2) for data 
transmission. This device supports the car pool service assistant in storing the checklist data 
into the central database. The device can then be handed over to the person that rented the 
car. For the trip-management, a special mobile application is running on the device and 
supports the driver in collecting the needed data. The driver-process that is support by the 
mobile application includes the authorization of the driver, indicating the start of the trip 
(“start-trip” button when starting trip), automatic registration of the number of kilometers 
driven, indication of the end of the trip (“end-trip” button at finish). When the car is returned, 




transmission of the data using the GSM-Module—but as this option might contradict to 
privacy policies it is not taken into further account.  
A Flexible Service Oriented Architecture Approach 
As it can be seen from the description of the old process, the legacy system implied 
many unnecessary steps and no databases or electronic forms were used.  
An improvement can be reached in the development of a software solution given 
above that would use Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) concepts and principles. 
Additionally a SOA based approach would allow easily for further extensions and integration 
of complementary applications.  
Figure 3 gives a more formalized presentation of the improved global process using 
the notion of event driven process chains (Scheer, 1998; Balzert, 2008).  
 




Following the paradigm of matching business services to web services (WS)—
assuming the use of web services as means of service oriented design patterns (see e.g., 
BPEL 2007; Drawehn 2008)—the following major services can be identified: 
− Application Form WS 
− Control Process WS 
− Local Car Pool Allocation WS 
− External Partner Allocation WS 
− Driving Order Generation WS 
− Car Handling WS 
The Application Form WS handles the application form and supports the user in 
requesting a car by collecting all relevant data including consistency checks. etc.  
The Control Process WS works on the application form data stored in the central 
database and supports the controller in handling the request.  
The Local Car Pool Allocation WS is the “intelligent” component that is in charge of a 
cost efficient and balanced allocation of a car to the given request.  
As mentioned above there may be situations in which the request cannot be satisfied 
out of the local car pool; in these cases, the External Partner Allocation WS is activated. 
The Driving Order Generation WS generates the necessary driving order for the 
specific request. 
When the car is picked up at the local car pool centre, the driving order is handed to 
the driver and the Car Handling WS is processed; this service initializes the mobile device 
with the needed data and manages the data handling of the checklist and trip data (at rental 
period start and finish). 
A service oriented software approach enables an agile, efficient and user-friendly 
realization of the described “Car Demand Management Process” and it supports the flexible 
adaption of single services to the demand of the involved organizational units as well as the 
integration of external business partners (Krafzig, 2007).  
Key aspect of the contribution is the connection of the service-oriented framework 
("architecture") with the classical optimization approach. As the problem describe an actual 
challenge within acquisition research an integral solution might support in an holistic and 
comfortable way the policy-making process for Department of Defense officials. 
In the following we characterize the several optimization problems which are central. 
It might be observed that such approaches exist so far in several units but integration is 
missing and required. Furthermore, our contribution proposes an IT-based decision support 
tool which is characterized by an actual state of the art SOA-based framework. 
In the following the different optimization "units" which should be integrated will be 
presented. 
Description of the Problem 
The overall optimization intent is to minimize the cost of the car fleet while several 
constraints have to be fulfilled. One constraint is that each driving job has to be served. As 




While the base fleet is present anyway, thus producing no reducible cost, each additional 
car creates extra costs. The additional cars are the main source of cost of the present 
optimization problem. Nevertheless the inability of the existing fleet to cover all driving jobs 
might not be the only reason to go for more cars. There’s another cost factor. All cars of the 
fleet are rent for a certain time frame—usually two years—and a certain mileage. If that 
mileage is exceeded an additional gradual charge is to be paid. Contrariwise an under-run 
mileage leads to a gradual rebate. That system could produce situations where an additional 
car would be the cheaper solution although the existing car fleet could cover the demand of 
driving jobs. As an additional difficulty, the driving jobs are categorized in certain classes of 
different types and qualities of cars. 
In all models there are two main types of question to be answered. The first one is: 
”What car should execute what driving job?”. Of course one car cannot deal with two 
overlapping jobs and the car has to be available in the fleet during all time frames of the 
driving jobs it runs. Second question to be answered is: ”Are there better/cheaper solutions 
to the problem when more cars are added to the fleet?”. The second question seems to be 
even more difficult to answer since there’s no preset given for the number of cars to rent and 
rent time. It’s also possible to rent an additional car in advance without even knowing the 
jobs it has to run. This adds the wide field of probability, prediction and uncertainty to the 
present problem. 
Problem Categorization 
To solve an optimization problem, it’s often beneficial to categorize it. Finding the 
right problem category can be a tremendous step to solve the problem since with the 
problem category the algorithms and methods used to solve such a problem or the non-
existence of such become apparent. The following sections will discuss possible categories 
and categorization factors. When modeling the present optimization problem there are 
several options selectable that will not only affect accuracy but also the complexity of the 
model. In some cases, it might be beneficial to reduce accuracy in favor of analyzability. 
Linear versus Non-linear 
One categorization factor is the linearity or non-linearity of the objective function on 
one side and of the constraints on the other side. For linear systems, there’s in general a 
wider and better performing selection of algorithms and methods available to solve the 
problem. Therefore, linearity can be a decisive attribute of a problem. Unfortunately, the 
present optimization problem is apparently non-linear, since the distance constraints for the 
mileage of individual cars create non-linear gradual cost steps. Nevertheless, the main core 
of the problem can be modeled in a linear way omitting the mileage constraints. This leads 
to a less accurate but maybe better analyzable reduced model. Therefore the present 
problem is—depending on the analysis needs—either non-linear or linear. Thus for now no 
limitations are raised based on the linearity of the problem. 
Integer versus Continuous 
Most decision variables in the present problem are integers. Theoretically, the lease 
times for additional cars could be modeled as non-integers. But since the driving jobs are 
bound to a fixed length cycle a more flexible lease time for additional cars is of no use. 




discussed problem categories in the following chapter originate from the combinatorial 
optimization. 
Deterministic versus Probabilistic 
Next to the already mentioned problem of assigning the right car of the fleet to the 
right driving job, including the option of adding new cars to the fleet, there’s another optional 
addition to the problem. In order to improve the decisions made based on the model it might 
be beneficial to predict future driving jobs. This adds the whole complexity of randomness 
and decision under uncertainty to the present problem. As already explicated the added 
complexity might circumvent detailed enough analysis. Therefore, careful judgment is 
required whether driving job prediction is needed and useful. 
Another kind of randomness comes into play when watching the mileage of the fleet 
cars. An incoming driving job comes with a very rough driving schedule that can be used to 
derive a prediction for the amount of kilometers the car will drive for the job. This prediction 
will again add a lot of complexity to the problem. But even without predicting the distance 
the car will drive, after its return the number of driven kilometers is a random parameter to 
the problem. Thus, as soon as mileage is included, the present problem becomes 
probabilistic. 
Possible Problem and Solution Categories 
Regarding the results from the previous chapter some promising candidates for the 
right problem category are discussed. Beside a short discussion of the solution strategy in 
general the pros and cons of the respective category in regard to the present problem are 
illustrated. 
Exhaustive Enumeration 
Omitting probability the most direct approach is exhaustive enumeration. This could 
be implemented as a simple back-tracking algorithm utilizing a depth-first search. Sadly the 
amount of possible combinations grows tremendously with the number of cars in the fleet 
and the number of driving jobs. In the worst case scenario the amount of combinations to 
check is  
where n is the number of driving jobs and F is the number of cars in the Fleet. This grows 
terrible. A small example with only five cars and ten driving jobs already produces over 4.8 
billion possible combinations to check. This is without additional cars and without predictions 
for future driving jobs in consideration. Without further improvements exhaustive 
enumeration is not feasible for real world scenarios. 
Branch & Bound 
One possible improvement to the exhaustive search is the branch and bound 
algorithm. It also tries to implement a depth-first search but it’s looking for clever shortcuts to 
avoid as many branches of the search tree as possible. To achieve this, the algorithm tries 
to predict upper and lower bounds for all branches. With better upper/lower bounds the 




challenge of the algorithm. First attempts to utilize Branch & Bound for the present problem 
have shown that finding adequate bounds is very difficult. So far in most example situations 
the calculation time of the bounds exceeded the time advantage of the Branch & Bound 
algorithm compared to the exhaustive search. This is not because the calculation took so 
long but because the calculated bounds only removed very few branches from the search 
tree. Unless better functions for upper/lower bounds are found Branch & Bound is no 
improvement to the solution of the problem. 
Scheduling Problem (Job Shop Scheduling) 
It’s possible to model the problem as a scheduling problem with the following 
attributes. The cars of the fleet translate into the machines of the scheduling problem. 
Machines of certain types can substitute certain other types, others can’t. The driving jobs 
represent the tasks. The jobs have a fixed start and end time and therefore a fixed length. 
All jobs have a type or class defining on what type of machine they can be run. If no feasible 
schedule with existing machines can be found, new machines are added. Also, if feasible 
schedules can be found, there might be cheaper schedules with more machines taking 
mileage into account. That demonstrates the difference of the present problem to usual 
scheduling problems. A usual scheduling problem seeks the fastest completed feasible 
schedule while here the cheapest feasible schedule is to be found. 
Summary and Outlook 
Building flexible structures that combine qualitative measures of e.g. business 
process design with quantitative optimization approaches proof to provide very effective and 
efficient solutions in real-world problems of the daily military work. The Service-Oriented 
Architecture Approach serves as an excellent connector and enabler between these two 
“worlds.” This approach offers a reasonable chance to be successfully transferable also to 
further domains of every-day military problem solving.  
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Quadrennial Defense Review Priorities and 
Implications for Acquisition 
Brett B. Lambert— Brett B. Lambert joined the US Department of Defense (DoD) in 2009 
as Director of Industrial Policy in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & 
Technology) (DUSD (A&T)). Mr. Lambert serves as the principle advisor to the USD (AT&L) on all 
matters relating to the defense industrial base, including industrial capabilities and assessments; 
defense industry mergers, acquisitions and consolidation; preservation of essential industries and 
technologies; and other related matters. 
Prior to joining the DoD, Mr. Lambert was a managing director for the Civitas Group. In this role he 
provided strategic advisory services for companies operating in the intelligence, homeland defense, 
and national security sectors. 
From 1989 until 2007, Mr. Lambert held positions of increasing responsibility at DFI International, a 
national security consultancy he built with the founder. Mr. Lambert assisted in the sale of DFI in 
2007. 
At the conclusion of his tenure with DFI, Mr. Lambert held the titles of Executive Vice President of DFI 
International and Managing Director of DFI Investment Partners. He was also the company’s ethics 
officer and served as a member of the Board of Directors. Mr. Lambert specialized in technology 
assessments, strategic planning, and market analyses for defense, intelligence, and space 
companies. His engagements assisted client’s identification and quantification of new or evolving 
markets, described the political and business environments in which they operated, and provided 
execution guidance to ensure the implementation of successful ventures. Mr. Lambert also worked 
closely with a number of leading venture funds, merchant banks and private equity firms in support of 
their national security portfolio companies. 
While with DFI, Mr. Lambert also led the company’s work with first-tier defense firms, financial 
institutions, and private equity organizations in merger and acquisition market advisory services. 
Throughout his time with DFI, Mr. Lambert was engaged in scores of acquisitions, international joint 
ventures, offset arrangements and foreign equity investments, representing a wide variety of both 
buyers and sellers in the national security space. 
Before joining DFI, Mr. Lambert worked for the US Department of State (USAID) at the American 
Embassy in New Delhi. Prior to this, he attended graduate school at Jawaharlal Nehru University on a 
Rotary Graduate Scholarship that he received during his senior year at Kansas State University. He 
also worked as an independent journalist in India, Pakistan and Burma. Before his time in Asia, Mr. 






Requisites for a Strong Defense Industrial Base 
Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr.—Lt. Gen. Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., USAF (Ret.), retired from the Air Force 
in October 1998 after 33 1/2 years of active duty.  Prior to his retirement from the Air Force, General 
Farrell served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters US Air Force, 
Washington, DC. He was responsible for strategic planning, resource programming and manpower 
activities within the corporate Air Force, and for integrating the Air Force's future plans and 
requirements to support national security objectives and military strategy. 
Previous positions include Vice Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, OH, and Deputy Director, Defense Logistics Agency, Arlington, VA.  He also served as 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs at Headquarters US Air Forces in Europe.  A command 
pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours, he flew 196 combat missions in Southeast Asia and 
commanded the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, Torrejon Air Base, Spain. He was also the system 
program manager for the F-4 and F-16 weapons systems with the Air Force Logistics Command, Hill 
Air Force Base, UT.  
General Farrell is a 1965 graduate of the Air Force Academy with a BS in engineering and an MBA 
from Auburn University.  Other education includes the National War College and the Harvard 
Program for Executives in National Security. 
A native of Montgomery, AL, he is married to the former Victoria Leigh Kruzel of Richmond, VA.  They 
have a son, Lt. Colonel Sean Farrell, a daughter, Kelly Farrell Lowder, and 4 grandchildren. 
Abstract 
A vibrant industrial base is critical to US national security, for both economic and 
national defense reasons.  Economically, the US industrial base is directly responsible for 
about 12% of US GDP, but it contributes as much as one third of GDP when considering 
commodities and services consumed.  Further, over 60% of total US exports are 
manufactured goods, and 10% of total employment is within the industrial base.  For 
reasons of national defense, the US must have full control of the supply chain that delivers 
supplies and equipment to those securing our nation. 
Although the US has the largest industrial base in the world, there are concerns that 
must be addressed to maintain and strengthen our position.  The often-stated but erroneous 
opinion that US manufacturing cannot compete globally, based upon labor rates, ignores the 
productivity gains from technology and the costs to move offshore. Other critical issues 
include the future availability of skilled workers, reliable supply of affordable raw materials, 
access to capital, uncertainty of the defense budget, and changing environmental policies.  
A key thread winding through all of these issues is the need for elected representatives to 
appreciate the vital role manufacturing provides.  By addressing these concerns, the future 





The Defense Budget and Defense Industry Finance 
David Berteau—David J. Berteau is a Senior Adviser and Director of the CSIS Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group, covering defense management, programs, contracting, and acquisition. His group 
also assesses national security economics and the industrial base supporting defense. Mr. Berteau is 
an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, a member of the Defense Acquisition University 
Board of Visitors, a director of the Procurement Round Table, and a fellow of the National Academy 
of Public Administration. He also serves on the Secretary of the Army’s Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations. 
Roy Levy—Roy Levy is a Consultant with the Defense-Industrial Initiative Group at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he specializes in financial aspects of the US 
defense industrial base. Before joining CSIS, Mr. Levy was a Policy Analyst with a New York City-
based economic research firm and was a Fellow at the Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies 
between 2007 and 2009. He is the author and co-author of several published articles on international 
security issues. Mr. Levy holds a BA in Political Economy from the City University of New York. 
Matthew Zlatnik—Matthew Zlatnik is a fellow with the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, 
where he focuses on how technological, industrial, and budgetary issues affect defense policy. Mr. 
Zlatnik previously spent 10 years in investment banking, primarily working with corporate clients in the 
telecommunications industry. He holds an MA in international relations from the Johns Hopkins 
School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), an MBA in finance from the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania, and a BA in economics from Carleton College. 
Abstract 
The defense sector’s fundamentals in terms of operating margin and cash flow return 
on investment (CFROI) are stronger today than at any point in the past two decades due to 
better cash flow management, operating efficiencies, and record US defense spending. 
However, the economic and business environment for the defense sector moving forward is 
likely to be more difficult because of the Federal budget deficit and the government’s non-
defense spending requirements. Likely changes in spending priorities have the potential to 
change the industry significantly. Assessing the vulnerability of the defense sector to 
potential market changes—both as a whole and within the various segments it comprises—
is of the outmost importance.  
Introduction 
To evaluate the vulnerability of the industry to potential changes in market 
conditions, it is important to understand the financial drivers of defense companies and to 
have insight into why companies enter or exit the industry and why investors choose to fund 
the sector.  In this annotated brief, we examine the defense sector’s profitability, both in a 
historical context and in comparison to commercial peers.  We choose to evaluate the 
profitability of the industry because of its importance to a sector’s attractiveness to outside 
investors. Low profitability relative to other sectors will hinder an industry’s ability to finance 
its operations. In the context of the industrial and technological base supporting defense, to 
the extent profitability shrinks, the industry may shrink as well, as companies and capital 
gravitate toward more lucrative sectors. 
Our analyses show that while the overall fundamentals of the defense sector in terms 
of operating margin and CFROI are stronger today than at any point in the past two 




specialization (from products to service, electronics to heavy metal). The main question to 
consider going forward is how can companies preserve margins and, by extension, maintain 
their attractiveness to capital markets in an era of flat or declining budgets?  
The CSIS Defense Index 
To examine and analyze the defense sector, CSIS will utilize existing tools and 
develop additional methods. To reflect changes and capture the diversity of companies 
within the sector, we created the CSIS Defense Index. Our index is composed of 23 public 
companies with revenue ranging from $114 million to $42 billion, representing not only 
hardware and equipment firms but also the professional services sector. We also include 
several foreign companies with a significant presence in the US defense market. Our 
financial analysis takes a bottom-up approach, aggregating data for each of the companies 
in the CSIS Defense Index to obtain weighted totals or averages. Financial data are 
obtained from commercial services. 
The Defense Budget  
Defense spending is at an historic high, surpassing in real terms both the Vietnam 
War era and the Reagan buildup of the 1980s (Figure 1). Top-line budget today is 85% 
higher than the top-line budget in 2001 (constant FY2010 US$).  
 
Figure 1.  Department of Defense Outlays, 1962-2011 (constant FY2010 US$ billion)** 
(Source: DoD Comptroller; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
*Excludes projected OCO 
* *FY1962-FY2009=Historical Outlays; FY2010=Budget Authority including OCO as of February 




From an industry perspective, while DoD contract action value more than doubled 
during the period, the relative composition of products and services procured remained 
largely intact (Figure 2). The one exception is the Professional, Administrative, and 
Management Support (PAMS), which grew from 26% of total professional services in 2000, 
to 34% in 2009. 
 
Figure 2. Composition of Total DOD Contracts, 2000 and 2009 (constant FY2009 US$, 
billion) 
(Source: Federal Procurement Data System, analysis by CSIS Defense Industrial-Initiatives Group) 
PAMS: Professional, Administrative, & 
Support 
FRS: Facilities Related Services 
ICT: Information, Communications, & 
Technology 
ERS: Equipment Related Services 
Defense Industry Financial Performance  
What does this all mean for the defense industry? From 2001 until the over-all stock-
market peak in 2007, the defense index outperformed the S&P 500. This outperformance 
was especially pronounced from March 2003 until late 2007, the period that saw the most 
intense fighting in Iraq. From 2007 to 2008, the indices traded closely together. Investors’ 
anticipation of the end of US involvement in Iraq and slower-growing investment budgets 





Figure 3. Defense Index Performance, 1999-2010 (1999=100) 
(Source: Bloomberg, analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
The plunge in the Spade Defense Index in 2008 probably reflects broader investor 
flight from equity more than a fundamental change in the financial health of the defense 
sector. Since 2009, the defense index has outperformed the S&P 500, possibly reflecting 
greater investors’ insight into the Obama administration’s defense priorities, as outlined in 
the recently-released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). It also is  a testament to the 
relative health of the defense industtry.   
In the medium and long terms, profitability is critical to a sector’s attractiveness to 
outside investors. Low profitability relative to other sectors will hinder an industry’s ability to 
finance its operations. In the context of the industrial and technological base supporting 
defense, to the extent profitability shrinks, the industry may shrink as well, as companies 





Figure 4. CSIS Defense Index Operating Margin, 1988-2009 (revenue weighted) 
(Source: Bloomberg, analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) is a widely used measure of operating 
profitability. EBIT margin for the defense industry was consistently lower than its commercial 
peers during the period evaluated. 2009 marked the first year in more than twenty years in 
which operating margins for the defense sector were higher than that of the S&P 500 index, 
though this is due to a drop in the S&P 500’s operating margin.  Still, at nearly 10% for 2008 
and 2009, the defense sector’s total EBIT margin is at a high since 1988.   
 
Figure 5. CSIS Defense Index Operating Margin, 1988-2009 Revenue weighted versus Index 
Average 




However, as was mentioned in the introduction, the defense sector is not monolithic, 
and operating margin performance varies by company size (by revenue) and specialization.  
Figure 5 above shows that from 1993 to 2000, small and mid-tier companies in the CSIS 
Defense Index had lower operating margins than larger defense contractors.  
 
Figure 6. CSIS Defense Indices Operating Margin, 1995-2009 (revenue weighted) 
(Source: Bloomberg, analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
When companies in the CSIS Defense Index are grouped by operating segments 
(professional services, hardware and equipment, and diversified), there seems to be an 
advantage for large or diversified companies.  The drop in operating margin for professional 





Figure 7. CSIS Defense Index Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI), 1993-2009 
(revenue weighted) 
(Source: Bloomberg, analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
A second, widely used profitability metric is Cash Flow Return on Investment 
(CFROI), which is a measurement of the cash flow available after expenses have been paid 
and sufficient investment has been made to continue current operations. CFROI is an 
important profitability measure to understand. Return on investment often drives decisions to 
enter or exit an industry, meaning it can ultimately shape the breadth and depth of the 
defense industry and the capabilities it offers. CFROI for the CSIS Defense Index has been 
higher than that for the indices of both the S&P 500 and S&P 1500 Industrial. The steep 
increase in CFROI, starting in 2004, can be partially explained by strong operating-income 





Figure 8. CSIS Defense Indices CFROI, 1993-2009 (revenue weighted) 
(Source: Bloomberg, analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group) 
Among the different segments, professional services companies have averaged 
higher CFROI than hardware & equipment and diversified companies, mainly due to 
generally lower net working capital. Beginning in 2003, CFROI for all three segments has 
tracked relatively closely together. 
Summary 
The overall defense sector’s financial fundamentals are as stronger today than as 
they have been at any point in the past two decades. While operating margin has been 
lower for the defense sector than that of its commercial peers for the period, by 2009 
operating margin for defense and commercial companies equalized. Within the defense 
sector, there appears to be an advantage for large or diversified companies.  The defense 
industry had higher cash flows compared to its commercial peers for the period. Among 
defense companies, while professional services enjoyed relatively higher CFROI than 
hardware and equipment, or diversified companies, by 2005 CFROI for the different 
segments tracked closely together. 
At this point, there are some key questions for industry and DoD policy-makers to 
consider.  How can companies preserve margins (and by extension their attractiveness to 
capital markets) when their main customer is fiscally constrained? How can companies 
position themselves for an era of flat or declining investment? Where can companies find 
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Abstract 
It's not true that life is one damn thing after another; it is one damn thing over and 
over.  - Edna St. Vincent Millay (1892-1950) 
The paper and discussion address the international impact of US export control and 
technology transfer regulations.  They highlight the current importance of this issue for the 
United Kingdom and outline an NPS-Cranfield University research project in this area.  The 
focus will be on the experience of the UK with these US requirements in connection with the 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.  This is relevant as the dispute regarding JSF source 
code access for the UK, resolved in 2006 at the President/Prime Minister level, was re-




This is a key topic due to the White House announcement in August 2009 of an 
initiative to change the US export control regime.  And it is a timely issue for the UK, as it 
prepares to conduct a Strategic Defence Review, including a review of international 
acquisition relationships.   
The UK perception of its relationship with the US and the benefits of participation in 
US-led multinational projects will be influenced by its JSF experience.  And the UK provides 
a unique perspective on the impact of US export control and technology transfer regulations, 
an issue of significance to those interested in multinational military cooperation with the US. 
Introduction   
At the 2009 Acquisition Research Symposium, the researchers from Cranfield 
University presented a paper titled Innovative UK Approaches to Acquisition Management.  
It addressed four areas in which the experience of the United Kingdom had relevance for 
practitioners of defence acquisition.  One of those areas involved UK participation in the 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme.  The difficulties that arose over the US refusal to grant 
the UK access to JSF source codes was an indication of the extent to which US export 
control and technology transfer policies generate obstacles to US-led multinational 
programmes.  The point was made that other countries would probably ask themselves the 
following question: If this is the way the US treats what is generally accepted to be its 
closest ally, what should other countries expect?  The 2009 paper could at least note that 
this was a historical issue, resolved in 2006, once it had been elevated to the 
Presidential/Prime Ministerial level. 
However, it was too soon to declare resolution of this issue.  As noted in a December 
2009 report to Congress (Gertler, 2009, pp. 14-15), the US will not be releasing the JSF 
source codes, and, quoting the head of JSF international affairs, "that includes everybody."  
The official added, "Nobody's happy with it completely, but everybody's satisfied and 
understands" (p. 14).  Instead, a reprogramming facility will be set up to develop JSF 
software and distribute upgrades.  Changes to the software will be integrated at that facility 
"and new operational flight programs will be disseminated out to everybody who's flying the 
jet" (p. 15).  The UK MoD statement from December 2009 in response to that 
announcement simply noted that the JSF "is progressing well and the UK currently has the 
JSF data needed at this stage of the programme, and is confident that in future we will 
continue to receive the data needed to ensure that our requirements for operational 
sovereignty will be met" (p. 15). 
The resurrection of the source code issue does not bode well for supporters of 
multinational defence programmes, particularly those led by the US.  And it comes at a 
critical time for the UK.  With a general election likely to be held before the 2010 symposium, 
both the major political parties have promised they will hold a Strategic Defence Review 
(SDR) following the election, whatever the outcome.  The last SDR was done in 1998.  The 
MoD has been working to generate the papers needed to prepare for the SDR, and most, if 
not all, address the importance for the UK of a strong defence relationship with the US.  As 
no project epitomizes the UK commitment to work with the US more than the JSF, the US 
decision to re-open the source code issue could not have come at a more sensitive time in 
the UK. 
There is an appreciation in the UK that the US has every justification for protecting its 
cutting-edge military technology.  However, what may not be fully appreciated in the US is 
the extent to which US export control and technology transfer policies have generated 




And it is important to note that in efforts like the JSF, there is much that partner states can 
bring to the programme.  For example, the UK is not just the only Level 1 participant in JSF, 
but BAE Systems is the largest sub-contractor.   
The UK can provide a unique perspective on the impact of US policies, particularly 
due to the resurrection of the JSF source code issue.  For that reason, the Naval 
Postgraduate School and Cranfield University will undertake a joint research effort over the 
next year into the impact of the US export control and technology transfer policies.  The goal 
will be to provide the results at the 2011 symposium.  The UK experience with the JSF can 
provide insights into the benefits and drawbacks of the US policies, which should be 
valuable to the US in pursuing multinational defence programmes. 
Current UK Review of Security and Defence Policy 
Green Paper.  It is worthwhile to consider the extensive work the UK is undergoing 
to review its security and defence policy.  This is particularly valuable due to the views that 
have emerged regarding the importance to the UK of its defence relationship with the US.  A 
discussion of the impact of US export control and technology transfer policies should be 
placed in the context of this major UK review and the key documents that have been 
produced.   
The recent MoD paper Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence 
Review (2010a), better known as the "Green Paper," notes that international partnerships 
and bilateral relationships will be important, "especially with the US" (p. 12).  It goes on to 
comment that,  
the UK has a range of close bilateral security and defence relationships.  None is 
more important than that with the United States.  The relationship is based on 
common values and interests which will endure in the 21st century, to our mutual 
benefit.  The UK benefits greatly from bilateral co-operation in the nuclear, 
intelligence, science, technology and equipment fields. (p. 15) 
The paper notably also comments that, "In Europe, the return of France to NATO's 
integrated military structures offers an opportunity for even greater cooperation with a key 
partner across a range of defence activity" (p. 15).  This generated discussion in the UK, 
which has since abated.  As indicated in the 2009 Cranfield paper, there is scepticism in the 
UK about the value of European programmes, such as the A-400M transport.  However, it 
remains to be seen whether greater cooperation with Europe in general and France in 
particular will have any momentum when the SDR is undertaken.  Certainly, to the extent 
that US decisions on the JSF or other programmes generates the view that the US is a 
difficult partner, this will buttress the case of those who support a greater emphasis on 
European cooperation.   
One intriguing question for the UK is how the US would view a strengthened UK turn 
towards Europe.  One of the issues the pending research will address is the perception of 
UK officials about the value the US places on UK contributions to the JSF.  If the UK 
believes the US does not put great store in UK participation, reflected in the way in which it 
is treated, then such a relationship could have an impact on UK views of European 
cooperation. 
The issue of acquisition receives considerable attention in the paper, and the 




In 2005, the Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) set out a comprehensive statement of 
how the Government would engage with industry on the acquisition of equipment, 
support, and services.  The DIS will be updated during the future Review, in the light 
of future military capability requirements.  We will have to revalidate our overall 
approach to: 
 Operational Sovereignty.  Our Armed Forces rely on assured overseas sources 
for some important equipment and support but there are cases where specific 
industrial capability must be located in the UK for operational reasons. 
  
 International Collaboration.  There are operational, industrial and economic 
benefits from working with other countries on acquisition.  However such 
acquisition involves risks, constraints, and potential costs.  We must choose the 
right approach for each project.  But the Review must set guidelines. 
  
 The broader benefits to the UK from our acquisition.  The Ministry of Defence 
must provide the Armed Forces with the equipment they require at best value to 
the taxpayer.  However, our annual global expenditure with industry and 
commerce—some £20 billion per annum—means that our decisions have a 
significant and long-term impact on the UK's industrial base and therefore on the 
livelihood of many of our citizens. (p. 38) 
The paper addresses the issue of defence exports, a key part of deciding whether 
and to what extent the UK will commit itself to a defence development programme.  The 
paper notes that, 
Support for defence exports remains an important aspect of defence policy, in that it 
can reduce equipment costs to the UK tax payer, support jobs, facilitate bilateral 
defence links with allies and friends and enables countries to take responsibility for 
their defence and security needs.  It is therefore in the MoD's interest to work with 
industry to take account of possible future exports when developing equipment for 
the UK Armed Forces.  Longer term certainty on our future equipment requirements 
will also help industry plan their investment in new technology. (p. 38) 
Finally, the paper addresses military technology.  It is fair to state that the UK has 
been inclined to see the benefits of cutting-edge technology.  However, the paper has a 
more nuanced view of the issue, influenced by the UK experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Such a shift in perspective, particularly in an era of tight defence budgets, can have an 
impact on the willingness of the UK to commit scarce resources to expensive, high-tech 
military programmes: 
Loss of our technological edge in significant areas of military capability would have a 
profound effect on the way we operate.  For at least the last twenty years, we have 
operated on the underlying assumption that our equipment would be more effective 
than our adversaries'.  If it were not, our operations would be more hazardous.  Our 
casualty rates, in particular, could be expected to increase markedly. 
We must also ensure we can bring technology to bear on the challenges we face.  
The most immediate threats may not be posed by the most advanced technology.  
The unique tactical threat posed by, for example an improvised explosive device or 
suicide bomber, can rapidly negate an assumed technological edge.  We must be 




A key challenge for Defence will be to monitor and respond to the increasing breadth 
and pace of technological change.  We will need to develop a greater understanding 
of the requirement for technological edge in our systems and of the risks associated 
with losing it.  We will need to be more agile in exploiting new technologies in our 
own capabilities.  We need to recognise that the technology we require depends on 
the threat we face. (p. 23) 
In short, the paper provides insights into some of the questions that will be 
addressed in the SDR, many of which will focus on the policy concerns regarding the UK-US 
security relationship.  And the practical UK experience of operating alongside the US in 
Afghanistan, or in programmes such as the JSF, will have an impact on the policies that 
emerge from the SDR.  
Acquisition Strategy.  The MoD released The Defence Strategy for Acquisition 
Reform (2010b) to complement the Green Paper.  The document notes the MoD spends 
£20 billion annually on goods and services, around two-thirds of the total Defence Budget 
(p. 6), with £6 billion on equipment and £5 billion supporting equipment in service (p. 7).  
The MoD reports that "nearly 90% of our equipment projects now deliver front-line needs to 
cost, and over 80% deliver them to time" (p. 6).  However, the report highlights the 
challenges faced by the MoD, particularly in view of tighter budgets:  
The difficulties we face in this area were considered in the independent report into 
Defence acquisition by Mr. Bernard Gray, which we published in October 2009.  His 
sobering analysis, subsequently echoed by the National Audit Office (NAO), was that 
our overall plans for new equipment are too ambitious, and need to be scaled down 
to match the funding likely to be available.  He also concluded that we must continue 
to improve the way we manage our equipment projects, both individually and as a 
portfolio.  We accept this analysis and, building on previous reforms, have framed 
much of this strategy around it. (p. 7) 
On the specific issue of international cooperation, the strategy outlines the key 
factors that should be considered, noting that 
Deciding whether to acquire equipment in collaboration with other countries has 
crucial ramifications for its performance, cost and timescale.  It often has important 
implications for international Defence relationships more generally, and for the 
Government's wider foreign and security policies.  We need to make sure all these 
issues are properly weighed in reaching final acquisition decisions. (p. 20) 
With regard to technology, the MoD states that it will be important to "examine the 
scope for managing technology and innovation better so that we can provide and update 
defence equipment more quickly, and at a price we can afford.  This includes using 
incremental and modular approaches so that we can keep pace better with the evolving 
threats" (p. 10).  The strategy also sets out a measurable standard for success in 
acquisition: 
But the overall success—or otherwise—of the strategy will be visible in more 
transparent ways.  Two clear indicators will be that, following the planned SDR, we 
can: 
 demonstrate each year, with independent audit, that we can afford our equipment 
and support plans (Chapter 2); and 
 demonstrate much lower levels of cost growth and delay across our equipment 




exceed 0.4% a year, and slippage should be under 0.8 months.  We have also 
set targets to ensure the large majority of projects are managed within tolerable 
cost and time limits each year. (p. 8) 
While a program like the JSF may not be bound by the MoD's acquisition strategy, 
the document, like the Green Paper, provides a good insight into the key issues being 
considered by the MoD.  As is probably the case with most military forces, the MoD's ability 
to tolerate cost overruns and programmatic disputes on issues like technology transfer has 
largely evaporated.  
Strategic Trends.  The third key MoD document is its Global Strategic Trends paper 
(2010, January 12).  On the general topic of US export control and technology transfer 
policy and the specific issue of the JSF, the paper has particular significance due to its 
assessment of future trends.  It predicts that "the hegemonic dominance of the U.S. will 
fade," and that "she is likely to remain the pre-eminent military power, although, in political, 
economic and military terms, she is likely to be increasingly constrained as others grow in 
influence and confidence" (p. 10).  The paper predicts that "By 2040, the U.S. is likely to lose 
her hegemonic status as rising powers enjoy more rapid economic growth and close the 
technology gap in military capability" (p. 45).   
However, the paper clearly indicates that while the balance of military power will 
become multi-polar, the US is likely to remain pre-eminent (p. 80).  And there will remain, at 
least out to 2020, a global expectation that the US will provide international leadership in 
times of crisis (p. 46).  Most pertinent for this discussion, the paper opines that while most 
developed countries will minimise defence expenditures, the US is likely to be the exception, 
"making by far the greatest commitment to defence, although its economic power and 
technological advantage is likely to become increasingly challenged" (p. 80). 
The report notes that "Defence production is likely to become increasingly 
internationalised and most states will lack guaranteed access to industrial surge capacity 
during times of escalating tension" (p. 17).  This is an issue that will become increasingly 
important for the UK, particularly in light of the need for supply chain agility.  With regard to 
the JSF, it will be one of the topics the Cranfield researchers will be addressing from a UK 
perspective.  And the specific chapter on military research and development has particular 
relevance to the focus of this paper and warrants extensive citation: 
R&D funding can be divided into 3 broad categories: private sector; government non-
military; and military. The first of these is much larger than the others and is likely to 
grow. However, it is increasingly likely that defence and government budgets will be 
unable to service the totality of the defence and security R&D need; novel 
approaches to address the shortfall will be sought. The development of specific 
military technologies will out of necessity remain largely a government activity. For 
the remainder, the industrial base will be stimulated through 'seed corn' initiatives 
that promote development of novel technologies.  Other avenues that are likely to be 
pursued include forming international, value-adding partnerships in military R&D.  
These are likely to sustain and acquire key enabling technological knowledge and 
capability, pull through technologies from multiple sources, particularly civil R&D, and 
harness the capabilities of academia and other civil research institutions. However, 
even where the civil sector is the dominant driving factor, transforming non-defence 
technologies into military advantage may require significant expenditure in defence 
R&D. (p. 136) 
Returning to the issue of Europe and its future development in the security arena, the 




Within Europe, the EU is likely to increase its influence and expand its economic, 
foreign policy and security role.  However, a more extensive defence relationship that 
would extend EU power into and beyond Europe's near abroad is unlikely.  For 
European powers, NATO is likely to remain the defence organisation of choice. (p. 
44) 
And specifically with regard to further European defence integration, the assessment 
is that,  
Further coordination of military forces is likely.  In particular, financial restraints are 
likely to result in a requirement to pool and share capabilities, for example, 
capabilities such as strategic airlift.  NATO is likely to remain the guarantor of 
European security, despite the fact that the U.S. will be less focused on Europe.  The 
EU is likely to remain reluctant to project military power beyond the Petersberg tasks 
even in cases of clear multilateral interest such as in the Balkans, or where the 
humanitarian imperative is clear. (p. 48) 
In short, the MoD prediction is that while the US will no longer have as much of a 
lead over all other nations as it has now, it will still be the pre-eminent military power.  And 
while Europe may develop more capabilities, that is not synonymous with sufficient 
capabilities.  Finally, the requirements for defence acquisition programmes will become 
more complicated, even without the added burden of an onerous export control and 
technology transfer regime. 
Character of Conflict.  The fourth MoD document concerns the Future Character of 
Conflict (2010, February 12).  On defence acquisition and the importance of strong ties to 
the US, the paper addresses two points.  The first is that in the key period around 2020, "the 
UK's strength in defence technology, along with many other Western nations (but probably 
excluding the U.S.), may have been surpassed by these emerging powers," emphasizing 
the likelihood is that UK defence budgets will be tight in this period (p. 29).  The opinion in 
the paper is that "investments now in technology could hedge against relative technology 
decline in UK defence" (p. 29). 
The second point is commentary of the centrality of the US for UK military planning.  
One of the key assumptions is that "the UK will act with others where shared interests and 
values coincide.  We will routinely operate with allies and partners, in particular as a 
supporting partner in a U.S.-led coalition," adding that "it is extremely unlikely that the UK 
will conduct warfighting without U.S. leadership, but in other operations the UK may be 
called upon to lead a non-U.S. coalition" (p. 3). 
Bernard Gray Report.  The report from Bernard Gray (2009) was commissioned by 
the MoD, and intended to provide an independent assessment of UK acquisition policy.  It 
has become an important part of the UK discussion on defence acquisition.  While not 
coming to any conclusion regarding the benefits to the UK of participation in multinational 
projects like the JSF, Gray provides the following commentary: 
A number of UK acquisition projects that are currently underway involve collaboration 
with other nations to jointly procure equipment for use by the military forces of all of 
the participants. The potential economic benefits of acquiring equipment in this way 
are significant: 
 fixed development costs can be defrayed amongst a number of partners, 
generating economies of scale and associated reductions in unit costs that would 




scale collaborative projects, including NLAW (light anti-armour missile), GMLRS 
(guided multiple launch rocket system); and 
 projects that are very large and which could not realistically be undertaken 
independently by the UK; in such circumstances, collaboration affords access to 
technologies and capabilities that would otherwise be out of reach. This means 
the set of collaborative projects in which the MoD is involved are high-profile 
such as Typhoon, A400(M) and PAAMS on the Type 45 destroyer. 
The potential benefits of collaboration are most evident on large, expensive projects 
with significant technical challenges to be overcome. Equally, these projects tend 
have a high profile; any delay or overrun on these projects is likely to be very visible 
and embarrassing to the MoD.   
The inherent difficulties in ensuring that all participants in any collaboration have their 
interests aligned is widely held to be at the root cause of many problems and, more 
generally, the view across the MoD and the wider defence industry is that such 
problems are a characteristic of all collaborative projects to a greater or lesser 
extent. 
It is certainly the case that the divergence between the objectives of the various 
partners has led to problems on some projects. However, the question of whether 
the poor reputation of collaborative projects is warranted across the board remains 
open. This study has not examined the relative performance of collaborative projects 
in detail; the small sample and the specific issues raised in relation to each project 
render any such analysis relatively meaningless on a statistical basis. (p. 83) 
Haddon-Cave Report.  While not directly relevant to the issue of export controls and 
technology transfer, another document has relevance to the general discussion topic.  The 
report from Charles Haddon-Cave (2009) focussed on the loss of a NIMROD aircraft in 
Afghanistan in 2006.  The task for Haddon-Cave was to address the problems that had 
developed in MoD acquisition that led to a weakening of the attention to safety.  However, 
one of the underlying themes of the report was the need for the MoD to be an intelligent 
customer, and not find itself at the mercy of industry and suppliers with whom the MoD were 
not able to properly engage. 
A further point noted by Haddon-Cave was the need to control the supply chain.  
Again, this was under the overarching issue of the MoD's need to manage the acquisition 
process.  But the issue has relevance regarding the extent to which the UK must be in a 
position to manage complex multinational programs, such as the JSF.  One final theme is 
the need to manage capabilities through-life, and a focus on details after the initial 
procurement is completed.  One of the issues with regard to the JSF is that the Lockheed 
support solutions for the F-35 may not be fully compatible with the systems the UK has in 
place.  As the UK has learned from other acquisitions, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
task is not simply providing materiel to the central distribution point, but being able to 
transport it that last mile.  This is all the more significant for cutting-edge fighter aircraft 
deployed at sea.      
UK Participation in the Joint Strike Fighter 
Background.  Having placed the JSF and the specific issue of US export control and 
technology transfer policies in the context of the UK policy review, it is now time to turn to 




multinational development program ever and the DoD's largest procurement program in 
terms of total acquisition cost, is worthwhile, as is the genesis of UK participation in the JSF.   
The DoD plans for acquisition of over 2,400 JSFs for the Air Force, Marine Corps 
and Navy for $246 billion, with hundreds of F-35s to be purchased by US allies (O'Rourke, 
2009, p. 1).  In the 1990s, the US Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force were working on a 
next-generation strike aircraft.  In 1996, the JSF project was announced by the US.  At 
about that time, the British Royal Navy was looking at new Future Carrier Borne Aircraft 
capability for its CVF programme.  The US and UK decided to combine efforts.  The 
requirements of the US services drove the program, but the UK focus was on an attack 
aircraft with advanced Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) capabilities so that it 
could operate from forward battlefields as well as from aircraft carriers. The UK preference 
for the JSF was confirmed in a 2001 MOU with the US.  In 2002, the UK selected the 
STOVL variant to meet its future requirements, with a positive review of the JSF programme 
and the STOVL design completed in 2005 (National Audit Office, 2008, p. 45). 
It was important that as an indication of US support for this endeavour, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defence sent down instructions that the JSF program should emphasise 
international participation, and there was a consensus that the UK would participate in the 
program (Franck, Lewis & Udis, 2009).  The US and UK engaged in extensive, detailed 
exchanges on the nature of the program and the UK role, compiled in the US-UK 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Framework Memorandum of Understanding.  
Comprised of agreements, letters and other supporting material, it provides the details of the 
US-UK relationship on JSF.   
While decisions on specific numbers of fighters to be purchased were not required at 
the outset, the Royal Navy and Air Force were looking at the purchase of some 150 STOVL 
fighters to replace the Harriers.  The UK participated from the outset of the program, and is 
the only "Level 1" partner contributing $2 billion to the system design and development 
phase (Bolkcom, 2009, February 17, p. 9).  That designation means the UK has significant 
access to most aspects of the programme as well as the ability to influence requirements 
and design solutions.  And the UK will not have to pay the non-recurring R&D cost 
recoupment charge that normally accompanies the purchase of US military equipment and 
will receive a share of the levies on sales to third parties.       
However, the UK commitment to the JSF is not primarily based on programmatic 
considerations such as cost savings, but on a key national security determination.  The UK 
made a policy decision on the need to retain an aircraft carrier capability, and the 
requirement for carrier-based fighters derived from that critical decision.  The postponement 
of the aircraft carrier production schedule by another two years due to constraints on the 
defence budget mean that the two carriers now have projected in-service dates of 2015/16 
and 2016/17.  However, that decision on the carriers is separate from the discussions on the 
JSF fighters that will operate on those carriers. 
There is no doubt that the UK has made a significant wager in tying itself to the JSF 
program, for if there are major problems with the fighter, the UK will need to generate a 
"Plan B" to avoid having its aircraft carriers merely serving as floating platforms.  If the 
STOVL version of the JSF does not emerge, then the UK would be faced with the challenge 
of re-designing ships so that, for example, they would have new catapults.  The UK plans to 
bring in a total of 138 JSF fighters, with 60 to be acquired in the period 2015-19 (Joint Strike 
Fighter, 2007).  The MoD is already in the process of working through modelling and 
simulation to optimise the safety and operability of the new aircraft carriers and the JSF 




The delays and cost increases in the Eurofighter program were a factor in the UK 
deliberations on whether to participate in JSF.  In the aftermath of the Eurofighter 
experience, the fact that the JSF was structured so that the most competitive firms would 
win contracts was appealing to the UK, and in line with the goal of pursuing more efficient 
acquisition programs.  And the fact that the US was providing the overwhelming amount of 
funding for a program with cutting-edge military technology was significant to the UK. 
Adding to the list of factors pressing the UK to participate in JSF, the Defence 
Industrial Strategy emphasises the need for the UK to remain interoperable with Allies, 
particularly the US.  And British industrial participation amplifies the UK focus on the JSF.  
BAE Systems is the largest non-American participant in JSF and has hoped for around £14 
billion in development and production contracts (McGhie & Gee, 2006).  Such a high level of 
BAE participation is to be expected, as it does the majority of its business in the US and is 
one of the largest suppliers to the DoD.  Indeed, BAE participation in the JSF was viewed in 
the UK as a seal of approval on the British ability to participate in cutting-edge military 
projects.  And there are potentially significant economic benefits.  Bolkcom (p. 17) notes that 
the DoD conducted a 2003 assessment that determined that partner nations could 
potentially earn between $5 and $40 of revenue for every $1 invested in JSF program 
contracts. 
It is also important to note the extensive US-UK military cooperation as the backdrop 
for discussion of the JSF source code dispute.  Franck, Lewis & Udis (2009) note that it is 
estimated that 99.8% of licenses for UK-US transactions are approved, which accounts for 
some 8,500 items with a value of $14 billion (p. 88).  This indicates that the routine operation 
of bilateral defence cooperation and technology transfer proceeds without friction.  
Moreover, the extent of UK-US defence industrial interconnection has increased 
substantially.  Franck, Lewis, and Udis (p. 98), citing Chao and Niblett (2006), note that 
aside from BAE, UK firms have acquired 50 aerospace and defence firms in the US since 
2001, which constitutes some three-quarters of all foreign investment in the US defence 
sector.  And major American defence contractors are established in the UK or have acquired 
operations or set up a presence in the UK.   
JSF Source Code Dispute.  With this backdrop of strong bilateral defence 
cooperation, the specific problems that arose regarding UK access to JSF source codes 
generated doubts in the UK regarding US-led military cooperative efforts that should (and 
could) have been avoided.  Initially, UK commentary on the JSF was full of praise as a 
model for future multinational defence cooperation.  That turned to criticism of the JSF as an 
example of why such efforts may not pass an all-encompassing cost-benefit analysis.   
It is a key operational requirements as well as a matter of sovereignty for the UK to 
be able to have the information needed to integrate, upgrade, operate and sustain the JSF 
as required.  As a practical matter, the UK cannot buy into a system that requires a US 
maintenance team to take care of any problems that may arise or to arrange for required 
modifications.  The House of Commons Defence Committee (2005) reported:  
It is vital that the UK gets all the information and access to technology it requires 
from the U.S. to have 'Sovereign Capability'—the ability to maintain the Joint Strike 
Fighter aircraft and undertake future upgrades independently.  The UK must receive 
adequate assurances that it will get all the information and access to technology it 
requires before the programme is too far advanced.  If these assurances are not 
given, it is questionable whether the UK should continue its involvement in the 




The Committee (2005, p. 29) emphasised the UK could not accept a situation in 
which it could not operate the JSF independently of the US and pressed the Defence 
Minister to ensure the UK would have operational independence.  It noted its expectation 
that the MoD would set a deadline by which the assurances on sovereign capability would 
be obtained from the US.  In December 2006, as the source code issue was heating up, the 
Committee warned that an assurance from the US was needed by the end of the year that it 
would provide the UK with all requested technical information.  In the absence of an 
agreement by the end of 2006, the Committee called on the government to develop a “plan 
B” to obtain alternative aircraft (BBC News, 2006).   
From the UK perspective, the history of the political discussions to resolve the source 
code issue is not the best advertisement for multinational programs.  The fact that such 
issues never seemed to be fully resolved added to UK frustration with US policy.  The 
technology transfer dispute had been raised in 2004, when Secretary of State for Defence 
Hoon wrote to Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld and referred to the fact that the US had 
signed an outline agreement on defence technology cooperation in 2002 (O'Connell, 2004).  
Prime Minister Blair believed he had reached an agreement with President Bush in May 
2006, but the dispute lingered on unresolved until the end of the year (Baldwin, 2006).   
Indeed, in the US Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (2006), Congress, aware 
of UK concerns over this issue, flatly wrote that "It is the sense of Congress that the 
Secretary of Defense should share technology with regard to the Joint Strike Fighter 
between the United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom 
consistent with the national security interests of both nations" (Section 233). 
The importance to the UK of technology transfer in cooperative arrangements with 
the US was already set out in the MoD's Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), in which the 
significance of the US defence market and US defence spending was acknowledged.  The 
DIS commented: 
To meet our own sovereign needs, it is important that we continue to have the 
autonomous capability to operate, support and where necessary adapt the 
equipment that we procure.  Appropriate technology transfer is therefore of crucial 
importance.  This is so for any cooperative project, but in practice difficulties have 
arisen particularly with the U.S., whose technology disclosure policy we have found 
less adapted to the needs of cooperative procurement than those of our partners in 
Europe.  To reiterate, this is not about gaining competitive advantage for UK 
industry; it is about being confident that the equipment we buy meets the capability 
requirements against which it is procured and can be modified effectively to meet 
emerging requirements through life.  We fully recognise the need to ensure that 
intellectual property is protected, and that appropriate measures are put in place to 
ensure this; security is a key issue for us, just as it is for the USA.  But a certain 
degree of technology transfer is required if we are to be able to fully cooperate with 
the USA (or any other partner) on our equipment programmes.  What we are striving 
towards is an agreed framework which facilitates this whilst ensuring that our mutual 
security needs are met. (p. 45) 
Frustrations with US policy are exacerbated when problems arise even when 
sensitive technology is not involved.  One Lockheed Martin employee noted that the 
restrictions on technology transfer have been “far more cumbersome and impenetrable than 
originally envisioned” and it is necessary to ask for Washington’s approval of “even 
unclassified information exchanges” (Metz, 2005, p. KN3-7).  Other close allies such as 




same time, pushing "for a resolution of long-standing technology release issues with the 
USA" (La Franchi, 2006). Such requirements make it difficult for partners to participate and 
generate a large administrative burden on team members, who face the requirement that “all 
information is releasable under penalty of jail terms—not a conducive atmosphere for co-
engineering a product” (Metz, 2005, p. KN3-7).  And this has an impact on the UK 
evaluation of whether participation in US-led programmes is possible, and if the benefits 
outweigh the costs.  In late 2006, with the issue of source codes at its most contentious, an 
unnamed UK MoD official was quoted as stating, “If we can’t trust the Americans to provide 
this, then you would have to ask what else we should be doing with them in defence terms” 
(Baldwin, 2006).   
It is worth noting the report of the Inspector General (IG) of the DoD (2008) on 
security controls regarding JSF classified technology that assessed seven applications from 
Northrup Grumman and BAE Systems for detailed review.  The IG's office also evaluated 
security reports on BAE facilities.  While the assessment from the IG's office was a frank 
statement that JSF advanced technology "may have been compromised by unauthorized 
access at facilities and in computers at BAE Systems" (p. ii), the specific criticism was that 
the DoD did not always use sufficient controls to evaluate potential unauthorised access to 
such technology (p. i).  Indeed, the specific recommendation with regard to BAE Systems is 
that the Defence Security Service (DSS) could have bolstered its efforts by collecting, 
analysing and retaining security audit reports completed by BAE Systems, a point on which 
the Director of DSS concurred.  And the other recommendations involved the actions of 
DSS. 
JSF Source Codes—The Sequel.  After the source code issue was resolved in 
2006, the JSF became a low-profile project.  The House of Commons Defence Committee 
(2009) simply noted that the MoD has assessed that the JSF programme is "progressing 
well" and the Committee would monitor the progress of the program (p. 47).  Secretary of 
State for Defence Hutton announced in March 2009 that the UK would purchase three F-
35B operational test aircraft, indicating the UK commitment to the Operational Test and 
Evaluation phase of the JSF (JSF, 2009).   
However, the announcement in late 2009 from the JSF project office that source 
codes will not be released has re-opened the issue.  And while the MoD response avoided a 
direct challenge on the matter, there is every reason to anticipate that UK objections raised 
the first time around will be reiterated.  The House of Commons Defence Committee 
commented in its report Defence Equipment 2010 (2010), "We also note that there still 
appear to be outstanding issues concerning technology transfer for the JSF, which are of 
key importance to the success of the programme" (p. 25). 
The second edition of the source code debate may be more heated than the first, as 
key UK concerns have been thrown into the mix.  The US discussion on the JSF is centered 
on the Administration's push to cancel the second engine (the F136).  As the F136 is a 
General Electric/Rolls Royce effort, the UK has an economic interest in the future of the 
second engine option.  As Bolkcom (2009, February 18) noted to Congress, the UK's senior 
defence procurement official had stated the UK would discontinue participation in the JSF if 
the technology transfer issues were not resolved and if the F136 engine were cancelled (pp. 
9-10).  Dr. Liam Fox, currently the Conservative party shadow defence secretary, said in 
2006 that a US decision to drop the F136 would "invariably effect future procurement 
decisions, with seriously negative consequences that may not be fully appreciated on this 




technology transfer issue, a debate on JSF source codes will probably be intensified if the 
second engine is deleted.  
An added factor is the increase in the cost of the JSF.  The UK defence budget is 
expected to come in for some cuts, irrespective of the outcome of the general election.  The 
cost increases that have been noted for each JSF (from £37 million four years ago to 
approximately £62 million today) have generated speculation about whether only one 
aircraft carrier might be fully fitted out with F-35s.  Other options include upgrading older 
aircraft, buying "off-the-shelf" competitors (such as the Rafale M or F/A-18E Super Hornet), 
using the CV version of the JSF instead of the STOVL version, at least on the carriers, or 
altering one of the carriers to an "assault" role, equipped with helicopters, Royal Marine 
Commandos and UAVs (Norton-Taylor, 2010).  While all of this is still in the realm of 
speculation, the fact that such options are being considered are critical, as they arise from 
the fact that there is no prospect of savings with regard to the two carriers.  The only savings 
can come from the aircraft that will be placed on those carriers.   
A final consideration is the fact that the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, 
signed in 2007, is still on hold.  The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2010, p. 
3) noted that "We are disappointed that despite promises to do so, the U.S. Senate has not 
yet ratified the UK-U.S. Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty.  We conclude that its swift 
ratification is imperative and would bring a range of benefits to both countries."  The goal of 
the treaty, to cut red tape in the bilateral exchange of defence goods, services and 
information, would be a productive step forward.  It is an open question whether the treaty, 
had it been in place, would have had any impact on the resurrection of the JSF source code 
dispute.  What is clear is that the delay in ratification indicates to the UK that improving the 
bilateral defence relationship is not a top priority for the US.  And it is notable that the 
Committee, although not referring specifically to the JSF, stresses that the UK should 
continue to work closely with the US but that "the UK needs to be less deferential and more 
willing to say no to the U.S. on those issues where the two countries interests and values 
diverge" (p. 7).   
It is worth reiterating that the resumption of this US-UK dispute has an impact on the 
perceptions of other nations regarding the attractiveness of US-led military development 
programs.  As noted by Chao and Niblett (2006): 
if the United States and the UK, the two closest of allies, are unable to overcome the 
continuing obstacles to the efficient sharing of defense-related technologies, what 
hope is there for broader transatlantic defense industrial and technological 
cooperation?  Bilateral U.S.-UK cooperation in the fields of intelligence, nuclear 
defense, and military deployments is unprecedented in U.S. alliances.  And the U.S. 
and UK defense industrial bases have become increasingly intertwined through 
investment and trade.  And yet, the U.S. and UK governments have proved unable to 
institute a more open system for exchanging and transferring defense technologies, 
despite the stated intent of senior political leaders and extensive efforts by both sides 
over the past couple of years. (p. 3) 
The authors stress that there is substantial willingness on the part of the UK to make 
this bilateral defense relationship work.  The problem is the lack of a corresponding effort on 
the part of the US.  As the authors note, 
The bottom line is that UK political leaders remain committed to working with the 
United States as the closest of security allies.  They want to be capable to deploy 
and operate UK forces from the outset, shoulder to shoulder with U.S. forces in the 




of U.S. defense equipment and technology for UK armed forces and to see the UK 
defense industry grow stronger through its involvement in the U.S. market.  But this 
vision presupposes a level of bilateral technology cooperation that U.S. leaders 
appear to be unwilling to concede. (p. 5)  
As indicated previously, the UK is clear about the value it places on US military and 
technological capabilities.  However, there is, at times, a UK perception that the US does not 
appreciate what the UK can bring to the table in this area.  As Chao and Niblett note, 
In addition, the UK can bring—as it already has brought—valuable technologies to 
the table for the United States.  The UK's track record of useful military technology 
innovation includes the contemporary examples of the vertical, short take-off and 
landing engine system and the anti-IED capabilities now deployed in Iraq.  A 
common perception of the threats also means that the UK defense science and 
technology establishment is focused on solving problems in areas that are of value to 
the United States, such as counter-terrorism and net enabled warfare.  And UK 
investment in cooperative programs such as the JSF can lessen the development 
cost for an increasingly-strained U.S. defense budget while decreasing the per unit 
costs of the system once they go into production.  Furthermore, while incomparable 
in size to the U.S. marketplace, the UK defense market does offer opportunities for 
major defense contracts. (p. 6) 
The question which seems to arise in the minds of UK officials is whether the US 
believes the UK actually makes a significant contribution to the JSF.  This will be a topic 
addressed by Cranfield researchers as part of the upcoming project.  However, it is 
worthwhile noting that this indirect question (what does the UK think the US is thinking?) is 
not as valuable as the direct question (what does the US think?), an issue that should be 
addressed in questions to US officials.  At this point, the case could be made that the UK 
perception is that the US does not place a significant amount of value on what the UK or 
British industry can bring to the JSF project. 
Chao and Niblett note that it should be possible to establish a close bilateral 
relationship on defence acquisition, as has been developed in far more sensitive areas.  
Confidence was built up over an extended period of time due to a body of experience, based 
on established procedures, and a similar long-term process will be needed in the defence 
acquisition area.  There is already an extensive bilateral defence relationship: ten umbrella 
MOUs between the MoD and the DoD have generated over 100 exchange agreements and 
30 project agreements.  For the US, this is the largest collaborative relationship.  For the UK, 
it is about 50% of the MoD's Defence Science and Technology Laboratory's projects.  And 
for over a decade, US defence industries have exported over $1 billion a year to the UK, 
and UK exports to the US were about $350 million, with US defence firms having either set 
up operations in the UK or acquired firms (p. 21).  As the authors note:     
The heart of any solution must lie in the exceptional closeness of the U.S.-UK 
political and military relationship.  The fact that there are "trusted communities" in the 
intelligence, nuclear and operational military fields indicates that a similar trusted 
community could be built in the defense-industrial realm for sharing defense 
technologies.  And, just as with the intelligence and nuclear trusted communities, the 
answer probably lies in developing a set of special practices, policies, and 
procedures for defense technology that both sides can have confidence in. (p. 8) 
Does It Matter to the US?:  The DoD has made clear the damage done to US 




"Reforming the U.S. Export Control System," the key excerpts from the Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report (2010) clearly note that 
Today's export control system is a relic of the Cold War and must be adapted to 
address current threats.  The current system impedes cooperation, technology 
sharing, and interoperability with allies and partners.  It does not allow for adequate 
enforcement mechanisms to detect export violations, or penalties to deter such 
abuses.  Moreover, our overtly complicated system results in significant interagency 
delays that hinder U.S. industrial competitiveness and cooperation with allies. 
The United States has made continuous incremental improvements to its export 
control system, particularly in adding controls against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery. However, the current system is largely 
out-dated.  It was designed when the U.S. economy was largely self-sufficient in 
developing technologies and when we controlled the manufacture of items from 
these technologies for national security reasons...   
The global economy has changed, with many countries now possessing advanced 
research, development, and manufacturing capabilities.  Moreover, many advanced 
technologies are no longer predominantly developed for military applications with 
eventual transition to commercial uses, but follow the exact opposite course. Yet, in 
the name of controlling the technologies used in the production of advanced 
conventional weapons, our system continues to place checks on many that are 
widely available and remains designed to control such items as if Cold War 
economic and military-to-commercial models continued to apply.   
The U.S. export system itself poses a potential national security risk.  Its structure is 
overly complicated, contains too many redundancies, and tries to protect too much.  
Today's export control system encourages foreign customers to seek foreign 
suppliers and U.S. companies to seek foreign partners not subject to U.S. export 
controls.  Furthermore, the U.S. government is not adequately focused on protecting 
those key technologies and items that should be protected and ensuring that 
potential adversaries do not obtain technical data crucial for the production of 
sophisticated weapons systems.   
These deficiencies can be solved only through fundamental reform.  The President 
has therefore directed a comprehensive review tasked with identifying reforms to 
enhance U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic security interests. (pp. 
83-84) 
The DoD certainly recognizes the new technological landscape.  A recent example of 
the DoD's use of advanced technology is the order by the Air Force for 2,200 Sony 
Playstation 3 videogame consoles to form the basis of a new super computer (The 
Economist, 2009).   
And recent research indicates that European firms are responding to the difficulties 
imposed by US policies.  Bialos, Fisher, and Koehl (2009) write that "Virtually every 
interview we conducted highlighted U.S. defense trade controls as a 'barrier' significantly 
impeding Transatlantic cooperation" (p. 37).  Bialos et al. note four key concerns.  The first 
is limits on operational sovereignty, which was noted previously as of particular significance 
to the UK regarding the JSF.  In fact, Bialos et al. writes that "The UK, one of our closest 
allies, as well as France and Italy, expressed strong concerns about this issue" (p. 113).  
The other three points noted by Bialos et al. are reliance on US International Traffic in Arms 




costs; re-export restrictions; and the complications the regulations generate for multinational 
facilities (p. 113).   
Bialos et al. also note, "There is clear evidence, beyond rhetoric, of a behavioral shift 
in Europe toward 'designing around' or designing out components or subsystems" controlled 
by the ITAR, "which has a particularly adverse impact on U.S. subsystem and component 
suppliers"  (p. 2).  Bialos et al. write, 
Over more than a decade, one study after another has highlighted the problems 
inherent in U.S. export controls—notably the ITAR.  While the specifics of these 
ITAR issues are beyond the scope of this study, the impact of ITAR on the 
Transatlantic defense market relationship is not.  Market participants, U.S. and 
foreign, consistently report that ITAR slows the speed of obtaining licenses needed 
for sales and collaboration, limits the release of U.S. technology, creates business 
uncertainty, and generally makes the process of Transatlantic defense industrial 
cooperation difficult.  Fairly or not, most European governments are concerned about 
relying on ITAR systems and subsystems because they potentially limit their 
operational autonomy over major systems (especially in real-time crises), introduce 
program delays and risks, and curtail their export flexibility for systems with U.S. 
components.   
Years of European talk of “designing around” or “designing out” ITAR have now 
begun to translate into action, according to market participants—with increased 
evidence that U.S. ITAR policies and practices, for better or worse, are limiting 
opportunities for U.S. firms competing in Europe (especially at the subsystem level).  
This is increasingly true even among our staunchest allies.   
The ITAR also inhibits U.S. firms from working with foreign firms on domestic U.S. 
programs and creates challenges for foreign firms seeking to enter the U.S. market.  
By declining to release certain information on technologies, the acquisition 
community can effectively preclude foreign participation.   
While strong and well-enforced export controls are an important tool of U.S. national 
security, it is clear that the U.S. failure to address these concerns will curtail the 
extent of Transatlantic defense technology sharing, defense cooperation and the 
development of an open and competitive Transatlantic defense market. (p. 20) 
Bialos et al. provide specific examples of this development.  On a policy level, the 
French White Paper "explicitly cites the need for non-ITAR-controlled electronics 
components to avoid limitations on French freedom of action" (p. 114).  In another instance, 
a country ensured operational sovereignty by "requiring that the program be staffed with 
domestic engineers free of ITAR restrictions" (p. 114).  European firms have developed 
policies specifically aimed at avoiding the use of ITAR items, developing "dual track" 
production lines of ITAR and non-ITAR items and favouring suppliers of non-ITAR 
components (p. 114).  Certainly, if ITAR items are superior to the non-ITAR items, the added 
complications may be worth the added capability.  However, if the gap is not that great; 
ITAR requirements can be a consideration.  As noted by Bialos et al., "Where the differential 
is not great, European governments and firms are increasingly opting for the non-ITAR 
choice" (p. 114). 
Complaints about US export control and technology transfer policy are long-standing, 
and it is not clear how heavily they will weigh on the decisions of other nations to work with 
the US on military projects when compared to the costs of cutting-edge military development 




generate sufficient orders to sustain a weapons source of efficient size in any category” (p. 
17).  And with the rapid growth of military technology (and the concomitant cost growth) the 
essential nature of the US in any development program will clearly increase.   
However, the US should consider whether it can afford to be indifferent to the 
willingness of other nations to participate in, and carry some of the costs of, such defence 
programs.  Spreading the cost burden would be presumably appealing to the DoD.  And 
increasing costs also have an impact on the production phase and potential overseas sales.  
It is an open question whether DoD contracts alone would be sufficient to sustain US military 
contractors.  The Congressional Research Service noted that while the US aviation industry 
is positioned to compete in the growing global market for civil aircraft, "the extent to which 
such economic conditions may preserve an adequate U.S. defence industrial base for the 
development and production of combat aircraft is debatable, however, given the significant 
differences between civilian and military aircraft requirements and technologies" (Bolkcom, 
2009, February 17, p. 17).  Even US firms and the DoD may need to focus on overseas 
sales to sustain programs.  And if the US wishes to generate sales to other nations, it will 
need to address the key issues of operational requirements and sovereignty which have 
been critical to the UK in the JSF.   
Bechat, Rohatyn, Hamre, and Serfaty (2003) note that there will always be a concern 
in the US, as in all countries, about the leakage of technology as a result of multinational 
programs.  However, there are benefits that also need to be considered: 
Governments seeking to strengthen the transatlantic defense relationship must 
weigh the potential benefits of cooperation against the risks that technology shared 
with allies might eventually leak to hostile states or subnational groups.  Although 
technology transfer to allies generally involve acceptable risks, those responsible for 
safeguarding U.S. military technology and for preventing the spread of conventional 
arms and WMD view technology transfer, even to close allies, as a potential threat 
and, therefore, as something to be tightly controlled.  Close transatlantic cooperation, 
however, may also reduce the potential risk of technology leakage as it improves 
each side's perception of sensitive issues and encourages adequate levels of 
protection. (p. 19) 
Bechat et al. note that "there continues to be broad consensus that the U.S. export 
control system attempts to control too much in light of the widespread diffusion of 
technologies with defense-related applications" (p. 30).  Indeed, one of the key criticisms in 
the UK that will be explored in the research project is that the US approach is all-
encompassing, and does not distinguish between high- and low-tech equipment.  There is 
substantial recognition in the UK that the US has every reason to closely protect cutting-
edge military technology, which it developed at significant time and expense.  The problem 
is that the export control and technology transfer policies extend far beyond such sensitive 
technology to adjacent areas that, to non-American eyes, do not appear to warrant such 
draconian measures.    
However, it is clear that transatlantic cooperation cannot work unless the tech 
transfer and export control issues are addressed.  As Bechat et al. clearly state,   
Export control difficulties go to the core of the problems that hamper transatlantic 
defense cooperation.  Changes in the United States and in Europe will be necessary 
if this critical impediment to enhanced cooperation is to be removed.  The U.S. 
export control system is broken; its technology transfer rules increasingly self-
defeating and out of step with broad trends in the global and European economies.  




shrinking the U.S. Munitions List to critical items, instituting greater corporate self-
governance with government audits of performance and creating a stronger appeals 
process for disagreements. (p. 52) 
Conclusion 
The resurrection of the JSF source code issue is an opportunity to assess the impact 
of US export control and technology transfer policies, and the UK perspective on this matter 
is of particularly value.  The JSF experience may be an indication of structural problems with 
multinational defence projects, which may be too difficult to be feasible.  Technology transfer 
disputes may be insurmountable.  Decisions on the awarding of contracts may be too hard 
to overcome.  Cost increases may be inevitable and excessive and outweigh political and 
economic interests.   
If these problems are inherent in multinational development programmes, perhaps 
the better option might be for multinational acquisition programs.  In such arrangements, 
there would be fewer states participating in development and more states signing up for 
purchase of the equipment.  This could reduce the impact of some of the problem areas 
while increasing interoperability.  However, there would still be major difficulties, and 
technology transfer problems, for example, would be reduced, but not eliminated. 
But it is not yet apparent that issues such as export controls and technology transfer 
are an inherently insurmountable barrier to effective programmes.  It is certainly important 
for friends and Allies to appreciate the concerns and interests of the US in protecting its 
technology.  However, the US should acknowledge the views of those who it may wish to 
participate in a US-led defence programme.  And UK views are particularly valuable, 
particularly as they involve a key programme like JSF.  These are the sorts of issues to be 
addressed as part of the joint NPS-Cranfield research to be conducted over 2010-2011, with 
the results to be presented at the 2011 symposium.   
If multinational defence programmes allow for more efficiency in development and 
production, and address concerns regarding protection of sensitive technology, they might 
be a cost-effective option, particularly in an era of tight military budgets and rapid 
technological advances.  However, a prohibitively restrictive export control and technology 
transfer regime could well negate any benefits from such multinational cooperation, and 
make it difficult for the US to convince other nations that they should commit themselves to a 
US-led military development project.  In short, if the US does indeed wish to lead 
multinational programmes that allow for the pooling of finances, talent and technology, this 
is an issue of importance, not just to the UK and other friends and Allies of the US, but 
particularly for the US. 
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Executive Summary 
This is a summary of the report cited above for inclusion in the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Acquisition Research Symposium (May 2010).  The 
report itself greatly exceeds the length guidelines for the Proceedings.  The topics raised 
here are discussed in greater detail within the body of that report. 
This is the third report from our project to better understand the evolving international-




• First, to better “map the terrain” in the international defense marketplace, which is 
steadily becoming more complex; and  
• Second, to consider the utility of various perspectives (or paradigms) in 
understanding the forces driving the changes in that industrial base. 
As a starting point in this multiyear effort, we undertook to study the interactions between 
the US and Europe (primarily European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) members).  Well into this project, we’re still considering primarily transatlantic 
defense industrial affairs. 
OUR CASES 
1. THE KC-X COMPETITION 
We continue our inquiry into the KC-X saga, which has consumed pretty much the entire first 
decade of the 21st century.  It has also been a major theme in our ongoing research project.  
In previous reports, we’ve considered the EADS strategy to enter the North American 
defense market (the KC-30 candidate for KC-X being a major part of that strategy).  In our 
second report, we considered the KC-X (or KC-45) competition between EADS (with its 
partner Northrop Grumman, NG) and Boeing, covering the major events of the competition 
from the original Request for Proposal (RFP) through the contract award to EADS-NG in 
February 2008, which included the Boeing protest, the GAO’s decision sustaining that 
protest, and the DoD’s abortive attempt to quickly re-compete the project.  Among other 
things, we concluded that the government side of the affair was better described by 
“quarrelsome committee” than by the traditional notion of the “sovereign monopolist.”  In this 
report, we give Graham Allison’s Model III (governmental politics) a preliminary test-drive as 
a paradigm for understanding the operations of the quarrelsome committee that has 
presided over the KC-X Affair. 
Overall, we see a confluence of trends with the KC-X Affair.  The growth in the size, 
complexity, and expense associated with new systems, combined with the post-Cold War 
defense industrial consolidations, mean fewer serious bidders for new projects.  When the 
US Air Force needed a new tanker, it found only one US supplier: Boeing.  However, EADS, 
which offered the KC-30 and had partnered with Northrop Grumman (NG), provided strong 
competition.  Although the EADS-NG team offered an attractive package that included 
substantial US industrial participation, Boeing’s political supporters were nonetheless able to 
appeal to nationalist sentiment against a “foreign” supplier.  The results so far resemble a 
political quagmire.  We also think that the “quarrelsome committee” (a dysfunctional 
example of governmental processes) is now a serious methodological challenger to the 
“sovereign monopsonist” model.  
2.  AIRBUS A400M DEVELOPMENT 
Our second case considers the difficulties that have attended the development of the Airbus 
A400M military transport aircraft—primarily the engines.  Among other things, it’s an 
interesting complement to our previous research about the difficulties encountered in the 
development of the Boeing 787 “Dreamliner” commercial transport aircraft.  As we’ve noted 
in previous reports, the scale and expense of major weapons systems frequently exceeds 
the capacity of firms, and also nation-states.  Among other things, this means that technical 
complexity has been accompanied by management complexity—at a number of levels.  
These include management of technology (or systems engineering) of integrating complex 
systems and of systems–of-systems.  They also include the management of complex 




787 experienced difficulties in the management of an extensively outsourced development 
project and a complex supply chain.  In the case of the A400M, the political choices made 
by the nations (and sponsors) drove the choice of a local engine—developed by a pickup 
team of European firms.  The result was extensive delays that have been costly in a number 
of ways.  Basically, the political imperatives associated with managing the A400M 
manifested themselves in the enormous technical difficulties encountered in developing 
those engines. 
A main theme in the case of the A400M is the interaction of globalization, sovereignty, and 
complexity.  The European participants chose an EU-based defense consortium as a 
method of reconciling globalization and “sovereignty” (in a regional sense).  The geographic 
and political logic of that consortium led to European engine development, despite an 
alternative that was much closer to fruition (and with much lower risk) from North America.  
The result has been very bad for Airbus and its prospective customers—extensive delays 
and cost overruns.  With those adverse developments, A400M buyers have either dropped 
away, hedged their bets, or become visibly less enthusiastic about pouring still more 
resources into the project.  While the A400M project has recently been refinanced and 
revived, we suspect the A400M story will, in the end, more closely resemble the Concorde’s 
than the A320’s. 
3. The (Maybe) Emerging Nordic Defense Bloc 
Finally, we undertake (we think) a fresh look at the maybe-emerging Nordic defense bloc.  
Nordic powers are making a number of serious and successful efforts to enhance 
cooperation among their militaries—with varying degrees of success.  But, will the natural 
attractions of geography, common culture, and common interests overcome the 
simultaneous attractions of nationalism and outside partners?  This tension has, inter alia, 
manifested itself in the competition between the Swedish Viggen and the American Joint 
Strike Fighter as the next-generation Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MRCA).  In our research, 
we’ve been fortunate to have received generous cooperation from a number of international 
respondents (promised anonymity).  They’ve provided valuable, inside information about 
both the attractive and centrifugal forces that affect the Nordic players.  Whether the Nordic 
group turns out to be a nascent defense bloc, or just a dead end, we believe the directions 
that Nordic defense establishments take will have significant implications for defense 
industrial affairs on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Our discussion of the Nordic bloc is an excellent example of the issues associated with 
regional partnerships.  Regional partnerships are attractive in principle and should be 
especially attractive given the many commonalities among the Nordic countries.  In practice, 
however, there are many “devils in the details.”  Indeed, some of those details surfaced in 
our interviews with knowledgeable officials from those Nordic countries. 
Overall: Taken as a whole, we think this particular report has furthered our research agenda 
of better understanding the nature of the contemporary defense industrial base—in all its 
global complexities—and in understanding some of the more likely future developments.  
We also think we’ve surfaced a fresh mode of analysis (Allison’s Model III) as a candidate 
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Abstract 
This study reports some preliminary results of a research agenda that seeks to 
address the absence of tested metrics to provide early indication of the acquisition risks of 
interdependent programs. The overall goal of this research is to forge new ground on 
uncovering early indicators of interdependency acquisition risk, so appropriate governance 
mechanisms can then be isolated. Funding will allow the ability to 1) expand on an existing 
database of Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAPs) performance data, 2) analyze the 
MDAPs to characterize the risks attributable to interdependence, and 3) determine whether 
acquisition setbacks cascade to downstream interdependent MDAP programs.  The 
deliverables of the effort are 1) a code book of DoD data acquisition items that can be 
employed in future research efforts, and 2) the results of the investigation of the cascading 
risks of interdependent acquisition efforts.   
In short, preliminary results indicate that perceptions of risk may prove influential on 
downstream program performance.  In terms of the direct influence that an upstream 
program’s performance might exert on downstream program performance, weak, but 
statistically significant, relationships were noted in three areas.  The next steps of the 
research are to 1) expand the dataset to include FY 2009 data, 2) document acquisition 
data, 3) collect a number of indicators on program interdependency, and 4) test a number of 






This research effort addresses two critical problems: 1) Data on major defense 
acquisition programs is piecemeal and fragmented, thus hindering acquisition research; 2) 
There is an absence of tested metrics to provide early indication of the acquisition risks of 
interdependent programs. 
A wealth of research indicates that the use of programmatic networks in the public 
sector is clearly on the rise (Weber & Khademian, 2008).  Noting that firms do not act by 
themselves, Granovetter (1973) witnessed that organizations are deeply embedded in 
“networks of external relationships” that influence the exchange of resources and 
capabilities among them.  Increasingly, state-, local-, and federal-level agencies are turning 
to joint interdependent programs to address gaps that only cross collaborative initiatives can 
span. Yet, as discussed below, the study of interdependency and its effects on program 
performance have yielded too few tangible results. For purposes of the discussion below, 
jointness, interdependency, exchange, and partnerships, all refer to a similar concept: the 
notion that autonomous organizations build relationships to provide capabilities that, when 
looked at in totality, form network structures. Additionally, at the individual pair-wise level, 
the exchanges are manifested as explicit transactions. 
Scholars have long contended that many contemporary policy challenges, and their 
associated solutions, lie across organizational domains outside the jurisdiction of any one 
agency (Gage & Mandell, 1990; Alexander, 1995; Agranoff, 2003).  Milward and Provan 
(2001) show that public policy arenas are inherently crosscutting; the requisite knowledge 
and corresponding solutions are not localized, but are instead distributed across a range of 
agencies and organizations. The DoD’s transformation to joint capabilities is in keeping with 
the ongoing trends.   Historically, acquisition investments at the DoD had been proposed as 
individual materiel solutions, typically championed by the armed service for which the 
product was to be obtained.  This gave rise to discrete systems designed in accordance with 
the individual service requirements.  When called upon to operate in a joint, multi-service 
environment, these systems exhibited problems interacting effectively with other service 
systems.   
The Transformation to Joint Capabilities attempts to provide military forces with the 
capability to adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances by leveraging a 
wider range of assets.  Central to the Transformation was the desire for enhanced 
coordination among agencies and across all levels of government (coalition, federal, state, 
and local).  In addressing the need for interagency cooperation, Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Giambastiani (2004) claimed that the integrated force had to become 
interdependent. That is, it must be capabilities-based, collaborative, and network centric.  
Military efforts require the ability to conduct high-level, or large-scale, vertical and horizontal 
collaboration. That means up and down the chain of command and across all capabilities 
and forces.   
While DoD agencies are expected to embrace joint capabilities, literature findings 
regarding the risks and best practice mechanisms of joint interdependent activities lag far 
behind.  Whereas early research did provide some insights, the research activities have 
stalled and progress is lacking.  For example, back in 1937, Coase found that 
interdependencies are based on mutual exchanges that can be examined at the transaction 
level.  He argued that these transactions accrued costs that could be attributed to 
establishing the rules of engagement, enforcing agreements, and monitoring compliance.  




In 1967, Thompson contributed to the research by offering a tripartite model that 
focused on the configurations of the transaction flows.  Sequential flows involved handoffs 
between partners.  Pooled flows involved partners that drew down from a common source of 
assets and the flows of reciprocal relationships involved feedback mechanisms.  Much of 
the research to date has been based on the anecdotal findings of small n case studies (Isett 
& Provan, 2005; Meier & O’Toole, 2008).   While the three configurations provide a starting 
point for understanding interdependent activities, the reality of today’s activities are far more 
complex. In short, it is not unusual for the acquisition or production of a service to 
incorporate multiple configurations with resources flowing in and out across organizations of 
public and private entities. As such, the most common configuration is the “mixed” pattern 
incorporating all three of the configurations and a wide array of nodes, assets, channels and 
zones.  
Exchange theorists argue that organizations develop interdependent relationships 
with other organizational entities to either obtain critical resources or provide critical 
capabilities. They also assert that interdependent relationships exhibit high levels of 
uncertainty due to participant 
constraints (Miles & Snow, 1978).  
Shirking or defection of a network 
member can have dire consequences 
on the survival and performance of 
the network in total and network 
participants in general.  Because of 
the nature and influence of the ties or 
interdependencies that bind 
organizations, Levinthal’s (1997) 
research indicated that increasing the 
density of the interdependencies that 
connect the organizations affects the 
complexity of the “landscape” in which 
it operates. Levinthal (1997) finds that 
these interconnections or flows can 
yield nonlinear consequences that 
often involve multiplier effects based 
on the nature of the 
interdependencies in the system.  
Apparently, the value chain of the joint 
capabilities is laden with junctions and bifurcations where delay, defection, or shirking can 
occur.  In fact, in 1999, Rosen argued that the uncertainty that arises from a relationship is 
the definition of “complexity.”  And that “complexity” can only be understood by examining 
the links that bind.  If Rosen is correct, then DoD acquisition is reaching unprecedented 
complexity.  A network analysis of MDAP data interdependencies suggests overwhelming 
complexity (see Figure 1).  The 78 MDAPs in 2005 demonstrated 989 unique links to other 
MDAPs as well as non-MDAP programs.  The yellow links indicate medium risk relationships 
and the red links show high risk links. 
Despite the activities, ten years ago Agranoff and McGuire (2001) wrote that “there 
are many more questions than answers in network management” and the assertion 
continues to ring true.  Apparently, the field is rich in anecdotal findings but poor in empirical 
evidence (Alexander, 1995). Oliver and Ebers (1998) liken the state of the field as a messy 
situation marked by a cacophony of heterogeneous concepts, theories, and research 




insights into the risks and threats of joint efforts.  Without a deep understanding of the risks 
and threats that interdependent efforts encounter, governance mechanisms that can help to 
insure acquisition success are beyond reach.  Given the pace at which joint efforts are 
pursued, early indicators of acquisition risk are needed to help isolate the critical 
governance mechanisms that will mitigate performance shortfalls. 
Additionally, of utmost concern is the state of current acquisition data.  While several 
initiatives are underway to compile the sundry datasets the fragmented acquisition data puts 
decision-making at risk for Type I and Type II errors (false positive and false negative, 
respectively).  Funding for this research effort will allow the ability to integrate, cleanse, and 
normalize authoritative datasets for the purpose of advanced research.  It will also provide 
the ability to document the acquisition data for future research purposes.  The 
documentation will allow the research community to forge new insights in the acquisition 
arena.   
The study of DoD acquisition efforts for gaining insights on interdependency is 
especially fruitful.  First, the DoD has rich, but fragmented and piecemeal, datasets on some 
of the important key interdependencies of major defense acquisition programs.  Second, the 
movement toward joint capabilities makes an understanding of interdependencies especially 
critical.  Finally, given the frequency with which government agencies are moving toward 
joint initiatives, findings based on DoD programs may prove instrumental to a wide range 
audience. The research below examines the ties that bind organizations in light of two 
different types of transactions: data ties and funding ties. And it begs the questions: do the 
ties result in cascading acquisition risks?  The research will act as a catalyst for a long-term 
research program on the risks and governance mechanisms of joint acquisition initiatives.  
Research Objectives: The objectives of the research are as follows:  
1. To map program interdependence to reveal the directionality of influence (i.e., 
“upstream”/“downstream”) of cause-effect relationships, 
2.  To test the cascading risks that upstream programs exert on downstream 
programs in light of data and funding exchanges, 
3. To test the extent to which the cost overruns of upstream programs cascade 
on to interdependent downstream programs, 
4. To test the extent to which schedule delays cascade on to interdependent 
downstream programs, 
5. To use the findings to make recommendations on potential governance 
mechanisms that may prove capable of mitigating the risks of 
interdependencies, and  
6. To provide a research code book of acquisition data elements for future 
research efforts. 
The remaining discussion provides an interim report on some of the findings to date, 
based on the interdependent activities identified in the Defense Acquisition Executive 
Reviews (DAES).  The findings below examine the influence of interdependencies on a 
number of program performance measures. 
Research Methods: Because of data availability issues, the unit of analysis for 
this research was restricted to Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Starting in the 
2005 time period, Major Defense Acquisition Program managers were asked to provide 




They identified upstream and downstream connections and indicated the perceived risk 
level (red, yellow, green).  Because of a small number of red risks, the risk variable was 
recoded to reflect “no-risk,” “risky.”  Hence the “risk” variable is binomial in nature.  The 
research findings described below are based on the influences these interdependencies 
might exert on program performance. 
Program performance is considered from multiple vantage points.  Table 1 provides 
all the variables used in this research and the documents they were derived from.  In short, 
performance is based on 1) annual cost variance figures (for total cost variance and the 
subsets of schedule, estimation, and engineering cost variance in millions), 2) DAES 
breaches (schedule, performance, and Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) breaches), and 3) percent cost growth from the original RDT&E estimates. All 
variables were derived from Selected Annual Reports (SARs) and DAES reports.  Because 
2005 marked the first year that the DAES reports began reporting interdependencies, the 
analysis reported below is based on MDAP performance in fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 
2007 (note: SAR reports were not reported in FY2008 due to the new presidential 
administration). 
Table 1. Variables Used in the Research 
Unit of Analysis: Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
Variable Data Source 
Count of APB Schedule Breaches 
Count of APB Performance Breaches 
Count of APB RDT&E Breaches 
Count of APB PAUC Breaches 
DAES 
Total Cost Variance 
Engineering Cost Variance 
Schedule Cost Variance 
Estimation Cost Variance 
SAR 
Percent Cost Growth SAR 
Data Exchange Interdependencies DAES Interdependency Charts 
As identified above, MDAP program managers were asked to provide insight on what 
they perceived to be the program’s interdependencies.  They also reported on the direction 
of the interdependency (inbound, outbound, and bidirectional) and the risk of the 
interdependency. The risk is based on the sender’s perceived risk with a downstream 
receiver.  Because performance data on non-MDAP programs were not available for 
analysis, the findings considered only the interdependencies that existed among MDAPs.  
Findings: Two major sets of findings are discussed below. The first is based on the 
influence of the sender’s perceived risk with the downstream receiver’s performance (during 
years 2005-2007).  The sender’s “perception of risk” is also considered in light of their own 
individual performance (during years 2005-2007).  To measure the sender’s perceived risk 
on their individual performance, the mean of the risk of all the relationships was calculated 
to provide an overall “risk” level for each MDAP.  The second set of findings is based on the 
sender’s performance and its influence on the receiver’s performance. Table 2 provides the 




downstream programs per upstream MDAP ranged from 1 to 23, with a mean of 5.  A total 
of 873 relationships were analyzed over the three-year time period. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Employed in the Research 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Upstream APB Schedule Breaches 269 .36 .481
Upstream APB RDT&E Breaches 522 .09 .289
Upstream APB PAUC Breaches 522 .08 .266
Upstream APB Performance Breaches 522 .13 .333
Downstream APB Schedule Breaches 518 .27 .444
Downstream APB Performance Breaches 522 .06 .240
Downstream APB RDT&E Breaches 522 .11 .319
Downstream APB PAUC Breaches 522 .11 .312
Upstream Perceived Risk 522 1.1073 .30977
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation
Upstream Percent Cost Growth 840 .08 1.00
Upstream Engineering Cost Variance 711 5.53 91.06
Upstream Schedule Cost Variance 711 4.76 38.31
Upstream Estimation Cost Variance 711 .32 159.33
Upstream Total Cost Variance 840 4.75 208.20
  
Downstream Percent Cost Growth 446 .014 .10
Downstream Engineering Cost Variance 351 -6.12 219.25
Downstream Schedule Cost Variance 351 3.77 25.05
Downstream Estimation Cost Variance 351 -7.95 324.36




Interdependency Risk.  The first set of tests sought to determine if the sender’s 
perceived risk of the relationship influenced its partnering receiver.  In terms of the “partner 
risk” variable, xx% of the MDAP program managers identified no risk in the partnerships. 
Xx% indicated some degree of risk in the relationships.  Of the 56 programs that indicated 
some risk, the risk ranged from a low of 1.1 to a high of 2 (recall that the variable ranges 
from “1” to “2,” with “1” indicating no risk).  Correlation coefficients were then obtained (see 
Table 3).  The data show that the Manager’s Perception of Risk is negatively with the 
partner’s total cost variance, engineering cost variance, and estimation cost variance.  
Interestingly, risk was correlated with the downstream partner’s performance, RDT&E, and 
PAUC breaches, but in a positive direction.  The fact that an upstream partner’s perception 
of risk might result in an increase in the number of DAES’ breaches illustrates the 
detrimental influence that upstream programs might exert on their downstream partners.  
But, why the negative relationship with cost variance?  Why would an increasing perception 
of risk on the upstream program result in reducing the cost variance of its downstream 
partners?  Perhaps the answer lies in the old adage that perceptions of risk result in 
increased attention.  Perhaps, under high-risk situations, program managers are more 
cognizant of the risk and act to mitigate the detrimental effects.  More research is clearly 
warranted to tease out why these correlations are demonstrated. 
Table 3. Bivariate Correlation with MDAP Program Manager’s Perception of Risk 
MDAP’s Percent Cost Growth -.024 
MDAP’s  Total Cost Variance .019 
MDAP’s Engineering Cost Variance -.081* 
MDAP’s Schedule Cost Variance -.007 
MDAP’s Estimation Cost Variance .05 
MDAP’s Schedule Breaches .05 
MDAP’s  Performance Breaches .11* 
MDAP’s RDT&E Breaches .13** 
MDAP’s PAUC Breaches -.05 
Downstream MDAP’s Percent Cost Growth -.07 
Downstream MDAP’s  Total Cost Variance -.12** 
Downstream MDAP’s Engineering Cost Variance -.22** 
Downstream MDAP’s Schedule Cost Variance -.05 
Downstream MDAP’s Estimation Cost Variance -.11* 
Downstream MDAP’s Schedule Breaches .07 
Downstream MDAP’s  Performance Breaches .13** 
Downstream MDAP’s RDT&E Breaches .09* 
Downstream MDAP’s PAUC Breaches .12** 




The next step of the “risk” analysis sought to isolate whether the MDAP’s mean risk 
score influenced their own specific performance.  The results show that the manager’s 
perception of risk is positively correlated with the program’s engineering cost variance.  
Outside of engineering cost variance, despite recognition of risk, no notable correlations 
were demonstrated in terms of DAES breaches, cost variance, or cost growth.   
The second set of tests sought to identify whether the performance of upstream 
programs exert influence on their downstream partner’s performance.  Because an 
upstream program’s influence would not expect to have an immediate effect, the data were 
lagged a year.  In other words, one might expect that the negative effects of an upstream 
program would influence their downstream partners one year out.  Table 4 shows the results 
of the sender’s performance on the downstream partners.  The results show little influence 
on APB breaches.  A weak, but statistically significant, relationship was demonstrated 
between the number of upstream program RDT&E breaches and the number of downstream 
program RDT&E breaches.  In terms of the influence of the upstream program’s percent 
growth, it showed no correlation with the downstream program’s percent growth.  Two of the 
cost variance relationships also showed weak, but statistically significant, correlations.  The 
sender’s total cost variance appeared to exert some influence on the downstream program’s 
schedule variance.  In addition, as the sender’s engineering cost variance rose, a 
subsequent rise was also noted in the downstream program’s percent cost growth. 
Table 4. The Influence of the Sender’s Performance on Downstream Programs  
FY 2005-2007 (Lag of One Year) 
 
Conclusions 
The results discussed above are the preliminary interim results of a segment of 
research that seeks to identify the influences that interdependencies might exert on 
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acquisition program performance.  In short, the results indicate that perceptions of risk may 
prove influential on downstream program performance.  In terms of the direct influence that 
an upstream program’s performance might exert on downstream program performance, 
weak, but statistically significant, relationships were noted in three areas. In subsequent 
months, we will complete the data collection effort and construct and test a series of 
interdependency metrics on program performance.  The data will be modeled using 
traditional statistical approaches to assess causality.  Additionally, we will employ Markov 
Decision Process (MDP)-based methods (Puterman, 1994) to take into account the cost and 
schedule variance specifications from the n-ordered downstream programs and produce a 
specification of the best possible budget trimming options for the decision-maker. Formally, 
a MDP is a probabilistic model of a sequential decision problem, in which states can be 
perceived exactly, and the current state and action selected determine a probability 
distribution on future states (Bertsekas, 1987). Specifically, the outcome of applying an 
action to a state depends only on the current action and state (and not on preceding actions 
or states). We assume that state changes in our model occur only at discrete instances of 
time, allowing us to model the network as a discrete event dynamic system (DEDS) and plan 
to employ MDPs. Our model facilitates the data acquisition process since we iteratively 
refine the state features critical to the decision-making. The action space will capture 
information about the funders, including changes in level of funding. We plan to model the 
probability of transitions from one state to another empirically by using existing data. The 
“Reward” function will be the presence of a schedule delay and cost variance that occurs in 
n-ordered downstream programs. Hence, we will be assessing various interdependency 
metrics in light of statistical and MDP methods to isolate the most feasible method for 
understanding interdependencies. 
In short, the next steps of the research are to 1) expand the dataset to include FY 
2009 data, 2) document existing acquisition data sources, 3) collect a number of indicators 
on program interdependency, and 4) test a number of interdependency diversity metrics in 
terms of their ability to provide insights on program performance. 
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Complexity is the hallmark of most modern military systems. The desire to have 
legacy systems interoperate with new systems, and especially the mounting interest in 
developing “systems of systems” (SoS) solutions, drive ever-more complexity into weapon 
systems. Complexity is further compounded by the increasing reliance on software to enable 
these systems. Existing forms of schedule- or event-driven reviews are inadequate to 
address the needs of software development in a complex SoS environment. What is needed 
is a true, evidence-driven, SoS-level evaluation capable of providing an overall assessment 
of, and insight into, the software development effort in that context. The Lifecycle 
Architecture anchor point is a technique used, typically, to evaluate the designs of single 
systems. This paper examines how, with some adaptation, the precepts of the Lifecycle 
Architecture anchor point can be scaled and applied to the system of systems domain. 
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Introduction 
Modern military systems are complex undertakings. The desire to have legacy 
systems interoperate with new systems, and especially the mounting interest in developing 
“systems of systems” (SoS) solutions, drive ever-more complexity. The problem is 
exacerbated by the reliance upon software to accomplish much of the underlying 
functionality; indeed, software often is the integrating element of an SoS. This complexity 
challenges the ability of engineers, managers, and users to achieve a solid understanding of 
an SoS during its development. Frequently, the SoS stakeholders (apart from the software 
developers themselves) have a very limited understanding of software or its contribution to 
the overall SoS. Yet, understanding an SoS during development is crucial to managing the 
development effort efficiently and to delivering quality products to the warfighter within 
schedule and budget.  
Traditionally, schedule- or event-driven reviews have been a crucial element of most 
major development projects. From a software perspective, such reviews tend to focus on 
different aspects of development: producibility reviews focus on the ability to produce the 
software within available resources; capability reviews focus on the services being provided 
by the software; integration and test reviews focus on the readiness of the software to enter 
or transition between those phases of the development life cycle; schedule reviews focus on 
the development effort’s adherence to planned timelines; and so on. Although these 
different types of reviews provide valuable insights into the software development project at 
various stages of the lifecycle, the sum of these reviews is not sufficient to address the 
needs of software development in a complex SoS environment. 
Most overall-systems reviews concentrate mainly on the functional definitions of 
system artifacts, and often treat evidence that the artifacts described will meet the system’s 
key performance parameter requirements comparatively lightly. Further, in order to support 
the needs of manufacturing planning and long-lead purchasing, such reviews tend to occur 
at points in the system development lifecycle ahead of the majority of the software 
development work. The resulting gap between maturity of SoS constituent systems and 
maturity of SoS software leads to uncertainty about the sufficiency of the overall SoS 
solution at a time when commitments must be made. Thus, traditional review approaches 
simply are inadequate when used as a means for understanding and evaluating software at 
an SoS level. How can stakeholders have confidence in an SoS that relies heavily upon 
software, when production commitments must be made well before completion of that 
software? 
Prior to its 2009 cancellation, the US Army’s Future Combat Systems program faced 
just such a dilemma. Needed was a true SoS-level evaluation capable of providing an 
overall assessment of, and insight into, the software development effort in that context—one 
that could provide a review/assessment of how the developed software capability enabled 
the program’s required operational capability. As a solution, the program hypothesized that 
something like a Lifecycle Architecture anchor point review (often referred to simply as 
LCA), conducted at the SoS level, could answer the question. Originally a software 




the elaboration phase of software development, when the requirements baseline is set and 
the architecture is complete (Kroll & Kruchten, 2003; Boehm, 1996). As extended to systems 
engineering in works by Richard Pew and Anne Mavor (2007) and Barry Boehm and Jo Ann 
Lane (2007), the goal of anchoring events such as the LCA is to assess program risk by 
examining evidence provided by the developers that a system developed to the architecture 
can satisfy the requirements. The LCA, in particular, strives to ensure that a system, as 
architected, can be constructed while also meeting planned cost and schedule targets. 
This paper reports on the extension of the Lifecycle Architecture anchor point 
concept to the SoS level and describes its application to the software and computing 
elements of the former Future Combat Systems program. 
The Lifecycle Architecture Anchor Point 
Nominally, the LCA anchor point occurs at a stage in the development lifecycle 
where stakeholders evaluate the work that has been completed through the elaboration 
phase (the phase in which requirements and architecture models are largely complete) and 
assess the risks of moving forward into the construction and transition phases (the phases 
in which design, implementation, and testing/validation are performed). The name LCA 
derives from the nature of the review: it is a look-ahead through the lifecycle, conducted at a 
point where the architecture is sufficiently mature to allow reasoning about the relative risks 
of continuing to the construction phase of development. It is a foundational event, one where 
project stakeholders come together and agree to move forward, hence the term “anchor 
point”. The LCA differs from traditional milestone reviews such as preliminary design reviews 
(PDRs) and critical design reviews (CDRs), which tend to focus superficially on voluminous 
system description data, in that the LCA is a risk-based assessment focused on the 
feasibility of proceeding with work. 
Central to the LCA is the notion of feasibility rationale, which documents evidence, 
provided by the developers, that the proposed architecture can be implemented to satisfy its 
requirements within the defined schedule and project budget. To justify the confidence of all 
stakeholders in moving forward into the latter phases of the development life cycle, the 
evidence must be both objective and internally consistent. The LCA is not just a technical 
assessment, but also a programmatic one. Successful completion of the LCA anchor point 
represents a commitment by all stakeholders to proceed with the program, based on 
objective evidence that the risks of doing so have been identified and sufficiently mitigated 
to provide a reasonable chance of project success. In contrast, insufficient or highly 
subjective evidence will not engender the confidence among stakeholders needed for them 
to commit to further development. Importantly, risks are addressed at a time when they are 
handled more easily and inexpensively than if they are allowed to propagate to later 
development stages. 
The LCA feasibility rationale is relatively straightforward in the context of a traditional 
system development project. For a complex system of systems program, the feasibility 
package becomes less clear. Simply rolling up results from the LCA anchor points of 
constituent systems, for example, is not a sufficient approach because important inter-
system and SoS implications might easily be missed. The feasibility of executing each 
individual software package/system does not necessarily correlate to the feasibility of 




Extending the LCA Process For The FCS SoS 
Prior to its cancellation, the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program extended the 
notion of a Lifecycle Architecture anchor point to the SoS level as a means of evaluating on-
going software development activities across the lifecycle in terms of risk with respect to 
meeting the program’s Key Performance Parameters (KPPs).  
The first step was to set up a team of experts from the Software Engineering 
Institute, the University of Southern California, and the Fraunhofer Center for Experimental 
Software Engineering at the University of Maryland (hereinafter referred to as the SoS LCA 
Team), with representatives from the Army providing guidance and representatives from the 
program’s Lead System Integrator (LSI) facilitating access to program artifacts and 
personnel. Team members brought a range of programmatic and technical expertise to the 
effort, including a deep understanding of the usual LCA process for software. They also 
brought the degree of independence necessary to assure both the LSI and the Army of an 
unbiased result. 
The SoS LCA Concept 
In defining the SoS LCA review process, the SoS LCA Team followed a few key 
guidelines set by program management: 
 Answer the following questions: 
− Can what is planned to be built really be built? 
− Will the various pieces add up to the desired whole? 
− Are the risks clearly identified and mitigated? 
 Base answers on evidence rather than unsupported assertions. 
 Discover issues early so that they can be fixed sooner rather than later. 
 Build the confidence needed in the software/computing system development 
plans for a successful Milestone C decision for the overall program. 
Rather than finding fault and assigning blame, the goal of the SoS LCA was to 
surface problems as early as possible so that they could be fixed at minimum cost. Equally 
important for FCS was the building of confidence in the software and computing system 
development plans, since an entire build of software would not yet have been developed at 
the time of the program’s planned Milestone C review. 
The FCS program had been executing traditional LCA reviews at the supplier and 
first-tier integration levels; however, simply rolling-up the results of these lower level reviews 
would have invited missing critical subtleties in the cross-system relationships that are the 
essence of an SoS. Also, the lower level LCA reviews focused narrowly on specific builds, 
often at different points in time. The SoS-level LCA was required to assess feasibility across 
future builds. Further, while other FCS software reviews focused on the plans for the 
immediately upcoming phase of a given build, the SoS LCA had to consider existing data 
and results from prior builds as well. The SoS LCA Team had to construct an SoS LCA 
evaluation process that had as its foundation the best-available facts and data as the basis 
for projecting forward. 
As shown in Figure 1, the FCS SoS LCA process extrapolated, from what was 
known through what was expected and planned, the likelihood of reaching the desired 




acceptable implementation of software Build 3 Final (B3F) to support a successful Milestone 
C decision (consequently, the SoS LCA results were a key feeder into the program’s SoS 
PDR). 
 
Figure 1. The SoS LCA Assesses the Likelihood of Achieving an Acceptable Outcome 
Without waiting for tests on the final implementation, the SoS LCA sought to 
determine if FCS software could be built and if it would satisfy program needs. The basis of 
the extrapolation was objective evidence: facts and data in addition to other artifacts. Facts 
took the form of test results and demonstration outcomes for software that already had been 
built. Data consisted of simulation results that predicted operational performance of planned 
designs as well as the results of various technical assessments. The remaining artifacts of 
interest included the various plans, designs, schedules, and so on, that formed the basis of 
the work yet to be done. Engineering work products were evaluated for completeness and 
adequacy, as well as for consistency with other work products and plans. The SoS LCA 
focused on test data and results (as well as software producibility analysis) to evaluate the 
current capability of FCS software and to project the ability to meet program needs. The 
goal was to determine if development was on an acceptable trajectory or if deviations of 





On a very large SoS program such as FCS, there is no practical way to review all of 
the data one might wish to analyze in order to draw conclusions. Such a detailed effort might 
require thousands of labor hours spread over many months. While the cost alone would be 
a significant deterrent, the time factor also would be of concern. The longer it takes to 
complete the examination of all the evidence, the higher the risk that analyses performed 
early in the process will be invalidated by ongoing development work  (due to prior problems 
or unknowns being resolved or new issues being introduced). 
On FCS, program management had decided to limit the scope of the SoS LCA to the 
software and computer-processing elements of the program, but even that limitation left the 
range of investigation too broad. It quickly became apparent to the SoS LCA Team that 
executing a traditional LCA at the SoS level, even one constrained to the software and 
computing system elements of the program, would not be feasible. Merely coordinating an 
effort of that magnitude would become a project unto itself. Such an LCA would be too large, 
too complex, and too resource-intensive to be managed successfully. Instead, the team had 
to determine what a modest-sized team with limited resources could reasonably accomplish. 
The result was a focus on high-payoff areas for the program. These focus areas were not 
necessarily risk areas, but rather crucial areas to successful development of the FCS 
software: 
1. ability to meet schedules within and across increments 
7. ability to meet budgets within and across increments 
8. ability to integrate across Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) and suppliers 
(including adequacy of requirements, architectural consistency, and so on) 
9. ability to achieve/maintain interoperability among independently evolving 
systems (including Current Force platforms) 
10. ability to coordinate multiple baselines for the core program, spin outs, and 
experiments 
11. ability to manage co-dependencies between models, simulations, and actual 
systems 
12. feasibility of meeting required performance levels in areas such as safety and 
security 
13. maturity of technology considering scalability requirements 
14. supportability of software 
15. adequacy of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) evaluations and mitigations 
A review of the results from lower level LCAs showed that these focus areas were 
commonly cited as problems, thus validating the list. With the scope bounded, the SoS LCA 
Team next worked on developing a process model for the SoS LCA. 
An SoS LCA Process Model—First Cut 
Figure 2 shows the initial SoS LCA process model. As envisioned, several analysis 
teams, consisting of the experts from the SoS LCA Team as well as representatives from 
the government, LSI, and the program’s suppliers (referred to as One Team Partners, or 
OTPs), were to be formed. Each team would tackle a single focus area, examining the 




examinations. The results from each analysis team would be collected, summarized, and 
reported on by the SoS LCA Team, with a final report that detailed findings and 
recommendations serving as input to the program’s SoS PDR. The SoS LCA final report, 
combined with results from the SoS PDR, would provide the basis for management decision 
making regarding any corrective actions. 
 
Figure 2. The Initial SoS LCA Process Model 
Although the process model seemed to be straightforward, team members’ 
experiences indicated that piloting the SoS LCA process on a small scale would be a wise 
first step. A pilot would allow the team to figure out the details of executing the process and 
discover any invalid assumptions and process inefficiencies. 
The SoS LCA Pilot 
Key considerations in planning for the SoS LCA pilot effort were its scoping and 
timing. It was important to limit the scope of the pilot to be executable relatively quickly, 
while at the same keep it broad enough to be useful as a test run for the larger effort. 
Equally challenging was scheduling the pilot. On a program with so many separate but 
interacting aspects, it seemed as if there was always a conflicting event to draw time, 
attention, and resources away from the SoS LCA pilot. As the pilot was not part of the 
original program plan, the need to minimize disruption to ongoing program activities served 
as yet another complication. 
As it happened, the lead of the C4ISR19 team volunteered his area of responsibility to 
participate in the SoS LCA pilot because he saw value in having some independent review 
of the work being performed by his team. The C4ISR area, however, was quite sizeable with 
many interdependent elements, which was good from the perspective of piloting the process 
                                                





but challenging in terms of completing the pilot in a short timeframe. The SoS LCA Team 
negotiated with the C4ISR team lead to adjust the pilot scope to be achievable yet still 
worthwhile. The negotiated scope included a subset of the 10 SoS LCA focus areas, 
coupled with the C4ISR lead’s principle areas of concern. The timing of the pilot also aligned 
well with a previously planned review cycle for the C4ISR team. 
After first socializing the notion of the pilot among the C4ISR team members so that 
expectations on both sides were clear, the SoS LCA Team next set about gathering data. 
Team members divided the focus areas among themselves based on their respective 
backgrounds and expertise. The Team spent about three weeks gathering evidence from 
existing C4ISR plans and technical documents; no new documents were to be created for 
the purposes of the pilot. 
Almost immediately, the pilot began serving its purpose. One early discovery was 
that SoS LCA Team members were not in full agreement about the goals or method of 
conduct of the pilot. Thus, the pilot was an invaluable experience both from the perspective 
of checking and refining the process and from the point of view of developing a common 
mission understanding within the SoS LCA Team. 
Another revelation was the considerable amount of misunderstanding between the 
SoS LCA Team, the C4ISR team, and its various performer organizations (despite efforts to 
set clear expectations at the outset). Documentation and evidence furnished by the C4ISR 
team generated more questions than answers, requiring numerous follow-up 
teleconferences and requests for additional documents. The documents provided often had 
timestamps differing by several months and frequently made what appeared to be 
incompatible assumptions. Trying to resolve these inconsistencies without interrupting the 
performers’ work gave the SoS LCA Team an appreciation of the difficulty to be expected 
when performing a complete assessment. 
The SoS LCA Team found little documentation to support an independent conclusion 
that the C4ISR plans and approach were feasible. This outcome was not because the 
C4ISR team had not done its job; on the contrary, there was ample evidence of significant 
engineering effort. However, there was no contractual obligation for suppliers to 
demonstrate the feasibility of their work, per se, outside of customary test and validation 
methods, which placed a heavier burden on the analysis team in trying to understand how 
completed work related to future work. Since the crux of the LCA is reliance upon evidence 
rather than verbal accounts and assurances, the SoS LCA Team realized that the full 
assessment would require extra time for data gathering and a deeper probe of the available 
evidence in order to ensure the veracity of findings. 
Despite the noted difficulties, the pilot generally was a success in that it helped clarify 
the SoS LCA Team’s thinking about conducting the full-scale SoS LCA. It demonstrated that 
program personnel would be too busy to participate significantly in gathering and examining 
feasibility evidence, which would necessitate a larger effort on the part of the analysis team. 
It also demonstrated the need to set expectations among developers and management 
continually to ensure their ongoing support of the process. The pilot also highlighted the 
need to review emerging findings with stakeholders to ensure accuracy. Meanwhile, the 
C4ISR Team also benefitted from the pilot by being able to raise issues that had been of 
concern to them for management attention, with the added weight of independent analysis 




Some Process Refinements 
As a result of the SoS LCA pilot and other program activities, the SoS LCA Team 
made some adjustments both to the focus areas and to the process model. 
First, in consultation with program management, the SoS LCA Team modified the 
focus areas. The initial list proved to be too vague and overly oriented toward programmatic 
(e.g., non-technical) considerations. The modified list represented the essential FCS 
capabilities, the "non-disposable" elements of the program. These elements (see Table 1) 
were ones that had to work in order to ensure that the program could produce a viable SoS 
capability for the Warfighter. 
Table 1. Final SoS LCA Focus Areas 
Focus Area Description 
Fusion and Data Distribution Includes: 
Distributed Information Management–effectiveness of data 
communications among platforms and systems over a network, 
analysis of data reliability, latency, etc. 
Distributed Fusion Management–effectiveness of utilizing several 
sources to gather and distribute fusion data, including network 
usage, data reliability, latency, etc. 
Rapid Battlespace Deconfliction–effectiveness of providing, 
recognizing, and utilizing battlespace deconfliction data passed 
among Brigade Combat Team  (BCT) platforms 
Quality of Service (QoS) Analysis of message prioritization effectiveness, delivery rates, 
methods of prioritization, etc. 
Information Assurance (IA) & 
Security 
Review of the status of efforts to develop and test FCS IA 
components, and a determination of the attainment of necessary 
functional capabilities 
Software Performance Analysis of the projected ability of fielded FCS software (e.g., 
algorithms) to enable planned capabilities in a comprehensive, 
end-to-end operational environment 
Display Management and Task 
Automation/Task Integration 
Networks (TINs) 
Analysis of the performance, usability, and automation capabilities 
demonstrated in Warfighter Machine Interface (WMI) displays 
Key Battle Command Systems Includes: 
Network Management System (NMS)–review of current status of 
development of the Network Management System (NMS)  system, 
as well as analysis of the current state of general network 
management issues 
Integrated Computer System (ICS)–assessment of the 
development and issues related to the various versions of the ICS 
system. Determination of the ICS' ability to meet FCS design 
needs 
Centralized Controller (CC)–analysis of the current state of the CC 
and its ability to meet necessary functional capabilities 
The results of investigations into these focus areas formed the detailed technical 




Second, the realities of personnel availability necessitated slight adjustments to the 
process model. Figure 3 shows the changes, which were encapsulated entirely within 
analysis team formation (i.e., inside the red oval denoted by the gray arrow on the left-hand 
side of the diagram).  
 
Figure 3. SoS LCA Process Model Showing Refinements 
As shown in Figure 3, instead of several analysis teams, there was only one, which 
was composed entirely of technical experts from the SoS LCA Team, although Army 
representatives provided guidance and an LSI representative facilitated access to 
documentation. Suppliers were unable to participate in the analysis process at all, although 
they were called upon to provide data and, occasionally, clarification of the data. The SoS 
LCA Team divided the focus areas among themselves; in each area, typically one or two 
team members had responsibility for identifying the types of artifacts needed for evaluation, 
reviewing them, and rendering recommendations based on review findings. The entire 
analysis team reviewed results as they emerged and briefed status to program management 
at frequent intervals. 
Capstone Analyses: Tying It All Together 
While detailed technical analyses are the foundation of the SoS LCA, they are 
inadequate for communicating status and risk to stakeholders who may have limited 
expertise in those technical areas. In particular, the highest levels of program management 
need to be able to relate the SoS LCA findings to overall program outcomes in order to 
make informed decisions about risk mitigation. Further, the thread to tie the focus areas 
together in a meaningful way was missing. Needed was a means of looking at the results in 




decision-making. The solution involved two capstone analysis efforts, one from a technical 
perspective and the other from a cost and schedule perspective. The end-state design 
analysis summed up the findings of the technical focus areas in a way that made the 
technical findings relevant for management decision-making. The software producibility 
analysis looked at the feasibility of developing the remaining software within allocated 
schedules and budgets based on a cost/schedule analysis of the completed builds cross-
compared to the relative risks that emerged from the end-state design analysis. Taken 
together, these two capstone efforts summarized the overall SoS LCA findings in terms of 
program performance, not simply software performance, providing management with the 
“so-what” in a report that was otherwise highly technical. 
End-State Design Analysis 
The capstone technical analysis was an examination of the overall “end-state” design 
– the software design as it was expected to exist at the completion of the development 
program. The analysis sought to determine if the end-state software design would truly meet 
operational needs of the program. The analysis was an ambitious undertaking; there had 
never before been an attempt to understand the FCS SoS software design to such a depth. 
Two problems popped up immediately: 1) how to characterize operational needs in terms of 
software and 2) how to tie the analysis to those needs. 
Rather than recast the program’s operational needs in software terms, a more logical 
approach to the first problem was to analyze the software contributions to the definitive 
characterization of the program’s operational needs—the SoS key performance parameters 
(KPPs). That realization made the analysis approach obvious. The SoS LCA Team applied 
assurance cases to analyze the SoS end-state software design with respect to the KPPs. 
Assurance Cases 
An assurance case is nothing more than a structured set of arguments, supported by 
a body of evidence, that justifies belief that a given claim is true. To make one’s “case,” one 
argues that certain evidence supports (or does not support) a given claim. One constructs 
an assurance case by starting with an overarching claim and then iteratively decomposing it 
into constituent claims, which, at the lowest level, are supported directly by evidence. Figure 





Figure 4. The Basic Structure of an Assurance Case 
The logic of an assurance case is straightforward. If all the evidence shown in Figure 
4 is sufficient, then belief in sub-claims 1, 3, and 4 is justified. Belief in sub-claims 3 and 4 
justifies belief in sub-claim 2, which, combined with belief in sub-claim 1, justifies belief in the 
top-level overall claim.20 
Applying Assurance Cases—An Example 
For the FCS SoS LCA, the end-state design analysis approach was to use each of 
the program’s KPPs as a main claim and demonstrate how well the SoS software and 
computing system designs supported them. (In one case, software and computing systems 
played no role in satisfying a KPP; developing a partial assurance case confirmed that 
suspicion.) The findings from the focus area analyses served as primary sources of 
evidence, augmented with additional analyses and artifacts as necessary. 
Figure 5 presents an oversimplified example (note that it is not an actual FCS 
analysis). 
                                                
20 A more complete discussion on the use of assurance cases for analyzing SoS software designs 






Figure 5. Oversimplified Example of an Assurance Case Using Focus Area  
Findings as Evidence 
The example shown is based on the Net Ready KPP, a common KPP among DoD 
systems that exchange information. As shown by the context bubble, Ctx1, the KPP 
definition is taken from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 
6212.01E (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008) rather than on a specific FCS 
program requirement. The figure shows the main claim, labeled C1, is supported by three 
sub-claims, labeled C2, C3, and C4. For purposes of illustration, each sub-claim is shown to 
be supported directly by findings from the SoS LCA focus areas (Ev1, Ev2, and Ev3).21 An 
actual analysis would be far more extensive, with many sub-claims and possibly multiple 
sources of evidence supporting the claims at the lowest level. 
For purposes of communicating findings to management, it is useful to speak in 
terms of risk (i.e., risk of not meeting a KPP). A common management practice is to 
associate a color code with different risk levels, such as red to indicate a high level of risk, 
yellow to indicate a moderate level of risk, and green to indicate a low level of risk. The 
relative risk levels are then rolled up according to predetermined rules to establish a level of 
confidence about the supported claims. A sample rule set for this example is shown in Table 
2.
                                                
21 In this sample case, assumption A1 helps to justify the use of the QoS focus area findings in 




Table 2. Sample Rules for Rolling Up Risk 
Green (low risk) All lower level claims and supporting evidence are green. 
Yellow (moderate risk) Some lower level claims and supporting evidence are a combination of yellow 
and red. 
Red (high risk) All, or an overwhelming majority of, lower level claims and supporting evidence 
are red. 
To further illustrate the assurance case concept, the authors have arbitrarily 
assigned one of each color-coded risk level to the evidence bubbles. Applying the rule set to 
the example, the findings for key battle command systems indicate a high risk within the 
focus area (Ev1), so the claim supported by that evidence is also rated as high risk (or, more 
correctly, low confidence that the claim is true). Applying the rule set to the remaining 
elements of the example yields the results shown. Since none of the sub-claims in the 
example is rated any better than moderate risk (indeed, C2 is high risk), the main claim C1 
can be no better than moderate risk and, therefore, there is only moderate confidence in 
satisfying the Net Ready KPP in this example. 
A full analysis, of course, would identify the specific issues that led to the risk 
assignments as well as corresponding recommendations for addressing them. Given such 
information, a program manager could decide if the moderate risk of not meeting the KPP 
was acceptable or, if not acceptable, decide on one or more courses of action for reducing 
the risk/increasing confidence. Although this example is deliberately negative, it should be 
clear that strong evidence in support of all claims would lead to a high level of confidence 
that a given KPP was well supported; this situation is, of course, the ideal. 
For FCS, the use of assurance cases provided a way to report the technical findings 
from the SoS LCA to program management in a way that related directly back to program 
goals without requiring a detailed understanding of software and computing systems. Each 
KPP had its own assurance case, and the findings from the technical focus areas were used 
as evidence to support one or more of those assurance cases. This approach tied both 
issues and strengths in the software to the overall program goals, providing a view of 
program risk that was vertically integrated within each KPP and horizontally integrated 
across the technical focus areas. 
Producibility Analysis22 
The second capstone, producibility analysis, concerned the programmatic aspects of 
the FCS SoS software development effort. Apart from technical feasibility, the producibility 
analysis sought to demonstrate the feasibility of developing the SoS software and computing 
systems within cost and schedule targets. 
Estimating software producibility presented some special challenges. Unlike 
hardware, which is typically built to completion before testing, the FCS software was being 
implemented in a series of increments or builds, which is a fairly common approach for large 
development programs. In such cases, the software producibility costs for later development 
increments tend to increase due to breakage in previous increments as well as increased 
integration and test costs.  
                                                




Breakage in previous increments has several sources. One source is errors 
discovered in the earlier increments that must be fixed within the budgets and schedules of 
later increments, which then increases development workload, while the integration and test 
burden for later increments is already larger due to the software product becoming more 
complete. Other sources of breakage include revisions of earlier-increment software to 
support later-increment needs or changes, and adaptation of the software to changes in 
COTS or external-software interfaces. 
The magnitude of these Incremental Development Productivity Decline (IDPD)23 
effects varies due to several factors, such as the degree of coupling to other parts of the 
software or the rate of requirements or interface changes. Thus, using constant-productivity 
estimates for future software increment producibility projections would lead to severe 
underestimation. 
Further, FCS was in a unique position in that there were no predecessor projects of 
equivalent scope and scale from which to predict accurately its software producibility rates. 
The estimation parameters and knowledge bases of current software estimation tools are 
generally good for stable, standalone, single-increment development of the kind of software 
being developed at the lower system levels by the FCS suppliers. However, such tools 
generally fail to account for the degrees of program and software dynamism, incrementality, 
coordination complexity, and system of systems integration that were faced by FCS. These 
phenomena tend to decrease software productivity relative to the cost model estimates, but 
it is difficult to estimate by how much. 
To calibrate software estimates involves measurement of producibility data from 
early increment software deliveries. For FCS, the best available relevant data was from the 
System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE) software because it 
underpinned most other mission software packages and thus had several early releases; 
consequently, there were four increments upon which to base the magnitude and evolution 
of its IDPD factor. SOSCOE was not fully representative of the mission software, however, 
leaving uncertainties about its use to predict the IDPD factors of the mission software 
increments. Similarly, mission software from other programs was not representative of the 
unique system of systems aspects of FCS. Thus, data from both sources (SOSCOE and 
other programs) were used to perform a sensitivity analysis of the amount of software that 
could be produced within the available budget and schedule. 
Research Results 
Existing software reviews had specific artifacts and criteria to examine, but their 
scope was necessarily limited. By defining appropriate and relevant criteria at the SoS level, 
the SoS LCA provided the opportunity to independently assess broader areas that were 
critical to FCS success. Anchoring the evaluation results with facts and data from early 
software builds provided a powerful and objective basis for judging the realism of plans for 
future builds, both from technical and productivity perspectives. Findings were refutable if 
engineers were able to supply evaluators with additional evidence that had not been 
                                                
23 IDPD refers to the phenomenon in which software developer productivity tends to decrease during 
the later increments of an incremental development project due to a larger code base that 
must be maintained and integrated in addition to producing new code for the current 




considered;24 indeed, there was one instance in which evaluation findings were revised 
based on evidence that had not been provided previously. Equally important, the evidence 
basis of the SoS LCA protected against pessimistic appraisals. In the end, program 
engineers were largely in agreement with the SoS LCA Team’s findings. 
The producibility and end-state design capstone analyses (which included roll-ups of 
findings from the technical focus areas) indicated several places where key changes needed 
to be made to the FCS SoS software development effort. What is more, regular reports of 
preliminary findings helped management make adjustments to the program or, in some 
cases, to the in-progress evaluations. Gaps in design, architecture, and requirements 
coverage that were unlikely to have been uncovered through other types of reviews were 
identified and prioritized for correction, providing a path to reach necessary capability levels 
in time to support a Milestone C decision. Equally important, the SoS LCA provided a 
mechanism to report technical, cost, and schedule risks, clearly tied to overall program 
goals, at an appropriate level of detail for senior program management, thereby enabling 
their understanding and supporting their decision-making processes. 
The FCS SoS LCA experience was extremely valuable in providing insights into 
processes better fitted to the DoD’s future systems of systems programs. For example, it 
has stimulated several improvements to the DoD version of the Incremental Commitment 
Model (ICM), initially defined by Pew and Mavor (2007) as a process model for DoD human-
intensive SoS. The resulting upgrade expressed in its draft DoD version changes the name 
of the pre-development phase from “Architecting” to “Foundations” (including plans, 
budgets, schedules, and contract provisions as well as architecture), and changes the name 
of its phase end-gate from “Lifecycle Architecture” to “Development Commitment Review” 
(Boehm & Lane, 2008). The SoS LCA also stimulated extension of the ICM process to 
include guidance for planning, executing, and earned-value managing the development of 
feasibility evidence as a first-class deliverable. Complementary process improvement 
initiatives for systems of systems are underway at the SEI. 
Some Lessons 
FCS conducted the SoS LCA prior to its SoS PDR, which was a good fit for the 
program; it enabled software to have a relevant voice during an event that otherwise would 
have been dominated by system and SoS concerns. Had the program continued, the 
authors believe that a follow-up SoS LCA would have been advantageous prior to the 
planned CDR as well.25 In fact, the Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTM) program, 
a follow-on to FCS, is exploring how best to utilize another SoS LCA. In general, the SoS 
LCA approach described here could be applied at either or both points in the development 
lifecycle as shown in Figure 6; the key determining factors are the maturity of the SoS 
architecture and designs, and the availabililty of early implementations to provide an 
analysis baseline. 
                                                
24 Note that such evidence had to have been in existence at the time of the evaluation, not created 
after the fact to defend against the findings. 
25 In theory, it should be possible to execute a similar type of analyses milestone (called an Initial 
Operational Capability anchor point in the RUP), again scaled to the SoS level, at the 
conclusion of the construction phase of development but still prior to initial operational testing, 






Figure 6. The SoS LCA Can Be Employed Prior to Traditional Milestone Reviews 
Obtaining contractual commitment to have the feasibility evidence produced and the 
independent evaluation26 performed is essential. Without such commitment, the SoS LCA 
Team’s requests for data simply did not have sufficient weight when balanced against other 
program priorities. Once the SoS LCA became a contractual requirement, it was easier for 
program management at all levels to prioritize requests for information appropriately. In 
addition, management commitment is indispensable to achieving benefit from an SoS LCA. 
The true value of the SoS LCA is in being able to make informed program decisions based 
on facts and data. While the intent is always to conduct an SoS LCA in a way that facilitates 
decision-making, without true management support the effort (like many other program 
reviews) is at risk of becoming a “check the box” exercise, where the event is held in order 
to claim completion on a schedule without regard for the evaluation’s effectiveness. Here 
also, contractual provisions and incentives for developers to plan for and produce feasibility 
evidence as a first-class deliverable are important elements. 
                                                
26  Technically, there is no requirement for independent parties to conduct an LCA evaluation. 
For the FCS program, using independent experts allowed the SoS LCA to be inserted into the 
development effort with minimal cost and disruption (such as for training staff). Had the SoS 
LCA been part of the program plans from the outset, independent experts might not have 
been needed as program staff could have been trained to produce and evaluate the 




To facilitate inclusion of an SoS LCA in a contract, standards for feasibility evidence 
should be developed. Such standards would make clear to all parties the kinds of evidence 
and levels of detail that would be acceptable, enabling the developers to produce it and 
evaluators to assess it. The FCS program had done this for its lower-level LCA reviews, 
making the standards a contractual obligation on suppliers. However, the relatively late idea 
to perform an SoS-level LCA left no time to develop appropriate standards at the SoS level. 
While this problem was overcome through deeper subject matter analysis, having agreed 
upon standards would have lessened the burden on the team performing the analyses. 
Exactly what those standards ought to be is not clear. Surely, the lessons from FCS could 
be applied to the follow-on BCTM program, but there likely is a generic set of standards that 
could be extrapolated to fit many different types of SoS. 
Gathering artifacts took much longer than anyone had anticipated, during both the 
pilot and the formal SoS LCA. Part of the difficulty lay in communicating exactly which 
artifacts were needed and which were available. While the SoS LCA Team believed it 
communicated its needs clearly, differences in interpretation between the team and program 
personnel providing the artifacts caused confusion and slowed the process. Another 
difficulty was that, owing to the sheer size of the program, just finding the custodian who had 
access to needed information often took a long time. 
Keeping management informed of progress and emerging results is essential, but 
doing so must be managed carefully. As findings became available, status updates to 
management became more frequent, which in turn led to a decrease in analysis due to the 
need to spend time to prepare and rehearse briefings and provide read-ahead material in 
advance of the actual update meetings. Management updates should be scheduled at set 
points during SoS LCA execution as part of the process. 
“Socializing” the process among stakeholders and management in advance is crucial 
to setting expectations. Many people initially found the SoS LCA concept obscure. Indeed, 
the term “Lifecycle Architecture” caused a great deal of confusion among managers and 
project personnel when applied in an SoS context. The word architecture, in particular, sets 
incorrect expectations that the event will be nothing more than an architectural review, which 
is neither the intent of an LCA review (at any level) nor, as explained earlier, feasible at the 
SoS level due to the differing development stages among the constituent systems. For this 
reason, a name other than “LCA” (e.g., Development Commitment Review as used in the 
Incremental Commitment Model) should be considered while still maintaining the principles 
embodied in the SoS LCA concept. 
Lastly, while the FCS program applied the SoS LCA to software and computing 
systems only, it should be possible to use the technique on a broadened technical scope 
encompassing hardware and system issues as well. As a practical matter, it is nearly 
impossible to ignore such issues even with a limited focus on software. 
Conclusion 
Extending the concept of an LCA review process to the SoS level was an effective 
means of evaluating the FCS SoS software and computing system designs. Both the depth 
and breadth of analysis of this software review far exceeded other software-specific reviews 
on the program. The broad, multi-build SoS view, in conjunction with the individual build 
reviews provided an excellent assessment of the state of the FCS software development 
effort and its potential for achieving program objectives. The technique provided insight into 




Overall, the SoS LCA was a success both as a review technique and, more 
importantly, in providing a solid understanding of the functional baseline for FCS software 
leading into the SoS PDR. The analyses not only helped discover problem areas, but also 
recognized software packages that were meeting or exceeding expectations. This latter 
category was particularly important, as it provided guidelines for recommended paths 
forward for other software packages. Recommended changes to program processes and 
evaluations were proposed and being developed for inclusion in the follow-on BCTM 
program. Rather than mere action items to be tracked to answer specific questions, the SoS 
LCA provided more details and greater program benefit, including new direction for certain 
program areas. 
The key element of the SoS LCA was the ability to report technical, cost, and 
schedule risks in a coordinated fashion relative to program goals and at an appropriate level 
of detail for senior program management, thereby facilitating their understanding and 
supporting their decision-making processes. 
The success of the effort suggested possible follow-up activities had FCS continued, 
including performing one or more “delta” SoS LCA reviews to re-evaluate areas where the 
highest risks were found and inserting a similar type of effort before a program CDR to gain 
deeper insights into the development efforts at that stage of the program. While these 
specific actions were not tried on FCS, it seems reasonable to conclude that they would 
have been beneficial. This idea is consistent with the concept that shortfalls in feasibility 
evidence are uncertainties and risks, and should be covered by risk mitigation plans. 
The FCS SoS LCA activity also has been a valuable learning experience for 
preparing and conducting future DoD SoS milestone reviews and acquisition processes. 
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Abstract 
The emphasis of the Department of Defense on capability-based acquisition has led 
to the simultaneous development of systems that must eventually interact within a system-
of-systems.  Thus, system development and acquisition processes encounter 
interdependencies that generate complexity and risk.  The authors’ prior work has 
developed a Computational Exploratory Model to simulate the development processes of 
these complex networks of systems intended for a system-of-systems capability.  The 
model’s goal is to understand the impact of system-specific risk and system 
interdependencies on development time.  The progress documented in this paper focuses 
on the quantification of risk propagation and the impact of network topologies on the 
propagation of disruptions.  The improved model enables trade studies that differentiate the 
effectiveness of alternate configurations of constituent systems and that quantify the impact 
of varying levels of interdependencies on the timely completion of a project that aims to 





The purpose of capabilities-based acquisition, as described by Charles and Turner 
(2004), is to acquire a set of capabilities instead of acquiring a family of threat-based, 
service-specific systems.  The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), for example, uses capability-
based acquisition to evaluate the success of a program based on its ability to provide a new 
capability for a given cost, and not on its ability to meet specific performance requirements 
(Spacy, 2004).  The Joint Mission Capability Package (JMCP) concept is another example 
that aims to create a joint interdependency between systems to combine capabilities in 
order to maximize reinforcing effects and minimize vulnerabilities (Durkac, 2005).  The goal 
is a more efficient utilization of both human and machine-based assets and, in turn, 
improved combat power.   
To accomplish the desired capability, systems are increasingly required to 
interoperate along several dimensions that characterizes them as systems-of-systems (SoS) 
(Maier, 1998).  Systems-of-systems most often consist of multiple, heterogeneous, 
distributed systems that can (and do) operate independently but can also collaborate in 
networks to achieve a goal. Examples of systems-of-systems include: civil air transportation 
(DeLaurentis, Han & Kotegawa, 2008), battlefield ISR (Butler, 2001), missile defense 
(Francis, 2007), etc.  According to Maier (1998), the distinctive traits of operational and 
managerial independence are the keys to making the collaboration work.  The network 
structure behind the collaboration, however, can contribute both negatively and positively to 
the successful achievement of SoS capabilities and, even earlier, to the developmental 
success.  Collaboration via interdependence may increase capability potentials, but it also 
contains concealed risk in the development and acquisition phases.  Brown and Flowe 
(2005), for instance, have investigated the implications of the development of SoS to 
understand the drivers that influence cost, schedule, and performance of SoS efforts.  
Results of their study indicate that the major drivers—as indicated by subject-matter-
experts—include systems standards and requirements, funding, knowledge, skills and 
ability, system interdependencies, conflict management, information access, and 
environmental demands.   
Disruptions in the development of one system can have unforeseen consequences 
on the development of others if the network dependencies are not accounted.  The goal of a 
single system’s program manager is the mitigation of risk, leading to successful 
development of that specific system.  While direct or immediate consequences of decisions 
are nearly always considered, the cascading second-and-third order effects that result from 
the complex interdependencies between constituent systems in an SoS are often not, which 
make success all the more difficult.  It falls on acquisition managers and systems engineers 
(or systems-of-systems engineers) to understand and manage the successful development 
of a system, or family of systems, to produce the targeted capability in this challenging 
setting.  
Evidence is abundant that system-of-systems-oriented endeavors have struggled to 
succeed amidst the development complexity.  The Future Combat System is a latest 
example (Gilmore, 2006).  Civil programs have not been spared either, e.g., Constellation 
Program (Committee on Systems, 2004) and NextGen (2009).  Rouse (2001) summarizes 
the complexity of a system (or model of a system) as related to the intentions with which one 
addresses the systems, the characteristics of the representation that appropriately accounts 
for the system’s boundaries, architecture, interconnections and information flows, and the 




The work presented in this paper specifically targets complexities stemming from 
system development risk, the interdependencies among systems, and the span-of-control of 
the systems or system-of-systems managers and engineers.  The objective of the research 
summarized in this paper is to quantify the impact of system-specific risk and system 
interdependency complexities using a computational exploratory modeling approach.  The 
work comprises new improvements to a computational exploratory model (CEM)—a discrete 
event simulation model—previously introduced in prior Acquisition Symposia (Mane & 
DeLaurentis, 2009) that aims to provide decision makers with insights into the development 
process by propagating development risk in the SoS network and capturing the impact that 
system risk, system interdependencies, and system characteristics have on the timely 
completion of a program. We also briefly introduce complementary work related to an 
analytical approach to treat the same complexities via computations on conditional 
probabilities that relate the transmission of risk in network dependent systems.  
Computational Exploratory Model (CEM) Overview 
The CEM is based on the 16 basic technical management and technical system-
engineering processes outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2008a), often 
referred to as the 5000-series guide. However, an SoS environment changes the way these 
processes are applied. The Systems Engineering Guide for System-of-Systems (SoS-SE) 
(DoD, 2008b) addresses these considerations by modifying some of the 16 processes in 
accord with an SoS environment.  The resulting processes and respective functions consist 
of translating inputs from relevant stakeholders into technical requirements, developing 
relationships between requirements, designing and building solutions to address 
requirements, integrating systems into a high-level system element, and performing various 
managing and control activities to ensure that requirements are effectively met, risks are 
mitigated, and capabilities achieved. 
The CEM, centered on these revised processes, is a discrete event simulation of the 
development and acquisition process.  This process creates a hierarchy of analysis levels:  
SoS Level (L1), Requirement Level (L2), and System Level (L3).  Component elements at 
each level are a network representation of the level below.  The SoS Level (L1) is comprised 
of the numerous, possibly interdependent, requirements (L2) needed to achieve a desired 
capability.  Similarly, satisfaction of each requirement in the Requirement Level (L2) requires 
a number of possibly interdependent systems (L3).   Error! Reference source not found. 





Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Acquisition Strategy based on SoSE Process  
(described in DoD, 2008b) 
At the Requirement Level (L2), Requirements Development contains the technical 
requirements of the SoS (provided externally). The technical requirements are then 
examined in Logical Analysis to check for interdependencies amongst the requirements. A 
check for inconsistencies amongst requirements is also performed.  Design Solution 
development and Decision Analysis are the next processes, which belong to the System 
Level (L3). They produce the optimal design solution from the set of feasible solutions to 
meet the given requirements.  The optimal design solution is based not only on the current 
set of requirements and solution alternatives but also takes into account all previous 
information available through requirements, risk, configuration, interface and data 
management processes.  Because most acquisitions are multi-year projects involving many 
different parties, the overlap between the management processes, Design Solution and 
Decision Analysis processes, allows for greater tractability of decisions. It is at this stage 
that system interdependencies are identified.  The optimal design solution obtained from this 
phase is then sent to the next stage: Technology Planning and Technology Assessment. In 
the event that an optimal or sub-optimal design solution to successfully implement the given 
requirements does not exist, the feedback loop to Requirement Development translates into 




Assessment are System Level (L3) scheduling processes that oversee the implementation, 
integration, verification and validation for all the component systems in the SoS.  
Systems in the SoS are often dependent on other systems for either implementation, 
integration, or both.  Disruptions during these stages of development in one of the systems 
result in time-lags in the acquisition process and to delays that propagate through the 
network of component systems impacting seemingly independent systems. For example, if 
the implementation of a system A is dependent on the Implementation of a system B—as 
could be the case for the development of an aircraft that depends on the specifications of a 
radar system—funding cuts to system B can result in development delays in system B but 
can also impact the development of system A.  If, on the other hand, a third system C 
depends on system A, this could also be affected by the problems caused in system C due 
to funding cuts.  
The Implementation and Integration Phases of component systems constitute the 
lowest level of detail modeled in the CEM.  The design decisions made at earlier stages 
must be implemented and integrated in these phases to generate the final product of a 
program.  Error! Reference source not found. presents an abstraction of the layered 
networks that result from the modeling of the acquisition process: systems are grouped to 







Figure 2. Layered Network Abstraction of Computational Exploratory Model 
Systems can be independent, can satisfy several requirements, and can depend on 
other systems.  The CEM simulates these layered relationships to capture the impacts that 
any changes—related to decision-making, policy, or development—in any of the component 
systems, requirements, and relationships between them have on the completion of a project.  
The exercise of the CEM described in this paper specifically targets complexities stemming 
from system risk, the interdependencies among systems, and the span-of-control of the SoS 
authority (if present). The next section will present the model dynamics that make possible 
the study of these complexities and will explore the design space of the SoS authority and 
tradeoffs between development risk and the number of systems and system 
interdependencies in an SoS.   
Detailed Model Dynamics 
The CEM operates as a discrete event simulator of the development process.  
Several challenges arise in developing a model for purposes of simulation and learning. 




with the project or individual systems. The CEM models risk associated with the 
implementation and integration of each component system as well as the risk due to the 
system interdependencies.  Furthermore, systems and SoS engineers are often faced with 
the decision of using legacy assets to satisfy a given requirement or opt for the development 
of brand new ones.  The CEM includes parameters such as readiness-level to differentiate 
between legacy assets/platforms, new systems, and partially implemented/integrated 
systems (i.e., systems under development) and to investigate the impact that the inclusion 
of such systems in the development of an SoS has on the success of a project.  The next 
sub-sections describe the model details:  parameters and inputs, Implementation and 
Integration dynamics, and the risk model. 
Model Input Parameters 
Error! Reference source not found. presents the input parameters and the 
remainder of this section expands and explains their role in the ECM.    
Table 1. Input Parameters of Computational Exploratory Model 
Parameter Notation Description 
Requirement Level (L2) 
Requirement 
dependencies 
Dreq Adjacency matrix that indicates requirement 
interdependencies 
Risk profile Rreq Probability of disruptions in Requirement Development 
Phase  
Impact of disruptions Ireq Time penalty when disruptions hit Requirement 
Development Phase 
System Level (L3) 
System dependencies Dsys Adjacency matrix that indicates system interdependencies 
Development pace of 
design 
tdes Increase in completion of Design Solutions Phase  
Design risk profile Rdes Probability of disruptions in Design Solutions Phase 
Impact of design 
disruptions  
Ides Time penalty when disruptions hit Design Solutions Phase 
Span-of-control soc Indicator of how Implementation and Integration are 
performed (sequentially or simultaneously) 
System initial readiness-
level 
m0(i,r) Initial readiness-level of system i to satisfy requirement r (for 
Implementation Phase) 
System risk profile Rsys(i,r) Probability of disruptions (during implementation) of system i 
when satisfying requirement r 
Impact of disruptions Isys(i) Time penalty when disruptions hit system i during 
Implementation/Integration 
Implementation pace pimp(i) Increase in readiness-level at each time step during 
implementation of system i 
Integration pace pint(i) Increase in completeness-level at each time step during 
integration of system i 
Implementation start  limp(i,j) Readiness-level of system j when Implementation Phase of 
dependent system i begins  
Strength of dependency S(i,j) Strength of dependency of system i on system j 
 
The requirement dependency matrix (Dreq) indicates how the development and 
satisfaction of requirements depend on each other, which impacts the sequence in which 
requirements are developed and satisfied.  For example, if Requirement A depends on 
Requirement B, then development of Requirement A begins when Requirement B has been 




Development indicates the probability of disruptions at this stage in the development 
process. Disruptors signify a change in requirements or addition of new requirements. When 
a requirement is changed after the acquisition process has begun, it affects all subsequent 
processes and it causes a time delay (Ireq) that is added to the project time.  Every 
requirement that is implemented is fed into its own Design Solution and Decision Analysis 
(Error! Reference source not found.) process. The Design Solution and Decision Analysis 
processes feed into each other and the risk profile (Rdes) indicates the probability of 
disruptions at each time-step during the completion of the stage with a value between 0 and 
1.  Any disruptions at this stage indicate that the design solution provided is not feasible and 
a time penalty (Ides) that indicates a re-design of the solution is incurred.  If the solution fails 
in multiple consecutive time-steps, then the requirement is sent back to Requirement 
Development stage, otherwise the set of component systems and their user-defined 
parameters are sent to the Technical Planning and Technical Assessment (Error! 
Reference source not found.) processes based on the development-pace parameter of 
this stage. 
Implementation Phase Dynamics 
Technical Planning is the stage in which Implementation and Integration of 
component systems is performed.  The Implementation Phase simulates the development of 
each system.  The nature of candidate systems may range from legacy systems to off-the-
shelf, plug-and-play products to custom-built, new systems.  Development of a “brand new” 
SoS has been and will remain a rare occurrence.  In their study on SoS, the United States 
Air Force (USAF) Scientific Advisory Board (Saunders et al., 2005) stated that one of the 
challenges in building an SoS is accounting for contributions and constraints of legacy 
assets.  Similarly, the regular utilization of off-the-shelf component systems in both defense 
and civil programs contribute to cost and time savings but also introduce a different type of 
risk to the system development process (Constantine& Solak, 2010).  These legacy systems 
may be used “as-is” or may need re-engineering to fulfill needs of the new program.  
Here, we define legacy systems as systems that have been developed in the past to 
achieve a particular requirement, and new systems as not-yet-developed systems 
envisioned to satisfy a new requirement.   When considering the use of legacy systems to 
meet a new requirement, the capability of these systems to satisfy the new requirement is 
not necessarily the same as their capability to meet the original requirement for which they 
were designed.  Additionally, the risk associated with the modification of a legacy system 
and the risk associated with the development of a brand new system can be quite different.  
Legacy systems may, however, provide cost and/or time benefits if modifications are less 
severe than a new development, as is the case with new systems.  To delineate systems in 
a meaningful way, we describe the spectrum of a system’s ability to satisfy a requirement in 
terms of its readiness-level.   
System readiness-level, a concept proposed by Sauser et al. (2006), is a metric that 
incorporates the maturity levels of critical components and their readiness for integration (i.e. 
integration requirements of technologies).  This is an extension of the widely used 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL), a metric that assesses the maturity level of a program’s 
technologies before system development begins (Department of Defense Directive 5000.2, 
2005).  While similar in spirit to the SRL metric proposed by Sauser, Verna, Ramirez-
Marquez, and Gove (2006), readiness-level in the present work is defined in a different 
manner and with less detail.  We define system readiness level as the readiness-level of a 
system i to satisfy requirement r, m(i,r), with a value between 0 and 1.  A system with a 




The dynamic model starts the Implementation Phase of a system from its initial readiness-
level and simulates its development/implementation until it reaches a readiness-level of 1.  
An initial readiness-level of 0 indicates a brand new system that must be developed from 
scratch, while a system with an initial readiness-level greater than 0 indicates a legacy 
system that is partially developed to satisfy a requirement r, but needs further development 
to reach a readiness-level of 1.  In general, careful research of a candidate system i will 
determine its initial readiness-level to satisfy a requirement r, and, therefore, the amount of 
development necessary to achieve a readiness-level of 1.0.   
The CEM simulates the Implementation Phase as a series of time steps in which a pre-
determined increment of readiness (pimp(i)) is gained at each time-step of each system i, or 
lost if a disruption occurs (according to the system risk profile of system i in satisfying 
requirement r, Rsys(i,r)).  This is clearly a gross simplification of the actual development 
process for a system; however, it adequately serves the purposes of the research, which is 
focused on the interdependencies between systems to develop an SoS capability and aims 
to capture the impact of disruptions on the development process.  Accurate modeling of the 
Implementation Phase would increase the accuracy of the model for a particular application, 
but it would not change the nature of the observed results. 
Representation of Risk 
The risk associated with the development of a system is a function of its inherent 
characteristics (technology, funding, and complexity levels) and on risk levels of the systems 
on which it depends.  The former may be estimated via a variety of analysis techniques that 
examine a system in detail, but the latter requires knowledge of system interdependencies 
which can be numerous, complicated, and often opaque.  Developmental interdependencies 
of SoS create layered networks that often span among a hierarchy of levels (DeLaurentis et 
al., 2008; Butler, 2001; Ayyalasomayajula, DeLaurentis, Moore & Glickman, 2008; 
Kotegawa, DeLaurentis, Sengstacken & Han, 2008).  The complexity of these networks 
often hides many of the otherwise explicit consequences of risk.  Depending on the network 
topology characteristics, disruptions to one of the critical nodes or links in the network can 
propagate through the network and result in degradation to seemingly distant nodes (Huang, 
Behara & Hu, 2008).   
In this study, we express risk as a density function that describes the probability of a 
disruption occurring at any time during the system development.  We concentrate on the 
Implementation and Integration Phase as the development stage in which disruptions occur.  
Here, inherent risk is the probability of disruptions due to the development characteristics of 
the subject system, e.g., technology readiness-level, funding, politics, etc.  Risk due to 
interdependencies, on the other hand, is the probability of disruptions during the 
Implementation Phase of a system due to disruption in the system on which the system of 
interest depends.  This is essentially the conditional probability of a disruption given that 
another system has a disruption.   
This study assumes that the inherent risk of a system i in satisfying requirement r, 
Rsys(i,r), is solely a function of its readiness-level, m(i,r).  While a somewhat simplified 
definition, expressing risk as a function of a system’s readiness-level is logical.  Recall that 
readiness-level is a metric that describes the necessary development of a system to satisfy 
a given requirement.  Therefore, risk changes as the readiness-level of a system increases.  
Equation 1 introduces a relationship between a system’s readiness-level and risk 
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Equation 1 
In this relationship, αi (with a value between 0 and 1) is parameter that indicates the 
upper bound value of risk for system i (i.e., producing maximum probability of disruption), 
while βi is a shape parameter that indicates how quickly risk changes as a function of 
readiness-level.  This formulation implies that risk is highest at the early stages of 
development (e.g., low readiness-levels) and it decreases (at different rates depending on 
the value of the βi parameter) as development progresses.  For instance, when a system i 
has a readiness-level of 0.0—it is a brand new system—the probability of disruptions during 
development will be highest, and it will have a value αi.  However, when the system has a 
readiness-level of 1.0, the probability of disruptions will be 0.  System inherent-risk is 
implemented in the CEM by using a uniform random distribution to select a value between 0 
and 1 at each time-step of the Implementation or Integration Phase and passing it into a 
binary channel to see if the number is smaller or greater than the probability of disruption 
defined by Rsys(i,j).  This determines if a disruption occurs or not. 
When all systems are independent, identification of the system with highest risk is 
trivial (e.g., system that, on average, will contribute more to delays in completion time).  
However, when systems are interdependent, systems that otherwise have a low inherent 
risk can be greatly impacted by disturbances because of the transmission of risk from other 
systems.  Systems are impacted by nearest neighbors (those systems on which they directly 
depend; first-order dependencies) and by systems that impact those nearest neighbors 
(higher-order dependencies). 
The CEM models risk due to interdependencies in terms of the dependency strength 
between two given systems.  Dependency strength, S(i,j), is an input parameter that takes 
values between 0 and 1 and is defined as the conditional probability (uniform random 
probability) that system i has a disruption given that system j (on which system i depends) 
has a disruption.  Risk due to interdependencies is, therefore, a function of the readiness-
level of the dependent-upon system as well as the strength of that dependency.   A notional 
example of a simple SoS is utilized here to present these features of the CEM (Error! 
















Each system in this simple SoS network serves a role and provides a certain level of 
capability in order to satisfy some requirement.  The links between systems indicate 
interdependencies among systems.  The arrows indicate the directionality of dependence, 
including the case of mutual dependence.  Mane and DeLaurentis (2009) contain more 
detailed information on the CEM structure.  For this example, Error! Reference source not 
found. presents the implementation history of this three-system SoS with a risk profile that 
has αi, and βi, values of 0.2 and 4, respectively,  and two different levels of interdependency 
strength, S(i,j). 




























































                      a)  S(i,j) = 0      b)  S(i,j) = 1 
Figure 4. Implementation Phase History for Example Problem  
Each system has a different initial readiness-level—system-A of 0.3, system-B of 0.5, 
and system-C of 0.  Recall that an initial readiness-level greater than zero indicates a legacy 
system that must be further developed to achieve a readiness level of 1 to satisfy a given 
requirement.  The model assumes that the readiness-level of a system can reduce to below 
initial readiness-level value.  This is reasonable since inherent disruptions or disruptions due 
to interdependencies can result in modifications to subsystems that were not previously 
considered (i.e., unforeseen technology limitations of a system may require redesign of a 
dependent system).   In Error! Reference source not found.a, all systems are independent 
(dependency strength of zero).  The occasional set-backs in the readiness-level of each 
system are due to disruptions stemming from the inherent system risk.  In Error! Reference 
source not found.b, one the other hand, dependency strength is highest (with a value of 
one).   Recall that dependency strength indicates the probability of disruption on the 
dependent system given that the system on which it depends has a disruption.  When the 
dependency strength is one, a disruption in a given system is always propagated to the 
dependent systems.  For example, disruptions in the development of system-C propagate to 
system-A with probability 1 and disruptions in the development of system-A propagate to 
system-B with probability 1.  Note, for instance, that there is a reduction in readiness-level in 
the development of the system-B every time that there is a reduction in readiness-level 
during the development of system-A or system-C (on which system-B depends).   The 
candidate systems for a desired capability can, in general, have different levels of 
dependency strengths.  Error! Reference source not found. presents a sensitivity of 


































Figure 5. Impact of Dependency Strength on Completion Time for Example Problem 
As expected, higher dependency strength means higher development time.  In this 
example, the number of systems and interdependencies is invariable, and the increase in 
development time can be different for a different family of constituent systems.  When 
considering the development of different families of systems that can provide a desired 
capability, the characteristics of interdependencies between component systems can have a 
large impact on the decision to pursue development of a certain alternative.  Quantifying the 
impact that such characteristics have on the development process can aid decision-makers 
in selecting the most promising alternative.  
Impact of Risk and System Interdependencies 
Quantifying risk is a complicated function of the individual system characteristics as 
well as the interdependencies between systems.   The combinations of systems that can 
achieve a given capability-level can be numerous.  Depending on the selection of the 
constituent systems, the completion time of a project can vary greatly due to the number of 
constituent systems, their interdependencies, and risk profiles.  As these families of systems 
get larger, it becomes more difficult to quantify the impact that each system and system-
characteristic has on the success of a project.  For instance, a three-system solution may 
appear to be preferable to a ten-system solution; but the interactions between the three 
systems can result in disruption propagation that greatly impacts the timely completion of 
the project.  System interdependencies and their characteristics can impact the completion 
time of a project by affecting the way in which disruption propagate.  In this section, we 
demonstrate the impact that system-inherent risk and the strength of interdependencies 
between component systems can have on the timely completion of a project.  Furthermore, 
we show and quantify how different families of systems that can provide the same set of 
capabilities can have greatly differing development histories. 
Interdependency Strength and Inherent Risk 
For this investigation, we assume that in order to achieve some capability a family of 
three classes of systems has been identified; for instance, a class-A system can be a land-




size aircraft, or a small aircraft.  Each of these classes of systems provides a certain 
capability that is required to achieve a global capability of the SoS.   The design authority 
must decide which constituent system to select for each system-class.  A notional example 
of a simple SoS is utilized here (Error! Reference source not found.).   
class-B system
class-A  system
class-C system  
Figure 6. Interdependencies of Notional SoS 
The links between systems indicate interdependencies among systems.  For 
instance, development of a class-B system must rely on information about the development 
and capabilities of a class-A system in order to continue development.  Similarly, 
development of a class-A system needs information from a class-C system.  Different 
systems are available to designers or systems engineers for each system-class.  Each 
candidate system can have different risk characteristics as well as different interdependency 
characteristics.  If we assume that the systems engineer has identified these characteristics 
for each candidate system, then we can use the CEM to simulate the development process 
when different combinations of these candidate systems are considered and identify the 
family of systems that results in the lowest expected completion time.   The strength of the 
CEM is in its ability to aggregate the individual system characteristics and quantify the SoS-
level performance (with respect to development time) of a family of candidate systems.   
Error! Reference source not found. presents results in which the expected 
implementation time of a family of candidate systems is measured against the inherent risk 
of individual systems and their interdependency strengths.   
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   a)  System-specific risk profile     b)  Expected implementation time 




We assume here that all candidate systems will have the same risk profile and all 
interdependencies will have the same strength.  Error! Reference source not found.a 
shows the inherent system risk, Rsys(i,r), as a function of system readiness-level, m(i,r), for 
five different risk profiles (five different αi values and a fixed βi parameter of 2).  The value of 
αi indicates the maximum inherent risk of a system, according to Equation 1. The 
assumption here is that risk is highest in the earlier stages of development and that it 
decreases as development progresses.   The results in Error! Reference source not 
found.b present the expected implementation time when families of systems with different 
combinations of inherent risk profile and dependency strengths are considered.  Each point 
on the surface indicates a family of candidate systems with a given combination of maximum 
inherent risk and dependency strengths.  For instance, a solution that entails systems with a 
maximum inherent risk of zero and dependency strength of zero (e.g., independent systems 
with no development risk) will have an expected implementation time of 20 time units.  The 
three systems are developed simultaneously but have no impact on each other’s 
development.  The trends in Error! Reference source not found.b show that the impact on 
implementation time of families of systems that have strong interdependencies is larger than 
when the systems have high inherent risk but low dependency strengths (e.g., the increase 
in implementation time is smaller as inherent risk increases than when the strength of 
dependencies increases).   
This investigation quantifies the impact that system interdependencies have on the 
implementation time of a project.  The results presented here point out the importance of 
interdependencies in the development process.  This type of analysis can prove useful to an 
SoS authority when selecting potential component systems as a part of a family of systems 
or SoS to satisfy a given requirement and achieve a desired capability.    
This simple example considers families of systems comprised of three constituent 
systems.  Different candidate families of systems, however, can have differing number of 
constituent systems that can provide different system-capabilities to achieve the desired 
SoS capability.  Similarly, risk profile and interdependency characteristics of the constituent 
systems can result in different disruption propagation and different development solutions. 
Comparison of Alternatives  
Given a set of alternative means to satisfy a requirement, an SoS authority (in 
conjunction with systems engineers) must determine the best network of systems to develop 
and acquire.  The number of systems alone may not be a good indicator of the complexity of 
a system and the eventual developmental success.  The risk profile of systems as well as 
the number and strength of system interdependencies play an important role that often 
hamper understanding of the impact of decisions.  For instance, an SoS that is comprised of 
three constituent systems may appear more likely to succeed than an SoS comprised of five 
systems.  However, the number and strength of interdependencies between the five 
systems may be such that the expected completion time of this SoS is lower than the 
expected completion time of the three-system SoS.  The three-system example in the 
previous section showed that the strength of dependencies plays an important role in the 
timely completion of an SoS project.  Here we use the CEM to investigate the impact that 
network characteristics (number of systems, number of dependencies, and strength of 
dependencies) have on the completion time of an SoS project.  We compare the 
developmental time of two example SoSs comprised of three and five constituent systems 














          a) Three-system alternative         b)  Five-system alternative 
Figure 8. Alternative Families of Systems 
The three-system network is the same network with three interdependencies as the 
one presented in Error! Reference source not found..  The new, five-system network is 
clearly a larger SoS with more systems and six interdependencies.  As in the previous 
section, different candidate systems are available to provide the required capability level.  
The systems engineer would like to quantify the expected implementation time of each 
combination of systems for the three-system and the five-systems options.  Via a Monte 
Carlo simulation of 500 samples, we are able to compute the expected implementation time 
of the five-system network—we previously did the same for the three-system network.  
Error! Reference source not found. presents this result for the different combinations of 











































































a) Three-system alternative   b)  Five-system alternative 
Figure 9. Expected Implementation Time of Alternatives 
Error! Reference source not found.a presents the expected implementation time of 
the three-system option (the same as Error! Reference source not found.b), while Error! 
Reference source not found.b presents the expected implementation time of the five-
system network.   As in the previous analysis, these results indicate the expected 
implementation time of candidate component systems that have differing levels of inherent 
risk and interdependency strengths.  The trends in the expected implementation time of the 
five-system option are larger than those of the three-system option.  This is expected 
because the former has more systems as well as more interdependencies.  Recall, however, 




that the expected implementation times of some five-system alternatives are lower than 
some three-system alternatives.  To show this more clearly, Error! Reference source not 
found. presents the expected completion times when the inherent system risk of all 
candidate systems is highest (α = 0.2). 


































Figure 10. Expected Implementation Time of Sample Results 
As previously  mentioned, the implementation time of the five-system alternatives is 
always higher than the three-system alternatives.  However, if the dependency strength 
between the systems in the three-system alternative has a value of 1, then the expected 
implementation time of this alternative will be 37 time units; if the dependency strength 
between the systems in the five-system is not as strong, say with a value of 0.4, then the 
expected implementation time will be 30 time units.  Therefore, depending on the strength of 
the interdependencies between the constituent systems, a family of systems can be a better 
(lower expected implementation time) alternative.  By simulating the development process of 
different alternatives via the CEM, it is possible to quantify the impact of system specific risk, 
the risk due to interdependencies, and the propagation of disruptions to compare different 
alternative solutions that can provide a desired level of capability. 
Analytical Approach to Measure Delay Propagation 
  Additional complexity in the model, carefully selected, will likely increase the 
efficacy of the CEM. However, as a simulation-based approach, it too has limitations.  
Therefore, in conjunction with the further development of the CEM, the authors are also 
developing an analytical approach that captures the characteristics of a network that results 
from the developmental interdependencies of systems.  This is an approach that uses a 
network-level metric to treat the same complexities via computations on conditional 
probabilities that relate the transmission of risk in networks of interdependent systems.  This 
provides means to compare networks in their ability to arrest the propagation of delays 
caused by random disturbances and can be used as a figure of merit when designing SoS 
architectures that aim to achieve some desired capability.  While typical networks like the 
World Wide Web, social networks, and communication networks are a result of evolution, 
some networks of military systems created for particular purposes can be designed.  The 
ability to quantify the performance of SoS networks enables comparison of networks, and 




The proposed approach to measure the performance of networks in their ability to 
arrest the propagation of delays is based on the “lost miner problem” (Ross, 2007).  In this 
example problem, a miner is lost in a cave inside a mine and there are four tunnels that lead 







Figure 11. Lost-miner Problem 
The miner can choose to enter a tunnel Ti with probability P(Ti) and has no memory 
of his previous choice. If the miner chooses tunnel T1, then he wanders in the tunnel for D1 
days and returns to the cave, where he must decide which tunnel to enter next. If he 
chooses tunnel T2 or T3, then he wanders in the tunnel for D2 or D3 days, respectively, only 
to return to the cave. If he chooses tunnel TF, then he is free, instantly. The question the 
problem poses is: What is the expected time until the miner reaches freedom (e.g., the 
expected duration of the miner’s stay in the mine)?  
Following this reasoning, we can describe the delay propagation in the system 
development process in a similar manner.  We describe a network of systems in terms of the 
number of systems (caves), the number and direction of their dependencies (tunnels), and 
the characteristics of the interdependencies (probability of choosing a given tunnel), e.g., 
probability of passing on a disruption and the impact of the disruption.  The simple three-












Figure 12. Example Systems Development Network 
Each node represents a system that is under development (i.e., aircraft, missile, 
radio) to achieve some capability. The links indicate interdependencies between the 
systems as well as the strength of those interdependencies. For instance, system-1 
depends on system-3 because information from system-3 is needed to continue 
development of system-1.  Tij represents the conditional probability that a disruption in the 
development of system i will impact development of system j and Dij represents the impact 
of a disruption (delay) on system i that propagates to system j.  These two quantities 




be strongly dependent if the probability of a disruption propagating from one system to the 
other is high, or if the delay experienced by one system because of a disruption in the 
development of the other is large.  Node F is a sink that represent the arrest of an event and 
its propagation in the network.  In this setting, a disruption can be seen as an event that 
travels from system to system causing developmental delays until it exits the 
system/network (via node F).  This is similar to the “lost miner problem,” in which the miner 
chooses tunnels until he reaches freedom.   
In system development, disruptions can be a result of funding decisions, political 
environment, technological setbacks, etc.  For example, system-1 can be faced with budget 
cuts and the program manager must reduce funding to one of the subsystems that comprise 
system-1. Depending on the magnitude of the reduction in funding, this can have no impact 
in the development of system-1 with probability T1F, and nothing is affected; it can cause a 
delay of D11 days with probability T11 in the development of system-1 that is not large 
enough to impact interdependent systems; or it can result in a delay of D12 days with 
probability T12 that impacts development of system-2.  Additionally, the delay in the 
development of system-2 can cause further problems that delay its development by D22 days 
with probability T22; it can cause a delay of D23 days with probability T23 that creates a 
problem in the development of system-3; or a delay of D21 days with probability T21 that 
impacts system-1; or, conversely, the problem is not large enough to cause any delays with 
probability T2F, and the propagation of delay in the network is arrested.    
Depending on the strength of the dependencies between systems and the 
magnitude of disruptions, delays can propagate and accumulate in a network.  Hence, 
networks with different number of systems, interdependencies, and strength of 
interdependencies will perform differently when faced with random disruptions.  The 
analytical approach now under pursuit may be able to estimate the expected accumulation 
of delays as a function of these network characteristics. The network-level metric can enable 
the design of networks that minimize expected delay whenever random events hit the 
development process of individual systems. 
Conclusions 
The development of complex systems (and SoS) is beset by risk. Risk analyses of 
individual systems can explain the threats and opportunities of systems, but do not capture 
the impact that disruptions to individual systems have at the enterprise level, where multiple 
systems—explicitly or implicitly interdependent—collaborate to achieve various capabilities.  
An understanding of risk in the development and acquisition process and its cascading 
effects is crucial to identifying means to exploit opportunities, as well as mitigate, transfer, or 
avoid disruptions.  
These research efforts center on the ongoing development of a Computational 
Exploratory Model that is based on the processes in the SoS-SE Guidebook and that 
estimates time to complete an SoS integration. The extensions to the model in this paper 
capture the impact of individual system risk and number and strength of system 
interdependencies on the propagation of developmental disruptions and, ultimately, the 
timely completion of a project.   In particular, the present work examined changes in the 
systems interdependencies and system risk profiles (i.e., different inherent risk profiles for 
different systems and different dependency strength) when alternative systems are 
considered for satisfying a given requirement and providing a certain capability.  Examples 
of alternative families of systems comprised of a different number of constituent systems 




quantify the development performance of SoS.  The sample analyses presented here 
showed that these characteristics, coupled with the interdependency characteristics of a 
family of systems, can result in expected implementation times that are not easily foreseen.   
When coupled with the theoretical basis of delay propagation and a network-level 
metric that describes the expected delay in a family of systems the methodology presented 
here can improve/facilitate the decision-making process of systems engineers and system 
integration as well as provide a means to design system architectures that aim to minimize 
delay propagation and development time.  
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Abstract 
Everyday, contracting officers must procure the goods and services for the Federal 
Government, while balancing competing and oftentimes conflicting demands. Over time a 
number of laws, regulations and guidance have been put in place to direct the actions of the 
Government as it interacts with the private sector in this country. As a result of our political 
process and the method in which laws are created, some of these requirements have 
conflicted with other guidance already in place within the Federal acquisition process.  
Several examples are present throughout our history, and in current regulations, to illustrate 
these forces that the contracting officer must manage. One example is the balancing act 
required between full and open competition, under Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) 
and the direction given by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to set aside 
requirements for different types of small disadvantaged businesses. However, through 
innovative strategies, the creative contracting officer can balance these requirements while 
providing the best value for the Government. This paper frames the context of how these 
competing demands have evolved and how the government can balance these different 
needs and responsibilities. 
Introduction 
Every day across the government a group of individuals known as Contracting 
Officers navigate the minefield of procurement policy to acquire the goods and services 
required for the Government to function. On the other side of this field are the vendors, also 
known as contractors, competing among each other to “win” the business of the 
government. As with any competition, certain rules apply to “the game.” The origins of this 
game, for the government, go back to the early days of our country. As the environment the 
Government operates in changed, the methods of procuring goods and services have 
evolved.  One cannot fully understand the Government procurement process without a little 
background in the political development of this country. As times change, new laws are 
passed affecting the procurement process. A number of these laws do have some political 
influence and address the perceived issues of the time.   
The contracting game is not unique to the Federal Government. State governments 
and private industries buy goods and services from other companies in order to operate 
more efficiently. As the business world moves faster and becomes more global, companies 
have had to focus on their core strengths and outsource certain functions and components 
to remain competitive. As such, the Government did not invent contracting. However, just 
because the private industry does contracting, does not mean it is identical to Government 




the process and make certain mistakes, even if the company has conducted private 
contracts for some time. Even though the Government tries to model a number of best 
practices from industry, different rules do apply. 
When I first lived in England, after growing up in the United States, I found out two 
things right away. First, while we both speak English, it is not the same language. Second, if 
you describe Cricket to someone, it may sound like baseball, but it is a completely different 
game. In Cricket, a pitcher throws to a batter that tries to hit the ball. If he does hit it, he runs 
between bases, until someone from the other team gets the ball and tries to throw him out. 
After hearing this description, you may think you are ready to watch a game and know what 
to expect. However, with the subtle differences in the rules, most people watching this sport 
for the first time are as lost as I was trying to follow the game. One must have a strong 
understanding of the rules in order to follow or play the game.  Government contracting is 
similar; you must know all the rules of the game in order to play successfully.  
As long as everyone plays by the rules, the result is a fair competition. Unfortunately, 
it would appear, the rules in the Government contracting game often change without 
thoroughly looking at the impact on other rules. In order to understand how this happens, we 
must first examine the history of our Government.  
A New Type of Government 
To refresh from high school Government class, the founders of the United States 
Government mostly came from countries that had governments that exercised complete 
power over their citizens. Whether it was a monarchy, dictatorship, or some other form of 
totalitarian rule, the people had little say in how the government exercised its power over the 
people. As such, the founders of this country were greatly concerned about the Government 
getting too powerfully and imposing its will on the people. They did not want this new 
Government to become a version of the governments from which they just broke away.  
The Constitution of the United States is the governing document for our country, 
often referred to as “the law of the land.” The founders designed it to spell out the structure 
of the federal government, and its powers in relation to the state governments. In developing 
the Constitution, the Founders felt very strongly that it needed to address the government’s 
interactions with the people and set limits on the power it could exercise over the people. 
The basic premise is that the government derives all its power from the people and must 
represent the people that it serves. 
The first sections of the Constitution of the United States address the structure of the 
Government and the powers of each branch, to include methods to balance those powers. 
This section specifically states that the government derives its power from the people it 
governs. In addition, any powers that are not explicitly given to the Federal Government by 
the Constitution remain the power of the individual states. The Founders saw a need for a 
Federal Government to unite the states and act on certain matters that affect all the states. 
However, they were cautious of a central government abusing its power over the people. 
The first ten amendments, also known as the Bill of Rights, focuses completely on how the 
Government interacts with the people of the United States and restricts the powers the 
Government can exercise over its people. 
To further restrict this power and ensure the government did not turn into an “elected 
monarchy,” the Federal Government was divided into three branches. Each branch has its 
role and area in which it has power to act. These powers put  “checks and balances” on the 




and impose its power on the people, unchallenged. In the simplest definition, each branch 
has a unique duty and power. The Legislative Branch is responsible for passing all Federal 
laws. Once passed, the President, Executive Branch, “signs the legislation into law.” The 
Executive Branch is responsible for enforcing the laws and managing how the government 
operates. The White House and the Office of the President cannot accomplish all the 
responsibilities of running the different aspects of government by itself. To accomplish these 
responsibilities, the Executive branch is further broken down into specialty areas through the 
establishment of Executive Agencies and Administrations. The Executive Branch manages 
through directives and Executive Orders to its Administrations. The Judicial Branch is 
responsible for interpreting the laws and stating how the laws apply to a specific situation. 
The Judiciary also passes judgment when someone files a complaint that a law or regulation 
was violated. This judgment can include indemnification of an injured party. Often agencies 
use these judgments as a basis for determining how to apply the law in the future. These 
precedents are watched for guidance in future procurements. 
Government versus Private Contracting 
Contracts have been around for hundreds of years. In simplest terms, a contract is 
an agreement between two or more parties that can be enforced by a government body. 
Under the current legal definition, a contract must have four elements to be legally enforced. 
First, the contract must be between two or more legal entities, individuals or businesses. A 
person cannot have a contract with himself/herself. Second, all parties must be able to 
legally enter into the contract and do so freely. The person cannot be coerced, underage, or 
incapacitated, etc. Third, the contract must have consideration. Consideration is an 
exchange of something of value. Most courts uphold that it should be an equitable exchange 
of value to be legal. For example, a contract to purchase a house for a dollar probably would 
not be enforced in court because the house would be worth more than a dollar, regardless 
of the condition. As a result, this would not be considered an equitable exchange of value.  
The most common consideration is exchange of a good or service for a payment of some 
type. Finally, the substance of the contract must be legal. The court will not uphold a 
contract for someone to have to perform an illegal act. In private contracts, anything else is 
allowed. Given these elements, a contract is formed when one party makes an offer and the 
other party accepts the offer. 
As long as the individuals do not break any laws, other salesmanship or common 
practices are allowed. A common one that is allowed in private contracting and not allowed 
in government contracting is the “wining and dining” of prospective clients. Another element 
that is in government contracting that is not present in private contracts is the need for fair 
competition. In the private sector one company can chose to contract with another simply 
because the owner likes the other company. This environment is not present in government 
contracting. The primary reason is the government operated under different rules then the 
private sector when it comes to contracting. Just as the cricket game mentioned earlier, at 
first glance it looks very similar to the “same old game” we all know. However, this game has 
different rules that can be complicated to a new “player.” This complex game can influence 
some players to stay off the field. Unfortunately, the government can lose out when 
companies do not want to enter contracting due to this “red tape.” So, if contracting can be 





Sources of Government Acquisition Rules 
While the “three branches system” of Government helps protect the people from 
abuses of power with its “checks and balances,” the system complicates the “rule of law” 
under which government acquisition professionals operate. Since the “checks and balances” 
gives each branch some influence over the other branches, procurement “rules” are 
influenced by all three branches.  Procurement rules can originate in any of the three 
branches of government.  
The executive branch issues policies and orders that must be followed by all the 
agencies within the branch. Similar to how a CEO directs the company on how it will conduct 
business, the Office of the President directs the Agencies on how to conduct different 
aspects of running the government. In relation to contracting, most of the time these policies 
are issued from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) under the President. The 
regulations for procurement are developed in this branch. 
With a new President every four to eight years, executive policies change. Just as 
each CEO has different management philosophies, each President has his own 
management policy. The management policy and acquisition philosophy of the President 
affects the policies coming out to the Administration. The larger the difference between 
philosophies of different Presidents, the greater the policy changes will be when a new 
President takes control. 
The individual agencies issues guidance on how procurement is conducted within 
the agency. Each agency has a specific mission. Their specific missions influence the needs 
of the agency. As a result, some agencies procure goods and services that other agencies 
do not procure. In addition, different agencies operate in different environments. Each 
agency must have its own guidance on procurement issue. The individual agencies 
accomplish this guidance in a few ways. Most agencies issue a supplement to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). In addition, they issue internal Informational Letters and 
handbooks or directives. These methods allow the agencies flexibility in providing internal 
guidance for procurement issues. However, agencies have to watch executive and 
legislative directions. The agencies operate in a dual reporting system. As part of the 
executive branch, the agencies report to the President. In addition, the heads of the 
agencies are often called to report or testify to Congress. This puts a unique responsibility 
on the agencies in developing its internal policies. 
The Legislative Branch affects government acquisitions a couple ways. First, this 
branch writes and passes the laws. All citizens and legal entities must follow the laws 
passed by the government to the degree it pertains to them. Due to the protections the 
Founders put in place with the interactions of government and citizens, the Federal 
Government can put restrictions and laws in place that affect how it conducts business 
easier than laws that affect private companies and citizens. When a law is put in place that 
directs the government to conduct business in a certain manner, the agencies must follow 
the laws that affect its contracting. In general, when society decides it needs to change a 
rule because of its impact on the people, it creates a law to restrict a particular behavior. 
The government is the largest buyer of goods and services in the marketplace. With this 
status comes a lot of power in negotiations. Since the government is concerned with the 
treatment of the citizens, a number of procurement laws over the years have focused on 





Another way the Legislative Branch affects government acquisitions is through 
control of the money for acquisitions. The Constitution states that no money will be spent by 
the government that is not appropriated by Congress. The appropriations process is 
accomplished each year through the Federal Budget. This budget authorizes how much 
each agency can spend. The agencies then decided to split its money up among its program 
offices. A Contracting Officer is not allowed to enter into a contract for which the money is 
not available to be obligated. During the budget process, the Congress will often set certain 
monies aside for a specific purpose. This practice is called earmarks. The money is released 
to the agency, but the accompanying law says the agency must use it for a specific purpose. 
Laws are often written and passed due to current events in society. Unfortunately, 
other influences affect the creation of laws. Special interest groups push the agenda of their 
perspective interests. Special interest groups are not just large organizations. Any group 
with a specific mission is a special interest group. Veteran groups, environmental groups, 
small business advocates, etc. are all considered special interests. Some interest groups 
have more influence than others do. These groups strongly encourage Congress to pass 
laws that assists their mission. Of course, these special interest groups compete with other 
groups when it comes to influencing Congress. This ebb and flow of power as laws are 
passed create new procurement policies that change the rules of how items are purchased. 
These changes can seem to contradict the rules in place prior to the new law. Another 
influence on the laws that Congress passes is the “TV effect.” The TV effect is change in 
public opinion after a “news” story comes out. Previous news stories of problems in the 
acquisition community have led to Congress investigating and often creating a new law on 
how procurement is accomplished. 
Unfortunately, since laws have a political influence in its creation, flaws in the system 
exist. In response to current concerns of their constituents, Congressional politicians bring 
forward new laws. When new laws are presented, the effect on current laws are not always 
addressed. At times, this process creates conflicting guidance. If a new law is passed, the 
government must follow the new law. However, current laws stay in effect until they are 
changed or repealed. So often, a new law that is passed will mandate an action that is 
contrary to an existing law. This is where the confusion originates for the Contracting Officer 
in the field.     
The language of laws adds to the difficulty in interpreting the intent and how the 
Contracting Officer is supposed to implement the new law. The nature of laws is to write the 
law in sufficiently vague language. This process is done on purpose. The reason for this is 
so the law can be applied to different situations. If the language is too specific, it cannot be 
applied to unforeseen circumstances. A side effect of this process is that laws must be 
interpreted. The interpretation of laws is a primary responsibility of the Judiciary Branch. 
The Judicial Branch also influences the acquisition process. Most of the states in the 
US follow common law. Common law is derived from the practices and court rulings. These 
rulings create a precedence that other courts take into account in future cases. Since these 
rulings can influence future decisions a court makes, the acquisition community closely 
follows the court decisions on topics related to contract law. Two types of decisions from the 
courts affect acquisitions. The first is if a law is challenged as unconstitutional, it could be 
heard by the US Supreme Court. If any law is determined to be unconstitutional, the law is 
overturned and people no longer have to follow that law. This is true of any law, including 
procurement laws. The other way decisions affect procurement is when a claim of unfair 
treatment is filed by a party harmed by Government in the award of a contract to another 




Protests and Disputes 
Each branch has its processes for hearing complaints that a vendor was treated 
unfairly in competition for a contract. In the Executive Branch, the vendor files an agency 
level protest. This protest goes to the Contracting Officer or one level above. If the agency 
determines the protest is valid, it can overturn the Contracting Officer’s decision. In the 
Legislative Branch, protests are filed with the Government Accountability Office, or GAO. 
The GAO is a nonpartisan group that reports to Congress. The GAO reports its findings and 
recommendations to the agency, whether it upholds a protest or not. While the agency does 
not have to implement the GAO recommendations, Congress watches how much agencies 
follow these recommendations. The Judiciary Branch hears complaints through the court 
system. Currently, the court structure that claims progress through is the Civilian Board of 
Contract Appeals (CBCA). This court was established by section 847 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for 2006. This is a continuation of the authority to hear disputes 
between the individuals and the executive agencies established under the Contract Disputes 
Act of 1978 (www.cbca.gsa.gov). 
The court makes a ruling on the claim in favor of the company or for the 
Government. If the contractor wins, the court will normally award damages. In these 
decisions, the court normally states a legal opinion or rational for its decision. The 
procurement community pays attention to these decisions. The result of these decisions 
from the different branches can give insight into what was intended by the law or policy that 
was the topic of the protest or claim. The legal opinion or decision can give great insight into 
how future decisions will be made. If a Contracting Officers encounters the same policy or 
law in the procurement of a good or service, he or she will be able to address the situation 
properly. 
History of Procurement Policy 
Since the founding of the United States, the government has paid for goods and 
services from individuals. As stewards of the people’s money, the government must ensure 
it spends the money wisely. Over time, the government has become the largest buyer of 
goods and services in the country. With that status, comes a power that could be abused. 
As a result, the government has passed laws to protect the citizens’ interests. These laws 
protect those doing business with the government and ensure the government is getting a 
value for the people’s money. As problems have developed, actual or perceived, policies 
have been changed. Contracting policies can be divided into three main historical periods, 
pre-WWI, WWII, and current. 
Prior to WWI, the government started enacting laws to guide its contracting activity 
with the public. Most of the needs in this time dealt with defense. Some major enactments 
(PWC, 2008) include Advertising and Sealed Bids27 in 1842, Civil Sundry28 in 1861, and the 
Antifraud Act29 of 1862. From 1862 to 1921, not a lot activity occurred in procurement policy. 
In the pre- and post-WWII period, some additional issues became known. As a result, 
                                                
27 Required advertising, sealed bids, formalized procedures, and regulations to ensure accountability 
and reasonable prices (DAU, 2008). 
28 Set up a competitive open bid system and formal advertising.  





several policies were enacted. In 1921 the Economy Act30 was passed. The Davis-Bacon 
Act,31 Buy American Act,32 and Miller Act33 were passed in 1931, 1933, and 1935, 
respectively. As the war moved to an end, the War Powers Act34 and Berry Amendments35 
were enacted in 1941. After the war in 1947, the Armed Services Act36 was passed in 1947. 
The 1970 Commission on Government Procurement37 starts recent history with a 
study of how the government procures goods and services and how to improve the process. 
In 1984, the Competition in Contracting Act was passed and the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) was developed. These two policy changes resulted in a mandate for all 
contractors to be treated fairly and on a level playing field. In addition, the FAR set a policy 
for all government agencies to follow in procurement of goods and services. In 1996, the 
Packard Commission38 studied successful companies to determine what the Government 
could learn from industry. This starts a shift in government to incorporating best practices 
into how it manages the large agencies. The National Performance Review39 of 1993, the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act40 of 1994, and Federal Acquisition Reform Act41 of 1996 
start addressing the issues companies have in doing business with the government. They 
also bring to light why companies are able to keep up with changing industries better than 
government. The processes and bureaucracy was adding a lot of waste to the process, 
especially with commercial items. A number of the requirements present in a noncommercial 
item are unnecessary when acquiring a commercial item that has been tested and available 
to the public. 
More recently, the Defense Transformation Act of 2004 and Service Acquisition 
Reform Act Final Report42 of 2007 have influenced government contracting (Vincent, 2009, 
Slide 8). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 added a new emphasis on 
                                                
30 Established the ability of an agency to purchase products or services from another agency. 
31 Requires contractors to pay the “prevailing rate” to workers in construction. 
32 Sets a preference for American products. It was established during the Great Depression to protect 
American companies. 
33 Set requirements for payment and performance bonds to protect government interests under 
construction contracts over $100,000. 
34 Removed most statutory requirements to allow rapid mobilization of industry during WWII. The end 
result was a more distant relationship between government and contractors. 
35 Required the Department of War (now the DoD) to buy domestic end products. 
36 Established extensive regulations for military procurements. Gave the DoD authority to contract for 
National Defense needs. 
37 After WWII, increase in regulations. Took away much of the discretion of the Contracting Officer 
that was granted under the War Powers Act.  
38 Determined many problems in procurement were a result of too much regulation over the decades. 
39 Focused on reform and reducing costs. 
40 Focus on efficiency in contracting. Eliminates some regulations and restrictions when procuring 
commercial items and set up simplified procedures. 
41 Established dispute resolution procedures, setting competitive ranges and allowed rejected offerors 
to request debriefings. 
42 Revised definition of commercial services and incorporated best practices from industry into the 




transparency and reporting. The implementation of the reporting aspect for vendors has 
proven challenging to companies, especially one new to government contracting.   
Conflict in Guidance 
This concern for fair treatment is present in a number of the laws affecting the 
Federal Procurement process. Such laws as the Competition in Contracting Act43 (CICA) 
and Truth in Negotiation Act44 (TINA) address how the Government interacts with 
prospective vendors. The Small Business Act put an emphasis on contracting with small 
disadvantaged business. However, the Government has a fiduciary responsibility to spend 
the taxpayers’ money wisely. The Government has had to balance using economies of scale 
to secure a better price for the taxpayers and assisting socioeconomic groups. As issues 
become a higher priority for the Government, it will get more attention from the President 
and rules or laws are passed to focus more of the contracting business on that area. A 
recent example of this is “green,” or energy efficient, products45. Guidance has come out 
recently on green contracting and the use of more Energy Efficient equipment. However, the 
FAR directs the Government to avoid using Brand Names as much as possible. Since 
“green” technology is new, this emphasis can limit competition to specific brands. 
Another priority for the Government is the veterans returning from war zones. 
Recently Public Law 109-461 includes the Veteran’s First Program for the Department of 
Veteran Affairs (VA). This allows the VA to choose Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small 
Business (SDVOSB) or Veteran Owned Small Business (VOSB) before any other groups.46 
The conflict arises when the SDVOSB does not sell the more energy efficient product. Then 
the Government Official needs to make a decision between the SDVOSB and the more 
energy efficient product that may be only made by a large business. Another conflict occurs 
when a small business gets a contract due to competition restrictions, but does not add 
value to the final product or service. The government must balance the need for spending 
money wisely and its social responsibility to help small businesses. In addition, the priority 
order under the socioeconomic programs changes over time. These changes result from the 
small business groups fighting, through special interest groups, for a better position in the 
order of priority. 
Recently, the government has shifted to more of a focus on using fixed price 
contracting whenever possible. This is supposed to lower risk and expense for the 
Government. However, by shifting risk onto the contractor, the vendor considers that risk 
when pricing their product of service. With commercial items, this makes more sense, 
because a company can better gauge its cost due to the large volume of an item or service 
it has already sold. Similarly, once a noncommercial product is developed for the 
Government and had several production runs, the contractor should have a better control on 
its cost and the Government can procure future production on a fixed price basis.  
With services, like construction, the ability to fix the price becomes a little more risky. 
Even with a set service, the conditions of every project are different. In essence, the 
                                                
43 Increase competition to more companies resulting in lower prices for the government. 
44 Requires contractors to submit cost or pricing data and certify data is current, accurate and 
complete. 
45 Energy Star programs require items on this list to meet certain energy efficiency standards. 





“commercial product” is being tailored. In addition, due to the Service Contract Act, a firm 
fixed price service contract is not as firm as a commercial item. When wage determinations 
change in an area a service is provided, the contractor must adjust wages. This is the one 
time a contractor can make a change in which the Government really does not have a 
choice. When the contractor requests an equitable adjustment due to change in wage 
determination, the government needs to adjust the pricing of the contract, due to law 
changes. The contract is a firm fixed price in name early. In practice, the contract acts like a 
fixed price with economic adjustment. The adjustment is tied to the wage determination. The 
current contracting environment created by these varied laws and regulations have created 
a jungle for the Contracting Officer to navigate (See Figure 1). 
The ideal place to address these conflicting requirements is in the legislative and 
policymaking level. At the policy level, the FAR Council47 issues proposed rules to the public 
and allows everyone to comment on the policy before making a final rule. This process 
helps to bring to light possible conflicts that the new policy could create. However, policies 
must work within the legislation. If the two are at odds, the law trumps policy. In an ideal 
process, a study would be done before enacting new laws affecting procurement. A similar 
period for public comment before the final law is drafted would put a spotlight on some of 
these issues before the government encounters them in practice. This process would greatly 
improve the procurement law and policy processes. This new initiative is contrary to how 
laws are normally made, with lawmakers comprising on different aspects and combining bills 
to accomplish their goals. However, this new approach would fit in with the new focus on 
government transparency and use of technology. 
Contract administration is another area that has conflicting guidance. Contracts must 
be properly administered. This is especially true in service or long term contracts. The 
success of the contract is how the service is delivered. However, many agencies put a focus 
on activity up to award. Many Contracting Officers are evaluated on contracts awarded, and 
time to get to award. Direction is given to improve administration, but no resources are 
expanded to assist with contract administration. 
A final example of a conflict in guidance is the directive from the Administration early 
last year that new service contractors must give “first hire” option to the employees of the 
incumbent contractor. The purpose of this directive is to minimize the impact of changing 
vendors, by having individuals familiar with the services and location stay in place to provide 
the services to the Government. However, this can conflict with the Contracting Officer’s 
fiduciary responsibility to spend the taxpayers’ money wisely. If a current contractor is not 
performing well, then the Government can be stuck with the same underperforming 
employees under a new contractor. The government made a best value decision to select a 
company, when it is receiving the employees of a different company, if they accept the 
offers of the new vendor. 
Approaches 
A few approaches are currently used to address conflicting requirements. As laws 
are passed or directives are received by the President, the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy starts the process of examining how to implement the new directive or law into the 
current Federal Policies. Initially, directives are sent to agencies to start implementing a 
policy while a proposed change is debated. Once a final rule is made, it is incorporated into 
the Federal Policy. This process is why different parts of the FAR seem to give different 
                                                




guidance from other parts. The result is like several people each writing a different chapter 
of a book and then putting it together. Periodically, a full review of the FAR in whole and how 
directions affect other parts needs to be accomplished. 
One way to address different competition requirements has been the use of 
thresholds. Under the micro-purchase threshold, the customer can use a government credit 
card to procure the goods or services needed. Between the micro and simplified thresholds, 
all procurements should be reserved for small businesses to the greatest extent possible. 
Above the simplified threshold, the agency should set aside for small businesses in specific 
socioeconomic groups whenever possible. If the agency must go to a large business, the 
large business should subcontract some of the work to a small business. A final approach 
used is writing an exception into the regulation (i.e., exception to the non-manufacture rule). 
These approaches help to satisfy a specific requirement, but not another. For example, 
under the Competition in Contracting Act all companies should have equal opportunity to bid 
on contracts. However, the focus on small businesses shuts large businesses out of 
competition in a number of contracts. If thresholds are used to determine set aside, the spirit 
of competition in contracting should require procurements above a certain amount be 
automatically open to large business. 
Currently the decision on whether small businesses can compete or the competition 
should be opened up to larger businesses is left up to the agency through the Contracting 
Officer and the Review Boards within the agency. As Contracting Officers become better 
skilled and trained, they can become the trusted business advisors that are needed to make 
those types of decisions.  
Another way to improve efficiency in the contracting field is to focus on training and 
accountability at the Contracting Officer level. Many agencies have internal policies of higher 
approval for contracting actions. This oversight is intended to ensure the Contracting 
Officer’s compliance with policies. Compliance with policy is only a problem if one of two 
causes is present. Either, the contracting officer displays a laxness in the responsibilities of 
the job; or the person lacks the knowledge and experience to implement the policy properly 
in the procurement process.  The approach best suited to solving this issue is to focus on 
training and accountability. If organizations ensure the proper, continuing education and 
hold the Contracting Officer accountable for the actions, a lot of the bureaucracy can be 
eliminated. 
Not all the fixes have to be done above the Contracting Officer. The FAR Guiding 
Principles state “unless a strategy is expressly forbidden by statute or regulation, the 
strategy is open to the Contracting Officer.” This gives the Contracting Officer a lot of leeway 
in how to conduct business. The Contracting Officer can use some innovative techniques to 
satisfy these different requirements and provide the best value for the Government. One 
method to address recurring needs has been establishing an IDIQ.48 The primary advantage 
to an IDIQ is the Government does an evaluation once for multiple requiring requirements 
anticipated in the near future. This streamlines the process of future procurements because 
the awardees have already been evaluated for past performance and technical ability to 
fulfill the requirements. When a future request from a customer occurs, an order can be 
placed without having to compete a second time. Eliminating this need for future 
competitions can speed up the procurement process without sacrificing quality. While this 
approach works well for most commercial items, problems occur with large quantities and 
small businesses or with services. Since services are customized, the final price could be 
                                                




different from one order to another. This removes the advantage of streamlining the 
procurement, the primary advantage of an IDIQ. One product recently used in construction 
that can be easily used in services is a MATOC49. This contract type issues awards to 
multiple vendors for an expected series of requirements. The same initial evaluation of an 
IDIQ occurs with a MATOC. The difference between the two is a pool of prequalified 
contractors is available under a MATOC. The MATOC uses either a seed, or first task order, 
project or a fictional project within the original solicitation to allow for a proper technical 
evaluation. This allows the Government to evaluate approach on customized requirements, 
such as construction or services. The way to use this and still keep competition is to hold 
competition at the task order level among all the awardees of the MATOC. This ensures the 
government receives the benefits of a small group of prequalified vendors bidding against 
each other for the service. 
The use of options50 in a contract has become more popular for ongoing services. 
This approach works best in services that are required from one year to the next and do not 
change rapidly in price and specifications. In areas where prices are rapidly dropping, long 
options are not in the best interest of the Government. If prices are rising rapidly, the 
contractor is put at a disadvantage. Technology is a prime area where specifications are 
constantly changing. An IDIQ for installing equipment might be better than option years in 
this case.  
One very effective technique to addressing requirements, when done properly is 
performance based contracting. This puts a focus on the desired outcome, not how it is 
accomplished. This lesson was learned from private industry. Companies often present a 
problem to a potential vendor as “this is what I want it to do, I don’t care how it does it.” 
Success is measured by the result. The Government took a while to arrive at this same 
conclusion, but is now taking greater interest in this approach. 
In contract administration, focus has shifted back and forth between “cradle to grave” 
and a separate Administrating Contracting Officer (ACO). Both have advantages. The 
problem with “cradle to grave” is the focus on Contracting Officers to concentrate on 
awarding new contracts and the original CO may no longer be with the organization. Since 
most employee evaluation is directed at this phase, administration gets less attention. 
However, in the ACO structure, often the ACO did not write the contract and may be in a 
different location. One way to address this is to adopt the ACO model, but have one at each 
contracting shop at the base level. This way a focus is on contract administration and the 
ACO is accessible at the location. In addition, if any questions arise the ACO can ask the 
CO that wrote the contract. 
So how can the Government capitalize on economies of scale and still nurture small 
businesses. Strategic Sourcing51 has been offered as a way to leverage the buying power of 
the Government. However, this eliminates most small businesses from competing. A couple 
methods can be used to accomplish both benefits. First, procurements under strategic 
                                                
49 Multiple Award Task Order Contract 
50 Ability to extend a contract for a period of performance or quantity that was agreed to in the original 
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51 A directive that agencies put in place contracting vehicles to procure large quantities of products 




sourcing can encourage teaming52 among companies to provide the products or services. 
Under this approach, companies can ban together in larger joint ventures to handle the large 
volumes. Another approach is for the agencies to set up large, regional Multiple Award 
IDIQs to handle these requirements. This approach would set up a “mini-schedule” similar to 
GSA. While these currently exist as GWACs53, the communication of availability to 
contracting offices is lacking. Better use of these contracting instruments can balance the 
requirements. 
Better reporting and contract administration can help ensure the government 
receives good services. The Presidential directive that new contractors give “first hire” 
choice to the incumbent’s employees can cause some quality issues. While the intent is to 
minimize delivery of services by having people on the ground that already know the job, 
often performance issues are rooted in the employee performing the service not necessarily 
the management. The Government recently expanded the past performance database by 
requiring all agencies to utilize PIPIRS. Expanding this system to allow the Government to 
report the performance of individuals would help to ensure the government does not inherit 
the same bad employees under a new company. In order for this to work, the Government 
must report bad performance when it occurs. Too often the Government would prefer to let 
the contract end or Terminate for Convenience because it is the route of least resistance. 
The Government does a disservice to the taxpayer when neglecting this responsibility. 
Conclusion 
Contracting Officers operate in a complex environment. Juggling requirements 
becomes the real art form of Government contracting. At the same time, agencies want to 
see new innovative methods to purchasing goods and services that will save the taxpayer 
money. Several methods are available to the well-informed contracting officer to fulfill the 
socioeconomic goals and be innovative and efficient. One example of this is the MATOC 
contract for construction. With some creativity, this type of contract can be used for other 
activities, like services. By using innovative processes; an agency can leverage its buying 
power over the year. In addition, the agency could make this a set-aside for a specific 
socioeconomic group if market research shows enough competition. As contracting policies 
change over time, the Contracting Officer must adapt operations to satisfy customer needs 
and stay within the regulatory guidelines. 
References 
CBCA. (2009, December). United States civilian board of contract appeals website. 
Retrieved March 15, 2010, from http://www.cbca.gsa.gov 
DAU. (2008, October). History of American acquisition (Coursework, Class CON 100, 
Lesson 1). Frederick, MD: Veteran Affairs Acquisition Academy.  
PWC. (2008, October).VAAA intern development program (Coursework, SBLD 008-A). 
Frederick, MD: Veteran Affairs Acquisition Academy.  
Vincent, L. (2009, December 29). Government contracting seminar slides. Slide 
presentation. 
                                                
52 An arrangement where more than one company cooperates on a project. In a number of teaming 
agreements, the Government has a direct contractual relationship with the members of the team, 
unlike a prime/sub relationship.   










Services Supply Chain in the Department of 
Defense: Comparison and Analysis of Acquisition 
Management in the Army, Navy, and Air Force  
Aruna Apte—Dr. Aruna Apte is an Assistant Professor in the Operations and Logistics 
Management Department, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. Her research interests are in the areas of developing mathematical models 
and algorithms for complex, real-world operational problems using techniques of optimization. It is 
important to her that her research is directly applicable to practical problems and has significant 
value-adding potential. She has numerous publications in peer-reviewed journals. She teaches a 
mathematical modeling course and has advised over 30 students for theses and MBA reports.  
Currently, she is working in the areas of developing mathematical programming models in 
humanitarian logistics and military logistics. Before NPS, she worked as a consultant at MCI and 
taught at Southern Methodist University. For more information, please visit  
http://research.nps.edu/cgi-bin/vita.cgi?p=display_vita&id=1105652618 
Uday M. Apte—Dr. Uday M. Apte is Professor of Operations Management at the Graduate School 
of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  Before joining NPS, Dr. 
Apte taught at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, PA, and at the Cox School of 
Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX.  Dr. Apte holds a PhD in Decision Sciences 
from The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.  Prior to his career in academia, Dr. Apte 
worked for over ten years in managing operations and information systems in the financial services 
and utility industries.  Since then, he has consulted with several major US corporations and 
international organizations. Dr. Apte has served as a founder and President of the College of Service 
Operations, Production and Operations Management Society (POMS), and as a board member and 
vice president of POMS.  Areas of Dr. Apte’s research interests include managing service operations, 
supply chain management, and globalization of information-intensive services.  He has published two 
books and over 40 articles, five of which have won awards from professional societies. 
Rene G. Rendon—Dr. Rene G. Rendon is an Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School where he teaches defense acquisition courses.  Prior to his appointment at the NPS, he 
served for more than 22 years as an acquisition and contracting officer in the United States Air Force, 
retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel. His Air Force career included assignments as a contracting 
officer for the Peacekeeper ICBM, Maverick Missile, and the F-22 Raptor.  He was also the director of 
contracting for the Air Force’s Space Based Infrared satellite program, and the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle rocket program.  Rendon’s publications include Management of Defense Acquisition 
Projects (2008), Government Contracting Basics (2007), US Military Program Management: Lessons 
Learned & Best Practices (2007), and Contract Management Organizational Assessment Tools 
(2005).  He has also published in the Journal of Public Procurement, the Journal of Contract 
Management, and the Project Management Journal.   
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of our empirical studies of current management 
practices in services acquisition in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  The primary objective of 
these studies was to develop a comprehensive understanding of how services acquisition is 
being managed within, as well as across, individual military services.  In these empirical 
studies, we developed and deployed a Web-based survey to collect primary data.  
Specifically, we studied the current management practices in such areas as contract 
characteristics, and acquisition management methods including regional- or installation-level 




requirements.  We also studied other program management issues such as scope and 
ability of personnel responsible for acquisition, adequacy of acquisition billets and their fill 
rates, and training provided to services acquisition personnel. 
We found that for the most part the services contracts awarded and administered 
conformed to our expectation.  For example, most service contracts are competitively bid, 
fixed-priced awards with a minimal use of any type of contract incentives.  The survey data 
also confirmed that the Navy uses regional approach in services acquisition, while the Army 
and the Air Force use installation-level approach.  These differences, in turn, appear to be 
having important implications for other acquisition management practices such as the use of 
project management and contract surveillance.  One surprising finding of the study was that 
the project teams are often led by the contracting officer as opposed to a formally 
designated project manager responsible for the overall service project success.  Finally, the 
survey respondents indicated that the number of authorized staff positions for services 
acquisition was inadequate and, furthermore, that the existing billets were inadequately 
filled. 
The analysis and comparison of management practices in different military services 
was used as the basis to develop, and report in this paper, our preliminary 
recommendations for improving the management of services supply chain in the 
Department of Defense. 
Keywords: Service Supply Chain, Services Acquisition, Service Lifecycle, Contract 
Management, Project Management, Program Management 
Introduction 
The service sector represents the largest and the fastest-growing segment of the 
economies of the US and other developed countries. For example, in the US, services 
accounted for roughly 80% of employment in the year 2004 (US Department, 2005).  The 
growth of services in the overall economy is also mirrored by growth of services acquisition 
in private sector companies (Smeltzer & Ogden, 2002) and in the government. For example, 
as seen in Figure 1, the procurement of services in the DoD has continued to increase in 
scope and dollars in the past decade.  Even considering the high value of weapon systems 
and military equipment purchased in recent years, the DoD has spent more on services than 
on supplies, equipment and systems together (Camm, Blickstein & Venzor, 2004).  
Specifically, the DoD obligations on contracts have more than doubled between fiscal years 
2001 and 2008—to over $387 billion, with over $200 billion spent just for services (GAO, 
2009c).  The procured services presently cover a very broad set of service activities—
including information technology and telecommunications services; maintenance and repair 
of equipment; professional, administrative, and management support; and transportation, 




















Figure 1. The DoD’s Contracts for Goods and Service (2000–2009) 
As the DoD’s services procurement continues to increase in scope and dollars, the 
DoD must give greater attention to the management of services contracts. However, the 
increase in service contracting has coincided with the reduction in the federal government 
workforce.  For example, the size of the federal workforce fell from 2.25 million in 1990 to 
1.78 million in 2000 (GAO, 2001).  This mismatch between the increasing workload and the 
decreasing size of the workforce, and the unique nature and complexities associated with 
services acquisition have possibly created an environment in which following the best 
practices has not always been feasible.  For example, between 2001 and 2009, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued 16 reports related to trends, 
challenges, and deficiencies in contracting for services.  In addition, between 2002 and 
2008, the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) has issued 142 reports on deficiencies noted in 
the DoD acquisition and contract administration process. Both the GAO and DoD IG have 
identified market research, contract type, project management, requirements management, 
personnel training, and contractor oversight as just some of the critical deficient areas in 




 The government is required to conduct market research to determine the market’s 
capability for providing the required supply or service and the government’s appropriate 
contracting strategy for the procurement (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  Reports have shown 
that the DoD has not conducted adequate market research during procurement planning 
of services contracts (GAO, 2002a; DoD IG, 2009).    
 Selecting the appropriate contract type is essential for ensuring the appropriate sharing 
and allocation of risk between the government and the contractor.  Fixed-price contracts 
allocate the majority of the cost risk to the contractor, while cost reimbursement contracts 
provide for most of the cost risk to be borne by the government.   Government reports 
have shown that inappropriate contract types were used in services contracts, resulting 
in more risk to the government (GAO, 2001; DoD IG, 2009).    
 The use of project management tools and techniques, such as designated formal project 
managers, project teams, and project lifecycles, have been considered a best practice in 
managing service contracts.   GAO reports have shown that the DoD lacks the proper 
management structure and processes for managing services contracts (GAO, 2007b; 
DoD IG, 2009).   
 Sufficient requirements management is essential for identification and development of 
needs for the DoD, in terms of required services.  If requirement management is 
insufficient, the resulting service contracts will not adequately meet the customer’s 
needs.   The GAO and DoD IG reports have identified poorly defined requirements and 
insufficient requirements management as problems in service contracts (GAO, 2007b; 
DoD-IG, 2009). 
 Defense contract management requires specialized skills and competencies that come 
from extensive training and experience.  A properly trained and competent acquisition 
workforce is considered the heart of successful defense acquisition management.  With 
the downsizing of the DoD workforce, the lack of a qualified acquisition and contracting 
workforce to manage the increased workload in DoD service contracts continues to 
plague DoD service contracting efforts (GAO, 2002b; GAO, 2009b). 
 The essence of DoD contract management is the proper administration of contracts and 
oversight of contractor performance. The lack of effective contract administration and 
contractor oversight increases the government risk of not ensuring total value for the 
dollars spent on service contracts.  GAO and DoD IG reports have consistently identified 
contract administration and contractor oversight as problem areas in the management of 
services contracts (GAO, 2005; GAO, 2007a; GAO, 2007b; DoD IG, 2009).  
 
Exhibit 1. Deficiencies in Services Contracting  
Indeed, DoD contract management has been listed as a “high-risk” area by the GAO 
since 1992 (GAO, 2009a). This “high-risk” status reflects the DoD’s challenges in achieving 
their desired outcomes in terms of meeting the service procurement cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives.  The DoD is at risk of paying higher prices for services than 
necessary.  Recently, the DoD Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
(DPAP) identified the inappropriate use of service contracts in the DoD (Director, 2007) and 
is planning to take actions to improve contracting for services throughout the DoD (Director, 
2006). 
Service production differs from manufacturing of products in several ways due to 
distinguishing characteristics of services.  There is a growing body of literature on 




textbooks (Fitzsimmons & Fitzsimmons, 2006; Metters, King-Metters & Pullman, 2003) 
include the intangibility of service output, co-production, simultaneity of production and 
consumption, the inability to store services, and the complexity in the definition and 
measurement of services.  These characteristics also lead to differences in the marketing of 
services (Lovelock, 1992; Hutt & Spec, 1998). 
Given these differences in the production and marketing of services as opposed to 
that of manufactured products, it is natural to ask if the acquisition of services is essentially 
the same as acquisition of products or if differences exist.  And, if the differences exist, then 
what they are, in general and for specific services, and what do they imply for the 
management of services acquisition?  Given the growth in size and scope of services 
acquisition in today’s economy, these questions are undoubtedly important.   
A survey of academic literature indicates that there exist only a handful of studies 
aimed at addressing some of these questions.  For example, Smeltzer and Ogden (2002) 
examined purchasing professionals’ perceived differences between purchasing materials 
and purchasing services; Ellram, Tate and Billington (2004) developed a supply chain 
framework appropriate for a services supply chain by comparing and contrasting the 
applicability of three product-based manufacturing models; and Schiele and McCue (2006) 
studied the acquisition of consulting services in public sector.  Although these and other 
studies have started to address some of the questions identified above, for the most part, 
the important questions raised above remain unanswered.  Furthermore, given the 
peculiarities of government procurement and the GAO and DoD IG reports on the 
deficiencies in the DoD acquisition and contract administration processes, there exists a 
unique and significant opportunity for conducting research into the management of services 
acquisition in the DoD. 
We have addressed the need for research in the area of services acquisition by 
undertaking a series of research projects.  The first two research projects were exploratory 
in nature.  In the first project, we tried to understand the major challenges and opportunities 
in the service supply chain in the DoD (Apte, Ferrer, Lewis & Rendon, 2006) by undertaking 
in-depth case studies on acquisition of services in three different organizations: Presidio of 
Monterey, Travis Air Force Base, and the Naval Support Detachment Monterey (NSDM).  
The second research project was targeted at studying the program management 
infrastructure (Apte & Rendon, 2007).  In this research, too, we conducted two additional in-
depth case studies of innovative project management approaches at the Air Education and 
Training Command (AETC) and at Air Combat Command (ACC). 
The next two research projects were survey-based empirical studies aimed at 
developing a more comprehensive understanding of how services acquisition is being 
managed at a wide range of Army, Navy and Air Force installations.  Specifically, the third 
research project was aimed at understanding management of services acquisition in the 
Navy and the Air Force (Apte, Apte & Rendon, 2008), while the fourth research project was 
aimed at the Army contracting centers (Apte, Apte & Rendon, 2009). 
The objective of the fifth research project, the preliminary results of which are being 
reported in this report, is to analyze the primary data collected in earlier empirical studies 
involving the Army, Navy and Air Force and to compare the results so as to develop a more 
thorough and comprehensive understanding of how services acquisition is being managed 
within, as well as across, individual military services.  The analysis of survey results will 
focus on the following areas: contract characteristics, acquisition management methods, 
project team approach, services acquisition leadership, and other management issues. The 




department-specific recommendations for improving the management of services supply 
chain.   
The paper is organized in four sections, including the current introductory section.  In 
the next section, we describe the empirical studies we conducted, including the survey 
research methodology used in the study. The results of survey data analysis and some 
salient observations are provided in the third section.  The findings and conclusions of the 
study and our recommendations for improving services acquisition and for future research 
are presented in the fourth section.  We wish to point out that the tables summarizing the 
survey data can be found in two previous technical reports, Apte, Apte, and Rendon (2008; 
2009). 
Research Methodology and the Empirical Studies 
The methodology used in this research consisted of a survey instrument specifically 
developed to address the research objectives and questions mentioned above.  This was a 
Web-based survey instrument developed using the “Survey Monkey” software. The 
developed survey was first pilot tested for its validity (Compton & Meinshausen, 2007) and 
was fine tuned prior to its use in the third and the fourth research projects. 
The survey begins with questions focusing on specific demographic data and then 
asks specific questions related to the approach, method, and procedures used in the 
acquisition of services for specific categories of services.  The categories of services 
targeted in this research are (1) professional, administrative, and management support; (2) 
maintenance and repair of equipment; (3) data processing and telecommunications; (4) 
utilities and housekeeping; and (5) transportation and travel.  These categories were 
selected because collectively, they represent a significant fraction of spending for all the 
services, and are commonly acquired in the Army, Navy and Air Force. 
The survey instrument includes core questions related to the methods and 
procedures used in the acquisition of services for the above service categories.  These core 
questions focus on the following areas: 
Contract Characteristics.  The purpose of this category of questions is to gain insight 
into the dominant procurement methods and contract types used in the acquisition of 
services. The contract characteristics examined in this section are degree of competition 
(competitively bid or sole-source), contract type (fixed-price or cost-type), and type of 
contract incentive (incentive-fee, award-fee, or award-term).   
Acquisition Management Methods.  The purpose of this broad category of questions 
is to understand the management methods and approaches used in the acquisition of 
individual services at each phase of the contract management process.  For each of the 
contract management phases, the survey asks whether the phase was conducted at a 
regional, installation, or some other organizational level.  This core question category also 
focused on whether a project-team approach was typically used in the acquisition of the 
respective service category.  The questions explore the position of the services acquisition 
project team leader, such as a program/project manager or contracting officer. The 
questions also explore information on the owner of the requirement for the service being 
acquired. 
Other Program Management Issues.  This last category of core questions is focused 
on the use of a lifecycle approach, length of assignments for services acquisition 
management personnel, use of market research techniques, level of staffing in services 




personnel.  These questions use a Likert-type scale to measure the level of agreement or 
disagreement among the respondents’ statements. 
The questionnaire described above was used to conduct surveys in all three military 
services. A summarized description of these survey-based empirical studies is given below. 
 Army: The standardized survey was deployed to 81 contracting offices.  The 
survey was distributed across 8 major contracting centers throughout the Army, 
including 40 Army installations.  We received a total of 61 responses to the 
survey, with a survey response rate of 75%. 
 Navy: The data was collected in the Navy survey at the installation level.  The 
data inputs were provided by the Navy Regions in charge of the installations in 
CONUS.  We received inputs from six Regions—covering 66 Navy installations 
plus Naval Supply (NAVSUP) and Naval Medical Logistics Command (NMLC). 
 Air Force: The survey instrument was deployed to 50 Air Force Contracting 
Squadrons, representing six Air Force major commands.  There were 34 
responses from the survey, resulting in a 68% response rate.  These responses 
represented all six Air Force major commands. 
Analysis and Comparison of Survey Data 
As mentioned above, a summary of the survey data can be found in the earlier 
reports related to the third and the fourth research projects.  Depending on the nature of 
responses received during the surveys, the level of details available for individual military 
services—Army, Navy and Air Force—were somewhat different.  Nevertheless, all three 
surveys generated data with sufficient details so that we were able to compare services 
acquisition practices across all three services and draw meaningful conclusions. We present 
below the results of our analysis and comparison of acquisition management practices in the 
Army, Navy and Air Force through a series of figures arranged along the lines of data 
categories described in section 2 above. 
Contract Characteristics 
We discuss three aspects of contract characteristics: degree of competition, type of 
contracts and contract incentives.   It should be noted that the Navy and the Air Force 
surveys were conducted in 2008, while the Army survey was conducted in 2009.    
Consequently, the Army survey results contain data for 2008, while the data streams for the 
Navy and the Air Force surveys end in 2007.  We used the contract characteristic data for 
2007 and computed averages across services and acquisition phases to obtain measures of 
contract characteristics.  The comparison of contract characteristics for Army, Navy and Air 





















































Degree of Competition 
Providing for full and open competition is a public policy and statutory requirement in 
government contracting.  The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) is a public law, 
enacted to increase the number of government procurements conducted using the 
procedures of full and open competition.  Unless the government can justify an exception to 
the competition requirements, the procurement must provide for full and open competition in 
the solicitation and award of the contract. In addition to supporting accountability and 
transparency in government contracts, competitive procurements also result in competitively 
priced proposals that increase the government’s ability to negotiate a fair and reasonable 
contract price. 
As we note in Figure 2A, the predominant procurement approach used in services 
studied was full and open completion.  Since these services are traditional and commercial 
in nature (administrative, maintenance, data processing, utilities/housekeeping, and 
transportation services), it would follow that the competitive marketplace would be capable 
of proposing and competing for these contracts. However, we also noted that a small but 
notable portion of contracts for Navy and Army were sole-sourced.  We do not have detailed 
data on these sole-sourced contracts, but perhaps the services acquired were context-
specific and unique in nature. 
Contract Type 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation categorizes the major contract types as fixed-
price, and cost-reimbursement.  Each of the various types of contracts (specifically cost-
reimbursement versus fixed-price contracts) reflects the sharing and allocation of risk 
between the buyer and the seller.  Fixed-priced contracts are appropriate for well-defined 
requirements in situations with a low risk of performance.  Using these types of contracts, 
the contractor holds the major burden of risk.  On the other hand, under cost-reimbursement 
contracts, which are appropriate for developmental requirements, the risk of performance is 
high.  In these types of contracts, the government shares the major burden of risk.  As 
mentioned above, given the commercial and low-risk nature of services being studied, firm-
fixed price contracts would be the appropriate contractual instrument for these service 
projects. We note in Figure 2B that, as expected, a significant majority of the contracts were 
fixed-price. 
Contract Incentive 
In some situations, the government may want to subjectively incentivize the 
contractor to meet higher levels of performance, which are over and above the basic 
requirements of the contract.  In these situations, award-fee or award-term contract 
incentives may be used.  In award-fee/term contracts, the contractor may earn additional 
money (or contract periods of performance for service contracts), based on the 
government’s judgmental evaluation of the contractor’s superior performance. Since 
commercial services are usually well understood and the output or outcome can be 
reasonably well defined, there is less need to use contract incentives.  That is what we 
observe in Figure 2C. 
Acquisition Management Methods 
In this sub-section we provide comparison of Army, Navy and Air Force practices 
along two dimensions: the organization level at which services are acquired, and the use of 



























Figure 3. Acquisition Management Methods 
Organizational Level at which Services Are Acquired 
The military departments procure services and manage service acquisitions at the 
installation level or regional level.  The proximity of where the acquisition and related 
contracts are managed to where the services are actually performed may have an impact on 
the effectiveness of the project management, as well as the success of the service project.  
Services performed at one location, with the contract and overall project managed at a 
distant location, may result in less than adequate management and control of the project, as 
well as less than proper surveillance of the service contractor.   Insufficient control of the 
project and less than adequate surveillance of the service contractor increases the risk to 
the DoD of not receiving the full value of its service procurement dollars. 
It is not possible, however, to derive any generalized conclusion that acquiring 
services using either regional or installation-level approach is necessarily better than the 
other approach.  Regional approach (centralized procurement) can give rise to economies of 
scale, uniformity of procedures, and possibility of consistently using best acquisition 
practices.   On the other hand, installation-level acquisition (decentralized procurement) 
allows for easier implementation of project management and program management 
approaches, including accurate requirements definition and proper surveillance.  Under 
either approach, however, key to success is adopting suitable management practices. 
We note in Figure 3A that Navy services acquisition takes place predominantly at the 
regional level, whereas in the Army and the Air Force, it occurs predominantly at the 
installation level.  This difference in approaches should be kept in mind when analyzing the 




Project Team Approach 
Service acquisitions, such as information technology services or aircraft maintenance 
services, are typically technically complex and require support from various functional areas, 
such as engineering, procurement, finance, and logistics.  Best practices in project and 
contract management reflect the use of project teams—specifically cross-functional teams—
in the management of service projects.   The use of project teams facilitates the proper 
integration and control of the various functional disciplines involved in the project effort.  
Insufficient control and functional integration of project activities increases the risk of not 
achieving the project’s cost, schedule, and performance objectives. 
We note in Figure 3B that the Army and Air Force use the project team approach 
more frequently than the Navy, where it is used slightly more than 50% of the time.  A 
plausible explanation is that, in general, when services are acquired at the installation level, 
the physical proximity of personnel can make it easier to establish and use the project teams 
in managing acquisition.  Thus, the use of the regional approach in the Navy means that it 
has less opportunity to use the project teams.  Perhaps a virtual team approach may need 
to be adopted.  
Acquisition Leadership 
In addition to the use of project teams, another best practice is formally designating a 
trained project manager/leader with the authority to lead the project effort.  The project 
manager is typically a coordinator and integrator of the various functional disciplines 
involved in the project and has overall responsibility for the project’s success.  The project 
manager is focused on the  overall objectives of the project, and integrating and balancing 
the interests of the various functional disciplines (engineering, procurement, finance, and 
logistics) involved in the service project.  Figure 4 provides answers to the question: Who 
leads the services acquisition project, contracting officer (CO) or Quality Assurance 
Evaluator (QAE)/Contracting Officer Representative (COR)?  Figure 4A shows that when a 
project team is used, the CO predominantly leads the services acquisition project in the 
Army and Air Force, and only slightly more than half of the time for the Navy.  Figure 4B 
shows that when a project team is not used, the CO predominantly leads the services 
acquisition project in the Air Force and the Navy, and only slightly less than half of the time 


























Figure 4. Acquisition Leadership 
Requirement Ownership 
Services acquisition includes managing the requirement.  The “requirement” is the 
specific service that is being procured—for example, information technology services or 
aircraft maintenance services.  It is important to note that the contract management process 
and, more specifically, the authorities and responsibilities of the contracting officer, do not 
include requirements management activities (such as determining the requirement, 
modifying the requirement, assessing the effectiveness of the requirement, or terminating 
the need for the requirement).  These requirements management authorities and activities 
belong to the requirements manager of the organization responsible for the service being 
procured.  Once the requirements organization identifies, develops, and defines the 
requirement, the contracting organization performs the contracting activities to procure the 
needed service.  Contracting officers, however, may support the development of the 
requirements documents by providing business and procurement expertise in this area.  For 
example, an aircraft maintenance squadron would own the aircraft maintenance service 
requirement being procured by the contracting organization for that specific installation.  


























Figure 5. Requirements Ownership 
In general, a contracting officer (CO) leading the acquisition, or owning the 
requirements, is not an appropriate practice, regardless of whether a project team approach 
is used or not. What is surprising from the survey data shown in Figure 4 is that the project 
teams are frequently led by the contracting officer as opposed to a formally designated 
project manager responsible for the overall service project success.  As we note in Figure 5, 
less frequently, yet significantly, the contracting officer also owns the requirements.  We 
consider these findings surprising since the contracting officer is a functional specialist 
concerned with ensuring the government rules and that the contract are in compliance by 
the contractor, while a project manager is concerned with the overall success of the project, 
in terms of cost, schedule, and performance objectives.  In addition, a project manager 
typically represents the service requirement owner, and is typically authorized to make 
changes to the requirement during contract performance.  Contracting officers do not have 
the authority to make changes to the service requirement, and, traditionally, do not have the 
expertise or technical knowledge to make such changes—for example, making changes to 
the requirements for aircraft maintenance service.  Leading project teams involves 
managing the requirement and authorizing related technical changes to the requirement 
during contractor performance.  We also observe the following in Figures 4 and 5:   
 For the Army and Air Force, the use of a project team increases the probability of 
the CO leading the services acquisition; 
 For the Navy, perhaps due to regional organization, the use of project teams 
decreases the probability of a CO leading the acquisition; and 




Program Management Issues 
The first set of program management issues we investigated is the scope and ability 
of personnel responsible for services acquisition.  Figure 6 provides comparative data on 
this count.   












































Figure 6. Scope and Ability of Personnel Responsible for Acquisition 
Contractor Surveillance  
As expected, we note in Figure 6A that the contracting officer always writes and 
awards contracts in the Navy and the Air Force.  In the Army, the CO predominantly writes 
and awards the contracts.  It is unclear why that would be the case.  Another critical aspect 
of services acquisition is contractor surveillance.  Contractor surveillance ensures that the 
contractor’s performance complies with the requirements of the contract and, thus, the 
government is receiving the services procured.  Due to the technical nature of government 
services contracts, contractor surveillance personnel should be knowledgeable of the 




for the service requirement.  Thus, having the requisite technical skills is critical for 
conducting contractor surveillance. 
We note in Figure 6B that, as expected, in the Air Force and the Army, QAE/CORs 
predominantly provide contractor surveillance.  However, in the Navy, QAE/CORs provide 
contractor surveillance in about 50% of the cases, with the contracting officer shouldering 
that responsibility in the remaining cases.  These results indicate another situation in which 
contracting officers may be performing activities outside their area of expertise; in this case, 
performing contractor surveillance.  Contractor surveillance involves technical knowledge 
and expertise in the service requirement area.  A contracting officer, considered a business 
advisor with expertise in government contracting rules and regulations, should not be 
performing technical contractor surveillance on an aircraft maintenance service contract.  
Perhaps this is related to and caused by the regional approach to services acquisition being 
adopted by the Navy.  
Finally, we studied the length of time COR/QAEs spend in their assigned position.  
The comparative data is presented in Figure 6C.  We note that: 
 The majority of COR/QAEs in the Air Force were assigned in the position for less 
than 3 years.  Perhaps this is caused by significant turnover in staff. 
 In the Navy, a significant percentage of COR/QAEs were in the job for more than 
3 years.   Interestingly, this seems to be the case in spite of the fact observed 
earlier that  the contracting officer is responsible for surveillance half the time. 
The final category of survey data consisted of other miscellaneous issues related to 
services acquisition program management.   These include the use of lifecycle approach in 
routine and non-routine services, service acquisition billets, responsibility of various staff 
members, and the training they receive.  The comparative data is presented in Figures 7 
and 8. 

































The use of a lifecycle to manage and control the progress of a project is considered 
a best practice in project management (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  The project lifecycle 
allows the project to be managed in phases, with each phase controlled by gates and 
decision-points.  The use of a project lifecycle should be a concern for ensuring proper 
management of service projects, especially non-routine services.  If the services being 
procured and managed are of a non-routine nature, one would expect higher levels of 
uncertainty—and, thus, higher levels of cost, schedule, and performance risk—in the 
management of these service projects.  Best practices in reducing project risk include the 
use of a project lifecycle—with project phases, gates, and decision-points for monitoring and 
controlling the progression of the service project procurement process as well as the 
resulting service.  Without the use of a project lifecycle, the service project may be 
vulnerable to excessive risk in terms of meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives.  
This would especially be true in the procurement and management of high-risk non-routine 
services. 
Figure 7A reflects that, for routine services, a lifecycle was predominantly used by 
the Air Force, and less so (approximately less than half of the time) by the Army and Navy.  
As seen in Figure 7B, for non-routine services, a lifecycle approach was predominantly used 





























































Figure 8. Acquisition Billets 
Service Acquisition Billets & Responsibility of Staff Members 
The management of services acquisition is the responsibility of the services 
acquisition personnel located at the regional or installation organizations.  Each acquisition 




addition, these positions may or may not be filled, due to lack of personnel (perhaps 
personnel are deployed) or due to the understaffing of organizations.  These acquisition 
personnel are also required to receive the appropriate training reflective of their assigned 
acquisition duties, such as contracting officer, quality assurance evaluator, or contracting 
officer representative.  Thus, having an adequate number of acquisition billets in an 
organization is not sufficient.  These billets must be adequately filled, and the personnel 
filling these acquisition billets must be adequately trained.  Having an adequate number of 
filled acquisition billets, staffed with trained acquisition personnel, is integral for providing a 
proper level of oversight for monitoring contractor performance.    
Proper level of oversight is integral to successful services acquisition management.  
Figures 8A through 8D reflect the survey responses for these areas.  The following are 
salient observations on the figures: 
 Figure 8A shows that the Army and Air Force predominantly disagree that there 
is an adequate number of acquisition billets, while the Navy survey responses 
are inconclusive.   
 Figure 8B reveals that the Army, Navy, and Air Force all predominantly disagree 
that these acquisition billets are adequately filled. 
 Figure 8C indicates that the Navy and Air Force predominantly agree that the 
services acquisition personnel are adequately trained, while the Army survey 
responses are inconclusive.   
 Figure 8D suggests that the Army predominantly disagrees that a proper level of 
oversight is afforded to monitor the contractor’s performance; the Air Force 
predominantly agrees that a proper level of oversight is afforded to monitor 
contractor performance, and the Navy survey responses are inconclusive.   
Recommendations 
To improve the management of services acquisition, our first recommendation is to 
maintain the positive trend of increasing the number of competitively bid, fixed-price 
contracts.  These types of contracts promote competition, which ensures the government 
gets the right services at the best value.  Fixed-price contracts shift the risk of cost overruns 
away from the government and onto the contractor.  This also serves to incentivize the 
contractor to complete tasks within budget.   
Our second recommendation relates to the management of services acquisition at 
the regional versus installation level.  As previously discussed, each individual approach has 
advantages and disadvantages.  In our view, the key to success under either approach is to 
use the proper supporting management processes.  Consequently, we recommend that the 
Navy’s regionalized management of services acquisition should implement a stronger 
project management approach, possibly a virtual project management team.  This team 
would consist of the project manager, requirements manager, and contracting officer at the 
regional office.  The QAE/COR would then serve as the site manager and be responsible for 
contractor surveillance.  The QAE/COR would act as the “eyes and ears” of the regional 
project manager and contracting officer and would coordinate program and contracting 
issues back to the project manager.  This may require QAE/CORs with higher-level 
knowledge and skills, due to their expanded roles and responsibilities.  The Army and Air 
Force’s installation-level management of services acquisition should ensure consistency in 
services acquisition management processes department-wide.  Our recommendations 




overall cost, schedule, and performance requirements of the services acquisition.  
Additionally, the installation project teams should include a requirement manager or 
representative that is authorized to identify, manage, and change the service requirement 
during the contract period.  Establishing a dedicated project manager and adding a 
requirement manager/representative to the project team would relieve the contracting officer 
from performing these conflicting roles.  
The third recommendation to improve the overall management of services 
acquisition is to increase the size of the acquisition workforce, reversing the downsizing 
trend that began in the 1990s.  The results of this research show that the number of 
CORs/QAEs also needs to be increased.    Increasing the size of the workforce will allow for 
better oversight and help ensure that contractor performance is properly monitored.  
Our final recommendation is to increase the effectiveness and availability of training 
to ensure a qualified acquisition workforce.  Based on the results from the research, a 
majority of respondents agreed that the acquisition workforce was adequately trained.  
Respondents also provided numerous negative comments regarding the poor quality and 
the lack of training.  The recommended training should focus on all phases of the contract 
management process and related Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) policy.  Additionally, 
training on areas related to working in cross-functional teams and using project lifecycles 
should be provided to all acquisition work force.  Finally, and more importantly, if the 
contracting officers are to continue acting as de-facto project managers by leading the 
acquisition teams, then they should receive training on project management concepts, 
project control techniques, and project leadership.  
Given the total amount of money spent and the scope of services acquisition in the 
Department of Defense, the opportunity for conducting research in this important area is 
limitless.  One area that stands out as needing research is contracting for medical services.  
We have already started to address this need.   
Finally, as discussed earlier, the researchers in the fields of operations management 
and marketing have studied and identified several key characteristics of services that lead to 
differences in the production and marketing of services as opposed to manufactured 
products.  We believe that the same key characteristics also must be taken into account in 
designing and managing the processes involved in acquiring services. For example, 
intangibility of service outcomes makes it difficult to clearly describe and quantify services 
and, therefore, to contract for services. Intangibility of outputs also makes it difficult to define 
and measure quality.  Co-production, requiring the presence and participation of customers 
in the creation of many services, is an important characteristic of services.  Hence, the 
contracts for software development should ideally specify not only what the service provider 
should do but also what inputs the customer should provide.  Otherwise, a satisfactory 
service outcome may not be realized.  Diversity of services also makes it difficult and 
undesirable to use the same contract vehicles or procedures for different services. Finally, 
services are complex and may involve multi-stage processes.  This makes it important yet 
challenging to write contracts that are flexible enough to cover all relevant scenarios and 
eventualities.  Given these considerations, we believe that there exists significant 
opportunity to conduct research into the impact of these characteristics on the acquisition of 
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The General Services Administration (GSA) Heartland Region is implementing a best 
value process (which minimizes time and cost deviations 98% of the time) and which 
minimizes the need for client’s decision making, transfers the risk and control of a project to 
the vendor, and forces the vendor to  manage and minimize the non-technical risk that the 
vendor does not control.  The Performance Information Risk Management System (PIRMS) 
has been tested by the US Army Medical Command and has minimized over 50% of client 
project management and risk management transactions, and also minimized cost and time 
deviations by as much as 70%.  The new paradigm uses Deming’s concept of managing 
and minimizing the project deviation instead of meeting minimum standards.  The system 
forces the client’s representatives to do quality assurance, and the vendor to do quality 
control.  The mechanism used is a risk management plan and a weekly risk report that 
creates transparency between buyer and vendor.  The system can minimize up to 90% of 
the government’s transactions and activities.  The system is a new paradigm for government 
systems. 
Keywords:  Best value procurement, minimized government management, high 
vendor performance, and measured environment              
Introduction 
The General Services Administration (GSA) is the largest buyer of non-military 
services in the United States.  It is a large management based organization.  An Achilles 
heel for any large organization is the number of layers of management, the large number of 
managers and subject matter experts (SME) and the practice of managing, directing and 
controlling vendors/contractors who are supposed to be experts at what they do.   
The current status of most projects in the GSA is where vendors (architect/ 
engineers and contractors) continually rely on being managed, directed, and controlled by 
GSA project managers and contracting officers.  To get a quality set of construction 
documents, the government project managers complete extensive quality control reviews of 
the A/E’s construction documents, once the sole responsibility of the A/E design firms.  GSA 
personnel (CORs, PMs, and COs) continually manage, direct, and control the contractors in 
construction.  Control and risk are not transferred to the vendors, thus making it difficult to 
hold vendors accountable for deviations.  Projects incur change orders due to design 
deficiencies.  Projects are not being completed in a timely manner and the actual close-out 




continually being developed and expanded at various levels both nationally and regionally in 
an attempt to increase the performance of the vendors.     
Upper level management in the GSA has struggled with implementing a sustainable, 
useable, and accurate system that measures the performance of their vendors and project 
managers.  Shrinking budgets, increased workload requirements, and the increased need 
for project managers to manage, direct, and control vendors, make the updating, collection, 
and analysis of performance information very difficult. The GSA has been exposed to many 
management measurement systems and philosophies (Alsup, 2010; Topi, 2010):  
1. Quality Management Circle (part of TQM) 
2. TQM (total quality management) (early 1990s) 
3. eTMP (electronic transaction management playbook) (2006) 
4. TMP (transaction management playbook) (2006) 
5. HCAM (included the following TMP, OMP, LCP, & AMP) (2005) 
6. OMP (occupancy management playbook) 
7. LCP (large construction playbook) 
8. AMP (account management playbook) 
However, the strategic objective of increasing performance and value of vendor 
services and measurement of the performance remains elusive.  
Problem 
The stubbornness of the problem of the GSA’s inability to sustain performance 
measurements in a timely fashion and increase vendor performance may be a systems 
problem and not a GSA unique management/leadership problem.  The current GSA system 
forces the project managers to document, maintain, and report the performance information.  
Because of the current project manager/vendor relationships and their heavy workload, 
project managers may not be motivated to accurately and consistently document the 
performance information.  The current system of delivery has the following suboptimal 
characteristics: 
1. The GSA project managers are required to manage, direct, and control the 
vendors. 
2. There is no transfer of risk or control to the vendors. 
3. The relationship between the vendors and the project managers may dilute 
accountability. 
4. The current delivery system does not motivate vendors to preplan and 
manage and minimize the risk that they do not control (think in the best 
interest of the client). 
Hypothesis 
Deming (1982) identifies the GSA problem as a systems problem.  The authors 
propose that the system may be stabilized but not meeting the expectations of the GSA’s 
upper level management. Increasing effort to optimize performance in a stable environment 




sustainable performance measurement system that results in an increase in vendor 
performance.   
Methodology 
The authors propose that the GSA find a new system that has the following 
characteristics: 
1. Run by a core team of systems managers who understand a performance 
information based system. 
2. Selects vendors by their capability to understand a project and manage and 
minimize deviations that are caused by sources outside of their control. 
3. Transfer the risk and control to vendors, who by contract must preplan, 
manage and minimize risk that they do not control, and manage the risk of 
their projects by measuring and minimizing cost and time deviations. 
4. Measure the vendors’ performance. 
5. Vendors are held accountable for all deviations unless they can dominantly 
document the source of the risk and how they attempted to manage and 
minimize the risks. 
6. System has past performance of success in other government organizations. 
Search for Performance Measurement Systems for 
Vendors/Organizations 
The GSA team composed of a project manager and a procurement officer proposed 
the above plan to their division manager in the heartland region located in Kansas City.  
They proposed using a best value approach to solicitation to procure the services of an 
organization that could: 
1. Provide a system that meets the requirements of the new system. 
2. Show documented evidence that the system measured performance and 
resulted in a dominant increase of performance. 
3. Show capability to educate and train GSA personnel to be able to understand 
the new system and run the system.   
The solicitation was posted on August 15, 2009.  There were only three proposers.  
The GSA identified the Performance Information Procurement System (PIPS) as the only 
system that could meet the new requirements.  It was the only system that: 
1. Had documented performance over 15 years. 
2. Minimized the amount of management, direction, and control. 
3. Transferred risk and accountability to the vendor. 
4. Measured the vendor and all other participants who interfaced with the 
vendor. 
5. Provided a mechanism whereby the vendor managed the risk that they did 
not control. 




No other vendor options would accept responsibility for ensuring the performance 
measurements on all participants, a resulting increase in performance and value, and 
minimized management, direction and control.  The other vendor options proposed to put a 
performance measurement system in place, but would take no responsibility for the 
successful implementation or the impact on performance of the organization and the 
vendors.  The best value PIPS system dominantly differentiated itself as the only option with 
the potential of disruptive change required to employ a sustainable measurement system 
and result in a dominant increase in performance and value.       
Industry Analysis 
The construction industry structure (CIS) model (Figure 1) (Kashiwagi, 2009) 
identifies the difference between what the GSA and other owners currently employ, and 
what is needed to employ a sustainable performance measurement system that has 
accompanying increase in performance and value.   
 
Figure 1. Construction Industry Structure  
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
The CIS identified the current GSA system as a price based system regardless of the 
perception of not awarding projects based on price (Sullivan, 2005).  The Price Based 
System (Quadrant I), has the following characteristic: 
1. Owner representative attempts to direct and control the vendor. 
2. Deductive logic assumes that the owner would only hire a vendor who knew 
what they were doing (expert). 
3. Someone who should know less about what is being done is directing 
someone who is an expert in what is being delivered.   
In the best value system, the client identifies their intent, but asks the industry 
(vendors) who can deliver the best value that meets the intent of the owner?  This system 
has the following characteristics: 
1. Vendors identify what they do, and what it costs. 
2. Client selects the best value based on performance and price (value). 
3. Vendors preplan, manage and minimize risk they don’t control. (They have no 




4. Clients do quality assurance (ensure that the vendor has quality control and 
risk management systems). 
 
The price based system is: 
1. Inefficient.  
2. Requires more people. 
3. Has more confusion. 
4. Subjective. 
5. Higher flow of information required between parties. 
6. If performance measures are kept, they are very subjective and potentially 
could be construed as biased.  There are more measurements that require an 
expert to decide what is good performance.    
7. Requires people to partner. 
8. Relationships are important between vendors and the client’s PMs. 
9. Adversarial.   
10. Because minimum requirements are used, performance will be in decline.   
11. Not accountable. 
12. Has high risk. 
13. Low performance (on time, on budget, meet client’s expectations.) 
 
The best value system: 
1. Is more efficient. 
2. Requires less people. 
3. Is measured with few and simple measurements. 
4. Is transparent.  
5. Uses alignment of resources. 
6. Has minimized flow of information. 
7. Minimizes partnering exercises.  
8. Managed by minimizing deviations.  
9. Has continuous improvement.   
10. Has a high level of accountability.   
11. Has high performance and low risk. 




Difference Between the Two Systems 
The difference between systems is that the price based vendor is reactive, managed, 
controlled and directed by the client/buyer; the best value vendor is proactive, preplans, 
manages and minimizes risk that they do not control, measures their performance, and 
manages their project by minimizing deviations.   In the price-based sector, the client directs 
the vendor using minimum requirements; the vendors transform the minimum into a 
maximum, and drive the performance the opposite direction (Figure 2).  
  
Figure 2. Min/Max Dilemma 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
Figure 3. Price-Based Award 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
The high performance vendor (high performance and low risk) can see a project from 
beginning to end.  They identify risk that they do not control, and plan solutions to minimize 
the risk.  The low performer (high risk) prices only what they are directed to price.  The 
overall effect of the client directing the vendors is the following (Figure 3): 
1. High performers become reactive instead of proactive.  They are told to price 
only what is directed, regardless of completeness, correctness, or whether it 
is doable.   
2. They are directed to assume that the directions are perfect. 
3. Therefore, they are directed to give the lowest possible price, assuming 
nothing goes wrong. 
Figure 4 shows the business approach to Quadrant I Price Based system.  The high 
performers, who get paid more for their expertise, get sent to the price based system, where 
they are directed and controlled by someone who is not an expert.  The confusing 
environment results in lower production of the high performer.  They become out of 
alignment, overpriced, and leave the environment.  A more damaging result of the system is 






Figure 4. Business Approach 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
The outsourcing owner who transfers risk and control to the expert vendor will get 
the high performer.  It is the only win-win situation.  The high performer will preplan, manage 
and minimize risk that they do not control to finish on time and maximize their profit, do the 
project once, and get paid and not go back to redo or fix problems.  This is the efficient best 
value system.     
Best Value Performance Information Procurement System 
(PIPS) 
After identifying the requirement to have a new system/environment that reflected the 
best value environment, the GSA selected the best value PIPS system to move from the 
price based to the best value environment (GSA contract #: GS06P09GYD0027).  The 
documented performance of the PIPS system included: 
1. 16 years of testing (1994-present) delivering 700+ construction services 
projects valued at over $800 million. 
2. Research funding of $8.5 million. 
3. Minimized client risk/project management activities by up to 90%. 
4. Maximized vendor profit by up to 100%, at no additional cost to the client. 
5. Delivered performance of 98% on time, no contractor generated cost and 
time deviations, and meeting client’s expectations. 
6. Arizona State University (ASU) moved PIPS into non-construction areas 
including the delivery of food services, IT networking, IT data centers, help 
desks, sports marketing, gym equipment, document control, long distance 
education services, and furniture buys.  ASU received investments of $100 
million over ten years due to the change of system environment, from price 
based to best value.   
7. The Dutch infrastructure agency used PIPS to deliver $1 billion of highway 
infrastructure to solve their problems with the delivery of construction.   
8. The Bank of Botswana used PIPS to deliver a critical bank facility and found it 
tremendously better than the traditional process. 
9. The State of Alaska is delivering a $200 million Electronic Resource Planning 




PIPS is a licensed structure/process from Arizona State University developed by 
Dean Kashiwagi and the Performance Based Studies Research Group (PBSRG.)   PIPS 
has three main phases (Kashiwagi, 2010): 
1. Phase I: Selection of the best value vendor. 
2. Phase II: Pre-award/pre-planning and creation of the risk management plan 
(RMP) and the weekly risk report (WRR.)  
3. Phase III: Project delivery by the risk management of deviation of time and 
cost.   
 
4. 
Figure 5. PIPS/PIRMS Phases 
 (Kashiwagi, 2010) 
During the early development of PIPS, the selection phase was identified as the 
most important phase.  As more tests were run, it was identified that the pre-award, 
preplanning phase was a more critical phase.  The risk management capability of PIPS 
became obvious, and the term, the Performance Information Risk Management System 
(PIRMS) was created to allow owners to use the risk management capability of the system 
even though they would select their vendor using the price based selection mode.   
PIPS has six major filters in the selection phase to ensure performance (Figures 6 
and 7): 
1. Requires the vendors to prove the potential to perform through documented 
past performance including the performance of critical personnel (project 
manager), and critical sub-vendors (engineering, professional consultants, or 
other crafts). 
2. Capability to do the project.  This submittal is a blind review of the vendor’s 
capability to do the project: 
a. Requires the vendors to show an understanding of the scope of the 
project in terms of the biggest technical risks in a concise and short 
explanation (two page submittal).  The high performers should identify the 
major technical challenges of the project and what makes them capable 
of minimizing the risk of nonperformance. 
b. Risk Assessment/Value Added (RAVA) submittal that forces the vendor to 
identify the risk that the vendor does not control, and how they will 
manage and minimize that risk so it does not occur.  It also asks the 
vendors to document dominant added value being offered by the vendor 




difference in project value) that makes them different from their 
competitors. 
c. The vendor is also asked for a milestone schedule, and how they will 
measure their performance during the project.   
d. The vendor will also submit a cost breakout.    
3. The interview of the critical personnel of the vendor to identify the person’s 
relative vision, ability to predict things before they occur, preplan and their 
capability to be accountable. 
4. A cost check to ensure the best value is not overly expensive.       
5. Prioritization of the best value based on the capability to perform (the past 
performance information, scope rating, RAVA rating, milestone schedule 
rating, rating on performance measurement system, interview rating and 
price). 
6. Pre-award Phase where just the best value vendor creates a risk 
management plan (RMP) and a weekly risk report (WRR) that they will use to 
manage and minimize the deviation of the project.  The WRR and RMP track 
risks that the vendor does not control.  This is the key mechanism in 
PIPS/PIRMS, and is the regulator that ensures that risk and control is 
transferred to the vendor.  This becomes a key component of the contract, 
and decommissions any attempts for the owner’s PM to manage, direct, and 
control the vendor.  This results in an alignment of resources, as it is in the 
best interest of all parties. 
A major paradigm shift is the movement from management, direction, and control to 
quality control/quality assurance.  This movement assumes that the vendor has no technical 
risk, and therefore will concentrate on managing and minimizing the risk they don’t control.  
This will be more fully explained in a following section.     
The vendor then writes their own contract (technical requirement, legal requirements 
of the owner, risk management plan and weekly risk control report.)  The project is then 
awarded.  The vendor self manages themselves based on the contract, managing and 
minimizing the cost and time deviation of the project.  At the end of the project, the vendor is 





   




Figure 7. PIPS/PIRMS Self Regulating Closed Loop  
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
A Paradigm Shift: Understanding that Expert Vendors Have no 
Technical Risk 
A major departure from the traditional project management practices is the 
understanding and handling of risk.  Information Measurement Theory (IMT) identifies that 
by definition, high performance/expert personnel have minimal or no technical risk 
(Kashiwagi, 2010).  If there is technical risk, it is only because the client hired a vendor who 
does not have the expertise and therefore is not capable of minimizing risk.  Instead of 
managing, directing, and controlling the vendor, the owner is now creating a new 
environment, where the vendor is identified as the expert.  Therefore, the new environment 
minimizes all management, direction, and control of the vendor.  This simple but difficult 
change in paradigm, forces the transfer of risk and control to the expert, and aligns all 
resources.   
The authors propose that the impact of unforeseen conditions can be minimized if 
experts are used to manage and minimize the risk that they don’t control.  The only risk high 




mainly the client in the form of over-expectations, items outside of the scope, decision 
making by other participants at the wrong time during the process, and the changing of 
expectations) (Figure 8). 
The new paradigm motivates vendors to preplan the project from beginning to end and 
know the risk that they do not control and how they will manage that risk before they accept 
the project.  By deductive logic, a system that increases client management, direction, and 
control moves the activity to the more inexperienced vendors and personnel (Figure 8).  This 
results in lower performance, reactive behavior, minimum standards or expectations, and 
minimum accountability. 
Price based contracts emphasize the technical risk that the vendors must control.  
Price based contracts attract the less experienced, and makes the very experienced less 
competitive (Figures 4 and 8).  Best value contracts must identify and communicate the 
expectations of the client but emphasize the requirement of the vendors to manage and 
minimize the risk that they do not control, thus thinking in the best interest of the client and 
creating a “win-win.”  Price based contracts must cater to the inexperienced and increase 
the flow of information, contract documents, and client management, direction, and control.  
Best value contracts cater to the high performing contractors who need minimal information, 
who act in the best interest of the client by giving high technical service (no technical risk) 
and manage and minimize the risk that the vendor does not control through the use of 
quality control and risk management plans.   
 
Figure 8. Inexperienced versus Experienced Vendor Risk Model 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) 
High performers and experts by definition are rarely surprised, are rarely affected by 
“unforeseen conditions,” and if there are “unforeseen conditions,” high performers have a 
preplanned solution that they can easily identify, manage, and minimize the cost and time 
deviation.  Due to the low performing mentality of the construction industry, and resulting low 
performance of the industry participants, the risk of “unforeseen conditions” has increased, 
and instead of requiring high performance and the minimization of risk that the vendor does 
not control, the industry has created a transaction based solution of client management, 
direction and control, which increases the number of participants who do not have the 
capability to minimize the risk.  These participants create silos where they verify and 
manage the vendors schedule and cost, negotiate prices, and approve all deviations in 
schedule or materials.  In this inefficient system, the inexperienced contractor becomes 
more competitive than the high-performance contractor with very experienced personnel, 
who cannot efficiently do their project in an environment of redundant and un-needed 
transactions. 
These deductive concepts have not only been confirmed through the 15 years of 




management, direction, and control of subject matter experts (SME), transferring the risk 
and control to the vendor, by forcing the vendor to write the contract which requires an 
expert vendor, and by forcing the vendor to manage and minimize the risk they do not 
control, a structure has been created which aligns resources and minimizes the 
transactions.  The regulator of the structural change is the weekly risk report (WRR) and the 
risk management plan (RMP.)  They create transparency, which minimizes the need for 
management, direction and control.     
Method of Measurement 
The method of measurement of performance utilized by PIPS is a novel approach 
which has had successful results in the past five years (Kashiwagi, 2009).  The assumption 
is that a large organization delivering services with project managers who are accustomed 
to manage, direct, and control, will have a difficult time consistently and doing timely 
reporting and analysis of performance due to the inefficiency of a management based 
system.  PIPS identifies who should be at risk (expert), and forces the measurement of 
performance (deviation of project time and cost) by the vendors.  The deviations are then 
reviewed for accuracy by the client/buyer’s professional (quality assurance.)  The 
information goes directly to the top decision maker in the organization, bypassing the normal 
filtering system in a bureaucracy.  A simplistic use of spreadsheets does the following: 
1. Identifies the deviation rates of all projects. 
2. Identifies the top ten riskiest projects, and which participant in the supply 
chain caused the deviation. 
3. Measures all participants in the supply chain, giving a relative performance 
rating based on deviations and performance.   
The PIPS measuring system overcomes the major obstacles large organizations 
have: 
1. Subjective filtering of measurements. 
2. Lack of timely reporting. 
3. Lack of time to do accurate reporting. 
GSA Strategic and Tactical Plans to Implement New 
Environment 
The GSA signed a five-year contract with the Performance Based Studies Research 
Group (PBSRG) to implement the new best value system.  Previous research results 
(Kashiwagi, 2010) identified that both a strategic plan and a tactical plan are required to 
successfully make the transformation.  Previous results identified the following priorities: 
1. Identification of a core group of visionaries who could understand the 
theoretical change in systems, and be systems managers and managers of 
personnel.   
2. Education, development of the core group of visionaries to learn how to use 
the system.   
3. Implementing and modifying PIPS to fit the environment of the owner.   




The strategic plan encompasses the first two objectives, and the tactical plan is the 
second two objectives.  The tactical plan (second two objectives) cannot be implemented 
without the strategic plan.  The strategic plan therefore, must include the following: 
1. The development of the visionaries. 
2. Theoretical education of the visionaries. 
3. Job transformation of the visionaries from project managers to educators and 
systems managers. 
4. Changing of the effectiveness of the chain of command. 
5. The visionary group must learn to apply the concept of PIPS to their 
organization’s transformation. 
6. Documentation of the transformation by the system. 
7. Peer review by other visionaries located at other organizations who are 
working toward the same goals.  
8. Development of measurements and a schedule showing the improvement in 
performance and value. 
The tactical plan must include: 
1. The modification of the PIPS to move the owner’s organization without 
increasing resistance due to the change of efficiency and structure. 
2. Education on PIPS to both vendors and PMs running the system. 
3. Prototype testing and implementing PIPS by core team visionaries.   
4. Design of the information system. 
If the concept of transferring risk and control to the expert vendor, and aligning the 
resources in the entire supply chain through measurement of deviation is accurate, this 
system transformation is not industry specific.  It is a system regulated by measurement, 
which aligns all the participants in the supply chain, minimizing the transactions and forcing 
experts to be accountable.  It will bring discomfort if a subject matter expert (SME) is 
misaligned or does not currently have accountability.  Therefore the transformation has to be 
“gentle” and evolutionary.   
Progress of the GSA 
The implementation of PIPS in the GSA has been relatively optimized due to the 
following: 
1. The head of the core team visionaries, the region director of the organization, 
was already attempting to transform the organization to a measured 
organization.  His strategic goals of efficiency and effectiveness of both 
vendors and the GSA organization was already in place.   
2. The PMs of the core team were identified and selected based on the 
Information Measurement Theory (IMT) and therefore were attempting to use 




3. This is the first time in 16 years of testing that both a PM and procurement 
officer were original members of the visionary core team, and the director 
was already attempting the transformation.   
4. This is the first time that the PIPS was selected through application of PIPS, 
thus confirming to the core team that PIPS was dominant in its ability to 
transform organizational environment/systems.   
First Measurement of Existing Performance 
The core team selected 8 projects where information was readily available to identify 
the performance of the existing environment.  The performance measurements include: 
1. Average cost/scope of projects: $526,992 
2. Average duration of projects: 152.5 days 
3. Cost deviation of projects (percentage): 7% 
4. Time deviation of projects (percentage): 231% 
5. Customer satisfaction (1 -10 rating, 10 being optimal): 6.5 
The core team is also interested in the following measurements that will be collected 
through surveys: 
1. Vendor profit margin: TBD 
2. Vendor rating of delivery system: TBD 
3. Vendor perception of new system (1 – 10 rating): TBD   
4. Number of projects a PM is responsible for: TBD 
The GSA’s next step is to complete six (6) test projects and collect data to confirm 
increased performance with the new best value PIPS system.  The Contractor and PM shall 
rate the following before and after on the traditional system vs. the new best value PIPS 
system: 
1. Effectiveness (deviations.) 
2. Value of preplanning by vendor as perceived by both the vendors and the 
GSA PM. 
3. Value of vendor managing and minimizing the risk that the vendor does not 
control as perceived by all participants. 
4. Vendor’s profit margin maximization. 
5. Accountability of all the participants as perceived by all participants. 
6. Successfulness and impact of the transfer of risk and accountability to the 
vendor. 
7. Project coordination by the vendor with the client. 
8. Minimization of surprises. 
Schedule of Implementation 




1. Year 1: set up core team structure.  Run the first tests with core team and a 
few PMs.   
2. Year 2: set up the Directors Report and expand both the running of the entire 
process and the risk management reporting (which measures the 
performance of projects). 
3. Years 3 - 5: expand implementation within organization.  Visionary core team 
becomes a subject matter expert (SME) to assist in the transformation of 
other organizations.     
Analysis of the Effort 
This research effort is using the deductive approach (confirmatory) instead of the 
inductive approach (exploratory.)  The success of the project will be determined by 
measurements of observation which minimize subjectivity as much as possible.  The 
following are observations of the effort thus far: 
1. PIPS has been identified by a GSA selection process as the only option with 
documentation of proven success to transform an organization’s environment 
from a management, direction, and control environment to a best value, 
alignment, leadership based environment. 
2. A large federal organization who is constrained by federal law, will implement 
the PIPS process for selection of vendor, and contract administration.   
3. A visionary core team has been organized that is optimal in terms of a high-
ranking visionary leader, and visionary PM and procurement components. 
4. For the first time, strategic and tactical plans have been drawn up and will be 
used in the research test.   
Conclusion    
The GSA Heartland region is implementing an advanced and theoretically sound 
best value delivery process to transform the system from a price based to a best value 
environment.  The major objectives include: minimization of management, direction, and 
control transactions, the transfer of risk and control to vendors who can minimize the risk, 
measurement of performance of the vendors and the GSA organization, and to measure an 
increase in performance and value of the services being delivered.  A core group of 
visionaries are attempting to transform the organizational approach from one of 
management of personnel to a systems management, where performance measurements 
drive alignment of resources.  This is a significant effort for a large federal organization that 
normally is management based and has difficulty in minimizing bureaucracy. 
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Abstract 
This paper proposes and demonstrates that experimental and quasi-experimental 
program evaluation methods can be applied to some parts of the defense acquisition system 
to provide evidence of program effectiveness.  The specific example presented is a quasi-
experimental evaluation of the Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research 
program.  Quasi-experimental methods are a set of program evaluation techniques that 
allow researchers to approximate the results of an experimental study, such as a 
randomized controlled trial, without performing the experiment.  The paper performs a quasi-
experimental evaluation of the DoD SBIR program, which provides evidence that the 
program is effective at transitioning SBIR-funded technologies into other DoD programs.  
This demonstration that quasi-experimental methods can be used to evaluate certain 
aspects of the DoD acquisition system provides policy analysts with new tools to meet 
Congressional requirements for acquisition system evaluation.  The paper recommends that 
more quasi-experimental studies be conducted and actual experimental studies be 
executed.  These methods can help the DoD overcome the well-documented deficiency in 
evaluating the effectiveness of its acquisition systems.  The Office of Management and 
Budget, the Government Accountability Office and the House Armed Services Committee 
unanimously agree that the DoD does not objectively measure the performance of its 
acquisition system.   
Motivational Quotes 
Findings.-The Congress finds that-  
(1) waste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine the confidence of the 
American people in the Government and reduces the Federal Government's ability to 
address adequately vital public needs;  
(2) Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to improve program 
efficiency and effectiveness because of insufficient articulation of program goals and 




(3) Congressional policymaking, spending decisions, and program oversight are 
seriously handicapped by insufficient attention to program performance and results. 
-- Introduction to the Government Performance Results Act of 1993 
(Sec. 5403) Directs each federal agency required to participate in the SBIR or STTR 
program to: 
(1) develop metrics evaluating the effectiveness and benefit of the program which 
are scientifically based, reflect the agency's mission, and include factors relating to 
the economic impact of the programs;  
(2) conduct an annual evaluation of their SBIR and STTR programs using such 
metrics; and 
(3) report each evaluation's results to the Administrator and the small business 
committees. 
- Public Law 111-84, signed by President Obama on October 28, 2009, (authorizes 
National Defense for FY2010, and specifically authorizes the DoD SBIR/STTR 
Programs through September 30, 2010)  
The Panel began with the question of how well the defense acquisition system is 
doing in delivering value to the warfighter and the taxpayer. For the most part, the 
Panel found that there is currently no objective way to answer this question. For most 
categories of acquisition, only anecdotal information exists about instances where 
the system either performed well, or poorly. Even where real performance metrics 
currently exist, they do not fully address the question. The Panel strongly believes 
that the defense acquisition system should have a performance management 
structure in place that allows the Department’s senior leaders to identify and correct 
problems in the system, and reinforce and reward success. 
- House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform Findings 
and Recommendations, March 23, 2010  
Introduction 
Evaluating the effectiveness of any government program is difficult. Data on the 
program’s output is often hard to obtain, selection into the program is usually not random 
and few programs are structured to facilitate the application of causal effects analysis. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is one 
such government program.  Evaluating the effectiveness of the DoD SBIR program is 
required by Congress, who directs each federal agency to “develop metrics evaluating the 
effectiveness and benefit of the program which are scientifically based, reflect the agency's 
mission, and include factors relating to the economic impact of the programs.”  Despite this 
legal requirement and nearly 30 years of running the SBIR program, neither DoD 
administrators, nor policy analysts evaluating the program know whether the program is 
actually effective in supporting the DoD R&D mission by transitioning SBIR-funded 
technologies into DoD weapons systems.  In their most recent assessments, the 
Government Accountability Office and the Office of Management and Budget, found that the 
effectiveness of the DoD SBIR program has not been demonstrated (GAO, 2005; OMB, 
2005).  The SBIR program is not alone in the DoD for its lack of evidence. 
The indeterminate effectiveness of the relatively small SBIR program is just one case 
of the DoD generally not examining its acquisition processes.  Congress finds that the 
Department of Defense acquisition system does routinely use objective methods to measure 




Committee on Defense Acquisition Reform concluded that there is no objective way to 
determine “how well the defense acquisition system is doing in delivering value to the 
warfighter.” (HASC, 2010)  Congress has officially required evidence-based policy 
administration by all Federal Agencies since 1993 through the Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA).  The GAO finds fault with the DoDs implementation of the GPRA, 
finding serious flaws in the DoD’s Program Management business processes, which are 
responsible for managing DoD acquisition.  Specifically the GAO cites, that the DoD’s plan 
to improve program management “lacked basic information, such as identifying specific 
business areas and key elements, such as goals, objectives, and performance measures.” 
(GAO, 2010)  There is ample evidence that DoD’s measurement of its acquisition processes 
needs improvement.  Unfortunately for many of the complex and unique acquisition 
processes that the DoD manages, instituting suitable performance measures has proved 
difficult.  This paper shows that performance measurement tools exist for one small piece of 
the defense acquisition portfolio—the DoD SBIR program.   
This paper proposes a methodology for measuring the performance of the DoD SBIR 
program that adapts quasi-experimental methods from the broader program evaluation 
literature.  The paper begins with a description of the DoD SBIR program.   It then describes 
the basics of the DoD SBIR program and examines two key biases in past DoD SBIR 
program evaluations that have confounded researchers: response bias and selection bias.  
The paper then documents strategies to mitigate these biases using quasi-experimental 
methods that have been used in other program evaluations.  Next, the paper illustrates that 
a better evaluation of the DoD SBIR program is possible if better methods are applied to 
existing data.  The paper then offers suggestions for strengthening evaluation of the SBIR 
program with better data collection methods and with randomization.  With evidence that 
better evaluations of defense acquisition processes are possible, the paper concludes with 
suggestions for further evidence-based research. 
Description of the DoD SBIR Program and Biases in Past 
Evaluations 
Congress requires that all federal agencies with extramural R&D budgets in excess 
of $100M, including the Department of Defense, set aside 2.5% of their R&D budget for the 
SBIR program.  The broad purpose of the program is to provide contracts to qualifying small 
businesses to support each agency’s research mission, and to commercialize the funded 
technologies. In 2010, the SBIR program represents about 1% of the $108B that the 
Department of Defense spends on procurement.   Congress sets the emphasis of the 
program with the following four goals: 1) to stimulate technological innovation; 2) to use 
small businesses to meet federal R&D needs; 3) to foster participation by disadvantaged 
businesses; and 4) to increase private sector commercialization of federally funded research 
(OSADBU, 2007).  Congress places more emphasis on the goal of increasing private sector 
commercialization. 
The law also requires the participating federal agencies to structure their SBIR 
programs with three-phases, with specific funding ceilings for each phase.  Phase I funds up 
to $100K for a 6-month feasibility study competitively awarded to firms.  Phase II is the 
principal R&D phase, which awards up to $750K over 18 months to the most promising 
Phase I submissions.  Phase III is the commercialization phase, which is the period when 
firms sell their mature technologies to interested parties—often DoD prime contractors or 
program offices.  No pre-allocated SBIR program funds support Phase III commercialization; 
however, if a topic reaches Phase III, the firm can be awarded a contract for that technology 




the most promising technologies from the thousands of ideas of the participating small 
contractors into fielded technologies.   
Within the constraints of the program, Congress offers freedom for the agencies to 
manage the SBIR program to fit the R&D strategies of the participating agencies, which are 
important to understand in order to evaluate the program.  Each agency has many 
noteworthy organizational innovations for managing a large dollar R&D program without 
explicit overhead that is required to award contracts and grants in relatively small dollar 
amounts.  The 2008 DoD annual report to Congress on the SBIR program highlights some 
of these challenges.  In 2008 the DoD solicited proposals for nearly 1,000 topics, for which 
they processed over 12,000 proposals, ultimately awarding about two SBIR contracts per 
topic.  In order to manage this administrative workload, the DoD manages the process 
online—publishing two or three SBIR solicitations a year online, requiring proposers to 
register with the DoD SBIR program with their unique federal contractor identification 
number and to submit their proposals online.  These online contract management tools will 
be shown later to be invaluable for measuring the program effectiveness. 
As highlighted in this paper’s introductory quote from the 2009 re-authorization of the 
SBIR program, Congress requires the program administrators to develop metrics on the 
program’s effectiveness.  The DoD has created a metric called the Commercialization 
Achievement Index.  This index is not deemed sufficient to measure the program’s 
effectiveness (OMB, 2005).  More broadly than the specific DoD program, across all federal 
SBIR programs, since its inception the effectiveness of the program to increase 
commercialization has never been evaluated (GAO, 2005).  Among the specific reasons the 
GAO cites are lack of an agreed-upon measure of effectiveness for commercialization and 
lack of reliable data on the program.  Published evaluations of the SBIR program typically 
suffer from two common issues identified in the broader literature on program evaluation:  
selection bias and response bias. 
The key aspects of past DoD SBIR program evaluations that are presumed to cause 
bias are the fact that evaluations must be performed after the fact of selection and with self-
reported survey data.  Response bias affects program evaluations that rely on surveys 
because it is presumed that program participants over-report the output resulting from the 
program.  Participants have an incentive to attribute more benefit from program participation 
in a survey so that the program will continue to receive funding and the participants continue 
to receive the benefits of the program.  Selection bias is the presumption that program 
administrators are not selecting program participants at random. Specifically, selection bias 
invalidated after-the-fact evaluations because it is assumed that more capable participants 
are selected at a higher rate and that these firms, in the absence of the program, are more 
productive.  In the case of the DoD SBIR program analyzed in this paper, winning firms were 
bigger, older, and more experienced defense contractors and as a result had more non-
SBIR defense contracts before and after winning a SBIR award. 
An ideal experiment of the SBIR program would randomly assign SBIR program 
treatment on a population of firms qualifying for the SBIR program and see if the treated 
firms have more future defense contracts than untreated firms.  Such an experiment has not 
been conducted, which motivates the example in this paper, estimating the treatment effect 
for winning a DoD SBIR award with after-the-fact evaluation methods and non-survey data.   
Strategies to Mitigate Biases 
To perform a better effectiveness evaluation on the DoD SBIR program this paper 
builds a data set based on 2003 SBIR applications.  To control for response bias, the 




The analysis uses after-the-fact quasi-experimental models to control for selection bias, 
which have been shown to approximate the results of a randomized controlled trial under 
certain assumptions.  
The program evaluation literature documents that the least biased program 
evaluations rely on a neutral source of outcome data (i.e. not reported by administrators or 
participants), have pre-treatment and post treatment observations, contain many 
characteristics of the participants and collect data on the treated population and a 
representative control population.  The data set created for this analysis uses defense 
contract award data as the outcome of interest.  The contract award data are an output of 
the defense accounting process represented by the DD Form 350, which documents and 
publishes every contract award greater that $25K.  The DoD identifies each contract 
awardee with a unique contractor identification number, which can be linked electronically to 
other databases the DoD maintains.  This paper links to the DoD’s Central Contractor 
Registry (CCR) and the DoD SBIR program’s database of SBIR applications to capture firm 
characteristics in the database.  The characteristics of each firm are important to after-the-
fact program evaluations, because researchers can explain some of the variation in program 
effectiveness by correlating program outcomes with firm characteristics.  For example, larger 
firms might win more defense contracts dollars simply because they have the capacity to 
take on more DoD-funded work, regardless of whether they won a SBIR award.   The DoD 
SBIR program’s database of SBIR applications captured information on all firms that applied 
for the DoD SBIR program by year of application and identified the firm’s proposal that won 
an award.  These pieces of information enabled the identification of a treatment population 
which applied for and won a SBIR award in a given year and a control population of firms 
that applied for but did not win an award.   Creating a comparable control group with 
distinguishing characteristics is the crucial ingredient identified by program evaluation 
literature to controlling selection bias.   
To control for selection bias the current program evaluation literature suggests using 
doubly robust estimation (DRE) methods to estimate the relationship between winning a 
SBIR award and future defense contract dollars.  As the name implies, researchers use two 
methods to estimate a treatment effect.  The first method prescribed is propensity score 
matching (PSM), which uses the observable covariates of the firms to create balanced 
treatment and control population.  The second method prescribed is to perform a statistical 
estimation of the treatment effect that uses the characteristics of the firms to explain 
variation in future defense contracts (usually a regression with controls model).  By 
combining two different estimation strategies, researchers have two chances to build the 
correct model.  According to DRE theory, this approach will estimate a consistent treatment 
effect even if only one of the models is correct.  The characteristic of double robustness is 
achieved in after-the-fact program evaluations when the estimation from the PSM model and 
the statistical model are consistent in magnitude and significance.  Under ideal conditions 
and with enough descriptive data, by applying these methods, a better estimate of the 
treatment effect from winning a SBIR award on future defense contract dollars is possible. 
A Naïve Estimate of SBIR Treatment 
In order to show why using a balanced treatment and control population is better 
than using raw data, this paper begins with a naïve estimate of the DoD SBIR program’s 
treatment effect.  Researchers with a treatment and control group typically estimate a 
treatment effect with a differences in differences estimate.  The first difference is calculated 




The second difference is equal to the difference in treatment between treated and non-
treated observations.    
A differences in differences is not the same as a typical program evaluation report 
based on a survey.  A survey based estimate can only report the average raw output data 
on the treated group.  For example, the National Academies of Sciences reports the 
average raw survey response to estimate sales generated by SBIR funded research to be 
$1.3M per SBIR project (Wessner, 2007).    This average survey response is not a 
differences in differences because it does not compare the results to non-treated 
observations.  Because the dataset created for this paper identifies winners and losers, it 
can be used to estimate a naïve differences in differences.  Naïve means that that selection 
bias is not controlled. 
The dataset used for this estimation is based on the entire population of DoD SBIR 
applicants in 2003 obtained from the Department of Defense SBIR administrative website.  
From the population of 2003 applications, a subset of 1460 firms who also applied in 2004, 
and who had a contractor identification number in the Central Contractor Registry, was 
identified as the population of interest.  The DoD SBIR administrative database identifies 
687 of these firms as winning a 2003 SBIR contract, with 773 applying for, but not winning, 
in 2003.  These 1460 firms were matched with their contractor identification numbers to the 
form DD350 database maintained by the Department of Defense Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports.  The DD350 contains all contract actions greater than $25K 
organized by year and by individual contractor identification number.    
Using the SBIR application dataset, the first difference between average total non-
SBIR defense contract dollars won in 2004 minus the 2003 total ∆04-03  is $650K for the 
average winner and $203K for the average loser (see Table 3).  The second difference, the 
average treatment difference between winners and losers, is $447K.  This naive treatment 
effect is assumed to be affected by selection bias. 
Table 1. Naive Differences in Differences 
Group/Year 2003 2004 ∆04-03
Winners 1,430 2,081 650
Losers 456 659 203
∆W-L 974 1,422 $447K
The effect of selection bias is presumably the cause of the SBIR winners having on 
average of $974K more in contracts than losers did in 2003, and $1.4M more in contracts in 
2004.  Because winners have more contracts to start out with, and firms with more past 
contracts will probably win more future contracts before and after winning in 2003, it is 
impossible to isolate the effect of winning the SBIR award in 2003.  To improve on this naïve 
estimate, more advanced statistical techniques are needed.    
Evidence of a SBIR Treatment Effect 
The naïve treatment effect estimate can be improved by using the characteristics of 
firms to explain some of their variation in treatment.  The characteristics are used two ways 
to control variation.  The first method to control variation using firm characteristics is to use 
an algorithm to balance the characteristics of the treatment and control populations.  The 
balancing algorithm will discard outlying observations so that the treatment and control 
populations will be theoretically identical to a randomized controlled trial population.  The 
second method to produce a better estimate of treatment effect using firm characteristics is 




pre-treatment observation of defense contracts before a firms wins a SBIR contract, some of 
the variation in the post-treatment contract award amounts can be explained. 
Applying these two methods to the dataset build for this paper can better estimate a 
treatment effect for the DoD SBIR program.   This research method is described by Ho, 
Imai, King, and Stuart (2007) as doubly robust estimation.  Double robust estimation 
protocols prescribe balancing populations and then using statistical methods to estimate the 
treatment effect.  Analysis in Ho, Imai, King and Stuart (2007) shows consistency between 
the results of RCT studies analyzed with DRE methods.  Their analysis supports the 
conclusion that estimates of causal treatment effects can be produced by DRE methods if 
researchers properly balance the treatment and control groups or researcher apply the 
correct statistical model.  Their analysis based on thousands of different population 
balancing assumptions and statistical models with data from randomized controlled trials 
supports the conclusion that if the average treatment effect estimated with balanced 
treatment and control groups is consistent with the estimated treatment effect from another 
statistical model (such as a regression model) then the DRE estimate can be considered a 
causal estimate.   
The model demonstrated estimates the future average increase in non-SBIR defense 
contracts for firms winning a 2003 DoD SBIR award.  The key parameter of interest is the 
correlation between winning a 2003 SBIR award and non-SBIR defense contracts in 2004.  
The control variables are total non-SBIR contracts in 2002, total SBIR contracts in 2002, the 
firms’ first contract year, the number of employees in 2003, whether the firm won a defense 
contract as a sub contractor in 2003, the number of topics submitted in 2003, and the total 
number of past Phase I or II awards. 
The populations are balanced using the Coarsened Exact Matching protocols 
described by Iacus, King,  and Porro (2008).  The balanced population retains 534 firms that 
won in 2003 and 681 losing firms for a 83% post-matching retention rate. As an example of 
the improvement in post-matching balance, the raw population had a difference in 2002 non-
SBIR contracts of $925K, the matched population, $58K. 
The doubly robust estimation model estimates a $147K treatment effect, with 
confidence level of greater than 99%.  Based on this estimate, there is empirical support that 
the SBIR program increases defense contracts in 2004 for firms winning SBIR contracts in 
2003.  
The estimation that the DoD SBIR program does significantly increase non-SBIR 
defense contracts one year after award might be missing delayed effects two or three years 
after award. A three year commercialization time horizon is supported by surveys on the 
self-reported commercialization outcomes related to the SBIR program by the National 
Academies of Science  (Wessner, 2007) and contract award analysis by RAND (Held, 
2006), both of which find that the majority of commercialization activity occurs three years 
after a SBIR award.  A doubly robust estimation is used to estimate several treatment effects 
for the non-SBIR DoD contracts won by firms in 2005 and 2006 who also won a 2003 DoD 
SBIR award.  The doubly robust estimated treatment effect for the 2005 non-SBIR contract 
dollar difference is $106K; the 2006 difference is $130K. Both estimates are statistically 
significant at the greater than 99% confidence level.  These estimations of a lagged 
treatment effect support a conclusion that for the average firm, winning a DoD SBIR award 
puts a company on a sustained path towards winning more future DoD contract dollars than 
had they not won.  
Winning a DoD SBIR award appears to put winning firms on a path of higher non-




and 2006 firms that applied for and won a 2003 SBIR contract won an average of $370K 
more defense contracts than a matching set of firms who applied for but did not win a 2003 
DoD SBIR award.  The DoD SBIR program appears to be effective at increasing 

















Figure 1. Three-year Estimated Treatment Effect of Winning a 2003 SBIR Award 
The Department of Defense explicitly acknowledges that access to new technology 
and a strong industrial base are crucial to United States national security  (OSD, 2010).   
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the DoD SBIR program may be both 
providing access to new technologies and broadening the industrial base by transitioning 
new technologies developed by small businesses into defense programs through defense 
contracts. The evidence that firms winning SBIR contracts increase their future sales to the 
DoD at a higher rate than had they not won supports the belief that the DoD SBIR program 
contributes to the DoD mission.  Prior to this analysis, the DoD emphasized without proof 
that they used the DoD SBIR program to support mission oriented research needs rather 
than to increase private sector commercialization.  With proof that the commercialization 
path from SBIR funded R&D into standard defense prime contracts may be enhanced, the 
DoD can fulfill their GPRA requirement to demonstrate the effectiveness of their 
administration of the program and support the DoD preference against private sector 
commercialization.   
This evidence can also provide a positive feedback loop for potential small business 
participants and program offices on the fence as to whether the program is worth their 
efforts.  Higher quality potential contractors might be motivated to apply.  Defense 
acquisition managers might be motivated to put more effort into developing SBIR topics and 




How to Improve DoD SBIR Program Evaluation 
 This analysis is motivated by a literature review of the SBIR program, which 
contains numerous government reports, policies and regulations requiring better evaluations 
of the DoD SBIR program.  Most of the policy responses to the need for better evaluation, 
such as the DoD-developed Commercialization Achievement Index, and the surveys 
conducted by the GAO and National Academies of Science, fall short of actually providing 
data for better evaluation because the data collected is incomplete, presumably subject to 
response bias and does not collect data on treated and untreated populations. By using the 
already-existing defense contract database, this paper shows that there exists a data source 
free from self-reported survey response bias to evaluate the program.  Additionally, by using 
econometric methods to control for selection bias, this paper provides policy makers with 
one example that it is possible to evaluate one key aspect of the program.  The policy 
recommendations on how to improve evaluation will increase the number of studies on the 
program, allow researchers to explore more evidence of SBIR research output, and improve 
the policy recommendations of the program evaluations.  This paper motivates three 
possible policy implementations the DoD can use to improve the evaluation of the DoD 
SBIR program.  The first is to make the DoD SBIR administrative data accessible to more 
researchers.  The second would be to build automated links to the applying SBIR firms to 
other innovation proxies—most specifically, the US Patent database, the iEdison database, 
and technical publication databases.  Finally, to more conclusively evaluate the DoD SBIR 
program, some form of Randomized Control Trials will need to be implemented, and the 
enormous number of topics and applicants makes the DoD SBIR a good candidate to 
implement RCT’s to evaluate the program.   
Evaluation Recommendation 1: Make SBIR Administrative Data Available to 
Researchers 
 The first recommendation to improve evaluation of the program, making 
administrative data more accessible to researchers, is a low cost, easily implementable 
policy change with potential for significant payback.  As already documented in the review of 
SBIR evaluations, one of the consistent themes of all past SBIR program evaluations is the 
lack of reliable, consistent data and the resulting lack of conclusive studies about the 
program’s effectiveness.  Additionally, the broader literature on R&D evaluations in general 
suffers from the same problems: lack of reliable data and a resultant dearth of conclusive 
evaluations on R&D programs.  Opening the wealth of already-existing data collected by the 
DoD SBIR program to policy analysts would be an enormous step towards improving 
collective knowledge about how effective R&D subsidy programs really are.  One specific 
example of data that is available to program administrators but not to program evaluators is 
the proposal evaluation scores used to award SBIR contracts.  If these scores were made 
available to researchers, then researchers could use those scores to better match firms in 
propensity score models or to control for variation in outcome.  Importantly, since the DoD 
SBIR program is probably already collecting this information for administrative purposes in 
electronic formats and making the data to available to administrators via the internet, the 
cost to make the data accessible to R&D policy researchers would be minimal.  The 
payback for making this data available to research policy analysts that have spent decades 
trying to determine the efficacy of R&D policies with nearly zero reliable data is potentially 
significant  Policy makers could have more fact-based studies to improve policy to meet the 




Evaluation Recommendation 2: Link SBIR Funding to More Innovation Proxy 
Data Sources 
The second policy recommendation to improve the evaluation of the DoD SBIR 
program is to enable automated matching of SBIR administrative data to other sources of 
innovation output data such as patent data, innovation tracking databases, sales data, 
venture capital funding, or technical publication data.  Per US law, any SBIR participant is 
mandated to report to the government the details of any inventions or patents generated 
from the program.  Unfortunately, the reporting is often decentralized, and the data collected 
is not easily linked to the actual source of funding.  There are certainly more research 
outputs than just increased DoD sales tracked through the defense contracting database 
that could be used to measure the impact of the DoD SBIR program.  Examples of 
potentially useful data sources are the US Patent and Trademark Database, technical paper 
databases, databases of firms such as COMPUSTAT, HOOVERS or DUNS, venture capital 
tracking databases, initial public offering databases, merger databases, or Internal Revenue 
Service data.  Currently automated linking of SBIR participant data to another data source is 
not possible because not all of the databases can be linked using contractor identification 
numbers or DUNS numbers.  The lack of a common standard firm identifier leaves 
researchers with the option of trying to match research inputs to output based on firm 
names, which contain tremendous variation in spelling within and across databases.  The 
SBIR program could require firms to include their DUNS number in the already-required 
government interest statements for patents generated by SBIR funds.  For matching 
technical publications, the SBIR program could require firms to report SBIR-generated 
technical publications with full citations in future application packages.  Since SBIR 
application packages are submitted electronically, the government can begin to understand 
the impact of the SBIR program on the body of technical knowledge through patent 
disclosure analysis and technical publication analysis.  
The most expedient link to establish might be the link between SBIR funding and the 
interagency Edison (iEdison) database maintained by the National Institutes of Health.  This 
database was created to fulfill the statutory requirement for federally funded researchers to 
report inventions and patents developed with Federal funds.  Currently it collects data from 
some, but not all, DoD research organizations.  DoD SBIR policies could be modified to 
require winning firms to report inventions and patents through this database, and to require 
the inclusion of the funding contract number and the correct contractor identification number.   
A final suggestion to improve tracking of SBIR output activity would be to require 
proposing firms to submit their tax identifier number to conclusively link SBIR funding to 
actual growth in revenue.  Since all firms winning SBIR awards must be US companies, this 
policy intervention would cover the entire population of awardees.  Moreover, since the IRS 
reports on income are legally required to be accurate and are subject to the possibility of 
auditing, the validity of the sales and revenue data will be substantially more accurate than 
the data self-reported in surveys.  Another strength of this source of data would be that the 
study population could be expanded beyond the non-representative sample of survey 
respondents to include potentially all SBIR applicants. 
The strengthening of the links between DoD SBIR program data sources and data 
sources on innovation proxies will greatly improve the quality and quantity of analyses 
possible on the program.  If any of these policy recommendations improve evaluating the 
link between innovation subsidies to innovation output, a new era of R&D policy evaluation 




Evaluation Recommendation 3: Implement Limited Randomized Control Trials 
for Improved Evaluations 
The final suggestion for improving evaluation of the SBIR program is to continue to 
apply and refine research methods proven to mitigate biases, including using randomized 
controlled trails.  The Government Performance and Results Act requires all agencies to 
strive towards evidence based policy implementation.  The gold standard research method 
to provide conclusive evidence of program effectiveness would be to conduct a randomized 
control trial by randomizing some aspects of the contract awards.  Of all the R&D subsidy 
and small business programs and the program evaluations reviewed for this paper, the 
SBIR program might be the most conducive to incorporating randomization to improve 
evaluation. 
One practical suggestion to implement an RCT would be to select a subset of some 
of the topic awards with a random process.  Since each topic receives around 15 
applications, the suggestion would be to identify the five highest rated applications, 
randomly select the winner from those five applications, and track the relative performance 
of the firms that received the award and those who did not.  There is a possibility that this 
type of experiment could be double blind because the firms would never know if they 
received the award due to random assignment and the program managers actually 
managing the SBIR contract could be kept blind to the actual award decision.  The DoD 
SBIR program is an ideal candidate for incorporating some aspect of an RCT to evaluate the 
program.  There are hundreds of topics each year, thousands of applicants, the research 
budget is by its very nature discretionary (not on a programs-critical path, or vital for national 
security), and the firms can be tracked over time.   
In lieu of the opportunity to perform an RCT, researchers should continue to apply 
the propensity score and doubly robust estimation methods to SBIR administrative data.  
These after-the-fact estimation protocols could be improved if the actual evaluation scores 
were made available to researchers.  If the evaluation scores were made available, 
researchers could use the scores to better match firms with balancing algorithms. 
Researchers could use the proposal evaluation scores in regression models to explain more 
variation in the outcomes of interest. 
Current best practices in developmental economics have adopted RCT’s (Rodrik & 
Rosenzweig, 2009).  The focus of developmental economics—on improving the lives of the 
citizens of poor nations through interventions such as micro-financing, distributing anti-
mosquito nets, improving immunizations and improving potable water supplies—by its 
nature makes it a much humbler and moderately funded field than national R&D policy 
analysis.  Rodrik & Rosenzweig (2009) note that in the field of development economics:   
 Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), in which randomly-selected subpopulations 
are selected for an intervention and then outcomes are compared across the 
treated and untreated populations, have been used to evaluate the causal effects 
of specific programs (e.g., cash transfers, subsidies to medical inputs), delivery 
mechanisms (e.g., kinds of financial products), and, less pervasively, to obtain 
evidence on fundamental behavioral assumptions that underlie models used to 
justify policy – e.g., adverse selection.   
If policy administrators can adopt RCT methods to determine the best way to deliver 
developmental economics policy interventions, then the better-funded, higher-profile field of 




to implement limited RCT studies to better understand the efficacy of the $1B+ DoD SBIR 
program.   
Policy makers should seriously consider incorporating randomization into the 
DoD SBIR program to improve the evaluation of the program and to demonstrate how 
to build evaluation tools into other government programs. 
Conclusion on How to Improve SBIR Program Evaluation 
These three suggestions could help revolutionize the way the SBIR program is 
evaluated and offer a wider variety of answers to the policy questions.   With more data 
available, better links to research output and actual experimental results, the artifacts of the 
DoD SBIR program that actually work best can be understood, refined and applied as best 
practices across the DoD and Federal government.  With better analyses, policy makers can 
use facts to craft and administer better policies. This paper has provided a small sample of 
the research possible if evaluation data and tools are improved.  If any form of these 
recommendations is adopted, the DoD SBIR program can be better evaluated.  
Suggestions for Further Evidence-based Acquisition Policy 
Analysis 
 The program evaluation tools demonstrated in this paper highlights that it is 
possible to evaluate the effectiveness of some aspects of the defense acquisition 
systems.  The after-the-fact tools demonstrated in this paper and the suggestion 
to implement randomized controlled trials can be applied to other areas of the 
defense acquisition system to provide policy makers evidence of how well policy 
changes perform.   Specifically there are  policy changes enacted by the Weapon 
System Acquisition Reform Act (P.L.111) and the National Defense Authorization 
Act for FY 2009 (P.L. 110-417) that are worthy of consideration for evaluation 
with experimental and quasi-experimental methods.   Some examples of the 
policy recommendations that might be suited for experimental anslysis are as 
follows: the emphasis on competition, the requirement for prototyping, the 
implementation of earned value management, and the increase in the number of 
acquisition professionals.   
 For example, estimating the effectiveness of maintaining competition throughout 
the acquisition lifecycle could be part of a randomized trial or could be analyzed 
using quasi-experimental methods.  For an RCT, policy makers could randomly 
pick which current program would be required to implement competition in 
technology development, prototyping, and production.  Analysts could estimate 
the effect of competition by measuring the difference in cost changes and 
schedule delays on the programs with and without competition.  If randomization 
of competition requirements is infeasible, after-the-fact analyses could estimate 
the effect of competition on cost and schedule.  The evaluator could use the 
characteristics of the different programs (weapon type, joint program, service of 
program office, year of program initiation), along with an identifier on whether 
they had competition or not to build treatment and control groups and to explain 
other variations in program outcomes.   
Conclusion 
Congress is re-emphasizing its direction to the DoD to improve the evaluation 




aspects of the defense acquisition system quasi-experimental methods can be applied and 
do provide evidence to estimate program efficacy.  This paper recommends that DoD policy 
makers build more experimental and quasi-experimental links into the current DoD SBIR 
program to improve the evidence available to acquisition policy makers.  Based on this 
demonstration, policy makers should consider broadening the application of these methods 
beyond the SBIR program to acquisition system aspects that can be analyzed with 
experimental and quasi-experimental models.  
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This research investigates evidence and tests the hypothesis that the linkages 
between the defense acquisition management system, the requirements process, and the 
budgeting system are not sufficiently defined to enable the success of acquisition programs. 
These disconnects contribute to weapons systems cost overruns, schedule delays, and 
performance problems, and are exacerbated by the ever-changing global security 
environment and rapid pace of technological advancement. Through historical research, 
qualitative and quantitative analyses, and a comprehensive review of current policies and 
procedures, this research illuminates these areas of disconnect and proposes specific 
recommendations to fix them.  
Keywords: Acquisition, Budgeting, Decision-making, Programming, Requirements 
The primary purpose of this research was to investigate how well the Defense 
Acquisition Management System interfaces with the requirements and budgeting systems of 
the Department of Defense (DoD). The United States of America possesses the finest 
weapons systems in the world. However, the same cannot be said for the systems that 
enable the Pentagon to acquire those weapons systems. Cost overruns, schedule delays, 
and operational test failures testify to numerous severed connections among the acquisition 
management, requirements, and budgeting systems (commonly referred to as the three 
decision support systems). The ever-changing global security environment and the rapid 
pace of technological change only serve to exacerbate these problems. 
For the Pentagon to earn a reputation for excellence in acquiring weapons systems, 
these decision support systems must operate with far better coordination and demonstrate 
that they can procure the right equipment, within reasonable timeframes, and at affordable 
prices. This research began with an investigation into the intricacies of the acquisition 
management, requirements, and budgeting systems. Next, interactions between these three 
decision support systems were illuminated to uncover areas of misalignment and 
disconnect. Recent initiatives to correct these problems were also identified. Finally, 





A January 2006 report of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) 
described the three decision support systems as: 
a highly complex mechanism that is fragmented in its operation. Further, the findings 
we developed indicated that differences in the theory and practice of acquisition, 
divergent values among the acquisition community, and changes in the security 
environment have driven the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes further 
apart, and have inserted significant instability into the acquisition system. In theory, 
new weapons systems are delivered as the result of the integrated actions of the 
three interdependent processes whose operations are held together by the 
significant efforts of the organizations, workforce, and the industrial partnerships that 
manage them. In practice, however, these processes and practitioners often operate 
independent of one another. Uncoordinated changes in each of the processes often 
cause unintended negative consequences that magnify the effects of disruptions in 
any one area.54 (DAPA, 2006, pp. 4-5) 
                                                
1. This problem has not been fixed. Writing in the January/February 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of 
Defense Robert M. Gates (2009) called for a reassessment of priorities within the Department of Defense: 
The defining principle of the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy is balance. The United States 
cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and 
buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and 
opportunity costs.  
The strategy strives for balance in three areas: between trying to prevail in current conflicts and 
preparing for other contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency 
and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic 
technological edge against other military forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have 
made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to 
be done. (p. 28)  



















Figure 1. DoD Decision Support Systems 
Figure 1 highlights the areas of interaction between the Defense Acquisition 
Management System, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 
and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. Coordinated 
management decisions at these interfaces are essential for the success of any acquisition 
program. Thus, this research began by seeking to understand the reasons why these three 
decision support systems were first established and how acquisition programs are affected 
by the decisions made within and between these systems today. 
Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS): Stratified 
Decision-Making 
Decision-making in today’s Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) can 
be traced to 1986. The late David Packard, then president of Hewlett-Packard, was selected 
by Ronald Reagan to lead the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management. Better known as the Packard Commission, its interim report of April 1986 
recommended the appointment of both DoD-level and Service Acquisition Executives 
(SAEs). The SAEs would appoint Program Executive Officers (PEOs) under their authority 
that would be responsible for a manageable number of acquisition programs and project 
managers. By design, the chain of authority from the project manager, through the PEO, to 
the SAE was short. The basic premise was that defense acquisition needed to be 





Another feature of the acquisition management system is that it classifies programs 
for higher levels of oversight based upon expected development or production expenditures. 
An Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP), requiring 
oversight by the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) or DoD Component Acquisition 
Executive (CAE), if so delegated, is a program that is expected to require in excess of $365 
million of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds and/or $2.19 billion 


















































Figure 2. The Defense Acquisition Management System 
Unlike the PPBE process that is calendar-driven or the JCIDS which is needs-driven, 
the acquisition management system is event-driven. All acquisition programs are managed 
through a series of sequential phases and milestone reviews (Figure 2). To successfully 
move from one phase to the next, a program must have demonstrated or completed the 
program-specific exit criteria for the current phase and must also have met the statutory and 
regulatory entrance criteria for the next phase. The appointed Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) makes the “go/no-go” decision based on the evidence presented at the milestone 
review. 
The effect of having a higher-level decision-maker for MDAPs is that 31% of the 
department’s programmed Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) funds are under 
the authority of one decision-maker—the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 




programmed RDA funds are under the control of the Services and Defense Agencies.55  The 
total number of decision-makers with MDA for lower-priority acquisition programs is over 
40.56 
In addition, analysis of acquisition decision memoranda (ADMs) documenting the 
decisions of the DAE for MDAPs reveals that 36% of the ADM contained language with 
impact on the requirements decision-making process, and 66% of the ADMs contained 
actions affecting decisions in the budgeting process.57 Obviously, decisions made on the 
more numerous lower acquisition category programs also ripple into the requirements and 
budgeting processes at higher rates.  
JCIDS: Centralizing the Validation of Capability Documents to 
Ensure “Jointness” 
Historically, the military Services have had their own systems for the approval of 
weapons systems requirements. However, in 1976 the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
published Circular A-109 that required a Mission Area Analysis to determine the need for a 
particular weapons system (OMB, 1976). In compliance with A-109, the Services were 
required to perform this analysis and prepare a mission needs statement to document the 
need at the front end of the acquisition process (Fox & Field, 1988, p. 46). Eventually, to 
ensure that requirements were not duplicated between the Services and to prompt 
interoperability and joint operations, the Joint Staff got involved. In the early 1990s, they 
required the Services to adopt a single document format for the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD). In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) process was created to identify the capabilities and associated operational 
performance criteria required by the joint warfighter. JCIDS also supports the statutory 
responsibility of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to validate joint 
warfighting requirements. 
                                                
55 In Future Years Defense Program 2008-2013 (FYDP 2008-2013), the total obligation 
authority for RDT&E and Procurement was $1,154 billion. By virtue of the fact that the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the MDA for MDAPs, the OSD has 
control over acquisition decisions totaling $362 billion, or about 31% of the total obligation authority in 
FYDP 08-13. On the other hand, the Services make decisions on about $792 billion, or about 69% of 
the total obligation authority for RDT&E and procurement in FYDP 08-13 (DoD, 2008c, Table 1-9, p. 
13; DAMIR, n.d., MDAP/MAIS Selected Acquisition Report query, FYDP 08-13). 
56 Each Service and Defense Agency has an Acquisition Executive (AE) with MDA. In 
addition, all PEOs have MDA. The total number of PEOs is 35 (Army-11; Navy-13; Air Force-11). 




57 The Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) uses ADMs as records of the 
decision made by the AE. For the purposes of this research, ADMs for the following weapons 
systems were reviewed: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (6 ADMs); Future Combat System (10 
ADMs); Global Hawk (12 ADMs); Joint Strike Fighter (13 ADMs); and Littoral Combat Ship (3 ADMs). 
In total, 44 ADMs were reviewed. Of these, 36% (16 ADMs) contained actions that would require 
involvement of the JCIDS. In addition, 66% (29 ADMs) contained actions that would impact upon the 















Figure 3. Capabilities-based Assessment 
Fundamental to JCIDS is Capabilities-based Assessment (CBA) (Figure 3). Unlike 
the more predictable threats of the Cold War that the Pentagon could anticipate and prepare 
for, threats today emerge on a daily basis, and are often asymmetrical to our existing 
capabilities. CBA seeks to find solutions to these emerging threats by changing Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities 
(DOTMLPF) (CJCS, 2009, p. GL-3). The CBA process produces initial capability, capability 
development, and capability production documents (ICD, CDD, and CPD). These 
documents guide the technology development, engineering and manufacturing 
development, and production and deployment phases of the acquisition framework, 
respectively (Figure 2). 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01G is explicit 
regarding how JCIDS interfaces with the two other decision support systems:  
The JCIDS process supports the acquisition process by identifying and assessing 
capability needs and associated performance criteria to be used as a basis for 
acquiring the right capabilities, including the right systems. These capability needs 
then serve as the basis for the development and production of systems to fill those 
needs. Additionally, it provides the PPBE process with affordability advice by 
assessing the development and production life-cycle cost. (CJCS, 2009, pp. A-1, A-
2) 
An approved ICD summarizes the CBA process, describes the capability gaps, and 
identifies potential solutions. The ICD is taken to a Materiel Development Decision (MDD), 
where it is reviewed and validated in order to start the acquisition process. A favorable MDD 
leads into the Materiel Solution Analysis phase, which is prior to Milestone A. In this phase, 
an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is prepared, based upon the broad type of materiel 
solution preferred in the ICD (i.e., information system, evolutionary development of an 
existing capability, or a transformational approach) (CJCS, 2009, p. A-3). Each alternative 
has an associated life-cycle cost that gives insight into the affordability of the program and 




the ICD drives the AoA process. The ICD also informs the technology development strategy, 
the test and evaluation strategy, and the systems engineering plan—all key documents for 
guiding the technology development phase prior to program initiation at Milestone B. 
 
Figure 4. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
PPBE: Then and Now 
In the spring of 2008, the American Society of Military Comptrollers (ASMC) 
surveyed 575 members of the defense financial management community about the PPBE 
process (Figure 4). Agreement was almost universal that PPBE was the best method to link 
performance and budgeting, “and a strong sentiment to fully implement the system as 
designed” (ASMC & Grant Thornton, 2008, p. 1). So, just what was PPBE originally 
designed to do? And, has the DoD implemented PPBE in a way that allows it to do what it 
was designed to do? To find answers to these questions, one must go back to the 
beginnings of PPBE (then PPBS), during the era of Defense Secretary Robert S. 
McNamara. 
In 1961, President Kennedy’s initial instructions to McNamara were “to determine 
what forces were required and to procure and support them as economically as possible” 
(McNamara, 1964, p. 14). Developed by cost analysts at the RAND Corporation during the 
1950s, program budgeting was just what the Pentagon needed to link budget inputs to 
capability outcomes and to centralize long-range planning and financial decision-making 
under the civilian Secretary of Defense. The system was originally called the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), and its fundamental purpose was to unify 




task of long-range planning was to calculate the needed effects or outputs that had to be 
produced by military forces and weapons systems in order to prevail. Budgeted funds for 
these military forces and weapons systems came from the funding appropriations for military 
personnel, research and development, procurement, and operations and maintenance. Yet, 
budgets are resource inputs. Moreover, because of the long development cycles for modern 
weapons systems, annual budgeting was not a useful planning tool. The key for McNamara, 
and the objective of PPBS, was to link the planning outputs to the appropriated funds inputs 
through the construct of defined program elements within a 5-year force structure and 
financial program (Novick, 1962, p. 2). 
As originally envisioned, planning within the PPBS was to be a comparative analysis 
of the projected costs and effectiveness of feasible alternatives. The example used by David 
Novick, one of the developers of program budgeting, is the comparison of the merits of 
buying more Polaris submarines versus Minuteman missile squadrons. Both systems could 
deliver nuclear warheads. The comparison between the two alternatives involved the 
methodical examination of the cost estimates for manpower, equipment, and facilities, and 
the expected military benefits (capability outcomes) derived from the systems (Novick, 1962, 
p. 6). Today, comparatively little analysis to this level of detail takes place in the planning 
phase of PPBE. Up until 2006, planning was simply an effort to turn the National Security 
Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) into guidance from which the Services could develop 
their Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). Such a shallow planning effort resulted in 
guidance that was not specific enough, in terms of priorities and quantities, for the 
programming of adequate resources for weapons systems acquisitions. Here is but one of 
many examples. 
The National Security Strategy (Clinton, 2000) was silent on the role of the military in 
finding and taking the fight to terrorists. While the document discusses the need for the 
military to help deter terrorism and respond in retribution to terrorist attacks, the mission of 
finding and destroying terrorist organizations is not mentioned. Thus, the FYDP for fiscal 
years 2002-2007, prepared by the Pentagon in fiscal year 2000, lacked a vision for the 
weapons systems and equipment necessary to prosecute an offensive global war on terror 
(Paparone, 2008, p. 157).58 As the world changes at an unprecedented pace, casting a 
meaningful strategic vision becomes more and more problematic. Without meaningful 
strategic vision, the acquisition management system may continue to acquire programs that 
will no longer be needed—and may fail to start programs that will be needed. The Obama 
                                                
58  COL Christopher R. Paparone, USA (Ret.), makes an argument that the Joint Vision 2020, 
published in June 2000, focused on defensive force protection from terrorists, not on the use of 
military forces to combat terrorism in an offensive way, which was the case after September 11, 2001. 
While the Joint Vision 2020 was not a PPBE document, per se, his point is applicable. Combating 
terrorists offensively is not seen in the National Security Strategy prior to 9/11. This is not the only 
failure on the part of past presidential administrations in providing meaningful strategic priorities. The 
2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) failed to envision the invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, the 
fall of Baghdad, and the associated requirements for nation building that were thrust onto the military. 
The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) failed to envision the need for massive humanitarian aid in 
the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 24, 2004, and the associated requirements that 
the military would need for logistical support across the shores of devastated islands and coastal 
regions. Similarly, the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) failed to envision that North Korea 
would test fire missiles over the Sea of Japan on July 4, 2006, and subsequently explode a nuclear 
device in the mountains on October 9, 2006. The 2005 NDS makes no mention of our nation’s need 




Administration has yet to set clear national security priorities. As a result, the Pentagon 
began in early 2009 the planning phase for fiscal years 2012-2017 without the benefit of an 
NSS. Clearly, no one knows what the future will hold. However, planning for a future we 
cannot see and attempting to bring that illusion to the future fight, with all the associated 
weapons systems acquisition requirements, is clearly folly if not patently dangerous. Yet, 
this is the current planning process upon which the Pentagon justifies and builds its 6-year 
defense program. 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires that each 
government agency establish a results-oriented management approach to strategically 
allocate resources on the basis of performance (US Congress, 1993). In assessing the 
implementation of GPRA, the Government Accountability Office has criticized the DoD for 
not establishing goals or timelines for accountability and for the measurement of progress 
toward implementation. The DoD implemented a risk management framework in its strategic 
plan—the 2001 QDR report (GAO, 2005, p. 8). However, it was not until 2003 that the DoD 
adopted the balanced scorecard approach to implement risk management. The GAO 
criticized the DoD for not integrating this framework with other decision-making support 
processes. Specifically, the GAO said that to be effective, risk-based and results-oriented 
management approaches have to be integrated into the usual cycle of agency decision-
making. The GAO presumed that without this level of integration, a mismatch between 
programs and budgets would continue, and a proportional rather than strategic allocation of 
resources would go to the Services.59 In addition, the Congress would not have insight as to 
the risks and trade-offs made during the Pentagon’s investment decision-making (GAO, 
2005, p. 5). 
Chartered to examine how the DoD develops, resources, and provides joint 
capabilities, the Joint Capabilities Study Team (also called the Aldridge Study) reported 
these findings to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in 2004: “Services dominate the current 
requirements process…; Service planning does not consider the full range of solutions 
                                                
59 The Government Accountability Office says that even though the DoD has adopted a risk 
management planning framework and balanced scorecard approach to programming for outcomes, 
the percentage of total obligation authority in the FYDP, by Service, has remained relatively 
unchanged. The GAO provided the following figures in its report Defense Management: Additional 
Actions Needed to Enhance DoD’s Risk-based Approach for Making Resource Decisions (GAO-06-
13): 
Table 1. Military Service and Defense-wide Percentage of the 2005 and 2006 Future 
Years Defense Programs 
(GAO, 2005, p. 16) 
 2005 Percentage of 
FYDP 
2006 Percentage of 
FYDP 
Percentage Change by 
Department 
Department of the Army   24.23  24.63  0.40
Department of the Navy   29.75  29.47  -0.28
Department of the Air Force   29.80  29.82  0.02
Defense-wide   16.22  16.08  -0.14






available to meet joint warfighting needs…; and, the resourcing function focuses senior 
leadership effort on fixing problems at the end of the process, rather than being involved 
early in the planning process.” They also found that programming guidance exceeds 
available resources (DoD, 2004, p. iii). Others have also identified this programming 
guidance “gap” (Christie, 2008, p. 196; Church & Warner, 2009, p. 82; Johnson, 2003, p. 9). 
The Aldridge Study proposed a four-step process: strategy, enhanced planning, 
resourcing, and execution and accountability. The strategy step involved the combatant 
commanders and answered the question: “What to do?” The enhanced planning and 
resourcing steps answered the question: “How to do it?” The execution and accountability 
step answered the question: “How well did we do?” Formal process review points for the 
Secretary of Defense were proposed after each of the four steps (DoD, 2004, p. v).  
Many of the recommendations from the Aldridge Study were implemented. Most 
notably, the Enhanced Planning Process (EPP) was made a phase of the Strategic Planning 
Process, and the EPP is to be approved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. 
Moreover, the Joint Programming Guidance is to document the decisions resulting from the 
EPP phase (DoD, 2006, p. 2). The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) 
already had responsibility as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) lead for 
coordinating the program review of the PPBE process. The only problem with this new 
assignment is that it appears to conflict with the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Policy), who has overall responsibility for coordinating the PPBE planning phase 
(DoD, 2003, p. 5). 
Another problem for PPBE is that developing and finally enacting the first year of the 
6-year program takes a long time. The program (termed Future Years Defense Program or 
FYDP) is put together only once every 2 years, during even numbered years. For example, 
in calendar year 2010, the Pentagon will put together the 6-year program for fiscal years 
(FY) 2012 through 2017. However, the Services began working on their portions of that FY 
2012-2017 program in the middle of calendar year 2009—more than 3 years before the first 
year funds for FY 2012 will be appropriated by the Congress. The next opportunity to make 
major changes to the program is in calendar year 2012 when the program for FY 2014-2019 
will be accepted by the Pentagon. Changes to the program are possible during the odd 
numbered years. However, these changes are usually limited to necessary fact-of-life 
adjustments. New starts (or stops) are generally not considered in the odd numbered years. 
Thus, the programming phase of the PPBE process suffers from false precision. Even if the 
vision of the future were correctly identified in the planning phase, programming for 
weapons systems new starts can only be done every other year. Moreover, funds requested 
are for use more than three or more years hence. Inevitably, projections for weapons 
systems costs that far in advance of execution are bound to be flawed. Yet, the process 
demands precision, whether or not that precision has any meaning (McCaffery & Jones, 
2005, p. 159).  
As originally envisioned, Secretary McNamara expected to conduct a continuous 
review of the entire defense program. In other words, he expected to have an up-to-date 5-
year force structure and financial program at all times. McNamara’s PPBS had a program 
change control system in which variations from approved cost estimates required advance 
authorization. Standard forms were established for research and development, investment, 
and operations—each relating to the key decision points in the life of a weapon system. The 
program change control system was first applied to 200 of the most important material 
systems. Milestone schedules were prepared for these systems, and actual progress was 




financial plan (Novick, 1962, pp. 7-10). Such is not the case today. The FYDP is open for 
changes only twice a year—in August when POMs (or changes to the previous POMs) are 
submitted by the Services to OSD, and at the end of the combined program and budget 
review once resource management decisions have been made and the defense budget is 
finalized for the Office of Management and Budget. 
In his first year as Defense Secretary, McNamara was heavily involved in the cost-
effectiveness and requirements studies of the planning phase of PPBS. Known as 
“McNamara’s 100 Trombones,” he assigned about 100 requirements projects to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and various elements of OSD. These planning studies were 
truly participative in nature and required a significant time commitment from McNamara, but 
they resulted in detailed acquisition programming guidance for the Services. For example, in 
his first year, McNamara made decisions on the number of strategic missiles and bombers 
for the next decade. He also decided on the airlift and sealift needed to support contingency 
war plans and the most cost-effective way of replacing worn out ground equipment for the 
Army (Hitch, 1965, pp. 74-75). 
Senior leader involvement in today’s PPBE process has typically been toward the 
end of the programming phase rather than in the earlier planning phase. This is not the 
optimum time for these senior leaders to enter the PPBE decision-making process. 
Moreover, failing to make the tough decisions up front in the planning phase only delays 
them into late in the programming phase (Johnson, 2003, pp. 10-11). Decisions become 
harder to make during the final stages of programming because less discretionary funding is 
available, and earlier decisions will need to be reconsidered. Such late decision-making on 
weapons systems acquisition terminations was typical in past PPBE cycles. However, as 
demonstrated by Defense Secretary Gates during the 2010 budget deliberations, he may 
get more involved up front and make these types of decisions early in the planning phase of 
PPBE.  
Today, PPBE fiscal and programming guidance is usually late in arriving to the 
Services. While no directive or instruction establishes a date for issuance of 
fiscal/programming guidance, issuance dates for the past two PPBE cycles were March 14, 
2008, for POM 10-15; and May 7, 2009, for POM 11-15. Fiscal guidance refers to the total 
obligation authority, by fiscal year, available to the Services. Fiscal/programming guidance is 
used by the Services to develop their POMs, or changes to the previous POM, which are 
usually due in August. They begin development of their POMs in the last few months of the 
prior year (October-December timeframe). While draft fiscal/programming guidance is often 
released earlier, final fiscal/programming guidance is usually issued too late to be useful. 
Today, fiscal/programming guidance is found in the “fiscally informed” Guidance for the 
Development of the Force (GDF) and the “fiscally constrained” Joint Programming Guidance 
(JPG) (Church & Warner, 2009, p. 84). The predecessor to the GDF was the Strategic 
Planning Guidance (SPG), and before the SPG, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). 
Originally envisioned to align strategy with investments, the GDF appears to have become a 
“wish list of programs and priorities for every constituency.” Feedback from the Services on 
the usefulness of the GDF and JPG is mixed. As indicated, both documents, but especially 
the JPG, are issued well after the Services have completed the development of their POMs 
and decisions have been made to fund or not fund various weapons systems programs 
(Church & Warner, 2009, pp. 81-82). 
Understandably, and working at a disadvantage with unclear programming guidance, 
the Service POMs are invariably criticized for failing to comply with the GDF/JPG. In 




weapons systems investments (Christie, 2008, p. 212). As a result, the Services tend to over 
program, believing they can develop, produce, and place in operation many more programs 
than realistically possible (Christie, 2008, p. 196; Church & Warner, 2009, p. 82). In other 
words, their 6-year programs fail to consider the cost “tails” past the last year of the FYDP. 
This is particularly a problem with weapons systems production programs that build up to an 
unrealistically high “bow wave” of procurement funding beyond the FYDP that becomes 
unaffordable for the Service and the DoD.  
Per DoD Directive 7045.14, the official linkage between the PPBE and acquisition 
management systems is achieved by designated membership on the Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (now the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)), the Defense 
Resources Board (now the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG)), and the Senior 
Leader Review Group (SLRG); and the requirement to develop an acquisition strategy for all 
major systems (DoD, 1984, reissued 1987, p. 6). The DAB is chaired by the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, who is also a member of the 
SLRG and DAWG. The SLRG is chaired by the Secretary of Defense, and the DAWG is 
chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, neither of whom sits on the DAB. In total, 11 
senior leaders are members of both the DAB and the SLRG/DAWG.60 The average tenure of 
the DAE is just 24 months.61 Most MDAPs have development cycles that exceed the tenure 
of four or even five DAEs. Therefore, the effectiveness of having senior leaders serve as the 
linkage between the resourcing and acquisition management systems might be questioned, 
given their enormous responsibilities and brief tenures serving as the DAE. Certainly, 11 
senior leaders cannot be held responsible for coordinating the multitude of interactions 
between the acquisition and budgeting systems. 
Recommendations 
In 1979, the Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS) recommended to 
President Carter that the programming and budgeting phases of PPBE be combined into a 
single annual review. The DRMS also recommended that the time freed up by combining 
the two phases be used to “focus additional attention on the strategic and resource planning 
issues, including resolution of selected major issues prior to the program/budget review” 
(Rice, 1979, p. viii). This was the centerpiece of the DRMS proposal, and it was designed to 
open up a “broad planning window” that would include “an orchestrated OSD review and 
prioritization of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council-approved programs 
competing for segments of the planning wedge” (Rice, 1979, pp. 9, 16). These 
recommendations were not implemented. However, in 2003, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
did combine programming and budgeting phases, but not with the intention of freeing up 
time for better planning. Rather, Rumsfeld’s Management Initiative Decision 913 specified 
                                                
60 The members of both the DAB and the SLRG/DAWG are as follows: Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretaries of the Military 
Departments; Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Under Secretary 
of Defense (Personnel and Readiness); Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Networks and Information Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer; Director, Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation (DoD, 2008b, encls. 3 & 4; DoD, 2009, p. 10.2.1). 
61 From Richard Godwin, the first Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) until Ashton Carter, the 
current Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, average tenure has 
been 24 months. To date, the shortest service was by Godwin, who served 12 months (September 
1986–September 1987), and the longest service was by Jacques Gansler, who served 38 months 




that the freed up time would be used for an execution review (i.e., the new “E” in PPBE) to 
“make assessments concerning current and previous resource allocations and whether the 
department achieved its planned performance goals” (DoD, 2003, p. 7; Church & Warner, 
2009, p. 81; Dawe & Jones, 2005, p. 49; Jones & McCaffery, 2005, p. 90). The Pentagon 
has yet to institutionalize this execution review. A recent survey of 575 professionals in the 
defense finance and accounting community found that, due to the wartime supplemental 
funding for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, emphasis on execution had not made the 
relationship between budget execution and performance more visible, nor had it provided 
the data needed to make more timely decisions to improve the PPBE process (ASMC & 
Grant Thornton, 2008, pp. 5-7). Perhaps, the “broad planning window” recommendation of 
the DRMS should again be considered, and this time implemented, to help resolve and 
clarify competing requirements and acquisition programs before the Services have to 
prepare their POMs. 
In 2007, Capability Portfolio Management was introduced to the programming phase 
of PPBE. The official definition of Capability Portfolio Management is “the process of 
integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating DoD capabilities needs with current and 
planned DOTMLPF investments within a capability portfolio to better inform decision making 
and optimize defense resources” (DoD, 2008a, p. 8). The Capability Portfolio Management 
initiative seeks to place all current and proposed warfighting needs into logical, manageable 
functional categories. In an effort to minimize redundant capabilities, capability portfolios are 
joint, not Service-specific. Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) provide cross-Component 
alternatives and recommendations on current and future capability needs and investments. 
They are to work with the JROC and the JCIDS, and develop capability planning guidance 
for inclusion in the GDF. Therefore, CPMs can impact capability portfolio composition, 
weapons systems acquisition, and weapons systems sustainment choices. In retrospect, the 
job of the CPMs is similar to the system analysts of the McNamara era. The systems 
analysts prepared “cost-effectiveness studies” and “requirements studies” at the request of 
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hitch, 1965, pp. 73-75). However, the 
advice of current-day CPMs is officially sought only at the end of the programming phase of 
PPBE when they provide the DAWG with independent programmatic recommendations and 
cross-Component perspectives on planned and proposed capability investments (DoD, 
2008a, p. 6). To have greatest influence, decision-makers need to formally tap into the 
advice of these CPMs about 9 to 12 months earlier, during the planning phase of the PPBE 
process.  
The deliberate, evolutionary pace of the Cold War is long past. The challenges of an 
ever-changing global security environment and the rapid pace of technological advancement 
represent a national imperative for the Pentagon to seek out and cultivate breakthrough 
ideas in the development and employment of defense systems (Johnson, 2003, pp. 6-7). To 
meet these challenges, the PPBE planning phase should be revitalized and extended to 
allow time for brainstorming and germination of innovative ideas and for the analysis of the 





As implemented today, the PPBE process is far different from the PPBS established 
by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1961. Over the course of nearly 50 years, changes 
have severely de-emphasized decision-making in the planning phase. As a result, the 
Department has had to establish a separate requirements analysis and approval system. 
The concept behind today's JCIDS was actually part of McNamara's long-range planning to 
determine the most cost-effective capability outcomes. Likewise, in McNamara’s 
management system, weapons systems development and production decisions, along with 
necessary funding adjustments, were made in real time, and at the same time as 
requirements decisions. Today, the linkage between PPBE and weapons systems decisions 
suffers from the timing disconnect between a calendar-driven budget and event-driven 
acquisition programs. To improve acquisition decision-making, the linkages between the 
requirements, budgeting, and acquisition decision-making systems must be reestablished. 
One solution is to reinvigorate the planning phase of PPBE and make the necessary 
decisions on weapons systems requirements, multi-year budgeting, and acquisition program 
continuation or termination, within the timeframe of that phase.  
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Appendix 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum or Acquisition Decision 
Memoranda 
AE Acquisition Executive 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ASMC American Society of Military Comptrollers 
BES Budget Estimate Submission 
CAE Component Acquisition Executive 
CBA Capability-based Assessment 
CDD Capability Development Document 
CDR Critical Design Review 
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
CPM Capability Portfolio Manager 
DAB Defense Acquisition Board 
DAE Defense Acquisition Executive 
DAMS Defense Acquisition Management System 
DAPA Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
DAWG Deputy’s Advisory Working Group 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive 
DoDI Department of Defense Instruction 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, and Facilities 
DPG Defense Planning Guidance 
DRMS Defense Resource Management Study 
encl. enclosure 
EPP Enhanced Planning Process 
FRP Full Rate Production 
FY Fiscal Year 
FYDP Future Years Defense Program 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GDF Guidance for the Development of the Force 
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act 




JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
JPG Joint Planning Guidance 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JS Joint Staff 
MDA Milestone Decision Authority 
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program 
NDS National Defense Strategy 
NMS National Military Strategy 
NSS National Security Strategy 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation 
PBD Program Budget Decision 
PDM Program Decision Memorandum 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PEO Program Executive Office or Program Executive Officer 
POM Program Objective Memorandum or Program Objective Memoranda 
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution 
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
RDA Research, Development, and Acquisition 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
SAE Service Acquisition Executive 
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Abstract 
System complexity is only one aspect affecting US space acquisition today. There is 
a large body of literature that suggests US space acquisition is over budget, behind 
schedule, and delivering underperforming systems. The GAO seems to attribute a number 
of factors to contributing to this situation. However, three primary factors include an over-
reliance on immature technology, managing requirements to build the “grand design” and 
the health of the space industrial base. Addressing these factors will be critical so that the 
US can maintain its technology superiority and leadership in space. This is especially critical 
as countries such as Russia and China continue to mount significant challenges to our 
dominance in space. A loss of US leadership in space could very well translate into a loss of 
prosperity and national security.   
 
 In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity 
and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. In order to 
increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, 






Since the onset of the Cold War, the United States has led the development of space 
for exploration, commercial uses, and national interests.  In that time, space has managed 
to permeate almost every aspect of our society and culture.  In the span of forty some years, 
space has enabled global communications, broadcasted various forms of entertainment, 
assisted in geolocating new deposits of natural resources such as gas and oil, predicted the 
weather, provided information on our adversaries, and facilitated the conduct of successful 
military operations.   
Despite our success, the national security of the United States faces an increasing 
risk of threat as a number of factors mount a significant challenge to our leadership in 
space.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others observe that a majority of 
these challenges may lie with our acquisition practices, procedures and policies.  Their 
reviews suggest that many of our developmental national space systems are over budget, 
significantly behind schedule and woefully inadequate in terms of expected user 
performance.  Lt. Gen. Michael Hamel, former commander of Air Force Space and Missile 
Systems Center, was pointed when he stated, “Nothing threatens US military superiority in 
space more than a loss of ability to develop, field and sustain our space systems” (Hamel, 
2009).  
Noting the challenges confronting the US space acquisition program, this paper 
seeks to accomplish three objectives. First, is to briefly explain the importance of US 
leadership in space by describing not only its historical development but also its contribution 
to the prosperity and national security of the United States.  Second, it seeks to explain a 
small subset of the current acquisition challenges the US is facing, to include: dependence 
on immature technology, requirements, and the state of space industrial base. Finally, in 
conjunction with those challenges, this paper offers some modest recommendations that the 
acquisition community might employ to overcome these challenges and ensure US 
leadership in space.   
The Space Development Imperative 
Shortly after World War II, the US became engaged in the Cold War against its 
former ally, the Soviet Union. From a strategic perspective, the US recognized that, first, it 
needed a capable and credible nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union and that, second, 
it needed to understand Soviet military developments and intentions. The development of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) solved the US’s need to deliver nuclear warheads 
half way around the world.  However, on the second issue, it still needed a means of 
obtaining information from denied areas. The shoot down of Gary Powers and his U-2 
aircraft only accentuated the need for space systems capable of accessing denied areas.  In 
other words, space development was the imperative.    
Many organizations had aspirations for and were vying for control of space, and it 
wasn’t until the 1960s that the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
would become the principal developers of military space power for the nation.  During that 
time, there were rapid advances in communications, weather, navigation, missile warning, 
and intelligence surveillance (Hamel, 2009). These advances continued for the remainder of 
the Cold War. However, these space assets were typically only employed in a strategic and 
operational role. As the Cold War came to a close, and as Iraq flexed its military power in 
the Persian Gulf War, the perspective of using space systems as only strategic and 




On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded the Kingdom of Kuwait, and the Iraqi 
government almost immediately annexed Kuwait as the nineteenth province of Iraq.  From 
the early moments of the first Persian Gulf War, it became apparent that satellites were not 
only a force multiplier on the strategic and operation level but also on the tactical level. For 
the first time, satellites connected military forces, sensors, and decision-makers across the 
battlespace; collected data on operationally relevant conditions, reconnoiter, survey and 
target hostile forces; and enabled precision, synchronization and command and control of 
forces in the field (Hamel, 2009).  As a result, Russia and China watched with disbelief as 
the American military easily dismembered and neutralized a Soviet-trained and -equipped 
military in a matter of days.  
Since the close of the Persian Gulf War, the US military has increasingly relied on 
satellites to conduct and facilitate military operations.  Additionally, the nature of warfare has 
evolved as adversaries recognize and attempt to negate the advantage that space systems 
provide for their American users.  As a result, US military forces have asked for increasingly 
complex space systems in greater numbers and on faster timelines to answer the challenge 
posed by adversaries.  This, in part, has contributed to the current state of US space 
acquisition.   
The Acquisition Challenge 
Without significant improvements in the leadership and management of national 
security space programs, U.S. space preeminence will erode ‘to the extent that space 
ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage.’ (Chaplain, 2009) 
Recent studies conducted by the GAO suggest that major weapon system 
acquisition is a serious cause of concern for government leaders.  For example, the GAO 
found that out of the DoD’s portfolio of 96 programs, “42% are higher than originally 
estimated and the average delay in delivering initial capabilities has increased to 22 months” 
(Chaplain, 2009).  Table 1 displays how costs have risen and schedules expanded for “big 




Table 1. Analysis of the DoD’s Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolios 
(Francis, 2009) 
Fiscal Year 
 2003 2007 2008 
Portfolio size 
Number of Programs 77 95 96 
Total Planned 
Commitments 
$1.2 Trillion $1.6 Trillion $1.6 Trillion 
Commitments 
Outstanding 
$742.2 Billion $875.2 Billion $786.3 Billion 
Portfolio Indicators 
Change to Total RDT&E 
costs from first estimate 
37% 40% 42% 
Change to Total 
acquisition cost from 
first estimate 
19% 26% 25% 
Total acquisition cost 
growth 
$183 Billion $301.3 Billion $296.4 Billion 
Share of programs with 
25% increase in 
program acquisition unit 
cost growth 
41% 44% 42% 
Average schedule delay 
in delivering initial 
capabilities 
18 Months 21 Months 22 Months 
 Unfortunately, the scenario does not fare much better for space acquisition either, 
as space systems cost estimates have risen dramatically. For example, the US Government 
is already expecting a $10.3 billion cost increase for the years 2009-2013 from original 
estimates (Chaplain, 2009). Obviously, these cost increases divert money away from new or 
existing space programs, making a cash-strapped environment for dollars even more 
competitive.  Figure 1 displays the dramatic rise in cost and schedule delays for specific 





Figure 1. Differences in Total Life-Cycle Program Costs from Program Start and Most 
Recent Estimates  
 (GAO, 2009) 
The GAO has identified specific issues causing significant cost increases and 
schedule delays  as well as presented several best practices they believe might alleviate 
them.  First, the GAO found many acquisition programs begin with an over dependence on 
emerging technology.  If an unexpected delay occurs in the development of the technology, 
it negatively impacts the program schedule (Chaplain, 2009). Second, many programs 
attempt to fulfill all requirements in a single step—that is to suggest that traditional 
acquisition approaches will not work given the current user demands and timelines coupled 
with complex capability. “Programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in 
a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies 
necessary to achieve the full capability” (Chaplain, 2009). Finally, the state of the Space 
Industrial Base is questionable.  First-tier contractors are showing only marginal profit 
revenues and can absorb loses as they are diversified across the acquisition market. 
However, a recent Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) survey suggests that second- and 
third-tier contractors are producing miniscule profits. Consequently,  many of these 




Dependence on Emerging Technology 
The GAO found that the DoD has a tendency to fund more programs then they can 
afford.  As a result, many programs come into existence already underfunded.  In fact, in a 
survey presented to space program managers asking what are the top obstacles to 
achieving success, over 36% stated unstable funding (Chaplain, 2006). Additionally, 
programs that are performing well often find funding transferred to an underperforming 
program. This creates a very competitive environment for both program managers and 
contractors. In an attempt to secure as much funding as possible, a program manager will 
often over promise on capability and focuses on “bleeding edge” technologies that seem to 
demonstrate “the most bang for the buck” to those in control of the purse strings.   
Unfortunately, this reliance upon bleeding edge technology comes at a significant 
cost. The GAO has found that developing technology in conjunction with program 
development is often fraught with schedule delays and cost overruns because the relied-
upon technology  often doesn’t work out as intended. In the same survey that measured 
unstable funding as a major obstacle, 18% of space program managers interviewed 
admitted that they relied on immature and untested technology (Chaplain, 2006).  
Specific examples of space programs relying upon immature technology include 
Space Based Infra-Red (SIBRs) satellite system, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
(AEHF) satellite system and the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS).  In some cases, the GAO noted that sensors had not been fully tested 
or even prototyped, or software needs in general were just greatly underestimated 
(Chaplain, 2006). This reliance upon immature technology can, in some part, account for the 
fact that these programs have experienced a cost increase of 40% or more since their 
original cost estimation (Chaplain, 2006). In the case of SBIRs, their costs have more than 
doubled (Chaplain, 2006). 
The GAO has provided two primary recommendations to help alleviate the 
overdependence upon immature technology. First, based upon best industry practices, the 
GAO recommends separating technology development from acquisition development. 
Implied in this concept is that program managers will have to rely upon and select proven 
technology. This leads to their second recommendation, which is to apply the technology 
readiness level (TRL) scale that the DoD “borrowed” from NASA. This rating scale evaluates 
technologies against 9 different levels of developmental maturity. The first level represents 
the least mature technology, whereas the ninth level represents the highest level of 
technological maturity. In the case of space acquisition, the GAO is recommending that 
programs only select and use technology that has reached a technology level of seven.  For 
this particular level, the technology should be tested at least once in an operational 
environment, which is defined as “an environment that addresses all of the operational 
requirements and specifications required of the final systems” (USD(AT&L), 2002). Not 
surprisingly, the DoD has pushed back on this recommendation and offers its own 
recommendation of selecting technology that has reached level six. This level demonstrates 
a prototype or model of a system or subsystem in a relevant end-to-end environment, which 
is described as a test environment that simulates the key aspects of the operational 





Requirements and the Grand Design 
There are several areas of concern with regard to space acquisition and 
requirements. First, as was alluded to earlier, many programs attempt to satisfy all users 
requirements in a single, grand design. Second, users and stakeholders have demonstrated 
a tendency to frequently change or add new requirements as the program is developing. Not 
surprisingly, these factors undoubtedly impact cost and schedule. According to Dr. Rustan, 
Director of Mission Support Directorate, NRO,  
Our requirements-driven stakeholders often do not understand the cost implications 
of the various elements of their respective wish lists, and when we proceed to blindly 
integrate these capabilities, considerable problems develop. This problem is 
exacerbated when we are asked to hold fixed performance, cost and schedule at the 
beginning on any space acquisition, thereby inexorably increasing program risk. 
(Rustan, 2005)  
Attempting to satisfy all stakeholders with a “grand design” is not only costly and has 
a long lead development time but also ineffective and perhaps impossible. Each stakeholder 
comes with their own needs and capabilities, which often come in conflict with other 
stakeholders requirements. For example, United States Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM) may come to the NRO and ask for an electrical optical satellite that can 
penetrate through dense jungle foliage. Whereas, United States Pacific Command 
(USPACOM) may ask for a satellite capable of performing broad area searches so they can 
identify ships in transit. Finally, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) may ask for satellite 
that can identify thermal signatures emanating from caves in an attempt to locate terrorist 
safe holds. Thus, designing this satellite becomes inherently complex because different 
technologies are required to achieve each of those capabilities. Not surprisingly, integrating 
these technologies so that they work together not only increases complexity but also 
increases risk to the budget and schedule.   
Stakeholders also have a tendency to add or change requirements during the 
development of the system. According to Dr. Rustan, this may be attributed  to new 
technology that has caught the user’s eye. Dr. Rustan also states that these stakeholders 
are often attempting to solve dynamic problems, problems that change and evolve rapidly 
over time (Rustan, 2005). 
Spiral or Evolutionary development may well help alleviate some these problems. 
These acquisition strategies offer several advantages that seem to address the problems 
that are manifesting themselves in space systems development. More specifically, 
evolutionary acquisition acknowledges that not all requirements in a program are  known up 
front.  Therefore, evolutionary acquisition seeks to divide a program into more manageable 
increments or spirals in which the requirement can be more tightly defined. “Evolutionary 
acquisition’s primary goal is to reduce product cycle times by dividing and phasing 
requirements to produce initial capabilities sooner … EA addresses requirements and 
technology risks by allowing requirements to evolve over time” (Ford & Dillard, 2009). Thus, 
these strategies allow program managers to take a complex design and break it down into 
smaller, more manageable intervals. Additionally, they allow the program manager to 
provide an initial set of capabilities to the user sooner than traditional acquisition 
approaches. The ability to deliver capabilities may also help negate the effects of 
requirements creep as well.  
However, there is new evidence suggesting that evolutionary development may 




David Ford and John Dillard suggests that although spiral development may satisfy first 
phase requirements faster, it certainly is more expensive when compared to traditional 
acquisition approaches.  Further, their modeling also suggests that it takes longer to satisfy 
all requirements when compared with traditional approaches (Ford & Dillard, 2009). See 
Table 2 for their results. Therefore, it would appear a comprehensive evaluation is needed 
to determine if the best practices recommended by the GAO will truly fix space acquisition. 
Table 2. Performance Comparison of Three Simulated Acquisition Projects 
(Ford & Dillard, 2009) 
Performance Measure 
Units of 







Duration to first requirement 
satisfied Weeks 471 470 397 
Duration to maximum 
requirements 
satisfied Weeks 520 518 762 
Total development cost $1.0 Million 722 719 1,555
Requirements satisfied by  
deadline Percent 100 91 18 
Final requirements satisfied Percent 100 91 91 
State of Space Industrial Base 
A robust science, technology, and industrial base is critical for US space capabilities … 
departments and agencies shall … encourage an innovative commercial space sector, 
including the use of prize competitions; and ensure the availability of space related industrial 
capabilities. (Office of Science, 2006) 
When examining the health of the space industrial base there seems to be two 
primary issues. First, is the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) export regulations 
controlled by the US State Department? Second, is their large dependence upon the US 
Government for business and revenue? Specifically, 60% to 65% of sales for the space 
industrial base were from the US Government between the years 2003 to 2006 (Chao, 
2008). In either case, while the first-tier contractors (Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin 
and Boeing) are showing minimal profit margins, the second- and third-tier contractors are 
leaving the industry. They are either going out of business or don’t feel there is enough of a 
business case to continue to engage in space acquisition.  
ITAR is designed to prevent protected technology and munitions from transferring to 
other nations and to enable the US to maintain its technological superiority. It is 
administered by the US State Department and was brought about as a result of Chinese 
technological gains from their observation of US investigative techniques on the failed 
ASTAR II launch (DoD, 1998). Despite its good intentions, strong arguments are arising that 
it is failing to prevent space technology from developing in other nations and is hurting the 
US’s technological superiority.  
For example, many foreign competitors, such as Thales,  are advertising their 




progress through a complex and confusing export license process to acquire similarly 
capable components. Additionally, many nations when issuing a request for proposal 
purposely restrict the response to their proposal to less than sixty days. This virtually 
eliminates US firms without having to worry about economic retaliation because US firms 
first have to apply for an export license under ITAR before they can compete. According to a 
recent survey conducted by AFRL, the average turn around time for a license approval was 
106 days in 2006 (Chao, 2008). Thus, it would appear that ITAR is further encouraging US 
firms to remain dependent upon the government as it is increasingly difficult to enter and 
compete in international markets.   
It would also seem that ITAR has encouraged foreign nations to develop their own 
space technology.  For example, we are seeing greater cooperation among foreign 
competitors in space, particularly among the Europeans. Further, China is closing the space 
gap with the US. They have developed their own positional navigational system, conducted 
their first manned space flight, demonstrated a successful space walk and successfully 
tested anti-satellite weapons technology (Chao, 2008). This would suggest that ITAR is not 
achieving its objective of maintaining US technical superiority in space.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) provided a report to the Congress in February 
2006, stating that the aerospace and defense industry was outperforming companies listed 
on the S&P 500 (DeFrank, 2006). As a whole, the industry did seem to outperform the S&P 
500.  However, when looking specifically at the space industry, and especially the second- 
and third-tier suppliers, we see that these companies had significantly lower profit margins.  
A recent survey conducted by Air Force Research Laboratory shows that second- and third-
tier suppliers were only bringing in profit margins of 4% to 6% (Chao, 2008).  These low 
profit margins mean there is less revenue to invest in their personnel and in their research 
and development. Combined with pressures from prime contractors to provide the “best 
possible price,” these companies become less competitive, and, thus, we see a “hollowing 
out [of] the supply chain” (Chao, 2006). Additionally,  the Suppliers Excellence Alliance 
asserts that 50% of all second- and third-tier suppliers will cease to exist by 2011 (Chao, 
2006). This represents a serious problem because the primary contractors subcontract out 
approximately 80% of their space acquisitions to these lower-tiered companies (Chao, 
2008). 
The Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) provides several 
recommendations that may help alleviate the current situation. First, the Department of 
State should conduct a technological review to determine which technologies are critical and 
which ones are not (Chao, 2008). However, simply labeling a satellite as a critical 
technology in its entirety seems counterproductive.  Currently, the US is the only nation in 
the world that labels a satellite as a munition, whereas many European nations designate 
them as dual use technology. Second, provide authority to those entities involved in satellite 
exports to “review cases in a real time, case by case, specific time period” (Chao, 2008). 
Finally, those government entities involved in space acquisition should annually review the 
state of the space industrial base.  
Summary  
Although space acquisition originally provided the US with an advantage in the Cold 
War, it has also impacted nearly every aspect of our society. It plays a role in our banking 
and financial industries, provides entertainment, enables us to communicate half-way 
around the world, provides information on otherwise denied areas, and acts as a force 




asymmetrical advantage that space systems provided for US forces. As a result, other 
nations made a series of steps and commitments to develop their own space assets. As the 
US became more reliant upon satellite technology, its users began expressing requirements 
for a greater number of systems with far greater capabilities.  
System complexity is only one aspect affecting US space acquisition today. There is 
a large body of literature that suggests US space acquisition is over budget, behind 
schedule, and delivering underperforming systems. The GAO seems to attribute a number 
of factors to contributing to this situation. However, three primary factors include an over-
reliance on immature technology, managing requirements to build the “grand design” and 
the health of the space industrial base.  
Addressing these factors will be critical so that the US can maintain its technology 
superiority and leadership in space. This is especially critical as countries such as Russia 
and China continue to mount significant challenges to our dominance in space. A loss of US 
leadership in space could very well translate into a loss of prosperity and national security.   
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Abstract  
This paper discusses research in developing DoD acquisition metrics associated with 
Systems Engineering activities that may provide greater insight into the technical 
performance of development programs.  These metrics are called Systems Engineering 
Applied Leading Indicators (ALI).  We examine current development of single and multi-
factor ALIs that have been developed during the past year at the Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, MD.   The development methods, early examination 
of ALI utility, and user acceptance are discussed.  The authors have been embedded with 
the NAVAIR Systems Engineering Development and Implementation Center (SEDIC) (the 





The authors have been working in close collaboration with the members of the 
NAVAIR SEDIC team at NAS, Patuxent River, MD, in the conduct of the subject research.  
Much of the foundational work referred to in this paper is a result of their efforts.  The team 
includes Juan Ortiz, Paul Hood, and Javier Sierra of NAVAIR, and Gregory Hein, Johnathan 
Gilliard, and Tina Denq from Booz Allen Hamilton. 
Introduction and Problem Definition 
Background 
What is the role of systems engineering (SE) in the acquisition and development of 
systems?  The professional society for SE (INCOSE) defines SE as follows: 
Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the 
realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and 
required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, and 
then proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while considering the 
complete problem: operations, cost and schedule, performance, training and support, 
test, manufacturing, and disposal. SE considers both the business and the 
technical needs of all customers with the goal of providing a quality product 
that meets the user needs. (INCOSE, 2010) 
The principles, practices, and methods of SE are well defined and long practiced by 
Government and industry (INCOSE, 2010; NASA, 2007; NAVY, 2004).  The value added by 
disciplining the development of a system is well appreciated.  In the mid 1990s, SE practices 
were augmented with the concepts of SE metrics (INCOSE, 1995; 1998; Roedler, 2005).  
Early implementation of these metrics has been directed at the measurement of the 
performance of the SE process itself.   
In the bolded part of the definition above, SE continues to expand its benefits to 
include not only the development team but also all customers and stakeholders who are 
maximally interested in a project/program that is delivered satisfying cost, schedule, as well 
as technical goals.  There is now interest in the SE community on how to expand, define, 
and derive metrics and methods that would provide predictive or prognostic indicators of the 
success of a development effort as a whole (see Error! Reference source not found.) 
(Rhodes, Valerdi & Roedler, 2009).  While the existing SE metrics and methods have 
typically produced lagging and inferred indicators of the health and status of a development 
effort, current efforts and research are now underway to examine how to provide direct 
leading indicators, derived from SE and applied to understanding and predicting the 
technical trajectory of the aggregate development effort.  Because we are applying and 
focusing the concepts of SE leading indicators (Roedler & Rhodes, 2007), we will refer to 





Figure 1. Government/Industry Partnership Exploring SE Leading Indicator  
Concepts and Application 
(Rhodes et al., 2009) 
The authors set out attempting to focus on why programs fail to meet user 
expectations at delivery.  Our goals were to determine what engineering metrics could be 
defined and analyzed to provide such insight where programs are apparently not getting 
such insight today (based upon failure rates of system qualification testing results).  This 
goal lead us to intersect ongoing efforts related to SE ALIs that we determined would 
provide an understanding of closely related metrics and processes that we would underpin 
our investigation.  The authors have been supporting and co-researching with Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR) in Patuxent River, MD, to examine the identification, 
relevance, and application of SE ALIs.  NAVAIR has been examining the ALI concept 
through engagement with acquisition offices, data gathering and analysis, formulation of 
predictor algorithms, and prototype ALI tool development.  The Systems Engineering 
Development and Implementation Center (SEDIC) is conducting this NAVAIR effort in 
collaboration with working groups depicted in Figure 1. 
Problem Definition 
Program managers apply well-proven and refined program metrics and control 
mechanisms largely based upon Earned Value Methods (EVM).  The EVM fulcrum metrics 
are cost and schedule that generate analysis outputs depicting variances from plans and 
estimates.  From EVM analysis, program cost and schedule status can be assessed and 
projection of those parameters can be inferred.  Program managers, however, are not 
provided abundant metrics that can provide insights into the technical health of a 
development effort and indications of the trajectory of program health, good or bad.  Risk 
metrics and processes provide some indications of technical health but are often qualitative 
and provide little algorithmic opportunities for prognostics.  In general, program managers 
are faced with the development of complex systems, use EVM and risk management 
effectively; however, programs are failing to fully control costs and can routinely exceed cost 





Figure 2. Control of Cost Growth of Programs Remains a Challenge 
(Arena, Robert, Murray & Younossi, 2006) 
In addition to the quantity of programs that exceed cost estimates, it appears that 
acquisition cost growth can be attributed to causes centered upon control of technical 
baselines (see Figure 3).  The development of ALIs is intended to gain much more granular 
insight into the development of the technical baselines as soon as possible to allow for both 
assessment and predicted program performance so mitigation can be applied.  In summary, 
the specific problem and research response follows: 
Problem—Program managers do not have access to adequate technical metrics in 
order to provide high fidelity assessment of technical health of a complex system 
development program and quantitative prediction of technical performance. 
Research Question—Can SE technical metrics be identified, quantified, and 
methodically applied to complex system developments to provide technical assessment and 
leading indications of technical program performance and ultimate success? 
Research Objectives: 
 Identify relevant data supporting the development of ALIs, 
 Identify leading indicators tailored to systems engineering effectiveness, 
 Prototype ALI user tools to measure relevance, acceptance, and obtain 
feedback, and 





Figure 3. Cost Growth Largely Impacted by Control of Key Attributes of  
Technical Baselines  
(NAVAIR 4.2 Division Analysis) 
Advance Leading Indicator Concepts 
Technical Measurements 
SE processes provide metrics, measurements, and analysis activities throughout 
systems development.  These technical measurement activities provide lead system 
engineers and project managers insight into project technical performance and associated 
risks.  These metrics are most often associated with Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), 
Measures of Performance (MOPs), and Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) with 
associated Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Key System Attributes (KSAs).  These 
associations and metrics are qualified through continual testing and often manifest 
themselves graphically using control chart methods (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Technical Measures Associated with MOEs, MOPs, and TPMs Guide  





The above technical measurement processes are often focused on assessing the 
progress of the system in meeting specification as development unfolds.  Although the 
development of ALIs seems similar to these practices, the intent of ALIs is provide a more 
holistic and prognostic assessment of the technical aspects of the project by integrating both 
system technical metrics as well as systems engineering-derived process metrics.  ALIs, 
although substantiated in historical performance of similar projects, are highly forward-
looking and technical-rich in fidelity.  They are intended to inform the project technical 
approach and be fully integrated with the program management approach (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. ALIs Provide Metrics Rooted in SE Technical Approach and Supports  
Program Management Approach 
The development and use of ALIs are intended to augment existing program/project 
management methods, not replace them.  Although influenced by many similar metrics (e.g., 
cost, schedule, etc.), ALIs are derived from system attribute and system engineering metrics 
to produce technical health and prognostics that enhance the program manager’s overall 
assessment and direction of the project (see Figure 6).  They enrich the existing EVM-
derived assessment to provide project leadership higher fidelity project technical status and 





Figure 6. SE Applied Leading Indicators (ALI) Augment Program Management 
ALI Approach 
Data Selection and Collection 
The development of ALIs has progressed through multiple phases.  The initial 
phases identified metrics that were not being integrated into technical assessment that could 
be derived from engineering activities.  The ALI effort is careful to augment program 
management evaluation methods, not duplicate them.  The identification of metrics led to 
the following list of relevant technical metrics that were considered readily available in 
program data repositories: 
 Aircraft empty weight, 
 Software metrics, 
 Architecture metrics, 
 Requirements metrics, 
 Technical review closure burn down rates, 
 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) metrics, 
 Technical risk metrics, 
 Engineering staffing metrics, 
 System complexity, and 
 Technology maturity. 
 The data above is collected to form a historical baseline of program performance of 
similar or related programs (later ALI phases would incorporate current program data to 
predict future performance).  The focus of early research has been associated with the 
technical metric of aircraft weight and subsequent modeling impacts of aircraft weight-
growth to program cost-growth throughout development.  This data was collected from 
historical records from the program division records.  The data was also “affinitized” or 
grouped in like-program categories to maintain relevance of analysis results.  Examples of 




wing, remotely piloted, etc.), size of program (ACAT I, II, etc.), and mission (fighter, 
transports, etc.).  In all, approximately 11 programs form the foundation for further data 
analysis. 
ALI Data Analysis 
Armed with a single dimension of ALI applicability (weight-growth versus cost-
growth), analysis has been conducted to assess what statistical methods can be applied to 
this data with confidence and with assurance that the methods are representative, relevant, 
and extensible to provide useful data to program managers.   The steps for the early “single-
factor” ALI analysis is depicted in Figure 7 and is summarized below. 
 
Figure 7. ALI Data Analysis Transforms SE Historical Metrics to Algorithmic, Leading 
Assessment of Technical Performance and Prototype ALI Tool Development 
 Test for impact (correlation)—Of several program performance impacts related 
to aircraft weight throughout development, cost growth proved to be highly 
correlated and validated and formed the basis for continued analysis. 
 Test for meaningful relationships (regression)—The ability of weight growth 
to predict cost growth was examined through several regression methods. The 
results showed significant statistical strength of using weight-growth as a cost-
growth predictor; however, the data must be segmented into major epochs of 
program development to maximize this predictive strength.  The epochs were 
separated by major design reviews (e.g., PDR, CDR, First Fight, etc.) to ensure 
predictive usefulness. 
 Derive algorithms to develop prognostics—The segmented data produced 
regression formulations with confidence and fit parameters for each epoch and 
program types.  These formulations established historical performance baselines. 
 Validate models against all programs—The data was validated against the 
affinitized groupings to ensure that the regression models derived above 
provided an accurate model of historical performance of the programs they 
modeled. 
 Develop “tripwire” boundaries prediction zones—Although a prediction 
algorithm was considered useful, it was considered most valuable if cost-growth 




adjusted based upon the interest of the program manager, but as a minimum, 
would be set at cost-growth conditions that would alert the program manager and 
leadership of severe program trouble (e.g., 10 USC 2433 (Nunn-McCurdy) 
limits).  These limits were segmented into classic color zones (or “tripwires”) of 
assessment (e.g., red, yellow, and green). 
 Build tool for user validation—The predictive regression-based formulation 
was combined with the tripwire assessments/graphics to prototype a user tool for 
inputting and assessing their program based upon current weight estimates and 
comparing their current weight estimate (at a particular time of the development) 
and comparing to historical performance of similar programs to provide a 
predictor of program cost-growth performan 
Early Single-factor ALI Feedback 
The user community (program mangers of NAVAIR acquisitions) were presented the 
output of the tool is depicted in Error! Reference source not found. to obtain feedback 
related to ALI concept and utility.  The graphic is described in the following paragraph.   
 
Figure 8. ALI Prototype Tool Provides Cost-growth Prediction Based Upon Similar Program 
Histories as well as Status of Subject Program 
(Denq, Hein & Gilliard, 2009) 
The starting “dot” in the yellow zone is the current assessment of an example 
program.  The solid black line is the predicted cost growth of the program based upon where 
the current program is in comparison to historical performance of similar programs.  The 
dotted lines are confidence bounds of the prediction.  This graph, once again, is the 
depiction of the impact of a single ALI (weight growth) on program cost growth.  Early 
program manager and lead engineer feedback revealed that this graph, although informative 
to a degree, generates more questions than it answers.  Some examples include: 
 If single-factor ALI analysis predicts cost growth, what other factors may also 
impact cost growth? 
 What are the impact comparisons among single ALIs?  
 Do other ALIs “mutual couple” to cause cost growth? 
 What do I (PM/SE) do about it? 
 How much is my program like historical programs? 




Moving to Multi-factor ALIs 
The most generalized feedback from program managers and systems engineers to 
the early single-factor ALI concept is that it needs (1) to consider more ALIs, (2) incorporate 
their interactions, and (3) algorithmically combine their influences into an integrated ALI 
metric for the program.  Similar to EVM integration of cost, schedule, and achievements 
(milestone completion) into a few key metrics, ALI needs to work toward that goal.  The 
process for moving to an integrated ALI output is shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9. Single-factor ALI Analyses Are First Steps to an Integrated ALI Output 
The single-factor ALI analysis and formulations are shown in the center of the 
diagram.  They are analyzed individually and then, after model validation, are integrated to 
provide a more “global” ALI metric.  The repeated analysis steps are depicted in Figure 10.  
This process has led to an attempt at an integrated, multi-factor ALI approach that is 






Figure 10. Parallel and Independent Single-factor ALIs Lead to an Integrated ALI for the 
Program 
 
Multi-factor ALI Development 
As discussed above, single-factor ALI development and research has led to the 
current research into multi-factor ALIs.  The underlying assumption is that if a single-factor 
ALI concept was validated historically, proved some utility in prediction program 
performance, and had statistical saliencies that could be exploited in a tool, then we may be 
able to ingest multiple ALI metrics simultaneously and provide meaningful analysis using 
related statistical methods suited for multi-factor analysis.  Ongoing multi-factor ALI 
investigation (see Figure 11): 
 Retains historical data analysis of key program ALI metrics (this maintains a 
credible baseline of program performance upon which to compare programs). 
 Applies multiple regression methods. 
 Integrates user assessment of both current conditions and their predictions of 
individual ALI future performance (e.g., if your program is currently 5% over 
weight, what is your prediction of how this metric will change in the future?). 
 Applies program end-state simulations based upon historical formulation and 
user estimates.  After establishing both historical baseline and associated 
multiple regression algorithmic models, user predictions are integrated into the 
models via simulations to predict program performance, fit, and confidence limits. 





Figure 11. Multi-factor ALI Development/Research Approach  
Early graphical concepts are intended to give insights into the “mutual coupling” 
among the ALIs and their impact on the program.  Some concepts include an “interaction 
matrix” approach (Figure 12, left) showing, for example, which multiple ALIs drive program 
cost and schedule (indicated by colors) and provide insight into their possible interactions 
(inferred by their relationships vertically and horizontally).  Additionally, from multi-factor ALI 
analysis, it may be possible to depict which factors are most influential on program 
performance 
 
Figure 12. Example of Multiple Alis Influencing Program (Left) Cost and Schedule 
(Color) and Inferring Their Possible Interactions (Vertical/Horizontal 




ALI Insight into System Qualification Testing Success 
Consistent with the authors’ original goals, an NPS capstone project thesis 
investigated using the available ALI analysis data to gain insight into how programs were 
succeeding in their qualification testing (Buchanan & Jungbluth, 2010).  Their research 
indicates some promising, although weak, statistical inferences about the data and 
successful testing outcomes.  Their work sets foundations for further research discussed 
below. 
Results and Conclusions 
Although this ALI research is in the early stages, the ALI strategy, methods, and 
results discussed in this paper show promise for providing program manager and lead 
system engineer insight into the current and predicted technical success of their programs.  
This has been demonstrated through ALI data analyses, ALI user tool prototypes, and user 
acceptance testing.  
This research began with a focus on why programs fail to meet user expectations at 
delivery.  The goal is to determine what engineering metrics can be defined and analyzed to 
provide insight into success of qualification testing (e.g., operational test and evaluation, 
validation, etc.).  This goal lead us to intersect ongoing efforts related to SE ALIs that we 
determined would provide an understanding of closely related metrics and processes that 
would underpin our investigation. The ALI research is still formative and evolving and the 
following conclusions are mostly qualitative (non parametric) but help to refine further 
directions related to ALIs and original research goals.  
Data—Although there are rich data repositories available in the case of NAVAIR, the 
data can be inconsistent and incongruent.   This increases difficulty in data analysis and 
bounding uncertainty in the predictive credibility of the ALI algorithms and tools.    
Additionally, retention of data from various programs is sometimes incomplete, leading to 
statistical analysis of sparse data.  These problems are not, however, insurmountable and 
occur regularly in statistical analysis activities.   The benefit of the ALI investigation is that 
recommended ALI metrics will emerge that can be recommended to be inculcated into the 
acquisitions to enable greater future ALI fidelity, granularity, and reliability.  
Single-factor ALI analysis—The weight-growth versus cost-growth ALI analysis 
revealed that the development method was valid, provided a basis for ALI tool prototyping, 
and garnered preliminary user acceptance, understanding, suggested improvements, and 
identified ALI concept shortfalls.  The technical basis is strong; however, the most impactful 
recommendation from users was to demand multi-factor ALI methods.  
Note: When we tried a “programmatic” metric (staffing-growth versus cost-growth) as 
a comparison, the statistical predictive strength was not as strong as the technical metric of 
weight.  The resulting conclusion was that there are many external factors (re-baselining, 
inter-program staff balancing, etc.), which weakened statistical fit.  Additionally, although we 
have some interest in multi-ALI interactions with programmatic metrics, we discontinued the 
staffing investigation because it proved too parallel with programmatic metrics (i.e., EVM).   
Multi-factor analysis—These methods and analyses are in very early stages. Early 
models and processes are employing data from the same programs, leveraging single-factor 
analysis lessons learned, expanding to include multivariate statistical methods, and new 




The next steps will include actual data, validate multivariate models, and prototype a tool to 
garner user acceptance. 
ALI metric expansion—The only metric that was validated was aircraft weight and 
its growth throughout the development cycle.  More metrics still need to be developed and 
incorporated into the research. 
User acceptance—Users recognize the need for a method based upon technical 
metrics to provide predictive program performance insight.  They do not, however, want ALI 
to replicate EVM-based metrics and methods.  Additionally, they desire ALI methods to 
incorporate prediction inferences and judgments of the project engineering and 
management team to influence analytical output.  Finally, as stated earlier, user inputs 
showed a strong need to reveal mutual coupling of the multiple ALI factors, the overall 
impact to the program, and insights into how to respond, technically. 
Areas for Continuing Research 
Multi-factor ALIs—As stated above, this analysis is in the early phases and needs 
to be completed to the point of testing, validation, and user acceptance/feedback.  The next 
steps are to include ingesting actual data, validating multivariate models, and prototyping a 
tool/user interface to gain insight into user acceptance 
Total-ownership-cost control—During the conduct of this research, there is a “sea 
change” underway toward Total Ownership Cost (TOC) control at NAVAIR. This potentially 
shifts the types of ALI metrics but the fundamental single and multi-factor analysis will, most 
likely, remain viable.  The nature of a TOC data gathering, algorithm development, and tool 
may have to be reengineered to ensure customer acceptance and TOC problem relevance.  
Specifically, the following areas will need addressing: 
 What are the salient TOC assessment goals and objectives? 
 What are the ALI metrics most relevant to TOC assessment? 
 What TOC ALI human interaction interfaces would be most useful to users? 
Qualification and acceptance metrics—We will continue to investigate how ALI 
metrics (or derivatives) might be viable for also monitoring, controlling, predicting, and 
maximizing success of system qualification testing.  Expanding and defining metrics and 
methods relative to predicting and analyzing program qualification and acceptance test 
success remains a goal. 
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Abstract 
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) spends £2.6 billion per year (MoD, 2008, Section 
1.2; 2007, p. 2) on research and development (R&D) (“Defense Technology,” 2009, p. 22). 
The figure is technically correct, but it conceals more than it reveals. Of the total, the MoD 
spends around £500 million (MoD, 2006, p. 8) on laboratory research and on taking what 
emerges from the lab in its first few steps down the long road that leads eventually to mature 
technology embedded in military equipment.  Analysis based on UK National Audit Office 
(NAO) data (Stationery Office, 2006, November 24; 2008, p. 5) shows that about half of 
project timescale overruns are due to technology maturation occurring too late (Jordan & 
Dowdy, 2007, p. 16). US evidence shows that defence projects that get all their technology 
mature before the equivalent of Main Gate suffer only very small time and cost overruns 




The first hypothesis would be that funding for technology development occurs too 
late in the acquisition process, when the problems that inevitably occur have a 
disproportionate effect on project timescales and costs. However, is this construct based on 
project failings or funding process failures? To improve the outcome, could we simply 
improve the timing allocation of funds? This research examines the profile of funding as 
aligned to maturity levels of technology and system and integration readiness, and makes 
proposals on the improvements that could be made. 
Keywords: Finance, acquisition, maturity, maturity levels, timescales, system 
readiness, audit, MoD; ministry of defence; defence, defense, systems engineering, Dstl; 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, National Audit Office, NAO. 
When is the Best Time to Spend—Globally? 
Organisations that procure products or services through contracts are routinely 
involved in costing and estimation efforts. Defence Acquisition is a long-term activity, and 
the success or failure of the endeavor can, in part, be related to the stability of the aims and 
contributory components.  
Economic growth has been driven by globalisation over the last 30 or more years, 
generating networks of connections and interdependencies between the major economic 
powers that are unprecedented in extent and pervasiveness (DCDC, 2009). The economic 
landscape has evolved rapidly with the demise of centrally planned economies, such as the 
Soviet Union; the rise of Asian economies, particularly China, which has embraced a market 
aware philosophy; and the maturation of the European Union as a cohesive economic 
market. These changes have created a multi-faceted economic landscape that is intimately 
interconnected and influential. 
Over the last 30 years, the global economy has grown at a trend rate62 of 3-4% (IMF, 
2008), and output has seen a greater-than four-fold increase. Economic growth, combined 
with the continuing rise in the global population, will intensify the demand for natural 
resources, minerals, and energy. It will continue to be uneven, fluctuating over time and 
between regions (Goldman Sachs, 2007). This global economic context places more 
pressure on all dimensions of UK government funding, and with the economic recession 
being felt in the homeland environment, defence focus shifts from operational reach to 
border security. Operational reach is the defensive objective of nations in times of affluence; 
border security is the focus during recession.  
The IMF considers there have been five global recessions in the last 30 years (IMF, 
2008). Global economic recessions will happen over the next few decades, and 
governments are likely to respond to them with protectionist policies, designed to shield their 
own economies and workforces from global competition. The global recession that started in 
2008 is illustrative of the likely response to, and effects of, future recessions. One outcome 
of a global recession is an expected increase in the incidence of poverty, which will promote 
grievance and dissatisfaction among those who suffer economic hardship, in turn breeding 
political violence, criminality, societal conflict and the destabilization of states and regions 
unable to cope. This type of economic crisis will produce pressures on government finances 
that, considered in isolation, will place downward pressure on global defence spending.  
                                                
62 Trend economic growth refers to average growth of an economy over a cycle of expansion and contraction. It is a moving average. Global recession is defined as 
annual world growth (based on purchasing-power-parity weights) falling below 3%. By that measure, four periods since 1980 qualify: 1980-1984, 1990-1993, 1998, 2001-




In September 2009 (“Britain’s Sharp,” 2009), the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer 
forecasted that in April 2010 public borrowing would exceed 12% of GDP. This projection 
would give Britain the biggest debt build-up between 2007 and 2014 in the G7 economies. 
Gaining credibility will require clear targets to cut the deficit, together with detailed and 
transparent plans on how to achieve them. A crucial decision will be the mix of spending 
cuts and tax rises. In the UK, public spending represents close to 50% of GDP, according to 
the Treasury. In the March 2010 UK Budget, the plan proposed was to halve the level of 
borrowing, to 5.2& of national income, by 2013-14 (“Economic,” 2010). The chancellor 
stated that spending plans from 2011 will be “very tough—the toughest for decades,” but 
refused to outline how this will affect public services, except to say that the Government 
would “protect spending on those frontline public services on which we all depend.” The 
annual funding review effects all government departments and has inter-related impacts on 
the services and support that can be offered. In the US, the current focus has been on the 
US health systems and associated reforms. In the UK, balancing the books and the 
impending election process has raised the level of scrutiny and resulted in long-term plans 
being put on hold until the political direction and stability have been secured (Arron, Gale & 
Orszag, 2004). 
In March 2010, UK expenditure per government department can be represented as a 
pie chart showing the key funded government departments (Figure 1) (“HM Treasury,” 
2010). The allocation of spending to functions is largely based on the United Nations’ 
Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) guidelines. Other expenditures 
include general public services, including international services, recreation, culture and 
religion, public service pensions, plus spending yet to be allocated and some accounting 
adjustments. The Defence spending is £40 billion, which represents 5.6% of the £704 billion 
total. 
 




Looking at the global and national data, it could be argued that “no” it is not the time 
to spend. Any expenditure commitments at this time will disappear into the deficit arrears, 
and any actual gains will be lost. However, funding streams need to be spent to ensure that 
the position does not regress, and so investment is required to ensure the maintenance of 
current position and level of capability and service.  
In the current global and national climate, it is not a good time to spend. However, to 
maintain capability in defence and other sectors, spending has to be sustained to ensure 
stability and maintenance. In terms of defence projects, some projects are pending 
approval, some projects are committed by still under development and some projects are 
further down the in-service and support stage. For committed projects, the global and 
national situation can be considered as relevant, but not a significant issue. The national 
situation will determine the size of the overall budget, but how and when it is spent is an 
issue for the project team. Systems engineers often serve as technical points of contact 
throughout the entire system lifecycle (Smartt & Ferreira, 2010); as such, they are one of the 
critical repositories of project life knowledge, technically and financially (Valerdi, Rieff, 
Roedler, Wheaton & Wang, 2007). Using the natural holistic skills of a systems engineer, 
and applying those inherent skills to costing, has been the basis of this research. 
To date, there has been significant research into through life costing (Haskins, 
Forsberg & Krueger, 2007; Valerdi & Miller, 2007),63 and the projection of through life 
implications is based on existing data, extrapolated to a conclusion. This method is well 
documented and appealing, as it reinforces the view that we can corporately learn from 
experience and that costing is achieved within a defined set of rules. It, therefore, follows 
that if we can define the rules, then we can define the outcome (Stationery Office, 2007; 
2008). This research examines the project costing profile, as related to three measures of 
readiness that are well defined in the systems domain. These three were selected because 
they represent a global viewpoint and are used in a number of multinational and multilingual 
programmes. 
Optimum Technology, System and Integration Investment Date 
Technology assessment of a complex system requires the assessment of all of its 
systems, sub-systems and components. Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) can be used 
to determine the current component maturity. Although broadly similar, different international 
agencies use different definitions for TRLs; the most common definitions are those used by 
the Department of Defense (DoD) (DoD, 2006) and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) (Mankins, 1995) (Table 1 and Figure 2). In Europe, the European 
Space Agency’s (ESA) definitions of TRLs are often used as contractual baseline criteria for 
project acceptance (ESA, n.d.). A TRL calculator has been developed for the United States Air 
Force by Nolte et al. (2003). As with all assessments, this TRL calculator provides a 
snapshot of technology maturity at a given point in time. The Technology Program 
Management Model (TPMM) was developed by the United States Army by Craver et al. 
(2006). The TPMM is a TRL-gated high-fidelity activity model that can be used as a 
management tool to assist in planning, managing, and assessing technologies for 
successful technology transition. The model provides a core set of activities, including 
systems engineering and program management tasks, that are tailored to the technology 
development and management goals.  
 
                                                




















Figure 2. NASA TRL Diagram 
System Readiness Levels (SRLs) (“What Are,” 2009) have been developed as a 
project management tool to capture evidence, and assess and communicate system 
maturity in a consistent manner to stakeholders. In the UK, SRLs define a set of nine 
maturity steps from concept to in-service across a set of systems engineering disciplines. 
Each of the SRL steps align to key outputs from systems disciplines such as Training, 
Safety and Environmental, or Reliability and Maintainability. SRLs aim to take a 
consolidated view of the essential steps needed to properly mature and deliver a complete 
supportable system to the end user. SRLs are a means of analysing key outputs of an 
equipment acquisition project, structured in such a way as to provide an understanding of 
work required to mature the project. In the UK, a matrix is used to capture these key outputs 




nine SRL steps across all relevant system disciplines, and a simple self assessment tool is 
provided (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Outline of UK SRL Matrix with a Representative Project SRL Signature Matrix 
(Applying, n.d.) 
In the generic SRL matrix, each SRL level from 1 to 9 is broken down into key 
outputs that need to be achieved for each of the systems disciplines, including Systems 
Engineering Drivers, Training, Safety and Environment, Reliability and Maintainability, 
Human Factors Integration, Software, Information Systems, Airworthiness, Project Specific 
Areas. For any project, an SRL assessment produces a “signature” rather than an absolute 
SRL figure. The signature records the variation of maturity that has been achieved across 
the systems disciplines, acknowledging that not all projects mature against the systems 
disciplines at a consistent rate. The signature shown in Figure 3 would be typical of a project 
in the Assessment phase (i.e., post Initial Gate where the target is to achieve SRL1), but 
indicates insufficient maturity to proceed to Main Gate (the target being SRL4). 
Integration levels are the next step. When brought together with TRLs and SRLs, 
Integration Readiness Levels (IRLs) provide a means of progressively measuring project 
maturity at technology, component, sub system and whole system levels. Maturity is 
measured in terms of cost, schedule and risk and should also take into consideration the 
impact of the overall system on the systems with which it is to operate, i.e., in a “system of 
systems” context. IRLs are used at a prime contractors and systems integrator level, and 
aim to support successful transition of technologies to and between acquisition partners. 
IRLs are used to support strategic, business and political progression, such as funding 
considerations (national or private), economic offsets and inter-government partnerships. 
We can consider the three (TRL, SRL, IRL) measurements as interrelated but 
independent sets of assessment, and use these assessments to build up a visual and 
numerical representation of maturity. Using the Red, Amber, Green (RAG) notation, this 
representation resembles a wall of bricks (Figure 4) and is, therefore, termed a wall matrix 
view. The lowest, and foundation levels, are the TRLs, and the number of layers relates to 
the number of key components. The next tranche are the SRLs that cover the nine key 
categories. The top, capping, level is the IRL, which can also be referred to as the System of 
System (SoS) integration level. Any project, of any complexity, can be evaluated using the 
wall matrix construct. As with any assessment, the wall matrix is linked to a specific time in 
the life of the project, and so represents a snapshot of maturity. Relating these “time now” 





Figure 4. TRL, SRL, IRL Wall Matrix Construct 
Costing Lifecycle 
The costing lifecycle is a method of project representation in which all costs arising 
from owning, operating, maintaining and disposing of a project are considered. Project costs 
take into account the initial cost, including capital, investment cost, development cost, unit 
purchase and installation cost, and future costs, including operating cost, energy cost, 
maintenance cost, capital replacement cost, financing cost and any resale salvage for 
disposal cost over the life time of a project or technology product. Any new product or 
project progresses through a sequence of stages (Figure 5). Figure 5 expresses the profile 
against an axis of sales, but the axis could equally represent investment, effort or cost. 
Using the traditional costing profile, and nesting the contribution of each of the 
stages of the UK Defence Acquisition CADMID64 lifecycle, a series of contributory peaks and 
troughs can be mapped. Using Valerdi’s results alongside similar project management 
costing models from Kerzner (2003), a lifecycle costing profile has been constructed (Figure 
6) and then roughly aligned to the UK CADMID process. Each contributory cycle has a 
peak, which represents the achievement of the aim of that stage of the lifecycle.  
There are a number of reports that relate to early investment, resulting in lower 
overall project cost. Jorgensen and Sjoberg (2001) examined a portfolio of software 
projects, and examined error occurrences as related to overrun costs. Their results show 
early investment was associated with early development of maturity, and, as a result, 
minimum rework and lower overall project cost (Jorgensen & Molokken-Ostovold, 2004; 
Jorgensen & Grimstad, 2005; Jorgensen, 2009). Valerdi (2005) and Valerdi et al. (2007) 
constructed a cost modeling tool that they validated against industrial projects. Using this 
evidence with the nested costing lifecycle, it can be concluded that contribution of funding 
                                                




prior to the peak accelerates that stage of the process; contribution after the peak ensures 
appropriate closure of that stage and contributes to the start up of the next stage. 
The research then focused on assessing when contributory peak was reached, in 
relation to the maturity levels, with the premise that investment prior to the peak was 
constructive up to the peak point, at which point it was better to invest in the next ascending 






















Costing Case Studies 
Using historical cost and progress data, a number of projects have been examined. 
The cost data has been sourced from UK National Audit Office (NAO) reports (Stationery 
Office, 2006, November 24, p. 14; 2008, p. 5; 2006, p. 57; 2007a, p. 4; 2007b, p. 6,313; 
2003) to minimize supplier interpretation, and selective accounting. The project data has 
also been sourced from NAO reports alongside other open source publications. 
Unlike other studies, access to data was not the issue; the data was in abundance. 
The real issue was in consistent interpretation from the differing types of source document 
and in the maturity assessments, which were based on technical reports and publications. 
For the purposes of this openly published paper, the case studies have been deliberately 
censured. All the source data is available openly, but some has been interpreted in the 
context of information that is privileged to the UK MoD. 
During the period August 2009 and March 2010, twelve projects were researched for 
source data. The research related to gaining published material that could be assessed 
against the costing and the three maturity criteria. The aim was to provide source data that 
could be validated by the authors and by a technical judgment panel of engineers and 
scientist proficient with the UK acquisition lifecycles and level assessments. The panel was 
sourced from colleagues with Dstl, who have familiarity with the assessment process and 
minimal knowledge or involvement in the selected projects. The projects were assessed 
against their known timeline, the theoretical costing lifecycle, published costs and 
associated panel TRL, SRL, IRL assessments. Each project was assessed at various points 
in its lifecycle. The number of assessment points varied from two to twelve. Larger, long-
term projects were replete with published data and so were assessed at multiple points; for 
some smaller projects, data was only available at two points. For each project, a consistent 
selection of components was assessed for TRL. The TRLs, the nine aspects of SRL and the 
capping IRL were then discussed using the source data and assessed on a wall matrix by 
the panel. 
Once a timeline position and an associated “RAG” wall matrix had been established, 
the average TRL, SRL, IRL score was calculated and plotted against the known cost curve 
of the project. Some plot points were on an ascending line, e.g., prior to peak, and some 
were on the declining line. In total, twenty eight wall matrix plots were constructed and 
associated with a costing timeline. Some of the projects were reported on for three 
consecutive years of NAO assessment so that a robust element of progression could be 





Figure 7. Consolidated Plot of Acquisition Lifecycle Stages versus Readiness Levels 
Matrices 
Overview, Conclusions and Further Work 
After reviewing and consolidating the data, a table was produced comparing the 
acquisition lifecycle phases of CADMID against the set of points of significance for the three 
readiness levels, extracting for the wall matrix (Table 2). From the data, the optimum 
investment date could not be established, but a limit point was found. Investments in a 
particular stage added benefit to a TRL, SRL, IRL limit point; investment after that point was 
required to ensure project progression, but did not represent the peak exchange. 
Table 2. Consolidated Wall Matrix and Timeline Table of Results 
 TRL point of significance 
SRL point of 
significance 
IRL point of 
significance 
CONCEPT < 3.2 < 2.4 N/A 
ASSESSMENT < 5.6 < 6.5 < 1.8 
DEMONSTRATION < 7.6 < 7.8 < 4.4 
MANUFACTURE < 8.1 < 8.4 < 8.2 
IN-SERVICE N/A N/A < 9.0 
There was a large variation in the sets of TRL, SRL and IRL data that will be 
examined in further studies. The source of variation could be related to source data error, 




groundbreaking atomic physics as opposed to next generation vehicle development. 
Expanding the analysis to a wider pool to projects would refine the technique and increase 
the robustness of the “points of significance” as well as reduce the statistical effects. The 
use of one technical judgment panel was convenient for this stage of the research but could 
introduce experimental errors over time. Familiarity and prior knowledge of previous results 
started to bias conversations on some of the latter assessments of larger projects. 
Looking at the global and national economic situation, the competition for 
government funding is becoming more intense, and departments such as the MoD are 
under increasing pressure to deliver optimum results against investment. This investment is 
not just what to invest in, but also when to invest. The extant UK MoD assessment criteria 
include TRL, SRL and IRL decision points, so this data is already available. By mapping the 
optimum investment point against the TRL, SRL, and IRL, a wall matrix could guide the 
diversion of funds into projects up to key points, which would result overall in maximizing the 
outcome benefit to UK Defence. 
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Abstract 
With support from the Naval Postgraduate School and government/industry 
partnerships, the Systems Development & Maturity Laboratory (SD&ML) at Stevens Institute 
of Technology has successfully developed a systems maturity measure (i.e., System 
Readiness Level [SRL]) and supporting optimization models for inclusion in a Systems 
Earned Readiness Management methodology.  We now believe it is time to spiral back to 
the beginning of the original developments of the SRL to enhance fundamental capabilities 
of assessing system maturity in order to address some recurring issues to its application.  
That is, systems have variants in their physical architecture that realize certain functionality 
and capability by which trade-off decisions are made to find a satisficing solution for a 
deployable system. This paper enhances previously developed methodologies by 
addressing this fundamental question, “What are the trades-off in functionality, capability, 
cost, schedule, and maturity that will allow the deployment of a less-than-fully mature 
system that can still satisfy specific needs of the warfighter?”  To answer this question, we 
formulate a capability-specific SRL and use multi-dimensional component importance 
analysis to identify which components of the system should receive the most application of 






With the support of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and government/industry 
partnerships, the Systems Development & Maturity Laboratory (SD&ML) at Stevens Institute 
of Technology has successfully: 
5. Developed a methodology for determining a system’s maturity using the 
System Readiness Level (SRL) scale (Sauser et al., 2008); 
6. Used SRL to formulate two optimization models—SRLmax (Sauser, Ramirez-
Marquez, et al., 2008) and SCODmin (Magnaye et al., 2010)—for predicting 
cost, schedule, and maturity performance, and 
7. Proposed a methodology that combines items a and b into an approach 
called Systems Earned Readiness Management (SERM) (Magnaye et al., 
2009). 
During the research that has fostered these developments, the SD&ML has 
maintained a spiral development approach where we have worked closely with industry and 
government to refine and implement our research in order to maintain its relevance and 
rigor.  The outputs of our research to date have focused on the analysis of systems that 
were meant to deliver a single capability.  We now believe it is time to spiral back to the 
beginning of the life cycle (see Figure 1) to enhance fundamental capabilities of the SRL in 
order to address a situation where the system under development is intended to be multi-
functional and is needed sooner rather than later by the warfighter. 
Such systems are becoming the norm given the urgency of the armed conflicts that 
we are currently fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against terrorism.  However, the desire to 
deliver capabilities immediately has to be moderated by the reality that resources are tight, 
such that where possible, we must deliver systems that can accomplish multiple things in 
the field.  Thus, we are confronted with the situation where complexity is increased by multi-





Figure 1. Research Spiral Development Plan 
Since these systems are to provide multiple functionalities and capabilities, their 
complexity surpasses that of systems providing only single functionality with single 
capability. In order to secure the intended capabilities, the US government mandates that 
the Key Performance Parameters (KPP) must be specified in the Capability Development 
Document (CDD) and Capability Production Document (CPD), and be verified by testing and 
evaluation or analysis (DAU, 2009). According to the DAU Manual, Key Performance 
Parameters (KPP) are “those attributes or characteristics of a system that are considered 
critical or essential to the development of an effective military capability and those attributes 
that make a significant contribution to the characteristics of the future joint force as defined 
in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO).” 
However, development of methodologies that can accurately predict the ability of 
systems to satisfy KPP while development is still ongoing poses challenges to the 
acquisition community. Volkert (2009) proposed an approach that used System Readiness 
Level (SRL) as the indicator of the level of capability that is being realized.  It answered the 
question of how to predict the achieved ability of a system while its development is 
underway. The objective of doing so is to monitor the system developmental progress and 
identify issues in a timely manner should there be any gap (e.g., schedule, cost, etc.) 
between the preset plan and the accomplishments. The information gathered from his 
approach is very important because when it is coupled with further analysis, corresponding 
decisions can be made and measures can be taken so as to prevent the issues from getting 
worse.  However, although Volkert’s approach can provide timely data about the progress of 
the system, it does not address the question of how to solve development problems (should 
there be any), and thus is unable to prescribe methodologies for prioritizing resources 
allocation.  Specifically, as problems arise or are anticipated, the program manager must be 
able to determine which of the system’s components should receive resources based on 




This paper proposes such a methodology based on component importance analysis. 
We use the term capability to represent both the “capability” and the “physical structure of 
technology packages whose combination enables the capability.  The paper reviews 
Volkert’s approach for measuring the achieved KPPs in a system under development, and 
then proceeds by proposing three component importance measures. A system with notional 
data is presented to illustrate the application of the proposed IMs. The paper ends with the 
conclusion the exploration of future research. 
Methodology for Measuring Achieved Capability 
In the procurement and management of the Mission Packages (MPs) for a system, 
the designated program office and manager, such as the PMS420 for the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) program, requires insight into the progress of the Development Program Offices’ 
(DPOs) constituent mission systems and knowledge about where they stand in terms of 
providing anticipated performance, especially the KPPs of the system. These insights are 
critical for requisite oversight and for management of development risks. However, the issue 
is how program managers accurately can predict the ability of the system to satisfy KPPs 
while development and integration are proceeding.  
Previously, DPOs were able to use Technical Performance Measures (e.g., 
Technology Readiness Levels [TRL]) to monitor the developmental status of specific 
technologies. With the development of complex multi-capability systems, such as the LCS, 
understanding the status of technologies are no longer sufficient for managers to gain the 
requisite level of knowledge on the extent to which the KPPs, as designated by the 
Capability Development Document, can be accomplished for the designated system.  
Volkert (2009) has pointed out the compounding reasons:  
1. The capabilities from the individual constituent mission systems are often 
being modified or utilized in manners different than that specified in their 
original requirement set.  Thus, their known/predicted performance may be 
different when used in a MP SoS.  
2. The constituent mission systems (capabilities) being developed by the DPOs 
are, in some cases, still maturing. This impacts the ability to determine KPP 
performance in two ways;  
a. It drives an incremental fielding of capabilities by PMS 420, meaning 
the solution set for accomplishing (full or partially) a KPP will vary over 
time.  
b. The capability delivered by the DPO may not provide the amount of 
performance anticipated/predicted by PMS 420 due to developmental 
challenges within the DPOs program.   
3. The combination of capabilities available to choose from means that the 
usage and contribution of an individual capability to the performance of a 
KPP can vary depending upon the operational employment of the system 
within a SoS.   
Therefore, for predicting the achieved proportional capability in a complex system, 
Volkert proposed an approach. Here we re-write his formula with minor changes: 




Where αC(1,2,…) represents the maximum level of performance capability the 
combination of technology packages (1, 2, …)  is expected to meet/provide. ωn represents 
the weighting factor representing the proportional level of performance expected at the 
maturity stage of n.  TC(1,2,…)n thus represents the achieved performance level of the 
capability which can contribute to the satisfaction of the KPP. The value of α would be 
expressed in the units of performance defined by the KPP while ω would be unit less.  
For ωn, Volkert suggested the use of the System Readiness Level (SRL) for the 
capability at that time. In order to differentiate this with the original SRL definition that is 
designed for assessing the development maturity of the whole system, we introduce the new 
notion of a Capability System Readiness Level (SRL_C) to measure ωn which represents 
the readiness of the Capability comprised by a specific combination of technologies and the 
integrations among them. For simplicity, for the rest of this paper, whenever SRL is 
mentioned, it means the SRL_C. 
Mathematically, the procedure for calculating the SRL_C is as follows (assuming the 
subset of n technologies from within the system, which will have to be integrated to deliver a 
capability C): 
a. Normalize the [1, 9] scale original TRLs and IRLs into (0,1) scale, and 
denote them by matrices:  





















































































Where ij jiIRL IRL= . When there is no integration between two technologies, an 
original IRL value of 0 is assigned; for integration of a technology to itself, an IRL value of 9 
is used, that is original 9iiIRL = . 
b. ITRL matrix is the product of TRL and IRL matrices:  










































































































Where mi is the number of integrations of technology i with itself and all other 
technologies, and Norm is to normalize the SRLi from (0, mi) scale to (0, 1) scale for 
consistency; i.e., Norm = diag[1/m1,1/m2, …, 1/mn]. 
a. SRL is the average of all ITRLs: 











See Sauser et al. (2008; 2010) for a more detailed description of how to 
calculate and apply the SRL. 
Component Importance Measures 
A system has variants in its physical architecture that realize certain functionality and 
capability. A systems engineer or acquisition manager would make trade-off decisions to 
find a satisficing solution for a deployable system.  Thus, in order to satisfy Key Performance 
Parameter during the development of the system, this paper proposes to perform 
component importance analysis by introducing three Importance Measures (IMs) for System 
Capability Satisficing (SCS) with respect to: TRL/IRL, cost, and labor-hours. 
SCS with Respect to TRL/IRL (IP) 
The IM of TRL/IRL evaluates the impact of a change in the development maturity of 
an component (i.e. technology or integration) on system development maturity. That is, IM 
measures the change of the SRL when the TRL or IRL of a specific component changes 
from its current value to a target value.  For example, let ( , )SRL TRL IRL denote the current SRL 
of the system, and  )|,( ii TRLTRLIRLTRLSRL =  ( )|,( ijij IRLIRLIRLTRLSRL = ) denote the 
resultant SRL when TRLi (IRLij) changes to a target maturity level )( iji IRLTRL   and all other 























IP implies the effect of change in the readiness level of a given component. A 
component for which the variation of the readiness level results in the largest variation of the 
system SRL has the highest importance.  
SCS with Respect to Cost (ICT) 
Zhang et al. (2007) suggests that classical component importance analysis ignores 
cost, and states that it is unrealistic to evaluate the importance of components without 
considering the cost. Hereby, for SRL component importance analysis, we propose to 
consider the economic factor. This is reasonable by noting that there are always situations 
where system developers have to make the investment decisions based on the comparison 
of the immediate return on the investment of dollars needed to mature components. 
Presumably, especially with a tight budget, developers allocate resources to the component 
that can result in the highest system maturity. Therefore, we propose ICT as an IM that takes 
into account the cost for maturing components to facilitate such comparisons. Since the cost 
to mature different components varies and improvements in different components have 
different effects on SRL, the IM that takes into account the development cost serves as a 
baseline to compare the investment returns from different components.  Let 
ii
TRLTRLi CTCTCT −=  denote the associated development cost for maturing TRLi from its 
current readiness level to a target level iTRL , and ijij IRLIRLij
CTCTCT −=
 denote the associated 
development cost from maturing IRLij from its current readiness level to a target level ij
IRL .  
































ICT implies the effect of the cost to mature a given component on SRL, and 
the component whose readiness improvement from the investment results in the 




SCS with Respect to Labor-Hours (ࡵࡸࡴ) 
Besides the consideration of cost, there are other situations (e.g., when only certain 
labor-hours are available) where developers care more about the return on the effort needed 
to improve components. Therefore, we propose another importance measure (ILH) that takes 
into account the associated labor-hours to upgrade the component readiness level in order 
to mature the SRL. Let ii TRLTRLi
LHLHLH −=
denote the associated development labor-hours 
for developing TRLi from its current status to a target level iTRL , and ijij
IRLIRLij LHLHLH −=  
denote the associated development labor-hours for developing IRLij from its current status to 































ILH implies the effect of the labor-hours or effort to mature a given component on 
SRL.  The component whose readiness improvement from the investment of labor-hours 
results in the largest gain of SRL has the highest importance.  
Notional Example 
The following example was used in Forbes et al. (2009) to illustrate the application of 
SRL. The system is designed to perform six capabilities. For the illustration of the proposed 
methodology in this paper, it is assumed that the mine-detection capability that is enabled by 
the combination of the shaded components is the KPP of interest. This capability has six 
components with six integrations among them, and the corresponding TRLs and IRLs are 
shown in Figure 2. 
The current capability SRL for the Mine-Detection is 0.622. According to the 
definition of SRL (Magnaye et al., 2009), this value indicates that the capability is 
undergoing the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. During this phase, the 
major assignments are to develop system capability or (increments thereof), reduce 
integration and manufacturing risk, ensure operational supportability, minimize logistics 
footprint, implement human systems integration, design for production, ensure affordability 
and protection of critical program information, and demonstrate system integration, 





Figure 2. Diagram of a System with Components Shaded for the KPP 
Since we are proposing to take into account the resource consumption (cost and 
labor-hour) in the component importance evaluation, Tables 1 and 2 show these values for 
maturing the components (i.e., TRL and IRL) of the capability of interest.  The cost is in 
thousands of dollars ($1,000), and the effort is in labor-hours. For example, it requires 599 
hours of effort and $980,000 to move Technology 1 from level 7 to level 8. It is the obligation 
of the program manager to obtain these estimates of resource consumption in reality. To 





Table 1. Resource Consumption for IRL Upgrade
 Tech 1 Tech 2 Tech 3 Tech 4 Tech 5 Tech 6 
TRL Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time 
1 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
2 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
3 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
4 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
5 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
6 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
7 $0 0 $579 453 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
8 $980 599 $157 177 $973 541 $459 154 $443 551 $410 580 
9 $820 290 $918 267 $404 582 $592 341 $490 304 $871 358 




Table 2. Resource Consumption for IRL Upgrade 
 
With the proposed component Importance Measures for IP, ICT, and ILH, this paper 
considers two scenarios for each measure to identify the importance of components towards 
achieving the KPP in question. While keeping all the other components constant, the two 
scenarios are to advance the current maturity of a component to (1) the next level, which is 
1+= ii TRLTRL or 1+= ijij IRLIRL , and (2) increasing to its highest level, which is 9=iTRL  
or 9=ijIRL .  
Increasing Component Readiness by One Level 
By increasing the component maturity by one level, Table 3 shows the results of the 
calculation. For the IP component importance, Technology 2 is the most important 
component whose change in maturity has the largest impact on the maturity of the 
capability. When Technology 2 is increased by one level, the Capability SRL is upgraded 
from its current value of 0.622 to 0.646, and gives an IP of 1.039. If the objective is to have 
the most increase in Capability SRL if only one component can be changed by one level, 
then Technology 2 is the most important one. The second and third most important 
components identified are Technologies 5 and 6, with an IP of 1.031 and 1.021, respectively.
 1,2 2,3 2,4 2,5 4,5 5,6 
ITRL Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time Cost Time 
1 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
2 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
3 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
4 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
5 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
6 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0 0 
7 $0 0 $754 414 $968 509 $317 524 $0  $0 0 
8 $906 478 $382 90 $159 490 $853 563 $613 392 $468 551 
9 $983 280 $735 220 $648 248 $648 147 $374 370 $237 503 




Table 3. Component Importance for the Scenario of Increasing by One Level 
For the ICT component importance, Technology 5 is the most importance with an ICT 
of 4.3*10-5 indicating that the capability SRL will be increased by 4.3*10-5 for each dollar 
spent on maturing this technology.  When considering budget allocation from a perspective 
of maturing the capability, Technology 5 is the most cost-effective component.  The second 
and third most important components are Technologies 2 and 6. 
Analyzing the ILH component importance in the same way, we found that technology 
4, with an ILH of 7.9*10-5 has the most impact on capability. The capability SRL will be 
upgraded by 7.9*10-5 for every labor-hour spent on maturing this technology. When 
considering effort allocation from a perspective of maturing the capability, Technology 4 is 
the most effort-effective component.  The second and third most important components are 
Technologies 2 and 5. 
Figure 3 puts together the component importance evaluation from applying the three 
IMs to the capability of the system. The left vertical axis is the scale for IP, and the right for 
ICT and ILH. Black bars represent the IP importance with respect to the importance factor of 
TRL/IRL for the corresponding component, white bars for the ICT importance with respect to 
cost, and grey bar for the ILH importance with respect to effort. The higher the bar, the more 
important is that component with respect to the importance factor represented by the 
corresponding color.  
Therefore, for the scenario of increasing by one level, Technologies 2, 5 and 6 are 
relatively more important than the other components with respect to TRL/IRL; Technologies 
5, 2 and 6 are relatively more important than others with respect to cost; Technologies 4, 2 
and 5 are relatively more important than others with respect to effort. When all three 
importance factors are considered simultaneously, Technologies 2, 4 and 5 are comparably 
more important components for the capability development within the system. Furthermore, 
Figure 3 implies, in general, that technologies are more important than integrations based 





SRL IP IP Rank ICT ICT Rank ILH ILH Rank
1 7 0.634 1.0195 5 1.2E-5 8 2.0E-5 8 
2 6 0.646 1.0390 1 4.2E-5 2 5.4E-5 2 
3 7 0.634 1.0189 6 1.2E-5 9 2.2E-5 6 
4 7 0.634 1.0197 4 2.7E-5 4 7.9E-5 1 







6 7 0.635 1.0207 3 3.1E-5 3 2.2E-5 4 
1,2 7 0.631 1.0146 8 1.0E-5 11 1.9E-5 10 
2,3 6 0.631 1.0146 9 1.2E-5 10 2.2E-5 5 
2,4 6 0.629 1.0112 11 7.2E-6 12 1.4E-5 11 
2,5 6 0.628 1.0096 12 1.9E-5 6 1.1E-5 12 












Figure 3. Component Importance Comparison for Increasing by One level 
Fully Maturing Components 
For the scenario of increasing the component to its highest maturity level, Table 4 
shows the results for considering each importance factor. Technology 2 is the most 
important component for all three factors, indicating the significant impact of fully maturing 
this technology on the maturity of the capability of the system. Therefore, resources must be 
prioritized towards the development of Technology 2 so as to ensure the satisfaction of the 
KPP of this system. 
For the consideration of importance factor of TRL/IRL, Technology 5 and integration 
2, 3 are the second and third most important components. Technology 5 and Integration 5, 6 
are the second and third most important with respect to developmental cost. Technologies 4 
and 5 are the second and third most important with respect to developmental effort. It should 
be noted here that some integrations also stand as very important components for maturing 
the capability to satisfy the KPP of the system.  
Again, results of component importance calculation with respects to all three factors 










SRL IP IP Rank ICT ICT Rank ILH ILH Rank
1 7 0.646 1.0390 6 1.3E-5 9 2.7E-5 6 
2 6 0.695 1.1171 1 4.4E-5 1 8.1E-5 1 
3 7 0.646 1.0377 7 1.7E-5 6 2.1E-5 9 
4 7 0.647 1.0394 5 2.3E-5 4 4.9E-5 2 






6 7 0.648 1.0413 4 2.0E-5 5 2.7E-5 5 
1,2 7 0.640 1.0291 10 9.6E-6 12 2.4E-5 7 
2,3 6 0.649 1.0437 3 1.5E-5 8 3.8E-5 4 
2,4 6 0.643 1.0337 9 1.2E-5 10 1.7E-5 11 
2,5 6 0.640 1.0288 11 9.8E-6 11 1.5E-5 12 






5,6 7 0.644 1.0347 8 3.1E-5 3 2.0E-5 10 
 





The complexity of developing systems that provide multiple functionalities and 
capabilities poses challenges to systems engineering managers. One of challenges is how 
to predict the development progress of the KPPs, and another one is how to leverage the 
allocation of resources to develop the Key Performance Parameter of interest. Volkert 
(2009) suggested a method for predicting the KPP development progress with the use of 
SRL. Based on his method, this paper proposes an approach for performing component 
importance analysis to identify the contributions of maturing components towards the 
maturity of a capability.  Using their contributions as a guide, components can be ranked.  
The ranking can then serve as a guide for allocating resources when they are constrained.  
With the component importance quantified and identified, managers can make use of the 
information to prioritize available resources to the more important components, and thus to 
satisfy the preset development expectations. 
Since TRL/IRL, developmental cost and effort are the major factors for maturing a 
system, and this paper proposes three corresponding importance measures (IMs). The 
application of these IMs to a notional example shows that the components’ importance can 
be identified and distinguished. It was found that for this particular example, technology 
components are generally more important than integrations.  This may be a reflection of the 
fact that the development of technologies usually starts first and integrations are considered 
later. However, a lot of systems cannot wait for integration until all technologies are 
completely matured. Therefore, even though development of integration may lag behind the 
development of technology, it is necessary to develop them in a parallel way. How the 
requirement of parallel development and implication from component importance analysis 
can jointly establish developmental strategy for determining resource allocation poses a 
question for future research. 
Another fact to be noted from the definition and application of these IMs is that the 
component importance is identified based on the current development maturity status. What 
will importance rank change if the components that were identified to be very important have 
been matured? Will a spiral methodology be needed to address component importance for 
the long system development life cycle? Future research is needed to investigate these 
problems. 
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Abstract 
Effective and efficient DoD acquisition programs require the analysis of a wide range 
of materiel alternatives. Alternative diversity, difficulties in selecting metrics and measuring 
performance, and other factors make the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) difficult. The 
benefits of alternatives should be included in AoA, but cost estimates predominate most 
AoA processes. Incorprating benefits into AoA is particularly difficult because of the 
intangible nature of many important benefits. The current work addresses the need to 
improve the use of benefits in AoA by building a system dynamics model of a military 
operation and integrating it with the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology. The 
synergies may be able to significantly improve the accuracy of KVA estimates in the AoA 
process. A notional mobile weapon system was modeled and calibrated to reflect four 
weaponized Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Modeling a hypothetical AoA for upgrading 
one of the UAV indicated that there were potentially significant synergies that can increase 
the number of alternatives that could be analyzed, establishing common units of benefit 
estimates for an AoA, improved reliability of an AoA, and improved justification of AoA 
results. These can improve alternative selection, thereby improving final materiel 






The US defense acquisition process is initiated by the Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS), which is one of the three major decision support 
systems used in the DoD to interconnect and arrive at new warfighting capability. The JCIDS 
formulates force requirements with a “top down” approach that serves as both a Joint Force 
integrative process and one that can also hierarchically decompose the complexities of the 
battle spaces and their critical mission elements. It must also be aligned with the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) funding process as a way to 
descend from the strategic to the tactical in acquisition programs and budgets (CJCSI 
3170.01G, 2009). JCIDS uses Capability Based Assessments (CBA) to validate capability 
gaps, to discover solutions such as those addressed by non-materiel-type changes to 
doctrine, organization, training, leadership & education, personnel, or facilities, or to pursue 
materiel solutions. Essential to CBA subprocesses is the knowledge of various functional 
warfighting Joint Capability Areas and how those communities operate within a joint 
paradigm. Functional Capability Boards are organized around top-tier functional areas such 
as Force Application, Logistics, etc.  
Once needs are specifically derived in an area, and it is ascertained that they can 
only be addressed by new materiel, the acquisition community is still often left with either a 
variety of system types or technical approaches within a particular system type to fully 
address that capability need. An in-depth Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) helps sponsors and 
program managers compare options. Examples include manned or unmanned aircraft 
versus a missile, chemical energy versus kinetic energy kill mechanisms, etc. In the past, 
these have also been called Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses, and cost-
effectiveness analyses—all variants of a Business Case Analysis.  
The focus of the current work is on improving the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 
process that is used to make these major acquisition decisions. We will demonstrate the use 
of a system dynamics modeling approach that incorporates common units of benefits 
parameters using the KVA methodology and the potential improvements that might result in 
an AoA. 
Problem Description 
In typical weapon system acquisition programs, there is a point where an AoA is 
conducted to select the most viable and cost-effective materiel solution, so that it may be 
pursued into advanced development and production. Often, a selection for advanced 
technical development among competitive system prototypes is needed—a practice that has 
recently become official DoD acquisition policy, but is not a new idea (USD(AT&L) memo, 
September 19, 2007, Subj: Prototyping and Competition). 
System concepts are further clarified during the Materiel Solutions Analysis phase 
and the accompanying AoA process. As part of these processes, programs move toward 
several kinds of evaluative cost comparisons that formulate costs estimates across a 
notional life cycle. In these early stages, programs use analogous and parametric cost 
estimation techniques. Parameters of system performance and key system characteristics 
are selected from technical and operational inputs. Usually, several Key Performance 
Parameters included in the Initial Capability Document are used in the AoA to quantify 
points of differentiation.  
 Simulations help address uncertainty across likely operational contingencies (Ford & 




risks should be accounted for, but costs predominate most analyses because, for major 
weapon systems, they can be huge. Not only must research and development costs be 
considered, but also the production costs, and, beyond that, all of the operating costs of 
spares, diagnostics, maintenance, tools, training manuals, etc., must be estimated.  
While the emphasis is clearly on cost in these stages, operational effectiveness must 
also be considered because that is where benefits are realized. Current guidance does not 
provide a method for estimating benefits in common units. Some feel that the emphasis is 
disproportionately on cost without enough emphasis on benefits. In current guidance (e.g., 
the GAO’s Cost Estimation Guide, 2009, p. 35) benefits are primarily in the form of cost 
avoidance or cost savings. Clearly, these are not equivalent to normal estimates of benefits 
in the business world where revenue is the primary indicator of benefit and is not derived 
from the denominator or cost side of the equation. Monetizing benefits as some form of cost 
savings/avoidance leads to a slippery slope where the only indicator of value, or numerator 
in a productivity equation, such as return on investment (ROI), is a derivative of the 
denominator, i.e., cost. Such predilections inevitably lead to the lowest cost alternatives, 
which may not provide the highest benefits.  
Research Focus 
Benefits, in common units, should be included in AoA to enable higher fidelity 
comparisons among alternatives on the basis of value and not just cost. But how can 
sponsors and program managers best valuate very real and important but intangible 
benefits such as combat effectiveness, survivability, or national security? Lacking a credible 
ability to quantify such subjective or intangible benefits of the capabilities of a system type 
(or technical alternative) is a serious omission in any rigorous analysis of alternatives. The 
third author’s experience includes several recent examples that illustrate the need for more 
than a conventional cost effectiveness analysis to defend a program requirement, or a 
system parameter of technical capability. Often, a particular system parameter of capability 
(e.g., weight, C-130 transportability, vertical take-off and landing) become a metric of 
program life and death, but with notably sparse articulation of empirical benefit to the 
customer/end user. 
The Case of the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapon System  
The Javelin anti-tank weapon system was, when it was conceptualized, merely 
named after its requirement as the Advanced Anti-Armor Weapon System–Medium (AAWS–
M). In 1987-89,the US Army tested three competing technologies to fulfill the operational 
need for a one-man-portable anti-armor weapon system in the medium range (1,000–2,000 
meter) category, and replace its aging and ineffective DRAGON weapon system. Principally, 
the weapon was to do the following: be able to defeat current and projected threat armored 
vehicles (including tanks), have a maximum range of at least 2,000 meters, weigh no more 
than 20.5 kg (with under 15.5 kg being desirable), have the ability to be fired from enclosed 
spaces, and be able to engage armored vehicles under cover or in hull defilade. The US 
Marine Corps agreed to these requirements, promising to pay for production items, but not 
to fund research and development. 
In August of 1986, “Proof of Principle” contracts of $30 million each were awarded to 
three competing contractor teams, spanning a 27-month period (the phase we now call 
“Technology Development”) to develop the technologies and conduct a “fly-off” missile 
competition. Each offered the needed capability solutions with differing technologies. Ford 




Hughes Aircraft teamed with Boeing to offer a fiber-optic guided missile. Texas Instruments 
teamed with Martin-Marietta, offering an imaging infra-red (I2R) or forward looking infra-red 
(FLIR) missile system. Each candidate system also offered some specific operational 
advantages and disadvantages that were almost impossible to quantify in terms of cost: 
 The Ford/Loral Laser Beam Rider required an exposed gunner and man-in-loop 
throughout its rapid flight. It was cheapest at an estimated $90,000 “cost per kill,” 
a figure comprised not only of average production unit cost estimates but also 
reliability and accuracy estimates. It was fairly effective in terms of potential 
combat utility, with diminishing probability-of-hit at increasing range. 
 The Hughes/Boeing Fiber-Optic guided prototype enabled an unexposed gunner 
(once launched) and also required man-in-loop throughout its slower flight. It was 
costlier, but less affected by range accuracy with its automatic lock-on and 
guidance in its terminal stage of flight, and even offered target switching. It was 
also more gunner training (learning) intensive, but could attack targets from 
above where their armor was thinnest. 
 The FLIR prototype offered completely autonomous “fire and forget” flight to 
target after launch, was perceived as both costliest and technologically riskiest. It 
would be easiest to train and would be effective to maximum ranges by means of 
its target acquisition sensor and guidance packages. It was an outgrowth of a 
1980 initiative by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) 
called Tank Breaker that also used “top attack” as a more effective means of 
armored target defeat. 
1988 was a busy year for the AAWS-M industry contractors, as well as the 
government acquirers and program sponsors. All three candidate teams engaged with finally 
building and flight-testing their missile prototypes. They were also submitting their bids to the 
government’s Request for Proposal for the upcoming advanced development phase. On the 
government side, acquirers were evaluating these bids and preparing to award the 36-
month Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase contract, while sponsors 
were completing a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) of the three 
candidate AAWS-M materiel solutions. Each of the teams enjoyed generally successful 
missile flight test outcomes as the “proof of principle” phase ended. Each flew over a dozen 
missiles and achieved a target hit rate of over 60%. 
The Laser Beam Rider candidate emerged the winner of the COEA, presumably 
from weighted cost/efficiency factors. But in a strange twist, the concurrent deliberation of 
the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) instead chose the FLIR candidate, 
presumably because of a bias toward “fire & forget.” As part of a typical capability 
formulation process, technical constraints are deliberately avoided in requirements 
documents, to allow and encourage a maximum range of alternative solutions to the need or 
capability deficiency. While time of flight and gunner survivability were not stated 
requirements in the AAWS-M Joint Required Operational Capability document per se, “fire 
and forget” nevertheless translated into greatly enhanced gunner survivability, and 
overwhelmingly appealed to user representatives (and government developers).  
The EMD contract was awarded in June of 1989 to the Joint Venture team of Texas 
Instruments and Martin-Marietta. However, at about 18 months into this program, serious 
technical problems doubled the expected cost of development and added about eighteen 
more months to the originally planned thirty-six months to complete. This constituted a 
Nunn-McCurdy breach of cost and schedule thresholds, with requisite Congressional 




Various technical issues plagued the program at this point, with system weight being 
perhaps chief among them.  User representatives convened a Joint Requirements Overview 
Council (JROC) to re-evaluate the maximum weight requirement of 45 pounds and 
increased the program threshold to 49.5 pounds. Clearly, the Army and Marine Corps 
communities wanted the emergent system and its planned capabilities. But that didn’t 
resolve all of AAWS-M’s issues. 
During the months that the program teetered on the brink of termination for its 
technical and business issues, the Director of the OSD Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (DPAE), as a principle member of the DAB, took the program to task stating that 
if the FLIR version could not be shown able to achieve the same $90K “cost per kill” as had 
been estimated for the laser beam-rider, then the program should be terminated and re-
started, changing technologies and pursuing the less risky laser-guided version. The 
principal cost driver of the FLIR technology that enabled fire-and-forget was a 64x64 matrix 
(of heat detectors/pixels) focal plane array (FPA), to be manufactured by one of the Joint 
Venture partners. These tiny micro-chips would comprise almost 14% of the estimated 
average unit production cost (UPC) of the entire missile. The ability of one of the few 
producers in the world to produce them with economically sufficient yield, and to achieve 
their rigorous performance specifications for sensitivity seemed, for a while, to hold the fate 
of the entire program. Intense scrutiny of projected yields and production costs of these 
critical components would determine whether the program was feasible from this aspect 
alone, some believed. But the answer was somewhat ambiguous, with roughly $12k being 
the target for average UPC, given a planned buy quantity of about 70,000. And cost of FPAs 
wasn’t the only problem with them. But it turned out that their benefits could be described in 
a fairly tangible way. 
The AAWS-M FPA specifications were derived from a scenario-based target list of 
potential threat vehicles in different environments of atmospheric temperature, humidity, 
obscuration, etc. When the user community saw that early developmental AAWS-M focal 
plane arrays were not meeting the full specifications, they convened another JROC to allow 
stepped, incremental achievement of target defeat scenarios over time—something we 
would now refer to as evolutionary growth. They stratified performance in terms of levels A, 
B and C to convey degrees of target defeat capability in FPAs—a very unusual move by 
sponsors, having to dissect a requirement to accommodate the pace of technological 
achievement.65 This provided a qualitative assessment of what was achievable and 
satisfactory for system performance. Once again, the communities that needed AAWS-M’s 
capabilities were trying to ease the path forward.  
Fortunately, independent program evaluation teams also reported that FLIR 
technology was progressing and would be achievable within a re-baselined program. This 
joint position, along with wider program advocacy, curtailed the technical and business 
arguments and the fire-and-forget Javelin was allowed to proceed. An additional and more 
capable provider of FPAs was brought in and accelerated as a second source for this critical 
component. After still more and difficult advanced development program challenges, AAWS-
M eventually became the Javelin—and is known today as one of our most successful 
combat systems. (In the end, soldiers and Marines never had to accept to accept B and C-
level FPA performance, as the full-capable FPA technology did in fact emerge in time for 
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fielding. And system weight has been held just below 49.5 pounds throughout its many 
years of production.) 
There are many business and public policy lessons to be learned from the Javelin 
program. Within its long saga from initial concept to modern-day deployment and combat 
use are illustrations of requirements capture, early prototyping, technology readiness, 
modeling and simulation, economic forces of competition, acquisition strategy, decision 
bureaucracy, product discovery, and economies of scale, etc. Perhaps the best lesson 
learned from the case presented here about analyzing alternatives is that a single, unstated, 
qualitative factor of performance (gunner survivability) ultimately drove the choice. Javelin 
had a requirements document with many pages of quantifiable requirements stated as 
measures of performance and effectiveness. But the parameter of system technology that 
promised the most of what was impossible to quantify became the overriding factor in the 
selection of alternatives. A magazine advertisement purchased by the Joint Venture shortly 
after their EMD contract win said it eloquently: “Fire & Forget AAWS-M: The Gunner Wins.” 
The failure of the Javelin program to move to the final solution faster and more directly is 
due in large part to the insufficient articulation of benefits as part of the Analysis of 
Alternatives process.  
Research Question 
As illustrated by the Javelin program, there is a basic need for the use of a common 
units of benefit estimate in the Analysis of Alternatives process. This should lead to including 
common units benefits estimates as well as costs in the acquisition AoAs.  The problem is to 
develop a means to do this more effectively, given the nebulous nature of so many of the 
critical benefits of weapon systems. How can such a method be consistently applied to 
many alternatives across a wide range of operational conditions? The current research 
examines how KVA can be integrated with system dynamics modeling to generate 
defensible common units of benefit estimates that will improve the rigor of the AoA 
process and thereby improve acquisition processes.  
The goals of the current work are:  
 Examine how military operations systems dynamics simulations can be 
combined with the KVA approach, 
 Identify potential advantages and disadvantages of integrating military operations 
simulations and the KVA approach, 
 Investigate the potential of exploiting the benefits from the synergy of SD and 
KVA to improve acquisition AoA processes, and 
 Identify and describe potential implications of the integration on acquisition 
practice. 
Due to the preliminary nature of this proof-of-concept study, precise descriptions of 
system operations are necessary. The focus is on the potential usefulness of integrating SD 
and KVA. 
Introduction to Knowledge Value Analysis 
In the US Military context, the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology is a new 
way of approaching the problems of estimating the productivity (e.g., in terms of ROI) for 
military capabilities embedded in processes such as the CONOPS for a weapons system. In 




system dynamic modeling to evaluate their relative productivity. The KVA approach was 
used to estimate the parameters based on the system dynamic models by providing the 
estimates of the relative productivity (i.e., the ROI66) of each alternative. 
In a broader context, KVA also addresses the requirements of the many Department 
of Defense (DoD) policies and directives previously reviewed by providing a means to 
generate comparable value or benefit estimates for various processes and the technologies 
and people that execute them. It does this by providing a common and relatively objective 
means to estimate the value of new technologies as required in the: 
 Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 that mandates the assessment of the cost benefits for 
information technology investments. 
 Government Accountability Office’s Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide for 
Evaluating Federal Agencies’ IT Investment Decision-Making, Version 1, 
(February 1997) that requires that IT investments apply ROI measures.  
 DoD Directive 8115.01, issued October 2005, that mandates the use of 
performance metrics based on outputs, with ROI analysis required for all current 
and planned IT investments.  
 DoD Risk Management Guidance Defense Acquisition guide book that requires 
alternatives to the traditional cost estimation be considered because legacy cost 
models tend not to adequately address costs associated with information 
systems or the risks associated with them.  
KVA is a methodology that describes all organizational outputs in common units. 
This provides a means to compare the outputs of all assets (human, machine, information 
technology) regardless of the aggregated outputs produced. Thus, it provides insights about 
the productivity level of processes, people, and systems in terms of a ratio of common units 
of output produced by each asset (a measure of benefits) divided by the cost to produce the 
output   By capturing the value of knowledge embedded in an organization’s core 
processes, employees and technology, KVA identifies the actual cost and value of a people, 
systems, or processes.  Because KVA identifies every process required to produce an 
output and the historical costs of those processes, unit costs and unit values of outputs, 
processes, functions or services are calculated.  An output is defined as the end-result of an 
organization’s operations; it can be a product or service, as shown in Figure 1. 
                                                
66 ROI is defined as the revenue-cost/cost where revenue is defined as the price per common unit of benefit 
using a market comparables approach. Given that the price per common unit is a constant, precision in 
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Figure 1. Measuring Output 
For the purpose of the systems dynamics model developed for this study, KVA was 
used to describe the outputs of all the processes and subprocesses in common units. This 
allowed us to make their relative performance (e.g., productivity, ROIs) comparable. KVA 
was used to measure the value added by the human capital assets (i.e., military personnel 
executing the processes) and the system assets by analyzing the processes performances. 
KVA provided a means to set the systems dynamic model parameters so that the results 
would provide a means to compare the performance of various approaches to the system 
problem.  
By capturing the value of knowledge embedded in systems and in use in operators of 
the processes, KVA identified the productivity of the system-process alternatives. Because 
KVA identified every process output required to produce the final aggregated output, the 
common unit costs and the common unit values were estimated. This allowed for the 
benchmarking of various systems and the processes they support with any other similar 
processes across the military.  
The KVA methodology has been applied in over 80 projects within the DoD, from 
flight scheduling applications to ship maintenance and modernization processes to the 
current project analyzing several alternative approaches to the system alternatives problem. 
In general, the KVA methodology was used for this study because it could:  
 Compare alternative approaches modeled with a systems dynamics model in 
terms of their relative productivity, 
 Allocate value and costs to common units of output, 
 Measure value added by the system alternatives based on the outputs each 
produced, and 
 Relate outputs to cost of producing those outputs in common units. 
Describing processes in common units also permits, but does not require, market 
comparable data to be generated, particularly important for non-profits like the US Military. 
Using a market comparables approach, data from the commercial sector can be used to 
estimate price per common unit, allowing for revenue estimates of process outputs for non-
profits. This also provides a common units basis to define benefit streams, regardless of the 




KVA differs from other nonprofit ROI models because it can allow for revenue 
estimates, enabling the use of traditional accounting, financial performance, and profitability 
measures at the sub-organizational level. KVA can rank processes or process alternatives 
by their relative ROIs. This assists decision-makers in identifying how much various 
processes or process alternatives add value.  
In KVA, value is quantified in two key metrics: Return-on-Knowledge (ROK: 
revenue/cost) and ROI (revenue-investment cost/investment cost). The raw data from a KVA 
analysis can become the input into the ROI models and various forecasting techniques such 
as real options analysis, portfolio optimization, Monte Carlo simulation. By tracking the 
historical volatility of price and cost per unit as well as ROI, it is possible to establish risk (as 
compared to uncertainty) distributions, which is important for accurately estimating the 
forecasted values for portfolio optimization and real options analysis. 
Introduction to System Dynamics 
The system dynamics methodology applies a control theory perspective to the 
design and management of complex human systems. System dynamics combines servo-
mechanism thinking with computer simulation to analyze systems. It is one of several 
established and successful approaches to systems analysis and design (Flood & Jackson, 
1991; Lane & Jackson, 1995; Jackson, 2003). Forrester (1961) develops the methodology's 
philosophy, and Sterman (2000) specifies the modeling process with examples and 
describes numerous applications. The methodology has been extensively used for this 
purpose, including studying development projects. The system dynamics perspective 
focuses on how the internal structure of a system impacts system and managerial behavior 
and, thereby, performance over time. The approach is unique in its integrated use of stocks 
and flows, causal feedback, and time delays to model and explain processes, resources, 
information, and management policies. Stocks represent accumulations or backlogs of work, 
people, information, or other portions of the system that change over time. Flows represent 
the movement of those commodities into, between, and out of stocks. The methodology’s 
ability to model many diverse system components (e.g., work, people, money, value), 
processes (e.g., design, technology development, production, operations, quality 
assurance), and managerial decision-making and actions (e.g., forecasting, resource 
allocation) makes system dynamics useful for modeling and investigating military operations, 
the design of materiel, and acquisition.  
When applied to acquisition programs, system dynamics has focused on how 
performance evolves in response to interactions among development strategy (e.g., 
evolutionary development versus traditional), managerial decision-making (e.g., scope 
developed in specific blocks), and development processes (e.g., concurrence). System 
dynamics is appropriate for modeling acquisition because of its ability to explicitly model 
critical aspects of development projects. System dynamics models of development projects 
are purposefully simple relative to actual practice to expose the relationships between 
causal structures and the behavior and performance that they create. Therefore, although 
many processes and features of system design and participants interact to determine 
performance, only those that describe features related to the topic of study are included. 
The importance of deleted features can be tested when system dynamics is used to test the 
ability of the model structure to explain system behavior and performance.  
Based on the preceding and the authors’ experience with system dynamics, there 
appears to be an opportunity to exploit the capabilities of the system dynamics methodology 





In the current work, Knowledge Value Added and system dynamics were integrated 
to test their ability to improve the precision of AoAs in acquisition programs. A generic 
structure of a mobile weapon system process was first developed and tested using the 
system dynamics methodology. Then, KVA value and cost estimates were operationalized 
in the system dynamics model. The model was calibrated to reflect four extant weaponized 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). One of those calibrations was used as the basis for 
using the model in a hypothetical AoA for upgrading the UAV to address a different type of 
target. Simulation results were analyzed to test the ability of the system dynamics model to 
estimate benefits streams using KVA in terms of the relative value added of the capabilities 
of the system.  
A Generic Model of Mobile Weapons Use 
The model has three sectors: weapons movement, target evolution, and KVA 
analysis. As will be described, the model structure simulates two critical aspects of mobile 
weapon system operations: 1) the support and movement of the weapon and 2) target 
evolution from identification through confirmation of destruction.  
The Weapons Movement Sector 
The Weapons Movement sector of the model simulates the positions and 
movements of weapons (e.g., individual UAVs or Javelin gunners). Figure 2 shows the 
positions that weapons (generically called “assets”) can take (boxes) and the rates of their 
movements from one position to another (arrows between boxes). It is assumed that the 
total number of assets remains constant, i.e., no weapons are added or lost during 
operations. This assumption can be relaxed when modeling a specific asset. The movement 
of weapons is a subprocess of operating the weapon system that adds value and imbeds 
learning into tools, requires learning time for operators to be capable of doing, and requires 
processing time to accomplish. Therefore, the completion of moving weapons to the station 
and back to the base is an output of that subprocess and an input to the KVA analysis. The 
combination of the two movements “Assets arrive at station rate” and “Assets arriving as 
base rate” represent the accomplishment of the vehicle movement subprocess.  
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Each rate in the weapons sector describes the average movement of the weapons in 
the accumulation that precedes the rate. Each rate is defined with the number of weapons 
preparing for that rate (to leave base or station) or event (to arrive at station or base) and 
the average time spent by a weapon in the preceding accumulation. For example, the 
(average) “Assets leaving base for station” rate is equal to the number of assets at the base 
divided by the average time that a weapon spends at the base between trips to the station. 
This formulation increases the average departure rate with more weapons at the base and 
decreases the average departure rate if weapons stay at the base longer. The average time 
at the base is characteristic of particular assets and can generate different behaviors and 
performances across weapons and configurations.   
The Target Evolution Sector  
The target evolution sector of the model simulates the development of targets 
through five subprocesses of system operations.  
1. Acquire target: Includes detection, recognition, location, classification 
(identification), and confirmation (Lombardo, 2003; Global Security, 2010).  
2. Fire support coordination: Allocates targets to weapons by a group of 
people that have access to information about the battlefield situation, and 
doctrine, major systems, significant capabilities and limitations and often their 
TTP [tactics, techniques and procedures] (Williams, 2001). 
3. Fire mission development: Prepares specific instructions and target 
information for transmission to the weapons team and to the weapon (e.g., 
target location coordinates).  
4. Engage target: Weapons operators (e.g., pilots for UAV) maneuver the 
weapon within striking distance of the target, enter the target coordinates and 
launch munitions . 
5. Battlefield assessment: Often the same asset as was used for target 
acquisition is used to evaluate the success of engagement in destroying the 
target. 
In the model, targets evolve through these stages in an “aging chain” structure of 
sequential accumulations (backlogs + work in progress, referred to here as backlogs) and 
(sub)processes that drain those backlogs and contribute to the backlog of the next 
downstream subprocess. Figure 3 shows the conditions of targets (boxes) and the rates of 
their movements from one condition to another (arrows between boxes) due to 
subprocesses. The movements “Acquire target completion rate,” “Fire support coordination 
to asset,” “Fire mission completion rate,” “Engage target,” and “Battlefield assessment rate” 
are subprocesses that add value, imbed learning in tools, require learning time for operators 
to be capable of doing, and require processing time to complete. Therefore, they are each 



































Lose target after miss rate













Figure 3. Accumulations and Movements of Targets in Weapon System Operations 
In addition to the primary flows of targets through the subprocesses, the targets 
sector models three common causes of mission failure: 1) hitting the target but failing to 
destroy it, 2) missing the target, and 3) missing the target and losing the location information 
needed to engage the target again (e.g., because the target moved). Each cause moves the 
target to a different condition in the target aging chain. Hitting the target but failing to destroy 
it (e.g., a hardened target) requires reengagement but often no additional targeting 
information. After Battlefield assessment, these targets are returned to the Target 
engagement backlog. Missing the target (e.g., a small target) requires that the fire mission 
be developed again to re-aim the weapon prior to reengagement. Therefore, these targets 
are returned to the Targets in fire mission development backlog after Battlefield assessment. 
Losing the target (e.g., a fast moving vehicle) requires that the target be reacquired. 
Therefore, these targets are returned to the Targets being acquired backlog after Battlefield 
assessment.  
In a manner similar to the modeling of the movement of weapons, the rates in the 
targets sector describe the average movement of targets between backlogs. The primary 
rates in the aging chain are defined by the number of targets in the backlogs of the 
subprocess and the average time required to perform the subprocess. The average time 
required to perform the subprocess is characteristic of particular subprocesses (e.g., 
different engagement durations for different weapons) and can generate different behavior 
and performance across weapons and configurations. When two or more flows drain a 
backlog (Targets in fire support coordination and Battlefield assessment backlog) the total 
outflow is split between the flows with a percent that leaves the stock through each outflow. 
The return flows are each a fraction of the Battlefield assessment rate. Those fractions are 
based on the ability of the weapon to successfully destroy, hit, and not lose targets. 
Therefore, like in practice, different weapon alternatives (e.g., range, payload, dash speed) 
impact mission success. The model use section of this report describes how these features 
of the model were used to describe operational scenarios and weapon configurations. The 
fraction of the targets that are returned due to being hit but not destroyed (to engagement 
backlog), missed (to mission development backlog), or lost (to target acquisition backlog) 
battlefield assessment rate are described with the probability of destruction if the target is hit 
with the ordinance (p(kill if hit)) or p(kill)), the probability of the weapon hitting the target with 




ordinance (p(not lose)), respectively.67 The probabilities are determined by comparing the 
ability of a weapon to successfully destroy, hit, and not lose targets to the characteristics of 
the target and a function that describes how the weapon’s ability compared to the target 
impacts weapon performance. More specifically, the probability of kill is modeled with the 
weapon’s payload compared to the lethal payload (i.e., ordinance size required to kill); 
probability of hit is modeled with the weapon’s dash speed compared to the target’s speed; 
and the probability of not losing the target is modeled with the weapon’s range compared to 
the target’s distance from the base. Therefore:  
p(kill) = fk(Payload / Lethal payload) 
p(hit) = fh(Dash speed / Target speed) 
p(not lose) = fnl(Range / Target distance from base) 
where: 
p(kill) - probability of destruction if the target is hit with the ordinance 
p(hit) - probability of the weapon hitting the target with ordinance 
p(not lose) - probability of not losing the target if it is missed with the 
ordinance 
The three functions that estimate the probabilities based on the ratios are assumed 
to be simple but realistic relations that include the entire range of possible conditions.68 The 
function relating the Payload/Lethal payload ratio to the probability of kill is assumed to 
increase linearly from p(kill)=0 when the ratio is zero (i.e., no payload prevents any chance 
of target destruction) to p(kill)=100% when the ratio is greater than or equal to 1 (i.e., if the 
payload exceeds the lethal payload the target is assumed to be destroyed if it is hit). The 
function relating the Dash speed/Target speed ratio to the probability of the weapon hitting 
the target with ordinance assumes that the vehicle will “chase” a moving target and that the 
faster the vehicle is then the closer it can get to the target before releasing ordinance, 
increasing the likelihood of hitting the target with the ordinance. However, there is always 
some possibility of missing a target even if the vehicle is faster than and, therefore, close to 
the target. The function is assumed to have an elongated “S” shape from p(hit)=0 when the 
ratio is zero (i.e., no Dash speed prevents hitting the target) to p(hit)=90% when the ratio is 
greater than or equal to three (i.e., high likelihood of hit if weapon speed far exceeds target 
speed.69 The function relating the Range/Target distance from base ratio to the probability of 
not losing the target if it is missed with the ordinance assumes that the vehicle will move 
toward the target but that the target may also move, sometimes closer to the vehicle and 
sometimes away from it. When the target moves away from the vehicle it may move out of 
the vehicle’s range, causing the vehicle to lose the target. The function is assumed to have 
a stretched out “S” shape from p(not lose)=0 when the ratio is zero (i.e., no weapon range 
causes the vehicle to always lose the target) to p(not lose)=95% when the ratio is greater 
than or equal to 1.8, reflecting some chance of losing the target even if it is well within the 
vehicle’s range.  
                                                
67 The probability of not losing a target is used instead of the probability of losing a target to retain a “bigger is 
better” standard for all three measures and, therefore, facilitate intuitive understanding of the model.  
68 These functions can be described more accurately with additional weapon testing information. 
69 The assumed function relating the dash speed/target speed to the probability of hitting the target is probably 
lower than current experience, but is used to reflect the change in targets described in the Model Use section of 




The KVA Sector 
The KVA metrics were fully operationalized within the system dynamics model. The 
KVA sector uses operations information from the weapons and targets sectors of the model 
and characteristic descriptors of weapons to generate relative value metrics for each 
subprocess (including weapons capability outputs) of the UAV operations. KVA generates a 
productivity ratio that reflects output/input. If monetized, this ratio can be a traditional 
benefit:cost ratio (e.g., ROI if benefits are monetized as a form of revenue surrogate). Other 
measures of benefits and costs can also be used, as long as there are common units in the 
numerator (benefits) and all the cost units of all the contributors to the denominator are the 
same (as is most often the case because costs are almost always monetized), so they can 
each be aggregated. At each point in time, each subprocess’s productivity is the benefits it 
has generated divided by the costs to generate those benefits (i.e., output/input).The model 
includes both monetized and time-based KVA metrics. However, it was decided that the 
current model would be simpler to interpret by using the non-monetized common units of 
output (as described in terms of the units of time it would take the average person to learn 
how to produce the outputs) as the numerator. This results in the output (i.e., common units 
of learning time)/input (cost to produce the outputs) standard definition of productivity.  
A time-based application of KVA uses Learning Time to quantify benefits and Touch 
Time to quantify costs. Learning time captures the benefits derived from human processing 
(e.g., flying the vehicle), automated processes (e.g., take offs and landings), and 
(importantly) technologies integrated into the weapon. One of several ways to quantify a 
subprocess’s Learning Time is to estimate the average time required for a common point of 
reference learner to be trained and become competent in performing the subprocess. Each 
subprocess is assigned a Unit Learning Time that reflects the relative (compared to other 
subprocesses) complexity of the subprocess.  
The denominator of KVA subprocess productivity ratios represents subprocess 
costs. Each subprocess is assigned a Unit Touch Time that reflects the relative (compared 
to other subprocesses) effort required to perform the subprocess. The total time spent 
performing a subprocess at any given time is the product of the average time required for 
the subprocess and the number of performances of the subprocess. Therefore, a set of 
equations for estimating the costs of a single subprocess in each time period are: 
Subprocess learning Time accumulated to date = ∑ (Rate of subprocess operation *  
Subprocess unit learning time) * dt  
Subprocess touch time accumulated to date = ∑ (Rate of subprocess operation *  
Subprocess unit touch time * dt 
Subprocess Productivity = Subprocess learning time accumulated to date /  
Subprocess touch time accumulated to date 
Learning Times and Touch Times are also aggregated across subprocesses to 
estimate the productivity or the entire operation. This allows the comparison of different 
asset configurations (alternatives).  
Model Calibration and Testing 
The KVA+SD model was calibrated to the operations of four actual weaponized 
UAVs. The operations included the following subprocesses: 




2. fire support coordination 
3. fire mission development 
4. move weapons 
5. engage targets 
6. battlefield assessments 
Three of the four actual UAVs are operational: Predator, Sky Warrior, and Reaper. 
The fourth UAV is the X-47B. Basic characteristics relating to performance were collected 
for the four UAVs from publicly available sources (e.g., Global Security, 2010). That 
information included vehicle range, total mission time, time on station, dash speed, and 
payload. In some cases, multiple versions of the vehicle with different characteristics have 
been developed. In these cases, a single version was selected and used. Other information 
was estimated for each vehicle’s operations, including learning and processing times for 
each subprocess. Reasonable assumptions were used in making these estimates, such as 
that the time required to engage a target after arriving on station is inversely proportional to 
the vehicle’s dash speed (i.e., faster dash speeds reduce the time required to engage). 
These estimates are rough, but adequate for this proof-of-concept study, which seeks to 
determine if the model is capable of reflecting differences in characteristics in KVA 
parameters, not predict actual outcomes.  
The model was tested using standard tests for system dynamics models (Forrester & 
Senge, 1980; Sterman, 2000), including for structural similarity to the actual system, 
reasonable behavior over a wide range of input values, and behavior similarity to actual 
systems. Basing the model on previously validated models, the literature improves the 
model’s structural similarity to actual acquisition projects, as practiced. Model behavior (e.g., 
simulated sizes of backlogs for subprocesses and rates of performing operations) were 
compared to typical behavior and found to be similar. For example, before operations start 
at the beginning of the operational scenario (described in what follows) the backlogs are 
empty and no operations are being performed. The appearance of targets increases 
subprocess backlogs and rates of operation as weapons leave base and subsequently 
arrive on station, targets are acquired, fire coordinated, missions developed, targets 
engaged, and the battlefield assessed.   
In the evolution of targets, these backlogs and subprocesses increase sequentially 
through the series of operations. The growth of operations and backlogs slows as capacities 
adjust to demand (backlog sizes), until the operations are in dynamic equilibrium conditions 
with sizes of backlogs and operations rates remaining within a relatively narrow range. This 
represents “steady state” operations that could be continued for a significant period of time, 
e.g., until damage to weapons or maintenance (not included in the current model) change 
weapon availability. Model behavior was also tested with extreme input values such as 
perfect operations (e.g., probability of hit=100%) and very large versus very small number of 
weapons and targets as well as more typical conditions. Model behavior remained 
defensible across wide ranges of input values, including extreme values. These tests 
increase confidence that the model generates realistic operational process behavior 
patterns due to the same causal relations found in the type of operations investigated (i.e., 




The operational scenario was described with the quantity and characteristics of the 
targets.70 A stream of targets entered the target acquisition backlog at a steady rate of five 
targets per minute. The target distance from the base was assumed to vary uniformly from 
400-1100nm. This describes targets that range from being closer to the weapon’s base than 
the shortest weapon’s range to targets that are farther from the base than the longest 
weapon’s range. The speed of the targets was assumed to vary uniformly from 50 to 250 
nm. This describes targets that range from those that are immobile to targets that are faster 
than the fastest weapon. The payload required to destroy the target if hit (i.e., lethal 
payload) was assumed to vary uniformly from 400 to 1,000 lbs. This describes targets that 
range from being very soft to very hardened. 
KVA productivities for the six subprocesses and the cumulative for those processes 
for the four Weaponized UAVs are shown in Table 1. For example, the KVA productivity 
ratios for the Fire Mission Development subprocess for the four UAV are 943 (Predator), 
3,122 (Reaper), 1,222 (Sky Warrior), and 3,962 (X-47B). They represent the benefits 
(output) per unit of cost (input) and, therefore, can also be interpreted as a measure of the 
return on the investment, in percent. These values remain constant in the model after steady 
state operations have been established. As an example of the components of the ratios, the 
Fire Mission Development subprocess ratio for the Predator (943) is the quotient of the 
accumulated benefits (e.g., after 5 hours of operations) of 79,684 learning-time hours and 
84.5 processing-time hours. In the simulated steady state operations this accumulated 
learning time hours increases at a rate of 301 learning-time hours per minute (the product of 
the estimated 500 learning-time hours per fire development operation and an average fire 
development rate of 0.6 targets developed per minute) and the processing-time hours 
increases at a rate of 0.3 hours per minute (the product of the estimated 30 minute 
processing time to develop a fire mission and the same average fire development rate of 0.6 
targets developed per minute). Transitional periods (e.g., start or end of operations) or other 
non-steady state operations can generate ratios that vary over time.  




Acquire targets 377 377 377 377
Fire support coordination 189 189 189 189
Fire mission development 943 3122 1222 3962
Move weapons 50 23 44 607
Engage targets 5094 70761 15212 254736
Battlefield assessment 377 377 377 377















                                                
70 Although a single operational environment was simulated for this research, multiple and different 
environments can be simulated. Examples of characteristics of the operational scenario that can be elaborated to 





Note that, as described above, these productivities are ratios of accumulated 
learning time divided by accumulated processing time. Therefore, they are relative values. 
As expected, the three productivities for the subprocesses that are not impacted by the 
characteristics of the vehicle (Acquire targets Fire support coordination, and Battlefield 
assessment) do not change. These subprocesses are not impacted by different vehicles 
because the subprocess is the same for all of these vehicles. The application of system 
dynamics and KVA to the Analysis of Alternatives of other system alternatives such as 
improved logistics or vehicle technology used for recognizing and indentifying targets would 
generate changes in these KVA productivities. However, three important subprocesses that 
do impact total product productivity (“Weapons” row in Table 1) do vary (Fire mission 
development, Move weapons, and Engage targets).  
Some of the ratios in Table 1 are relatively large when compared to returns on 
investment experienced in many industries, especially for the engage targets subprocess. A 
primary reason is that the numerator of these ratios includes the benefits of the technologies 
incorporated into the UAV for target engagement purposes. These technologies are 
extremely complex, are reflected in very large learning-time hours that are accumulated 
each time a target is engaged, and, therefore, generate high productivity ratios. Similarly, 
the denominator of these ratios reflects the time required to perform the subprocess, e.g., 
engage a target after it has been acquired, fire support coordinated, fire mission developed, 
and the UAV moved to station. Actual engagement times are relatively short for these UAV, 
further increasing the KVA productivity ratios for the engage target subprocess. Differences 
in learning-times across the UAV reflect their relative performance (e.g., automation of 
subprocesses previously performed by humans) and technologies are the primary causes of 
differences in the ratios across UAV in Table 1. Therefore, it is reasonable that the very 
large benefits of the under-development X-47B with its extremely advanced technology 
generate the largest ratios. Improved estimates of learning-times and processing times can 
improve the accuracy of these ratios. However, comparing the KVA productivity ratios for the 
engage targets subprocess with the ratios for the move weapons subprocess that is simpler 
(lower numerator) and takes longer (larger denominator) indicates that the rank order of the 
ratios reflects the relative returns of the different subprocesses.  
Based on these and additional tests, the model is considered useful for the 
investigation of the integration of system dynamics and KVA. 
Using System Dynamics and KVA to Improve AoA 
Consider the following hypothetical example of the use of an integrated system 
dynamics/KVA model to improve the productivity estimates supporting an Analysis of 
Alternatives. Assume that a new version of the Predator UAV is being developed to enable it 
to engage opposing UAVs. Due to the much higher speeds and agility of UAVs compared to 
most land-based targets, the fraction of targets missed is expected to be higher than that 
currently experienced with the Predator. The acquisition program management team has 
access to some, but limited, resources (e.g., money, expert developer time until required 
delivery, technology development capabilities, approvals) to improve performance. Different 
stakeholders value payload, dash speed, and range differently and want the program 
management to recommend different improvements. Therefore, program management 
expects a rigorous review of its Analysis of Alternatives process and the results that will 
recommend one (and only one) of the improvements. As part of justification of the AoA 
decision, stakeholders of the two solutions not recommended are certain to require 
explanations of how and how much the recommended improvement impacts operational 




likely, be their primary economic consideration as evidenced by the earlier case study 
examples. However, our analysis will focus on value compared to cost in terms of the 
capabilities of the systems. 
Many alternatives have been proposed and are being considered. A few examples 
are71 as follows:   
 Increase the size of the power plant, which can be used to increase the 
vehicle’s payload, dash speed, or a combination of both. This requires an 
increase in fuel capacity to not reduce range.  
 Redesign the transmission, which will increase the vehicle’s dash speed.  
 Increase the fuel tank size, which will increase the vehicle’s range but decrease 
its dash speed unless the power plant is also increased.  
 Reduce the time required at base between trips to station, which increases the 
time that the vehicle is on station and available for missions. 
Performing detailed analysis of all the possible alternatives, such as by building and 
testing prototypes or very detailed simulations, often exceeds the resources of acquisition 
programs. Therefore, program managers are faced with the challenge of reducing a long list 
of potential alternatives to those that should definitely be included in the program, those that 
should be investigated further for potential inclusion, and those that should be rejected. The 
integration of system dynamics and KVA provided a timely and inexpensive means of 
evaluating all potential alternatives and reducing the “long list” of potential alternatives to a 
“short list” to be pursued or investigated further based on an objective and justifiable 
process. To do this, first the operation of the system with each potential alternative is 
simulated and the simulation model is used to calculate the KVA productivity ratios for the 
subprocesses and system as a whole. Table 2 provides an example of a portion of such an 
analysis for the hypothetical upgrading of the Predator UAV using the model described 
above.
                                                
71 There are interdependencies and tradeoffs in these alternatives, such as needing to increase the power plant 
size to maintain a given dash speed if the fuel tank size is increased. These are ignored here for simplicity. 
However, in application to an actual program developers would describe specific sets of features (e.g., possible 
















Predator Base Case 943 50 5,094 705 0.0%
Increase fuel capacity 
100%
1,886 50 5,094 951 34.9%
Increase fuel capacity 50% 1,415 50 5,094 831 17.9%
Increase Power plant 
100% for payload
849 50 7,641 771 9.4%
Increase Power plant 50% 
for payload
849 50 7,641 771 9.4%
Redesign transmission for 
100% faster dash speed
943 100 10,188 741 5.1%
Redesign transmission for 
50% faster dash speed
943 75 7,641 727 3.1%
Increase Power plant 
100% for dash speed
849 100 10,188 717 1.7%
Increase Power plant 50% 
for dash speed
849 75 7,641 702 ‐0.4%
Reduce time at base 50% 943 52 5,094 699 ‐0.9%














The KVA productivity ratios are repetitive for some subprocesses across alternatives. 
This is partially because some alternatives do not change the impact on some subprocesses 
and partially because of the limited number of system interactions incorporated into this 
proof of concept model. However, the KVA+SD modeling results are adequate to show how 
more accurate results might be used in an AoA of these potential capabilities upgrades. 
Based on the results above, a program manager can assess the relative value-added of the 
eleven alternatives (including no-change as reflected by the Base Case) analyzed. 
Comparison to the base case (e.g., the existing vehicle in the case of the Predator upgrade) 
provides an estimate of relative performance improvement. Sorting the improvements 
provided by potential alternatives in decreasing order (Table 2) lists alternatives from most 
attractive (Increase fuel capacity 100%) to least attractive (Reduce time at base 50%). The 
AoA suggests that, if adequate resources are available, the alternative that improves the 
system the most is to increase the fuel capacity 100% because it improves the development 
of the fire missions. If inadequate resources are available to implement this alternative, then 




program manager can also delete reducing time at the base and a 50% increase in power 
plant capacity that is used to increase dash speed from consideration since they do not 
improve performance. Certainly, other factors must be incorporated into a complete AoA 
(most notably development costs), but the results of the KVA analysis using the system 
dynamics model provide valuable information for making final recommendations.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Summary 
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) approach to including benefits in Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) was integrated with a system dynamics model of weapon systems 
operations to investigate the potential of their integration to improve the accuracy of KVA 
productivity ratios and, thereby, AoA. An integrated model was developed for a generic 
mobile weapons system and calibrated to four existing weaponized Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV). Six basic subprocesses of operations using the weapons were included in 
the simulation. KVA productivity ratios for each subprocess for each UAV were calculated, 
compared, and used to explain how the simulation and KVA approach work together to 
generate quantitative assessments of the relative value-added of each subprocess and 
whole weapon systems. A hypothetical upgrade program to one of the UAV was also 
simulated to demonstrate how the integrated model can be used to evaluate alternative 
upgrades and justify AoA decisions.  
Evaluation of Results  
An Analysis of Alternatives based on an integrated system dynamics/KVA model 
provides program management teams with several kinds of valuable information.   
 Quantified Measures of Improvement that include Benefits: Measures of 
subprocesses and the weapon system as a whole are quantified using a 
common set of assumptions and values (those incorporated into the simulation 
model). Therefore, differences in ratios and the implied relative value of different 
alternatives are due to the differences in the alternatives themselves.  
 Overall System Improvement Estimates: The weapon (versus subprocess) -
productivity ratios reflect changes in total product operations. If adequate 
resources are available to adopt at least one alternative, then a list of alternatives 
ranked by overall system improvement (e.g., Table 2) can be used to “triage” 
alternatives into those that should definitely be pursued, those that require more 
investigation before deciding, and those that should be abandoned. For example, 
based on the right-hand column, Table 2 suggests that increasing the fuel 
capacity should be pursued before redesigning the transmission and that 
reducing the time at the base should not be considered further.  
 Guidance for Alternative Selection: The analysis specifically identifies which 
alternatives improve which subprocesses and the whole weapon system and by 
how much. For example, Table 2 suggests that increasing fuel capacity 
increases the Fire mission development subprocess most and three alternatives 
significantly improve the engage target subprocess most.  
 Justification of Analysis of Alternatives Decisions: When used with the 
simulation model, the KVA productivity ratios can help explain and justify 
Analysis of Alternatives decisions by providing a means of describing how each 
alternative impacts operations, subprocesses, and performance. For example, in 




increases the Payload/Lethal payload ratio, which increases the probability of 
destruction if hit (p(kill)), which decreases the return flow “Incomplete kill rate” 
from the Battlefield Assessment Backlog to the Target engagement backlog 
(Figure 3). This reduces the average number of times that a target must be 
engaged to be destroyed, thereby improving the productivity of the engage target 
subprocess. 
 Guidance for Further Investigation: In addition to suggesting better and worse 
alternatives to pursue, an integrated system dynamics/KVA model can provide 
guidance for further investigation of alternatives by indicating which 
subprocesses each alternative improves. For example, Table 2 indicates that the 
reason increasing fuel capacity improves performance is it improves the Fire 
mission development subprocess. The model (Figure 3) indicates that this occurs 
by increasing the vehicle range, which reduces the likelihood of losing a target if 
it is missed with ordinance. Acquisition program managers can use this 
information to focus further investigation and development of this alternative on 
Fire mission development to assure that these improvements in the specific 
operations identified with the model are realized during the alternative’s 
development.   
It is important to note that neither a system dynamics model nor a KVA analysis of 
this system alone can reasonably produce these results. Only by integrating system 
dynamics and the KVA approach are the benefits above available. Based on the modeling 
and assessment above, we conclude that integrated system dynamics/KVA models can 
significantly improve the Analysis of Alternatives and, thereby, acquisition.  
Implications for Practice 
The current work indicates that acquisition can be improved by using integrated 
system dynamics/KVA models in the Analysis of Alternatives. The rigorous development and 
use of integrated system dynamics/KVA models can have important implications for 
acquisition practice, including:   
 The number of alternatives that can be analyzed with KVA can be increased due 
to the relative ease of reflecting alternatives in the operations simulation model 
compared to manually developing forecasts for use in KVA analysis. This 
increases the likelihood of identifying and selecting the optimal alternative.  
 Justifications of AoA decisions can become stronger due to program managers 
having the ability to causally trace from specific potential and selected 
alternatives through their impacts on specific subprocesses and operations to 
performance.  
 Justifications of AoA decisions can become more robust because they can reflect 
an analysis of a wider range of alternatives and more alternatives.   
 Results of AoA can become more consistent through the use of a single, 
integrated model of system operations and KVA metrics instead of separate 
operations and value-added models.  
 System dynamics/KVA models may be used to baseline product performance 
during the acquisition process. Performance of the product can be tracked over 
time and used to improve the model and thereby performance forecasts and AoA 




 Program management will select better alternatives due to the implications 
for practice above. This will generate more effective and potentially cheaper 
materiel solutions.  
In addition, improving AoA and acquisition through integrated system dynamics/KVA 
models can improve CONOPS. The Javelin case study described previously in this report 
provides a vivid example of the ability of acquisition in general and improved AoA such as 
through integrated system dynamics/KVA modeling to impact tactics and strategy. Upon 
receipt and use of Javelin, operators expressed surprise that its range was twice that of the 
weapon it replaced. That increased range initiated improvements to tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (ttp) such as the use of Javelin to detonate Improvised Explosive Devices. This, 
in turn, can generate changes to strategies. Accurate forecasts of product subprocess 
performance (e.g., accuracy at longer range) can be used to plan CONOPS improvements 
before product delivery.  
It is important to note that the purpose of the simulations of operations developed 
and illustrated in the current work is to capture the relative benefits and costs of different 
materiel alternatives, not to simulate the impacts of operations on opposing forces. The 
usefulness of models can only be judged in relation to the specific purpose for which they 
are built (Sterman, 2000). Therefore, because the purpose of integrated system dynamics 
and KVA models is to improve AoA, those models should be developed, assessed, and 
used separately from force-on-force and other simulations of operations developed for other 
purposes.   
Future Work 
The current proof-of-concept work has demonstrated the potential of integrated 
system dynamics/KVA models to improve Analysis of Alternatives and acquisition. Additional 
research can extend this work toward implementation and expanded application. 
Opportunities include:  
 Modeling a specific acquisition program in support of its Analysis of Alternatives 
process can develop and demonstrate the capability of operationalizing the 
approach tested here.  
 If important uncertainties in system operations are incorporated into the system 
dynamics model it can be used to generate distributions of KVA productivities. 
These can be used to estimate the volatilities used in real options analysis, which 
has been demonstrated to be useful in DoD acquisition.   
 The application of integrated system dynamics/KVA modeling to DoD product life 
cycle management can be investigated by using the model to generate forecasts 
of performance and KVA ratios during acquisition, comparing those forecasts 
with actual operations, and using the results to improve the model fidelity with the 
system. The improved model can then be used to analyze proposed changes or 
replacement of the system throughout its life cycle.  
The Analysis of Alternatives is a particularly challenging part of DoD acquisition. 
Integrating system dynamics modeling and the Knowledge Value Added approach has been 
shown to be capable of improving that analysis and, thereby, alternative selection. Adapting 
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PEO-IWS ACB Insertion Portfolio Optimization72 
Johnathan Mun, Tom Housel and Mark D. Wessman 
 
Overview 
Program Executive Office–Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO-IWS) engaged a team 
from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to conduct a pilot study to apply the Knowledge 
Valued Added + Real Options + Integrated Risk Management + Portfolio Optimization (KVA 
+ RO + IRM + PO) method to estimate the value stream created by the capabilities to be 
inserted within the Aegis Weapons System (AWS) through the Advanced Capability Build 
(ACB) process—as described in the PEO-IWS Surface Combat System Acquisition 
Management Plan (AMP)—given budget constraints and ship industrial availability 
schedules. The goal was to determine what order of capability insertion provided the best 
returns within an optimized portfolio, treating each capability as a real option. The KVA + RO 
+ IRM + PO approach was used to estimate the warfighter value delivered by each 
capability within the context of a portfolio-optimization, integrated risk-management model. 
The results provide a set of options based on selected constraints for insertion of the 
capabilities over the period of interest (Fiscal Years 2014–2025) based on an optimized 
portfolio model. For detailed information on the KVA + RO +IRM + PO approach, see the 
technical appendix to this report. 
The pilot study analysis articulated a notional value measure of military capability for 
a specified set of 23 capabilities to be considered, and examined four discrete approaches: 
(1) a ranking by value within a constrained total integration budget (optimal on budget), (2) a 
similar ranking by value and budget with a risk constraint added (optimal cost-risk), (3) 
ranking by value constrained by integration budget, with the additional constraint that a 
particular capability must be included in the first increment (Capability 2 must-have), and (4) 
the portfolio with the specified capability in the first increment and a risk constraint added 
(Capability 2 cost-risk). Each approach generated a distinct recommendation for the 
composition and sequencing of the capabilities within the ACB schedule. Under the ACB 
model, capabilities will be inserted within the AWS system every two years. ACBs are 
identified by the fiscal year in which the first ship receives the software upgrade. The 
analysis encompassed ACB 14 (2014) through ACB 18 (2018). The analysis included all the 
ships that would receive the ACBs for each two-year period from 2014–2025, and 
accounted for the ships being phased into the program through scheduled repair availability 
periods. This period was selected because at the end of that time, all ships with the AWS 
would have been inducted into the process. The analysis assumes that value would begin to 
accrue for a given ship as soon as an ACB was implemented in that ship and would 
continue to accrue through subsequent ACBs throughout the service life of the ship. ACBs 
beyond ACB 18 were not considered for the pilot analysis, but both additional capabilities 
and future ACBs can easily be added to the analysis. Within the ACB process, a ship 
                                                
72 The analyses performed (Monte Carlo risk simulation, dynamic optimization, and real options analysis) apply the Risk Simulator 
software and ROV Modeler software tools available from Real Options Valuation, Inc. (www.realoptionsvaluation.com), and the software 
screen shots were reprinted with their permission. Although there exist several commercial off-the-shelf software products available for 
running optimization, Risk Simulator and ROV Modeler were the only tools found to be suitable due to their ability in handling real options 
analysis, stochastic optimization, risk simulation, and other requirements in the analyses performed. These software tools were developed 




receives the current ACB, as well as the previous ACBs not yet completed. For example, a 
ship entering the program with ACB 18 also receives the capabilities from ACB 14 and ACB 
16 at the same time. A ship that receives the first ACB as ACB 14 will receive its next 
update with ACB 18 but will receive the ACB 16 capabilities at the same time. Aggregation 
of the value for individual ships provides a measure in terms of capability-ship-years. 
Within the context of the KVA approach, the study assumed that a relatively objective 
and extensible metric for military value was the relative complexity of the software modules 
that implement each capability in the open architected AWS, and that the complexity of the 
component could be represented by the relative magnitude of the number of delivered 
source lines of code (DSLOC), given that the programming languages used were 
comparable. A second measure of relative military value was achieved through collection of 
subject-matter expert (SME) rankings of relative component complexity and mission 
criticality. The study methodology aggregated the component data to the capability level 
using SME mapping of components to capabilities. These measures correlated highly with 
the DSLOC rankings, providing a validation of the assumption that relative magnitude of 
DSLOC can provide a measure of military value. SME estimates of the complexity of code 
and DSLOC were presumed to be those of the capability components themselves (versus 
simply the integration) since warfighting functionality (the military value of the system) was 
implemented by the component. Integrating the components/capabilities into the system 
made the warfighting functions of the components/capabilities available to the user.  
The cost basis for each insertion employed for the study was based on an 
aggregated average of high-, medium-, and low-cost estimates to integrate the required 
components into the AWS for given capability insertions. Cost of integration was used as the 
key cost parameter to provide the analysis based on PEO-IWS 1’s perspective as the 
integrating agent, versus as a component provider. The correlations among the subjective 
measure of military value and relative complexity of components derived from judgments of 
SMEs from PEO-IWS 1.0 and the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division 
(NSWCDD) were very high, indicating that the estimates were reliable (Table 1). The 
correlation between costs for the insertions and value described using this method was very 
low, indicating that integration cost does not predict military value. These findings support 
the need for using the KVA method to determine expected military value (EMV), the 
objective measure used in portfolio optimization and selection.  
The toolset applied—using real options, portfolio optimization, and integrated risk 
management—provides a means for quickly estimating the effects of various capability 
insertions over the period of interest. It provides management with the flexibility to examine 
various ACB capability insertion options given budget and ship availability constraints. The 
analysis for this study employed the following steps: 
1. Data collection and analysis to determine the best proxy for Expected Military 
Value (EMV), using objective data on DSLOC, subject-matter estimates of 
complexity and mission criticality for each capability, and OPNAV (Chief of 
Naval Operations staff) sponsor and technical community priorities for each 
capability. 
2. Static and dynamic optimization runs based on four different EMV measures 
for multi-criteria optimization, to determine the best allocation and selection of 
capabilities given a nominal $150 million budget constraint for each ACB, 




3. Combination of the four EMV methods to obtain the portfolio of options, 
results and recommendations for sequencing capability insertions for ACB 
14, ACB 16, and ACB 18. 
4. Computation of aggregate EMV values through the insertions of ACBs using 
actual planned ship-availability schedules as published in the Surface Ship 
Acquisition Management Plan (AMP). 
5. Monte Carlo risk simulation of cost estimates to determine risk of budget and 
cost overruns. 
6. Generation of an alternate scenario by applying OPNAV’s Priority 1 capability 
(Capability 2) as a “must-have” in the portfolio selection, and identification of 
what other capabilities should be inserted in such a scenario and how this 
would affect accrued value over the ACB insertion timeframe. 
7. Determination of a Portfolio Efficient Frontier, in which we determine multiple 
scenarios of increasing budget (i.e., if the $150 million budget were increased 
to $200 million, or $250 million, or $300 million, etc., what will the optimal 
portfolio look like for each budget; what capabilities should be added or 
replaced, and what would be their impacts on EMV?). 
8. Repetition of the previous analyses—with an additional constraint that the 
portfolio selected must have an 85% or greater probability of completing 
within budget. 
As follow-on to the work documented in this report, PEO-IWS should consider the 
following:  
1. Strategic Real Options or analysis of alternatives, examining various courses 
of action should certain capabilities be linked or nested with respect to 
another (e.g., there might be a “platform capability” that might have a high 
initial cost but bring significant downstream options for add-on capabilities 
with significant EMV. Or, there may be mutually exclusive or dependent 
capabilities—with which the implementation of capability precludes another 
from being implemented or requires another to be implemented, or will 
reduce the cost and increase the total EMV of another capability when they 
are implemented together). 
2. Additional modeling, such as adding new capabilities to the list, adding 
considerations of additional risk factors (e.g., technical, schedule). 
3. Training and software implementation for risk simulation and optimization.  
Adoption of the foregoing will lead to a more refined and robust analysis of the value, 
risk, and cost of future options for capability insertions for the Aegis system. The remainder 
of the report is sequenced as follows: 
 Statement of Work (SOW) Objectives 
 Problem Formulation 
 Methodology 
o Data Collection 
o Portfolio Optimization 




o Sequencing of ACB 14, ACB 16, ACB 18 
o Alternate Scenario: Capability 2 Must-Have 
o Aggregate EMV 
o Monte Carlo Risk Simulation 
o Portfolio Optimization’s Efficient Frontier 
o Optimization with a Risk Constraint 
Statement of Work Objectives 
The focus of this work is to conduct a pilot study to provide return on investment and 
real options/portfolio optimization analysis to help articulate value proposition in selection of 
capabilities for inclusion in the modernization of the Aegis Weapons System (AWS) in US 
Navy cruisers and destroyers. The analysis was to be demonstrated in a manner that would 
support the next budget submission cycle. In addition, the project was to use the Knowledge 
Value Added + Real Options + Integrated Risk Management + Portfolio Optimization (KVA + 
RO + IRM + PO) methodology, with supporting software, to aid in the process performance 
analysis and option-value estimation. The customer selected the processes and systems for 
the analysis to establish the baseline return on investment (ROI) estimates. This project 
focused on conducting the KVA + RO + IRM + PO analysis on the identified ACB insertion 
options by working with PEO-IWS 1 and NSWCDD personnel to establish the necessary 
baselines and analyses and, concurrently, to lay the foundation for developing the level of 
knowledge necessary for the organization to use and maintain the toolset going forward. 
This approach ensures that the managers of the process have a decision toolset and the 
knowledge to interpret the results of the analysis outputs. These tools include the 
applications of risk analysis, forecasting, risk hedging and management strategies, strategic 
real-options applications, project portfolio optimization and selection, and other related 
analytics. In addition, aggregate numbers used to support the building of a business case to 
meet the acquisition community requirements for the selected problem space were also to 
be documented. Management-level reports were provided to evaluate ongoing OA 
acquisition initiatives. The products of the pilot were developed in a manner that can provide 
a basis for extension and implementation across the PEO as a method and toolset to be 
used on an ongoing basis. This extended use will provide the ability to better manage 
acquisition decisions and to make the case for those decisions to both sponsors and the 
Acquisition chain of command. 
Problem Formulation 
The US Navy is constantly faced with many difficult portfolio optimization decisions. 
These decisions include allocating financial resources, building or expanding facilities and 
capabilities, and determining acquisition strategies. Such decisions might involve thousands 
or millions of potential alternatives. Considering and evaluating each of them would be 
impractical or even impossible. A model can provide valuable assistance in incorporating 
relevant variables when analyzing decisions and finding the best solutions for making 
decisions. Models capture the most important features of a problem and present them in a 
form that is easy to interpret. Models often provide insights that intuition alone cannot. An 
optimization model has three major elements: decision variables, constraints, and 
objectives. The optimization methodology finds the best combination or permutation of 




conceivable way such that the objective is maximized (e.g., return on investment, military 
value-added, proxies for revenues and income) or minimized (e.g., risk and costs) while still 
satisfying the constraints (e.g., budget and resources).  
In order to obtain optimal values, one generally must search in an iterative or ad hoc 
fashion. This search involves running one iteration for an initial set of values, analyzing the 
results, changing one or more values, rerunning the model, and repeating the process until 
finding a satisfactory solution. This process can be very tedious and time-consuming, even 
for small models, and often it is not clear how to adjust the values from one iteration to the 
next. A more rigorous method systematically enumerates all possible alternatives. This 
approach guarantees optimal solutions if the model is correctly specified. If an optimization 
model depends on only two decision variables, and if each variable has 10 possible values, 
then trying each combination requires 100 iterations (102 alternatives). If each iteration is 
very short (e.g., two seconds), then the entire process could be done in approximately three 
minutes of computer time. However, instead of two decision variables, if the option set 
includes “go” or “no-go” decisions on 23 alternative selections—as in the case of the current 
ACB analysis—then trying all combinations requires 2.58 x 1022 iterations of alternatives. It 
is easily possible for complete enumeration to take months or even years to carry out on a 
supercomputer. Practicality, then, demands that the analyst employ some advanced 
algorithms and techniques in Risk Simulator and ROV Modeler for running the portfolio 
selection and optimization. Before embarking on solving an optimization problem, it is vital to 
understand the terminology of optimization––the terms used to describe certain attributes of 
the optimization process. These words include decision variables, constraints, and 
objectives.  
Decision Variables are quantities over which the decision-makers have control; for 
example, the amount of a product to make, the number of dollars to allocate among different 
investments, or which projects to select from among a limited set. As an example, portfolio 
optimization analysis includes a “go” or “no-go” decision on particular projects. In addition, 
the dollar or percentage budget allocation across multiple projects also can be structured as 
decision variables. 
Constraints describe relationships among decision variables that restrict the values 
of the decision variables. For example, a constraint might ensure that the total amount of 
money allocated among various investments cannot exceed a specified amount or, at most, 
one project from a certain group can be selected. Constraints also include budget and timing 
restrictions, minimum returns, or risk-tolerance levels. 
Objectives give a mathematical representation of the model’s desired outcome—
such as maximizing EMV, benefits, and profit, or minimizing cost and risk—in terms of the 
decision variables. In financial analysis, for example, the objective may be to maximize 
returns while minimizing risks (maximizing the Sharpe’s ratio or returns-to-risk ratio). 
The solution to an optimization model provides a set of values for the decision 
variables that optimizes (maximizes or minimizes) the associated objective. If the real 
business conditions were simple, and if the future were predictable, then all data in an 
optimization model would be constant, making the model deterministic. In many cases, 
however, a deterministic optimization model cannot capture all the relevant intricacies of a 
practical decision-making environment. When a model’s data are uncertain and can only be 
described probabilistically, the objective will have some probability distribution for any 
chosen set of decision variables. The analyst can find this probability distribution by 
simulating the model using Risk Simulator. An optimization model under uncertainty has 




Assumptions capture the uncertainty of model data using probability distributions, 
whereas forecasts are the frequency distributions of possible results for the model. Forecast 
statistics are summary values of a forecast distribution, such as the mean, standard 
deviation, and variance. The optimization process controls the optimization by maximizing or 
minimizing the objective. Each optimization model has one objective, a variable that 
mathematically represents the model’s objective in terms of the assumption and decision 
variables. Optimization’s job is to find the optimal (minimum or maximum) value of the 
objective by selecting and improving different values for the decision variables. When model 
data are uncertain and can only be described using probability distributions, the objective 
itself will have some probability distribution for any set of decision variables. In the current 
project’s optimization analysis, the problem formulation is to optimize the Aegis ACB 
composition based on: 
 Potential return on capability (return on investment, expected military value, and 
other multiple criteria), 
 Investment constraints (e.g., $150 million per ACB cycle), 
 Ship schedule and availability, and 
 Selecting the best combinations and permutations of capabilities using the 
portfolio optimization approach as a series of options.  
Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the methodology employed in more detail, with particular 
emphasis on the high-level understanding of the approach and the results. For the technical 
mathematical constructs, please refer to the Appendix for additional technical background 
readings. Briefly, the methodology employed is divided into several steps, as covered in the 
following subsections. 
Data Collection 
Data collection and analysis is the first step employed to determine the best proxy for 
Expected Military Value (EMV) and cost estimates of each capability. To that end, we relied 
on data ranging from objective values such as delivered source lines of code (DSLOC) of 
software, semi-objective measures such as estimates of integration cost for each capability 
(using high, most-likely, and low estimates for cost, so that we can perform a Monte Carlo 
risk simulation later), to more subjective estimates from subject-matter experts (SMEs) on 
the amount of functional complexity and operational criticality for each component. PEO-
IWS representatives also provided OPNAV and acquisition community priorities for each 
capability. The analysis demonstrated that complexity is proportionate to value, but there 
were low correlations between EMV and cost estimates—indicating that we cannot reliably 
use cost alone as an estimate to determine the best portfolio allocation for maximizing EMV. 










Table 1. Correlation Matrix 
 
Risk and uncertainty can also be estimated based on various criteria (in the current 
analysis, we use cost uncertainty as a proxy for risk), and value is assumed to be generated 
as capabilities are realized through installation in specific ships over time. To get started 
with the data collection, we had to perform the following steps: 
 Establish operational definitions of value and cost of each ACB capability 
insertion. 
 Identify the projected ship schedule to establish availability for ACB insertions 
every two years. 
 Obtain SME identification and description of ACB components and capabilities. 
 Undertake model generation and iterations with various inputs, including running 
cross-correlations to determine the impact and validity of SME estimates. 
The data sources used include:  
 AMP Ver. 5.4 (27 Oct 2008) documentation of moving to an OA approach in ACB 
insertions, 
 Ship schedule, capability candidates for integration, components of the system to 
be changed (mapped to the capabilities), and integration cost for each capability 
provided by IWS 1, 
 SMEs estimates of complexity and mission criticality for components, and  
 DSLOC for each component. 
Figure 1 shows a sample of the collected data used in the analysis. The analysis 
began by assuming 23 capabilities (more can be added later as required). Next, the analysis 
applied the average of the SME value-added estimates; the high, most-likely, and low cost 
estimates; the OPNAV and technical priorities; and the DSLOC for each component, as 
specified in the Surface Combat System Objective Architecture. Using these raw variables, 
we generated various EMV metrics by accounting for the SME mean value-added estimates 
and DSLOC,  and weighting them—as well as common-sizing their mean values—to 
determine a comprehensive metric, considering OPNAV and technical priority only, and 
combining OPNAV priority with DSLOC estimates. Clearly, other metrics can be easily 





Figure 1. Input Assumptions 
Portfolio Optimization  
Static and dynamic optimization runs were executed based on four different EMV 
measures for multi-criteria optimization to determine the best allocation and selection of 
capabilities given a nominal $150 million budget constraint for each ACB. Figure 2 shows 
the portfolio optimization model, in which we have the 23 capabilities listed (clearly, we can 
add as many additional capabilities as required, as long as we have valid data and 
assumptions for each capability). The EMV values (column C in Figure 2) show the value of 
the composite EMV metric, depending on the calculation method chosen, the EMV value 
using risk-simulated cost estimates (column D), and EMV value using an estimate of risk 
(columns E and F) for each component (for the initial study, we impute the risk as the 
budget cost overrun and variability, whereas we can add additional variables and measures 
of risk later, as required). Finally, there is a column of decision variables, or “go” and “no-go” 
variables (column H), which are the decisions that are being optimized, such that the total 
portfolio EMV objective (cell C28) is maximized. The total cost of the portfolio is also 
computed (cell D28), and the portfolio is run subject to a cost constraint of less than or equal 
to $150 million (cell D29). For future applications, we can add to the existing optimization 
model by also considering: 
 Additional Capabilities as required, beyond the initial list of 23, 
 Optimization and selection of Components, instead of Capabilities, 
 New and alternate EMV metrics beyond the four EMV estimates currently used,  
 Additions of cross-constraints such as mutually exclusive projects and 




 Inclusion of additional constraints such as full-time equivalences, facilities, etc., 
and 
 Estimates of technical or schedule risk. 
 
Figure 2. Portfolio Optimization Model 
Figure 3 illustrates the portfolio optimization and capability selection setup using the 
Risk Simulator software. It shows Static and Dynamic Optimization routines run on multiple 





Figure 3. Optimization Model Setup in Risk Simulator 
Expected Military Value (EMV) 
The next step in the analysis was to apply the combination of 4 EMV methods to 
obtain the portfolio of options results and recommendations for sequencing capability 
insertions for ACB 14, ACB 16, and ACB 18. Figures 4 through 7 show the details of each 
portfolio optimization run and their corresponding capability set selected. The specification 
of each optimization depends on the EMV that is selected. For instance, the first set of 
results below is run based on using the mean of the subject-matter experts’ (SME) value-
added estimates, software lines of code (DSLOC), and OPNAV and technical priorities, and 
all these variables are combined through weighting and common-sizing the averages. The 
portfolio optimization is run to determine the best capabilities to select to maximize the total 
EMV for the portfolio, while at the same time maximizing the EMV, subject to the $150 
million budget constraint. These results indicate a multi-criteria optimization routine, in which 





Figure 4. ACB 14 Optimization Results  
 






Figure 6. ACB 14 Optimization Results III 
 
Figure 7. ACB 14 Optimization Results IV 
Figure 8 summarizes the capabilities chosen based on each of the four EMV 
approaches, and the resultant recommendations for implementation. Specifically, the last 
column shows the optimal decision based on a portfolio of options of decisions. For 
instance, the following capabilities should be considered as optimal for ACB 14: Capabilities 
4, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18. Using the multi-criteria optimization, the analysis 
does not simply rely on a single estimate of EMV, but is able to employ the data from 
multiple facets and triangulate the best course of action. Figure 8 shows the results. It 
illustrates that certain components are always selected regardless of the EMV metric used, 
providing a higher level of comfort in the analysis, and these are the components we 
recommend (last column in the figure). Further, there are multiple components that 3 out of 
4 of the optimization routines suggest executing; in most cases, these are not considered 
the top 10 components, but nonetheless important in the current ACB 14. These 4 EMV 
choices provide a view on the Analysis of Alternatives. The results of this analysis 
postulates which components are considered the top 10 and which are not, while still being 
critical in the ACB 14 portfolio. Using these four EMV options, we have four optimal 
portfolios, and we can quickly determine the best Course of Action (shown as the last 






Figure 8. ACB 14 Portfolio of Options Results 
Sequencing of ACB 14, ACB 16, ACB 18 
The next step in the analysis was performing a sequential compound portfolio option 
by examining ACB 16 and ACB 18. In other words, based on the analysis for ACB1 4, the 
budget of no more than $150 million will be spent on 11 capabilities, with the remaining 12 
capabilities still available for future execution. So, with another $150 million budget in ACB 
16, the portfolio optimization was rerun with the truncated list of available capabilities, and 
the results shown in Figure 9 were obtained. The analysis considers capabilities that may 
not be available until later ACBs by simply including them in the process beginning with the 
earliest ACB for which they are ready for integration. The optimization is repeated based on 
each of the four multi-criteria objectives and provides a list of recommended capabilities to 
execute (highlighted box in Figure 10 shows the recommended components in this ACB).  
 
 






Figure 10. ACB 16 Portfolio of Options Results 
The analysis continued with the portfolio optimization on ACB 18. The highlighted 
boxes in Figures 11 and 12 show the recommended component to execute in ACB 18, and 
in this case it is Capability 2. Capability 2 holds the highest OPNAV priority, but when the 
analysis includes the other inputs into the EMV metrics (DSLOC, Technical Priority, 
Weights, and SME Estimated Value-Add), and considers the high cost ($126 million) with 
respect to the allowed portfolio budget ($150 million), Capability 2 fails the selection for ACB 
14 and ACB 16, and is only recommended in ACB 18. However, the analysis can consider 
alternate scenarios in which OPNAV Priority is taken as the most important criteria, and 
Capability 2 is specified as a “must-have” in ACB 14. The analysis was then rerun to 
determine the optimal portfolio given this new requirement. The results of that run are 
documented in the next section. The report next illustrates the effects on EMV of selecting 
Capability 2 in ACB 14 through to the year 2025. The report then continues with the Efficient 
Frontier analysis to show what additional components should be added in each ACB if 
additional budget is allocated (e.g., what if the budget were extended to $175 million or $200 
million, and so forth, to determine at what point perhaps more critical components would 
have been selected). The optimization analysis is highly flexible to accommodate such 






Figure 11. ACB 18 Optimization Results 
 
Figure 12. ACB 18 Portfolio of Options  
Alternate Scenario: Capability 2 “Must-Have” 
The optimization model and approach used is highly adaptive and flexible. The next 
analytic step conducted was the specification of one or more components as a "must have," 
specifically, Capability 2 was set as a mandatory capability for inclusion in ACB 14. Figure 
13, illustrates the generation of an alternate scenario by applying OPNAV’s Priority 1 on 
Capability 2 as a “must-have” in the portfolio selection and by identifying what other 
capabilities should be inserted in each ACB examined in such a scenario. When the 
integration budget is constrained to $150 million, if a significant portion of it is allocated to 
Capability 2, then only a little is left over for other components. Figure 13 shows what these 
components are (i.e., on the last column of Figure 13, the decision variable set as 1 
indicates a “go” decision, whereas 0 indicates a “no-go”).  
 
 





By computing EMV accrued for each ACB, the analysis can then track the 
aggregation of value in terms of EMV available by ship-year based on the year of installation 
of each ACB in an individual ship. This approach permits representing the total capability 
available to the fleet as a single number. Figure 14 shows the ship availabilities for ACB 
insertions. Using this ship schedule and availability for ACB insertion and applying the 
optimal EMV values, the aggregate EMV values through the year 2025 become known 
(Figure 15). The second curve in Figure 15 demonstrates that EMV over time is marginally 
reduced by requiring Capability 2 to be included in ACB 14. Figure 15 also shows the “catch 
up” effect of the ACB process. Even though the introduction of a capability might be delayed 
from one ACB to the next, the total number of ships possessing the capability will become 
the same after the fourth ACB period if the delayed capability is included in the next update. 
An alternative to consider is to maintain the $150 million budget across all ACBs, but at the 
same time increase the ACB 14 budget to include a “special insertion budget” to cover 
Capability 2 and maintain the portfolio as suggested previously.  
 
Figure 14. ACB 14 Ship Availabilities 
 
Figure 15. ACB 14 Aggregate EMV 
Monte Carlo Risk Simulation 
Monte Carlo Risk Simulation of cost estimates is used to determine the risk of budget 
and cost overruns (project timing overruns can also be determined if required). A sample of 




question addressed in this study, the risk analysis results are necessary and support some 
of the optimization analysis. For future modeling and decision-analysis work, the proper 
determination of appropriate risk measures, potentially including cost, schedule, technology, 
and other risks, would be appropriate and beneficial. The analyst can model all these 
uncertainties using the Risk Simulator software tools. Instead of relying on single-point 
estimates for cost and scheduled completion times, distributions of cost and time through 
expert estimates, comparable historical data, and expectations of high, most-likely, and low 
estimates for each input should be employed. The analytic method then specifies that these 
values be simulated thousands of times with the software to generate all possible outcomes 
and scenarios, and the results are then interpreted to examine the risks inherent in each 
ACB insertion. Applying this method to the first analysis, the results indicate that although 
the expected total cost is $150 million, there is 83.30% chance that the budget will be 
exceeded. In fact, to be 99% sure that there is sufficient money to cover the potential cost-
creep, the budget would have to be increased to $171 million, indicating the need of a $21 
million cushion. Similarly, the analyst can apply the methodology to determine the probability 
of the occurrence of schedule overruns. Other risks, such as technology risk, may be 
expressed in other ways to provide inputs to the simulator software. 
 
Figure 16. Risk Analysis on Cost for ACB 14 
Portfolio Optimization’s Efficient Frontier 
The portfolio Efficient Frontier analysis determines multiple scenarios of increasing 
budget (i.e., if the $150 million budget were increased to $200 million, or $250 million, or 
$300 million, and so forth, in various increments, what will the optimal portfolio look like; 
what capabilities should be added or replaced; and what are the impacts on EMV?). This 
analysis provides useful input for deliberations with the sponsor early in the budget-
development process and yields data-driven sets of alternatives for various levels of 
funding. 
Running the optimization procedure yields an optimal portfolio of projects in which 
the constraints are satisfied. This represents a single optimal portfolio point on the Efficient 




subsequently changing some of the constraints—for instance, by increasing the budget—the 
analyst can rerun the optimization to produce another optimal portfolio given these new 
constraints. Therefore, a series of optimal portfolio allocations can be determined and 
graphed. This graphical representation of all optimal portfolios is called the portfolio’s 
Efficient Frontier. At this juncture, each point represents a portfolio allocation. For instance, 
Portfolio B might represent capabilities 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15, and so forth, while Portfolio C 
might represent capabilities 2, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15, and so forth—each resulting in different EMV, 
tactical, military, or comprehensive scores, and portfolio returns. It is up to the decision-
maker to decide which portfolio represents the best decision and if sufficient resources exist 
to execute these projects. Typically, in an Efficient Frontier analysis, a decision-maker would 
select projects for which the marginal increase in benefits is positive, and the slope is steep. 
In the next example, that decision-maker would rather select Portfolio D rather than Portfolio 
E, as the marginal increase is negative on the y-axis (e.g., EMV). That is, spending too 
much money may actually reduce the overall EMV; hence, this portfolio should not be 
selected. Also, in comparing Portfolios A and B, a decision-maker would be more inclined to 
choose B, as the slope is steep and the same increase in budget requirements (x-axis) 
would return a much higher percentage EMV (y-axis). The decision to choose between 
Portfolios C and D would depend on available resources, and the decision-maker must 
decide if the added benefits warrant and justify the added budget and costs. Figures 18 
through 22 illustrate the results from the Efficient Frontier analysis by changing the budget 
constraint from $150 million to $300 million by incrementing it $25 million in each step.  
 





Figure 18. Portfolio Efficient Frontier 
 
Figure 19. Efficient Frontier with Additional Budget Allocation I 
 
Figure 20. Efficient Frontier with Additional Budget Allocation II 
 





Figure 22. Efficient Frontier with Additional Budget Allocation IV 
Optimization with a Risk Constraint 
Figure 23 shows an example optimization run in which we can set cost as the 
stochastic constraint. That is, seeing that cost overruns typically occur in development, we 
can set the risk simulation optimization combination model such that we want a portfolio 
where there is a 90% probability that the $150 million budget is not exceeded. In this sample 
run, we see that this can be accomplished by replacing Capability 9 with Capability 23, at a 
lower cost, thereby still creating the maximum EMV possible while maintaining a 90% 
probability that total portfolio cost will be under the required $150 million budget constraint. 
Alternatively, as shown previously in Figure 16, if the optimal portfolio is still desirable, then 
the $150 million budget needs to account for a potential overrun of $22 million.  That is, 
there is a 99% probability that the total portfolio budget will be under $172 million. There is 
clearly a risk-value tradeoff occurring in this situation; the higher the probability of lower 
budget overruns, the lower the anticipated EMV. This tradeoff is also seen very clearly in the 
Efficient Frontier analysis, in which the results demonstrate that the higher the budget 
allocation, the greater the EMV. The final step in the analysis was a sample run with ACB 
14, 16, and 18 based on the EMV applying all input assumptions, and with the additional 
contingent constraint the total budget used will not exceed $150 million for each ACB for at 
least 85% of the time. The results are shown in Figures 24, 25, and 26 for each of the ACBs 
sequenced. The resulting budget overrun risks are depicted in Figure 27. When this 
constraint is applied, the analysis yields a different portfolio selection for each ACB, and the 
probability of not exceeding the requisite $150 million budget becomes 97.99%, 90.90% 
and 99.99% for the three ACB years. Running the model with Capability 2 as mandatory in 
ACB 14 and applying the risk constraint, generates yet another set of selections, yielding 
confidence levels of not exceeding the budget of $150 million. Figure 28 shows the resulting 
aggregate EMV across all ships, revised to include the risk-cost portfolio. It is clear that the 
opportunity cost of applying the risk constraint, while measurable, is minimal for this case 
and actually represents less reduction in EMV overall than does the mandatory selection of 
a capability.  
 





Figure 24. Cost-based Risk Optimization for ACB 14 
 
Figure 25. Cost-based Risk Optimization for ACB 16 
 
Figure 26. Cost-based Risk Optimization for ACB 18 
 






Figure 28. Aggregate EMV for 2014–2025 
Figures 29 and 30 summarize the results of all portfolio runs as a simple visual 
matrix and list of summary statistics. The portfolio runs’ visual matrix of results consists of 
four columns of portfolios: (1) optimization based on the required total budget of $150 
million, assuming all costs are exact and have no risk (Optimal on Budget); (2) cost with 
uncertainty and risk that there will be budget overruns—with an added constraint of a 
portfolio with no more than 15% probability of a budget overrun, or 85% probability or 
higher, that the total budget of $150 million will not be exceeded (Optimal Cost-Risk); (3) 
Capability 2 is a required component in ACB 14 (Capability 2 Must-Have); and (4) Capability 
2  as a Must-Have in ACB 14, with the added assumption of cost-risk as defined above 
(Capability 2 Cost-Risk). Similar ACB years are color-coded (e.g., green for ACB 14, blue for 
ACB 16, orange for ACB 18, and red for components that are not selected in these three 
ACBs, allowing for potential implementation later).  
Figure 30 shows the summary key statistics of these portfolios, listing the number of 
capabilities implemented in each ACB cycle, the total expected budget used, the total EMV, 
and the probability that the ACB will be under budget. Clearly, the non-Cost-Risk portfolios 
bear higher total implementation costs with higher EMVs (high risk means high returns); 
however, the probability of being under budget is low, and the probability the budget will be 
exceeded is high. In this First Phase analysis, due to the analysis being run on only 23 
capabilities, as expected, the EMVs are reallocated over time in various amounts (e.g., 
Capability 2 must-have will yield a smaller initial EMV due to the higher cost and moderate 
EMV value of executing Capability 2, but the catch-up happens in the subsequent ACBs). 
Figure 30 also examines the risk distribution of the budget based on the different portfolio 
criteria. For instance, we see that if we apply the value optimization without regard to the risk 
of cost overruns the median (or 50th percentile) budget is $153.2 million, above the budget 
constraint of $150 million. Alternatively, if we consider the risk of cost overruns, the median 
is only $142.9 million, providing a buffer for any overruns. In fact, we see that the 85th 
percentile is $146.6 million, and the 95th percentile is 148.7 million—both under the required 
$150 million. Further, there is a 97.90% probability that this portfolio will come in under the 
$150 million budget (for the sake of clarity, these values are highlighted in yellow in Figure 
31). To reduce and hedge the risk of cost overruns—the expected budget used is less ($139 
million as opposed to $146 million), with a return on EMV that is also less (310.98 as 
compared to 299.74). Therefore, to hedge and reduce the risk of cost overrun, the Navy 
spends less and gets less. This can be viewed as keeping some of the budget aside for the 
worst case scenario—therefore leaving less money available to invest in additional 
capabilities (the remaining statistics are fairly self-explanatory). One alternative to utilizing 
the highest number of capabilities, maximizing the EMV, and yet coming under budget, is to 
consider strategic real options in contract negotiations. 
Decision-makers should exercise caution in the use of risk constraints to restrict 




opportunity cost if other means exist to reduce risk in the input data. For example, better 
cost estimates in one or more of the components would reduce volatility in that component 
and, thereby, make it less likely to be excluded due to a high contribution to aggregate risk. 
Similarly, altering the cost profile through risk mitigation efforts in the contract structure 
(caps, fixed-price provisions, etc.) changes the input and will change the output from the 
model. By applying the appropriate risk-mitigation measures and by rerunning the analysis, 
decision-makers may provide a better portfolio selection than simply constraining the 
analysis through applying a risk cap. Intelligent use of the toolset as a decision aid 
maximizes its value to the manager. 
 
 
Figure 29. Summary of All Sequenced and Optimized Portfolios  
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Determining the Optimal Staffing Level for the 
Acquisition Workforce: Different Models in 
Different Services Yield Different Results  
Tim Reed—Timothy Reed is a visiting Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he 
teaches graduate courses in Acquisition Management and Corporate Entrepreneurship. He has 
previously taught at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), where he created the Air Force 
Strategic Purchasing Graduate Degree Program and served as the director of that program for two 
years.  He has instructed at the University of Dayton, the University of Maryland (University College), 
and American University (Washington, DC) and at visiting seminars at American University in Cairo 
(Egypt), and Instituto de Empresas in Madrid (Spain).  He has conducted a wide range of acquisition 
training courses for international military procurement officials throughout the world, including courses 
in the Czech Republic, Egypt, and Latvia.   
Dr. Reed retired from Active Military Service in 2008 after 21 years in the Air Force. He began his Air 
Force career as a Missile Launch Officer in Minot, ND.  He transitioned into the contracting field in 
1993 through the Education with Industry Program, working in the F-22 Fighter Engine Development 
Office at Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Engines in West Palm Beach, FL. He’s held various assignments 
in contracting, including the C-17 Cargo Aircraft and Fighter Engine Systems Program Offices. He 
served as the director of Joint Contracting Command-North, Kirkuk, Iraq. He also served at the 
Pentagon as Deputy Chief, Procurement Transformation Division, Headquarters Air Force, where he 
was responsible for implementing strategic sourcing and commodity councils for the DoD and AF. In 
his final assignment as Commander, 325th Contracting Squadron, Tyndall AFB, FL, he was 
responsible for $500 million in annual purchases in support of F-15 & F-22 fighter aircraft, and 
AWACS flight training.  Dr. Reed earned a PhD in Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship from 
the University of Colorado and is a Certified Purchasing Manager with the Institute of Supply 
Management.   
Dr. Reed has extensive experience advising organizations in federal government with Censeo 
Consulting Group.  At Censeo, he assisted federal agencies such as Air Force, Navy, Army, Housing 
and Urban Development, Veterans Affairs and the Executive Office of the President with the creation 
of sourcing strategies, and provided the training necessary to implement those plans.   He is currently 
the principal director of Beyond Optimal Strategic Solutions in Washington, DC. 
He is the author of over 40 articles, book chapters, and conference presentations. His research 
interests are strategic sourcing, entrepreneurial thinking, acquisition workforce development, and 
proposal process optimization. He can be reached at tsreed@nps.edu. 
Abstract 
The increasing pace of change in the acquisition workforce, coupled with a new 
emphasis on contracting accessions, has increased the interest in the models utilized by the 
DoD to 1) measure contracting workload, and 2) assign adequate resources to effectively 
manage the workload with an acceptable level of risk.   
Numerous acquisition studies and commissions have cited personnel management 
as one of the most critical factors contributing to the success or failure of buying 
organizations.  Strategic human capital management and DoD Contract Management have 
been on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) High-Risk List for the last several 
years. Actions to understand the nature and dynamics of the acquisition workforce are a first 
step toward the development and execution of an integrated strategic human capital 




consolidate some contracting offices increases the importance of moving toward a workforce 
model that is applicable in the joint environment.   
This paper identifies the key elements of contracting workforce staffing models in 
various DoD services. Further, it investigates the rationale and assumptions utilized to 
develop the models. The validity and applicability of the rationale and assumptions to the 
current acquisition environment are discussed. The disparity of results and 
recommendations derived from each of the models, given identical scenarios and inputs, is 
also identified and discussed. 
This research investigates each of the services’ workload and resource assessment 
methodologies in the operational, systems, and contingency environments.  Comparisons 
and contrasts of the various methodologies are discussed. 
The research goal is to identify potential opportunities whereby the existing 
methodologies can be enhanced to reflect the impact of emerging technology on the models 
in use, ensure the work being performed at various stages within the contract process, and 
ensure that the differing levels of complexity of the contracting workload are captured in 
measurement systems.   




Compensation, Culture and Contracts: The 
Realities of the DoD’s Blended Workforce 
Kathy Loudin—Kathlyn Loudin has served on the Defense Acquisition University faculty since 
2008. Previously, she led an acclaimed group of cost engineers at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 
supporting Navy, Marine Corps, and other DoD programs. Loudin has acquisition experience within 
both the DoD and industry, holds an MPA, and is a PhD candidate at Virginia Tech. She has written 
for Contract Management, Defense Acquisition Review Journal, and Defense AT&L, and has 
presented at the Acquisition Research Symposium (2008), the American Society for Naval Engineers 
(2008), the Navy Cost Analysis Symposium (2009), and the DoD Cost Analysis Symposium (2010). 
Abstract  
The Obama Administration's March 2009 mandate that the federal government 
rebuild its organic acquisition workforce, coupled with the recent repeal of the National 
Security Personnel System (NSPS), opens the curtain for a fresh look at Department of 
Defense (DoD) human capital management practices, particularly for employees in critical 
acquisition positions. Common perceptions hold that the DoD, given its relatively weak 
ability to provide economic rewards, sacrifices much of its best talent to private-sector 
employers.  Driven in large part by this revolving door phenomenon, the DoD’s acquisition 
workforce now consists of a rich blend of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, who 
deliver many basic acquisition competencies.  
This study synthesizes three quantitative analyses of compensation packages 
available to military, civilian and contractor personnel, with qualitative research on the less-
tangible incentives offered in each sector, to explore the DoD’s competitive position in the 
recruitment and retention of high-caliber acquisition professionals.  It finds that, although 
high-performing DoD civilians are at slight financial disadvantage, they can be motivated to 
stay in organizations in which a positive, mission-focused ethos prevails.  
Background: The Pay-for-Performance Debate  
Several years ago, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 
(FY) 2004 amended Title 5 of the US Code, authorizing the Secretary of Defense to 
implement a new personnel system, known as National Security Personnel System (NSPS), 
to replace the long-standing General Schedule (GS) system.  Heralded as a human capital 
management system that could boost organizational effectiveness by paying employees for 
exemplary performance, NSPS was gradually deployed throughout most of the DoD.  Six 
years later, just as the later-adopting DoD organizations were pondering the results of their 
first NSPS review cycles, the FY 2010 NDAA further amended Title 5, effectively rolling back 
NSPS73 and instituting an improved version of the General Schedule (GS) system, one that 
will eventually feature management flexibilities and workforce incentives crafted to attract 
and retain talented employees.   
                                                
73 The National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 (US Congress, 2010, HR 2647, Sect. 1113, pp. 







Mere months before the repeal of NSPS, in March 2009, President Obama published 
a memorandum74 succinctly addressing the shortcomings of the government’s acquisition 
system and directing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to work with Executive 
Agency and Department Heads to ensure both the capacity and the ability of their 
workforces to appropriately negotiate, manage and oversee acquisition programs. Within 
weeks, the DoD had constructed an action plan. This plan called for the addition of some 
20,000 acquisition positions by 2015.  Of this figure, approximately 11,000 would be 
converted from contractor positions to government positions; the other 9,000 would be new 
government positions (Hedgpath, 2009). 
Against this exciting but perplexing backdrop, the DoD must balance dramatic 
demands for experienced, talented personnel, while at the same time reinvigorating the GS 
system.  Some would argue that those two goals are in direct conflict: Many have pointed to 
the GS system as rewarding longevity (or time in service), rather than retaining the truly high 
performers.  In fact, the main indictment of the GS system was that it failed to motivate 
strong performance and that it levied few consequences for poor performance.  Given that 
public organizations strive to treat employees equitably, agencies cannot reward stellar 
performance much more handsomely then they reward mediocre performance.  According 
to James (2002), the GS system has traditionally supported internal equity, but not external 
(i.e., market-based) equity.  Other Office of Personnel Management (OPM) studies have 
found that 75% of pay increases have been unrelated to performance (Asch, 2005).  
Administration of pay-for-performance systems is not much easier for private-sector 
organizations, however.  Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) found that the highest-rated 
employees were only paid a few percentage points more than the lowest-rated employees.  
Lazear (2000) found a positive correlation only between compensation and time in service 
and/or hours worked—both objective, not performance-based, metrics.   
Recommendations for more effective personnel systems are plentiful:  Jamieson and 
O’Mara (1991) cited flexible rewards, incentive pay tied to both individual achievement and 
company profits, cash awards for patents and intrapreneurship, stock options, merchandise 
and travel incentives.  Branham (2001) suggested retention bonuses, project bonuses, 
selective stock options, and higher pay for hard-to-fill positions.  However, while the pursuit 
of more money is a socially acceptable reason for leaving an organization, Branham (2005) 
found that fewer than 12% of employees actually left for financial reasons.  Gellerman 
(1992) nodded at money as an inducement, but stressed its general inefficiency as a 
motivator.  Paraphrasing Maslowe (“Man does not live by bread alone, except when there is 
too little bread”), he argued that base pay is essential, but incentive pay motivates the 
extraordinary. 
The DoD’s current compensation conundrum seems custom-made for analysis via 
the principal-agent framework, which emanated from economic theory.  In basic terms, 
principal-agent theory posits that the employee or contractor (the “agent”) is rewarded for 
acting in ways consistent with the best interests of the employer (the “principal”).  If the 
agent’s needs are fulfilled, and the principal’s expectations are met, then the relationship will 
endure (Miller & Whitford, 2007).  Miller and Whitford also identified a problem dubbed "the 
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principal's moral hazard constraint," in which bonuses large enough to produce desired 
behaviors were cost-prohibitive for the principal.  Consistent with much work in this area, I 
will focus on striking optimal contract(s) among players.  Rather than advocate an “either-or” 
arrangement—i.e., either a behavior-based (base pay) or an outcome-based (incentive pay) 
contract—I acknowledge the complexity of contracts, both in the real-world sense and in the 
metaphorical sense.  Contracts fall onto a continuum of arrangements, appropriately 
balancing risks and rewards over time.  This lends itself to multiple theoretical lenses for 
analysis.  For instance, studies contemplating risks and rewards associated with (fixed) 
salary versus (variable) commission packages (Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988; Conlon & Parks, 
1988) have augmented principal-agent theory with institutional theory, which addresses the 
whole hierarchy of human needs.  Duncan (2001) leveraged agency theory, alongside 
equity theory and reinforcement theory, to argue for broad-based incentive stock option 
plans, because they uphold ownership as a strong source of motivation. Likewise, Blair and 
Kruse (1999) heralded the rise of employees as an important shareholder group over the 
past 20 years, embracing employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and defined-
contribution pension plans, such as 401(k) plans. Wilson (1994) advocated the sharing of 
rewards, as well, tied to collaboration and teamwork.  In addition to the tangible rewards 
outlined above, compensation structures can also feature intangible or aspirational rewards.  
Promotional opportunities and career-path options, for example, are often offered along with 
fixed and variable pay.   
Indeed, to create enduring work arrangements, one must not draw solely from 
economics (a la Hirsch, Michaels & Friedman, 1987).  Social relationships are important, as 
well.  Throughout this paper, I will explore embeddedness theory (Granovetter, 1985), which 
supports the notion of letting managers create a positive climate through pleasing others 
and generally doing the right thing, thereby serving as role models for the suppression of 
“force and fraud.” The workplace can provide both economic and social incentives for 
trustworthiness.  Such acculturation is an ongoing process, created and calibrated through 
action in interpersonal networks.   
The Blended Workforce  
Bringing ever-more complexity to the stage, the phenomenon of the multi-sector, 
blended workforce has emerged. Contractors, civilians and military personnel are now found 
working shoulder to shoulder in pursuit of common goals.  In a recent study by the 
Government Accountability Office (2009) of 66 large program offices throughout the DoD, 
some 37% of their acquisition workforce members were support contractors.  Within the 
Missile Defense Agency and joint program offices, the percentage of contractors was higher: 
49% and 47%, respectively.  Certainly, from an everyday, operational standpoint, the 
delineations between “public” and “private” employment have blurred.  To understand the 
nuances of managing in today’s complicated blend of mixed allegiances, I decided to 
conduct a two-part study, balancing  the quantitative with the qualitative, and meshing 
economic with the sociological theory. 
Review of the Literature  
For decades, researchers—most notably those from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), charged with Federal Pay Comparability studies—have attempted to compare public 
and private-sector compensation.  Results have been mixed; critiques of various 
methodologies have abounded.  Many have portrayed comparisons of public and private-




argued that because politics infiltrate nearly all organizational behaviors and processes, they 
are all “public” to some extent.    While government and industry differ in their goals, they 
employ similar mechanisms (a generic set of management functions) in pursuit of those 
objectives.  Allison (1980) concurred that management processes were basically alike, but 
that the importance of the means (i.e., functions) was eclipsed by the ends (i.e., different 
missions).  Hinting at the “revolving door” phenomenon, Allison cited several high-profile 
executives75 who had performed both public- and private-sector jobs, sharing unanimous 
sentiment that public management was more difficult. 
The difficulties of public management notwithstanding, many practitioners bemoan 
the relatively low compensation associated with public-sector work.  The salary, per se, may 
not be the problem.  In fact, Borjas (2002) found that male federal workers earned more 
than private-sector males with similar experience.  The problem is the tight distribution of 
earnings among public-sector workers:  Civil servants performing the roles of greatest 
responsibility do not earn substantially more than those in less-critical roles.  Borjas (2002), 
Gibbs (2001), and Katz and Krueger (1991) all argued that the compressed distribution of 
earnings among those in the federal government (relative to the broader possibilities in the 
private sector) will likely hinder the government’s future ability to recruit and retain highly 
talented personnel.  As many have pointed out, the best employees will always be 
underpaid; the mediocre will always be overpaid.  
Quantitative Analysis: The Surveys 
To better assess the DoD’s competitive position with respect to compensation, I 
collected recent salary data from three professional associations: The National Contract 
Management Association (NCMA), the Society for Cost Estimating and Analysis (SCEA), 
and the Project Management Institute (PMI).   Members of these three organizations fall into 
the same general labor categories that commonly make up the DoD acquisition workforce.  
To normalize the salary and bonus data, I used Consumer Price Indices (CPI) from the BLS 
website.76  Although slight inflation is typically the norm, the purchasing power of $1 actually 
increased marginally between 2008 and 2009, so the 2008 salary data are appropriately 
deflated. 
NCMA Survey 2008 
The NCMA produced a Salary Survey in 2008, and reported findings based upon 
usable responses from some 3,543 contracting professionals.  Of this sample, 
approximately 56% were contractors to the federal government, 3% were employed by 
professional services firms, and 23% were federal employees.  Nearly half (47%) worked for 
very large organizations with annual revenues or budgets exceeding $501 million.  
Of the NCMA sample, 86% had attained at least an undergraduate degree; 45% had 
earned a graduate degree as well.  42% indicated they currently held professional 
certifications, such as DAWIA Levels I through III (26%), Certified Professional Contracts 
Manager (11%), and Certified Federal Contracts Manager (5%). Approximately half reported 
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holding some level of security clearance.  More than two-thirds of the respondents resided 
on the East Coast or the West Coast, typically higher-cost areas.  The top cities in terms of 
median reported salary were San Jose, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC. 
As might be expected, salaries correlated positively with age, years of experience, 
educational level, clearances, professional certifications, and military experience.  
Interestingly, respondents from the very smallest companies (annual revenues or budget 
under $1 million) and from the very largest organizations (over $501 million) earned the 
highest median salaries.  Of the sample, the typical (median-salaried) male reported a salary 
$18,000 higher than the typical female’s salary.  This difference is likely attributable to 
differences in experience, education, organization size, and level of responsibility. 
Of all of the independent variables, the NCMA researchers identified position as 
having the strongest relationship to salary.  Specific positions reported most frequently were 
contract manager, supervisor, or director (31% total), and contract administrator or contract 
specialist (28%). 8% were contracting officers. No other job title was indicated by more than 
4% of respondents.  Lacking the complete NCMA dataset, the researcher made informed 
judgments on how titles mapped to the general job functions, reflected in Table 1. 
Table 1. Salary by Job Function 








Executive 152,000$       151,459$     4% 6,058$      
Attorney 140,000$       139,502$     1% 1,395$      
Manager 115,000$       114,591$     18% 20,626$    
Consultant 112,000$       111,602$     3% 3,348$      
Contract Mgr 108,000$       107,616$     15% 16,142$    
Subcontract Mgr 104,000$       103,630$     15% 15,544$    
Supervisor 99,800$         99,445$       16% 15,911$    
Staff (Contract Admin.) 76,700$         76,427$       28% 21,400$    
      Weighted Average, All Functions (TY09$) 100,425$   
In comparing median salaries of contractors to those of federal employees, 
pronounced differences were not found.  Contractors reported salaries approximately 2% 
higher than those of federal government employees.  Consultants (i.e., employees of 
professional services firms) earned considerably more; however, lacking complete data from 
the NCMA study, it was not clear whether these consultants were working with government 
or commercial clients. 
Table 2. Salary by Type of Employer 






Contractor to Government 56% 92,000$    91,673$     62,606$    
Federal Government 23% 90,000$    89,680$     25,154$    
Consultant 3% 100,000$  99,644$     3,646$      
      Weighted Average, Certain Employers (TY09$) 91,405$     
Analyses of other elements of compensation packages revealed compelling 
differences.  While nearly all respondents (96%) received some package of paid absences, 
92% were offered healthcare assistance, 90% were entitled to participate in a 401K or 




assistance, 75% qualified for vision care assistance, and 70% were afforded tuition 
assistance; other valuable benefits were bestowed upon smaller segments of the sample.  
Only 35% were entitled to a pension plan, 30% (contractors, consultants, and commercial-
business employees only) were offered ESOPs, and 64% were eligible for bonuses.  For the 
respondents eligible to receive bonuses, the median bonus was $3,500 (TY08$).  24% 
reported a bonus of $10,000 or more, 9% indicated a bonus of less than $1,000, and 3% 
indicated none.  Of respondents identified as executives (roughly 4% of the sample), the 
median bonus was $25,000 (TY08$).  Bonuses by percentile are shown in Table 3.   
Table 3. Bonuses for Contracting Professionals 
(NCMA Salary Survey, 2008) 
Bonuses  (normalized to TY09$) 
10th percentile  $           794  
25th percentile  $        1,589  
50th percentile  $        3,475  
75th percentile  $        9,631  
90th percentile  $      19,858  
Executives  $      24,822  
SCEA Survey 2005 
The most recent salary survey from SCEA was conducted in 2005, and reflected 
usable responses from 405 professionals.  Of this sample, approximately 78% were male 
and 22% were female.  Geographical data were expressed in terms of SCEA chapter 
affiliations; because 25% of respondents did not identify a specific chapter, the prevalence 
of respondents’ geographic locations could only be roughly estimated.  Approximately 42% 
of SCEA respondents were linked to either East Coast or West Coast chapters (typically in 
higher-cost areas).  Of the SCEA sample, 67% worked for private-sector companies and 
30% were government employees.  Of the government employees, 89% were civilians and 
11% were active-duty military personnel; of the military personnel, 92% were Air Force and 
8% were Navy.  For the private-sector respondents, no breakouts were provided on type or 
size of company. Instead, breakouts of primary end products were given. The greatest 
number of participants (30%) worked aircraft, missile and spacecraft production. The next-
largest category was research and consulting (24%), followed by electronics (11%), and 
intelligence/reconnaissance (7%). 
SCEA respondents were highly educated: 97% had attained an undergraduate 
degree; 70% held a graduate degree as well.  36% indicated that they had earned SCEA’s 
professional certification.  Again, salaries correlated positively with age, years of experience, 
and educational level.  Of the sample, males generally reported significantly higher salaries 
than females, even within similar geographic areas and job functions.  For example, among 
the 65% of all respondents identified as cost estimators, males earned 16.5% more than 
females.  Disparities such as this are likely tied to differences in experience and 
responsibility levels: The typical (i.e., median) male respondent reported 19 years of 
experience, while the typical female reported 15 years.  The males were slightly more likely 
to shoulder supervisory responsibilities as well. 
Although the vast majority of SCEA participants were cost estimators, salary data 
were reported by several other types of professionals.  Program managers and financial 




Value Management (EVM) professionals reported the highest salaries, but collectively 
represented only 6% of the SCEA sample, as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Salary by Job Function 








% of Total 
Reporting 
Salaries
Earned Value Management 114,000$         125,229$     3.00% 0.0326087 4,084$         
Contracting 108,000$         118,638$     3.00% 0.0326087 3,869$         
Program Management 100,000$         109,850$     10.00% 0.10869565 11,940$       
Financial Management 94,450$           103,753$     11.00% 0.11956522 12,405$       
Cost Estimating 92,030$           101,095$     65.00% 0.70652174 71,426$       
Accounting & Other not reported not reported 0.00% - -$            
     Weighted Average, All Functions (TY09$) $103,723  
Overall, as was the case with the NCMA survey, the median salaries of SCEA’s 
private-sector employees were closely aligned with those of government employees, 
averaging about $107,000 (TY09$).  Interestingly, though, with increasing levels of 
experience, salaries of public-sector professionals greatly surpassed those of private-sector 
employees, as shown in Table 5.   
Table 5. Salary by Type of Employer and Years of Experience 
(SCEA National Survey Results, 2005) 
Employer & 
Experience Level Percentage <10 years
10 to 19 
years
20 to 29









Business 67% 71,500$    98,000$            98,000$           95,000$       98,000$       107,653$     
Government 30% 75,000$    97,000$            106,000$         108,000$     97,000$       106,554$      
Aside from base salary, the SCEA survey did not address any other aspects of 
compensation, such as bonuses and fringe benefits.   
PMI Survey 2007 
The Project Management Institute (PMI) released a salary survey in 2007, reflecting 
usable responses from some 1,143 professionals from the United States.  Of the PMI 
sample, approximately 65% were male and 35% were female.  Geographical data were not 
collected by specific location, but by type of locale.  Nearly two-thirds of respondents (65%) 
worked in large cities, while roughly one-third (31%) worked in small to medium-sized cities; 
the remaining 4% worked in rural areas.  Of the PMI sample, 83% worked for private-sector 
companies; 9.5% were government employees; 7.5% were consultants.  Nearly half (44%) 
of the respondents worked for very large organizations (i.e., more than 10,000 employees).   
Of the PMI sample, 88% had attained at least an undergraduate degree; 44% 
possessed a graduate degree as well.  64% indicated that they held PMI’s professional 
certification.  As expected, salaries correlated positively with age, years of experience, level 
of education and certification.  PMI also mapped salaries to project size, project team size, 
and project budget, both of which positively correlated with salary.  Of the sample (65% 
male, 35% female), salaries for males were roughly 10% higher than those for females.  PMI 
respondents, not surprisingly, were predominantly project and program managers.  To 
ensure definitional consistency across the country, PMI detailed the functions for each title 




approximating their normal job duties, rather than reporting on a company-specific (or 
contract-specific) title currently held. For example, PMI (2007) distinguishes program 
manager from a project manager III as follows: A program manager coordinates multiple, 
interrelated projects in pursuit of a common operational objectives, while a top-level project 
manager oversees high-priority projects, involving extensive functional integration and 
considerable resources. 
Table 6. Salary by Standardized Job Title 
(PMI Salary Survey, 2007) 
Job Title Median Salary
Normalized 
to TY09$ % in Role
Chief Executive Officer 130,000$         134,511$     1% 1,295
Chief Information Officer 125,000$         129,338$     1% 1,471
Director of PMO 120,000$         124,164$     4% 5,323
Portfolio Manager 111,065$         114,919$     6% 6,535
Program Manager 105,500$         109,161$     22% 23,685
Consultant (Internal or External) 104,384$         108,006$     6% 6,709
Functional Manager  $         100,000  $     103,470 5% 4,888
Project Manager III 94,000$           97,262$       28% 26,975
Project Manager II 86,100$           89,088$       15% 13,172
Specialist (Scheduler, Cost Analyst) 84,500$           87,432$       4% 3,672
Project Manager I 82,750$           85,622$       8% 7,041
     Weighted Average, All Jobs $100,766  
Consistent with the preceding two surveys, PMI’s median-base salaries differed only 
slightly across sectors.  PMI collected salary data by industrial category; the categories 
typical of DoD contractors (information technology, aerospace, engineering, manufacturing, 
and telecommunications) are presented in Table 7.  As was the case with the NCMA survey 
results, consulting firms appeared to pay most generously; however, it was not possible to 
tell whether the consultants were doing business with the government or with other private 
companies. 
Table 7. Salary by Type of Employer 
(PMI Salary Survey, 2007) 
Types of Employer Percentage
Percentage 




Consulting 8% 14% $111,500 $115,369 15,643$       
Aerospace 3% 5% $104,500 $108,126 5,498$         
Telecommunications 6% 10% $101,000 $104,505 10,628$       
Engineering 5% 8% $98,975 $102,410 8,679$         
Government 10% 17% $98,000 $101,401 17,187$       
Manufacturing 5% 8% $97,000 $100,366 8,506$         
Information Technology 22% 37% $93,000 $96,227 35,881$       
   Weighted Average, Certain Employers (TY09$) 102,021$     
Only on the aggregate level did the PMI survey address bonuses and other incentive 
pay.  Since PMI defined “total compensation” as salary plus bonuses, Table 8 displays the 
delta between total compensation and base salary for all United States respondents; these 




outlying data (e.g., extremely high executive bonuses), the median (i.e., 50th percentile) 
figure will be used in subsequent comparisons. 
Table 8. Bonuses for Project Management Professionals 
(PMI Salary Survey, 2007) 
25th percentile 4,656$         
50th percentile 7,295$         
75th percentile 13,192$       
Mean 11,035$       
Bonuses  (normalized to TY09$)
 
Synthesis of Three Surveys 
The PMI, SCEA and NCMA surveys were selected because they focused upon the 
exact types of employees desired for this study (i.e., program managers, cost estimators, 
and contract managers).  As detailed in the preceding sections, the preponderance of 
participants in each of the respective surveys fell into those named categories.  Summarized 
in Table 9 are the median base salaries (TY09$), as reported for government organizations, 
consulting agencies, and the types of companies likely to be DoD contractors (e.g., 
aerospace, information technology, engineering, telecommunications, and manufacturing 
firms).  Since only certain types of employers were deemed of interest within each sample, 
the percentage columns do not always add up to 100.   
Table 9. Three-Survey Comparison of Base Salaries and Bonuses for Project 
Managers, Contracting Professionals, and Cost Estimators (TY09$) 
(PMI, 2007; SCEA, 2005; NCMA, 2008) 
Type of Employer % of Sample Med Salary % of Sample Med Salary % of Sample Med Salary
Contractor 41% $96,229 56% $91,673 67% $107,653
Government 10% $101,401 23% $89,680 30% $106,554
Consulting Firm 8% $115,369 3% $99,644 0%
Median Bonus $7,295 $3,475 n/a
PMI Survey NCMA Survey SCEA Survey
 
Clearly, these figures cast doubt on the common perception that government 
employees are poorly compensated relative to their contractor counterparts.  However, it 
should be noted that, in each of the three samples, the percentage of contractor employees 
represented far exceeds that of government employees.  It could be inferred that fewer 
government employees belong to professional organizations, or that few feel compelled to 
report their salary data, since federal civilian and military pay data are publicly accessible.   
Moreover, more analysis is necessary to pinpoint compensation data on the 
expertise levels needed within each labor category to manage major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs).  To provide a more focused comparison of the compensation of a DoD 
contractor to DoD government (both military and civilian) employees, at the levels 




Table 10. Cross-Sector Comparison of Total Compensation for Employees Supporting 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (TY09$) 








Basic Pay 78,408 96,469 94,048 82,248 113,998 106,489 87,480 134,094 131,219
Bonus 0 1,300 4,205 0 1,400 4,761 0 1,500 5,867
Healthcare 12,000 6,900 6,900 12,000 6,900 6,900 12,000 6,900 6,900
Housing 22,884 0 0 24,948 0 0 25,200 0 0
Subsistence 2,676 0 0 2,676 0 0 2,676 0 0
Tax Savings 6,390 0 0 6,906 0 0 6,969 0 0
Retirement 3,920 4,823 3,292 4,112 5,700 3,727 4,374 6,705 4,593
Paid Absences 8,444 12,295 8,114 9,031 14,529 9,187 9,606 17,090 11,321
Total $130,803 $116,964 $113,267 $137,809 $136,827 $127,337 $143,931 $159,584 $155,306  
This chart captures the mix of acquisition personnel who typically support major DoD 
programs.  Given the complexities inherent to the MDAP environment, it was assumed that 
contractor capabilities would be at least equivalent to a project manager II or III (in PMI 
terms); the interpolation of that salary aligns closely with the weighted average ($94,048 in 
TY09$) of median contractor salaries reported by the NCMA, SCEA, and PMI.  Similarly, the 
median bonus mapped to an employee at that level reflects the weighted average ($4,205) 
of bonuses reported by the NCMA and PMI.  Within the MDAP framework, the second tier of 
contractor employee is equates to a program manager (in PMI terms).  Since the median 
program manager salary was 13.23% higher than the project manager II/III salary, 
commensurate adjustments were made to the salary and bonus at second level.  Similarly, 
the top tier of contractor employee aligns with an executive or a director (depending on the 
company).  Since that salary was typically 23.22% higher than a program manager salary, 
appropriate adjustments were made to the contractor salary and bonus at the top level.  
Support for this methodology was obtained through a series of personal interviews with both 
contractors and civilians affiliated with MDAPs in early 2010; more details are provided in 
forthcoming sections. 
For civilian salaries, all figures in Table 10 reflect base salaries at the midpoint of the 
grade level under consideration, augmented with the national average of 20.54% in locality 
pay.77  For the military pay computations, base salaries for officers with 14 years of 
experience were used.78  Military housing allowances79 for Minneapolis were chosen due to 
that metropolitan area’s similar cost of living; it most closely approximates the national 
average with 20.36% in locality pay.  The basic allowance for subsistence for all military 
officers is $223 per month.80  Because DoD payments of housing allowances and 
subsistence are not taxable, military personnel save approximately 25% of that combined 
amount on income taxes each year, relative to their civilian and contractor counterparts. 
                                                
77 Locality pay data (2009) are available at http://www.opm.gov/oca/09tables/indexGS.asp 
78 Military pay tables (2009) are available at 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarypay/militarypaytables/2009MilitaryPayTables.pdf 
79 Housing allowances (2009) are available at http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/perdiem/bah.html 





Valuation of non-monetary compensation involved making some assumptions.  For 
example, healthcare is provided free of charge to military personnel and their dependents.  
Assuming the total premium cost plus medical care would average $1,000 per month per 
family, the annual benefit to military families was assessed at $12,000.  While civilians and 
contractors generally receive assistance on healthcare premiums as well, the researcher 
assumed an out-of-pocket cost of $2,600 per year for insurance premiums and $2,500 per 
year for medical costs.  Accordingly, the valuation of the contractor and civilian-employee 
benefit was $6,900. 
For matters concerning retirement benefits, there are endless variations on their 
valuation and administration.  For the purposes of this analysis, however, a simple approach 
was used.  For civilians and military personnel, the full potential agency contribution, 
equating to 5% of annual salary, was used.  For industry employees, a notional company 
contribution of 3.5% was used.    
Crisp calculations of the value of paid absences were stymied by the methods of 
accounting for such benefits.  In the military model (a 24-hour, 7-day-per-week operational 
context), personnel are granted approximately 30 days off per year, but additional leave is 
sometimes authorized.  On the other hand, additional duty days are often required.  In this 
comparison, 25 days was chosen as representative of the leave utilized by military 
personnel.  Active-duty personnel are also entitled to unlimited sick leave; for this 
comparison, three days of sick leave per year was assumed.  For each of the three civilian 
grades, annual leave was valued at six hours per pay period (the level afforded to 
employees with fewer than 15 years of federal service).81  For the civilian grades, it was 
assumed that the average employee takes three days of sick leave annually.  Finally, 
federal holidays added 10 days per year to the paid-absence total for civilian and military 
personnel.  For paid absences in the private sector, a factor of 22 days per year (combined 
total of family/personal, sick leave, and federal holidays) was used. 
Qualitative Analysis: The Interviews  
To check the realism of these assumptions, while collecting qualitative data on the 
non-monetary factors that help retain high-quality personnel, I embarked upon more than 30 
in-depth interviews with both public- and private-sector managers during the months of 
February and March 2010.  My research study was publicized via Linkedin.com, a career-
oriented networking site,82 to several DoD-oriented groups, as well as through word of 
mouth to other colleagues.  Targeted participants were managers with a minimum of 15 
years of experience, working for at least two of the three types of employers (military, DoD 
civilian, or contractor).  My interview questions were designed to capture both sides of the 
principal-agent relationship.  After all, managers are familiar with both sides of that equation: 
They serve as principals on behalf of their organizations, but they perform as agents 
themselves.   
Interviewees were given read-ahead material, so that the interviews could be 
conducted within a 45-minute timeframe, either face-to-face or via telephone. Given time 
constraints, I had to solicit input via e-mail in a few cases.  Lacking a two-way mechanism 
                                                
81 While most senior civilians have more than 15 years of service, it is probable that their program-office duties 
preclude the full use and enjoyment of leave benefits; accordingly, the figure used for comparison purposes was 
6 hours per biweekly pay period (or 19.5 days per year) of annual leave. 




for clarification and feedback in those exceptional cases, the questionnaires that were 
delivered via e-mail were reviewed thoroughly for consistency and realism.  A few responses 
had to be discarded for reasons of inconsistency.  While the interview questions were 
standard, they could be altered in order to fully explore the interviewees’ knowledge areas.  
In very few situations, the focus remained on financial compensation; in most cases, the 
range of topics encompassed a host of other intangible inducements, including 
organizational culture. 
The interviews took place in a variety of venues—in the cushioned alcoves of briskly 
percolating cafes, under the harsh lighting of 1940s-era government facilities, in modern 
high-rise offices, in the lobbies of posh hotels, behind the closed doors of unused 
conference rooms, and in quiet corners of company cafeterias.  Due to my limited travel 
budget, however, just as many interviews were conducted via telephone—from my desk in 
northern Virginia, from telework centers, and from my kitchen table.   
Compensation, I affirmed at the beginning of each interview, is a term that extends 
well beyond figures on a paycheck.  Compensation can be understood as the complete 
package of rewards for work performed in support of an organization.  The total package 
may include ESOPs, profit-sharing, bonuses, tuition assistance, rewards for improving 
credentials, subsidized childcare, transportation or food service, healthcare, retirement 
contributions, life insurance, housing, subsistence, travel, and relocation assistance, as well 
as flexible working arrangements (hours, location, job-sharing), home-office equipment, car 
allowances, and reinforcements such as event tickets, gift cards, and free coffee, soda and 
snacks (reminders that the organization is constantly paying you back for your hard work).   
“Industry Pays More” … Or Does It? 
In the Washington metropolitan area, one manager stated, “Industry jobs are $155K 
and up.  With ‘tickets,’ you can command another $20K.  Since the DoD salary range is now 
around $30K to $155K, it simply cannot compete for people who are after high salaries.”  
Another manager corroborated this: “As a person with ‘tickets’ and certifications, I make 
$175K per year.”  One manager with visibility into salaries (both CONUS and OCONUS) 
stated that program manager salaries range from $120K and $150K, with clearances and 
professional certifications potentially adding $5K to $20K to the base salary.  Yet another 
interviewee acknowledged that “top-level program managers make $160-$200K.  Of course, 
higher-level positions pay much more, about $300K and up.”  A civilian manager with 
cognizance over contractors observed that “nearly all senior-level industry folks, with or 
without managerial duties, make more than $100K here.  The program managers I work with 
are pulling down $160K to $180K in base pay.”   
While most interviewees applauded the pay flexibilities offered by industry, not all 
were able to secure high salaries initially.  “When I retired (as an O-5) and interviewed with a 
DoD organization that used paybanding, they equated my rank to a GS-12 or 13.  I made a 
sacrifice in terms of earning power to work within DoD, but I did not stay there.”  Similarly, a 
former Army officer recalled questionable salary advice while transitioning.  “My counselor 
recommended scaling back my pay expectations, but I knew that the only way to something 
close to the salary I wanted was to ask for it!”  Other retirees mentioned trade-offs: “Since I 
didn’t need healthcare insurance, I traded those for a higher salary.”  “When I moved to 
industry, there was more flexibility with salary, but I couldn’t negotiate more leave.  The 





“Non-taxable benefits are a big draw to me now. When first I left the military, I was 
shocked to see a large portion of my paycheck being taxed away.”  To attract contactors to 
support military operations in both hostile and non-hostile environments, one manager 
indicated that overseas employees were entitled to tax savings of $28,000 from non-taxable 
compensation.  
In industry, according to another manager, compensation is far more subjective. “I’ve 
seen salaries differing as much as 20% for people doing technically the same job.  I’ve seen 
vice presidents with almost a 100% difference in salary for the same job—at these higher 
levels, it comes down to this person’s contribution to the overall mission.  That’s hard to 
quantify because a lot of ‘soft’ assets—creativity, leadership and decision-making skills—
come into play.”  Another manager stressed that salaries for good people will be higher in 
industry than in government.  “You get what you pay for. If you have the good fortune to be 
able to hire the best people, do it! You can accomplish just as much with one great person 
as other companies can do with two or three average people.” 
Why, then, would a highly motivated performer want to work within the DoD?  Most 
of the interviewees pointed to the intrinsic rewards. “When I retired, I first worked as a 
contractor.  However, my leadership capabilities—those I had been refining throughout my 
entire military career—were just not used in that contractor role.”  Other retirees concurred. 
“It’s very hard, after being a key decision-maker, to just be an advisor, subservient to 
inexperienced program-office personnel who can easily dismiss my opinion.”  Another 
downside for military retirees joining private companies is that, in order to win business, they 
are often required to exploit relationships with people still working within the DoD. “The 
pressures that come with generating business are sometimes not worth the extra pay.”  
Bonuses and Awards 
Bonuses and awards, given their highly variable nature, are among the most 
interesting aspects of compensation.  One manager related that he had held positions with 
four different contractors, but had rarely heard of five-figure bonuses.   Another manager 
said that bonuses were relatively rare, but that everyone was eligible.  “Our bonuses are 
based on percentage of Award Fee dollars earned.  Our goal is to delight the customer, so 
our incentive is tied to that.”  Other managers revealed that bonuses are not typical: “Only 
the people who have invested at least 10 years with the company are eligible for bonuses.”  
“No one gets bonuses unless they’ve been with the company for a very long time.”  “In the 
companies I’ve worked with, the program manager did not get any special bonus.” “Only the 
most senior program managers get bonuses.” 
Other companies employed very different practices with respect to bonuses. “We 
notify employees at the beginning of their performance-assessment cycle of their eligibility.  
To get the bonus, there’s a range of compensation and goals/objectives to meet.  At the end 
of the cycle, feedback is provided, and a final payout decision is made.”  Another manager 
affirmed that “everyone is eligible for some type of bonus, based on our sector’s 
profitability.”  Still another stated, “Bonuses are based on project performance.  Meeting 
revenue and profit marks set by upper management constitutes half of the bonus, while the 
other half is subjectively determined by the direct supervisor.”  Another manager was 
pleasantly surprised: “I haven’t been with the company through the entire year, but I just 
received $2,800—after just four months on the job.”  Two other managers said, “Annual 
bonuses are an expectation of all employees.” “Bonuses are a great retention tool, but have 




customer satisfaction, business development, collateral duties, and participation in morale-
building activities. 
On the government side, civilian bonuses depend less on performance than on the 
size of the organization’s pay pools.  “Under NSPS,” said one manager, “individuals could 
be rewarded more fully.  However, to many of my senior folks, being recognized as a ‘five’ 
(top of the scale) is more important than money.”  Another manager concurred: 
“Disappointments among my engineers tend not to center on the paltry bonuses, but on not 
being rated ‘outstanding.’ With limited bonuses to go around—and personnel rules tying the 
amount to the rating—not everyone can achieve that top rating.”  Yet another civilian 
manager confirmed that the small bonuses are not enough to influence behavior: “We’re 
usually talking about 1% of salary here.  The good part is that people know and understand 
this.”  Military officers, on the other hand, can obtain special pay for specific job duties, but 
are not eligible for bonuses.  Instead, officers are motivated by the potential of future 
promotions.  
When asked about group bonuses to reward collaborative efforts, only one 
interviewee had been part of an organization that gave out group bonuses, and they 
represented a very small percentage of the overall compensation strategy.  To encourage 
cohesiveness and teamwork, many of the managers bestowed non-monetary recognition 
upon groups, during periodic award ceremonies, through letters of recognition, and within 
the context of monthly project reviews. 
Salary Reviews  
When asked about the frequency and the impact of salary reviews, one civilian 
jokingly feigned confusion over the question.  “I do what I do, and by all accounts I do it well.  
Nothing ever changes my salary—except cost of living adjustments.”  Another civilian 
provided clarity: “Because DoD organizations have become fairly flat, many technical 
experts can only go so far.”  Others concurred: “For military and civilians, performance 
reviews exist, but salary reviews really do not.”   
Within industry, salaries are usually reviewed annually, or “upon negotiation for an 
increase.”  Said one manager: “Most companies have an out-of-cycle process for unique 
situations that require immediate address.”  Increases of 3% to 15% per year were reported, 
with the higher increases afforded to lower-salaried personnel.  Sometimes, though, pay 
increases do not keep up with the cost of living.  “This year, given economic concerns, our 
company elected to freeze all salaries over $100K.”  Another manager revealed, “Depending 
on the economy, we get a 3-5% pay bump.  But anyone who’s been in this business awhile 
knows that the best way to increase your income is to play the mercenary role: Move over 
and move up!  You don’t gain a whole lot in terms of earning potential by staying with the 
same company.” Others agreed: “Sometimes, the only way to boost compensation is to 
leave your current company for a higher bidder.  Accordingly, industry employees often have 
a better sense of their market value.  With that comes a drive to work harder and move 
forward.” 
One manager pointed to an unintentional seniority disincentive. “If the average pay 
increase for 15 years was 2% per year, while salaries for new hires increased at 2.2% per 
year, eventually you will have new hires making more than the old timers, since prevailing 
rates were paid to lure new people, but only minor adjustments were made to keep the old.”  
Such problems are solvable, given the flexibilities of contractor systems.  One manager 
touted the opportunity to really look out for people, where appropriate.  He has autonomy 




“One time, an employee bargained for a 30% pay increase.  He was working on a cost-plus 
contract.  There’s no way I could ask the government to cover that, so I let him go and get 
that raise from another company.” 
Another manager reported conducting salary reviews after just six months for 
exceptional new hires, but emphasized that “salary reviews, by themselves, are not good 
retention tools.  Other things seem to matter a lot more.”  Clearly, retention of talent is not 
contingent solely upon economics.   
Other Aspects of Compensation: The Work Itself 
Fueled by technological advances, workplaces have fundamentally changed over the 
past decade.  Flexible working hours, mobile communication devices, and telework 
arrangements are largely taken for granted.  As such, they no longer hold great motivational 
power.  In 2010, the most frequently cited non-monetary forms of compensation centered 
upon aspects of the work itself.   A civilian pointed to travel opportunities. “My projects are all 
over the country, so I’m rarely stuck in my office for more than a few weeks at a time.” 
Another nodded to his colleagues. “They are well educated and motivated.  We don’t have 
to worry about back-stabbing from the inside!  Sure, there are politics everywhere, but here 
we don’t tend to have ‘camps’ and ‘cliques,’ as I’ve witnessed when I spend time at my 
contractors’ facilities.”  Other civilians concurred: “It’s definitely not Us versus Us.  Friction 
might fester between Us and Outsiders (e.g., Congress and resource sponsors), but this 
helps bolster that sense of shared mission. It keeps us together.”  
“My military career prepared me to move—had to go in, learn the ropes, and perform 
wherever I was sent.  Two or three years later, I had to pack up and do it all again.  To be 
successful, you needed agility of mind, and willingness to take on more responsibilities and 
manage risks.”  These experiences primed her for senior positions, which she found in the 
private sector, but has since moved back to the DoD, where she feels she can directly 
improve the livelihoods of soldiers and sailors.  Another retired officer emphasized intrinsic 
motivators. “After 20 years of leadership acculturation, I gravitate to positions where I am in 
charge.”  Having worked as a support contractor, “I couldn’t stop program offices from 
making bad decisions.  Now I can!”  Another retiree who has worked across sectors cited 
satisfaction in teaming with other strong female civilians, as well as people from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds. “Opportunities for this are far greater within DoD than in the 
traditional white, male, upper-middleclass network found in industry.” 
A civilian manager stated that “many of my senior folks hold patents and doctorate 
degrees.  Accordingly, they command fairly high salaries, but that’s not why they work. They 
just love what they’re doing!”  Similar sentiments came from another civilian manager, for 
whom money is not a big motivator.  “I feel that I’m making a positive difference.  Every 
morning I wake up energized to go to work and do great things!” As highly credentialed 
professionals move through their careers, money may become less important.  A civilian 
manager mentioned cases in which senior systems engineers took $50-70K pay cuts to 
come back to the DoD. “They wanted ‘quality of life’ things—respectful working 
environments and manageable workloads.” 
Certainly, job satisfaction can be found outside of the DoD as well.  One industry 
manager reminisced, “I’ve held jobs where I just loved the work—I was making a difference 
in soldiers’ lives, because I was right there, giving them the tools they needed.”  For another, 
“in taking the reins of a small company, I was trusted to make decisions without constraints.  
Somehow, the stockholders knew that I would do the right thing!  My goals were simple—to 




agreed that “too many rules lead to managers becoming robotic—just going through the 
motions—people need some latitude to be creative problem solvers.” 
Managing the Blended Workforce: Different Norms, Different 
Expectations 
When queried about the relative ease of managing civilians versus contractors, most 
interviewees stated that contractors could be relied upon to deliver results within the 
timeframe allocated.  If managed astutely by a strong Contracting Officer’s Representative 
(COR), the contractor will have firm deliverables, a well-defined scope, and established 
schedules.  This is less common on the government side, where deliverable dates tend to 
be flexible, budgets are complex, scope is virtually unlimited, and schedules stretch for 
many years.  One civilian offered that contractors “don’t see the breadth of our 
responsibilities.  Whereas a contractor might provide great support in a well-defined area, 
we are all over the place—steering diverse projects and programs—managing enormous 
amounts of money over long timelines.”  An industry manager offered that “DoD civilians 
face tremendous administrative hurdles in getting things done.”   
“There’s definitely more motivation for contractors to perform,” said a manager with 
experience on both sides. “That’s due to a higher paycheck, supposedly.  But I think there’s 
more to it.  There’s more focus—and a greater sense of accountability.” This could stem 
from less job security.  “Industry projects are very time sensitive.  Failure to make budget or 
meet deadlines usually translates to dismissal,” said one manager.  “If you screw up, you 
are history,” said another. “We have to take calculated risks in order to make things 
happen,” another industry manager said.  “Out here, you’ve got to produce…and 
quickly…making decisions and meeting customer demands.”  Managers with experience on 
both sides agreed that there are many culture-driven expectations regarding employees’ 
work habits. “Uncompensated overtime in industry is normal.  I log about 10 extra hours per 
week, but that’s just what I do as a professional.”  On the civilian side, “There’s no 
expectation that anyone should work more than a 40-hour week.  In the working-capital 
environment, the norm of working no more than 80 hours per two-week pay period was 
especially pronounced, because labor accounting there had to be a lot more precise.”   
A civilian shared a different perspective.  “My Blackberry-equipped program 
managers are almost always on duty. I can send them a question any time of the night, and 
I’ll have an answer within the hour.”  Although managers from both sides were quick to note 
DoD civilians who personified dedication and commitment, the general thinking was that 
“Civilian workers are a little bit too secure.”  “It’s hard to fire them—there are no grave 
consequences when they mess up.”  “There’s more acceptance of mediocrity.”  Disturbingly, 
one manager pointed to “few incentives for departing DoD experts to share knowledge with 
the junior folks, who are discouraged when they are not being challenged.”  Civilian time-in-
service promotions are another irritant: “People can move all the way up to GS-13 without 
necessarily performing strongly.”  Two contractors expressed sadness over the repeal of 
NSPS.  “Government managers really need a ‘stick’ to keep people productive. (They need 
better ‘carrots,’ too.)” 
Broadly speaking, performance expectations for military personnel and industry 
workers were perceived as being higher than they are for civilians.  These differences are 
driven by job-security issues (on the industry side), and the ability to gain promotions in rank 
(on the military side).  Some observed that “the culture within industry is similar in some 
ways to active duty.  You do whatever it takes to get the job done.” A civilian manager 




expectations.  “As a program manager, I always had a counterpart on the industry side with 
similar duties and concerns.  We understood one another and worked well together.  
Whenever our respective organizations had differences, we let the attorneys duke it out and 
we continued our collaborative engineering!”  
 “There are no problems with the blended workforce, as long as there’s good 
leadership.”  A civilian manager agreed: “People are people—we should adopt a ‘colorless 
badge’ ethic.”  An industry manager confirmed that “values are embedded in people, 
regardless of where they work.  That’s what the DoD customer is really buying—great 
people, strong ethics, professional judgment.  Of course, there are lines that cannot be 
crossed.  We develop products for decision-makers to use—Independent Cost Estimates, 
Acquisition Plans, Performance Work Statements, etc.—but we cannot support a program 
that our company might eventually bid on.”   
Hiring, Firing and Everything in Between 
“No rational private company would institute a personnel system like ours,” 
confessed one civilian manager.  Most DoD organizations have a fixed number of billets, 
and cannot initiate ad hoc hiring actions.  Processes must be followed; attritions are not 
automatically backfilled.  Another manager admitted, “when I worked in the private sector, I 
appreciated the speed and smoothness with which human resources functions were carried 
out.”   
Several retired officers were repelled by the application process for DoD jobs. “So 
much documentation, so many narratives on knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs)—who 
actually reads this stuff?”  When applying for DoD jobs, “you upload documents to a ‘black 
hole’ of a database, and don’t hear anything for months!  I considered DoD when I retired, 
but I have to put bread on the table.  I can’t wait six months for a call.”  Radically different 
stories came from this industry side:  “All I did was post my resume on the NCMA website, 
and within days, I had 20 potential interviews.  The first inquiry came within hours!”   
 “We have lots of flexibility to recruit and retain…without a lot of hassle,” said one 
manager.  With this discretionary power, though, comes perceptions of reduced 
transparency. Another manager stressed, “We seem to have few standards on years of 
experience needed, or the value of degrees and certifications.  It’s very subjective, and 
when employees ask what they need to do in order to get promoted, I cannot offer much 
guidance, except to keep performing!” 
“On firing, our rules are obviously looser than DoD’s.  As a director, I could fire for 
cause (e.g., harassment) or for non-performance.  I could fire any of my direct reports on the 
spot for serious infractions (e.g., assault).”  As chronicled in the preceding section, many 
managers are concerned over difficulties in terminating non-performing civilians. “Deadwood 
does exist,” stated one. “Non-performers get shuffled around, but only rarely do we find a 
better fit that fixes the performance problem.”  “Unfortunately, the lack of productivity from 
poor performers puts more pressure on the civilians who do try to make things work,” a 
civilian explained. “This can lead to frustration and the exodus of good employees.”  
 Other examples of inflexible rules emerge when DoD civilians obtain attractive offers 
from other DoD organizations: The employing organization cannot respond.  “It’s hard to 
keep my best folks from being lured away,” said a senior manager.  “I must recruit very 





Proactive succession planning is also critical.  “We mentor all GS-14s and GS-15s,” 
said a civilian manager. “That way, no one feels singled out or neglected.  These are our 
senior folks—the ones next in line to lead.  Whether or not they get that promotion, they’re 
the ones running departments and divisions now, so they need to stay energized.”   
Mentoring younger workers is also key. “With Generation Y, the ‘thou shalt stay’ mentality is 
counterproductive.  We need to engage in enterprise-level thinking.  Every person needs to 
find the best environment in which to use their skills.  For some, it’s within DoD; for others, 
it’s with a DoD contractor.  By taking this broader view, we can encourage young people to 
find their own way, without stifling growth and confining them to stovepiped organizations.” 
Compensation, Culture and Contracts: Conclusion 
This study was conducted in two phases, which sometimes overlapped and required 
additional iterations. While the first phase involved gathering, normalizing and organizing the 
quantitative data, the second was aimed at gaining a richer understanding of the data via 
qualitative interviews with highly experienced managers.  My goal was to produce a 
balanced view of compensation practices, situated within particular organizational cultures, 
thereby infusing principal-agent theory with embeddedness theory.  From a sheer economic 
perspective, the compensation packages of DoD employees compare favorably with those 
of contractor employees.  However, flexibilities in contractor personnel systems open up 
possibilities for much higher earnings if an employee is willing to work hard, take risks, and 
deliver results.  From a more sociological perspective, retention of employees is aided by a 
positive, mission-focused culture, which can be created and sustained both in contractor 
and DoD organizations provided that strong, effective leaders are present.  In conclusion, to 
motivate strong performance,  organizations have a variety of tools from which to choose.  
These tools transcend base salary to encompass a shared sense of purpose, positive 
morale, leadership development, mentoring, and fresh ways of thinking about career 
progressions. When reinstituting the GS system, the DoD should fully leverage the 
management flexibilities and workforce incentives (toward these ends), as authorized by 
Congress. 
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Abstract 
Large, complex Defense Department weapons system acquisition programs have 
been plagued by cost overruns, delayed schedules, and subpar performance. Much of the 
blame has been placed on government program managers (PMs). This study provides a 
new perspective on government PM competencies by surveying defense industry managers 
who work with the government PMs on a day-to-day basis. 146 industry managers rated the 
importance of PM competencies and assessed how well, from their perspective, their 
government PM counterparts met those competencies. The data gathered from this survey 
revealed several surprising insights, including a conclusion that government program 
managers’ performance on several key technical skills may need improvement. The results 
of this study may be useful in updating training and development strategies for government 
PMs to improve program outcomes. 
Introduction 
The US Department of Defense uses a program management structure to acquire its 
sophisticated sea-, land-, air-, and space-based systems. Under this management 
paradigm, a civilian or military program manager, leading a team of government engineers, 
logisticians, business and financial managers, contracting officers, and administrative 
personnel, is responsible for the development and delivery of his or her system. The GAO 
reported in 2005 (p. 14) that there were 729 program managers executing programs in the 
DoD.  
In a typical defense project, the government team works closely with representatives 
of the operational (warfighter) community to understand new system needs and 
requirements and to translate these needs into performance or technical specifications. The 
government team is responsible for cost and schedule estimates for the program, as well as 
for describing the procurement and contracting approaches, test and evaluation plan, and 
the strategy for supporting the system over its lifecycle. These plans and strategies evolve 
within a complex bureaucracy of checks and balances that provides oversight and 




After plans are in place for the acquisition, the government program team creates a 
contract solicitation and accepts proposals and bids from companies in the defense industry. 
After a contract is awarded, the government team works closely with its industry partner to 
proceed to system development. This process is typically slow and methodical, proceeding 
through a series of decision milestones in which progress is gauged by an oversight official 
above the program manager’s organizational level. Throughout the development program, 
the government PM must advocate and negotiate for his or her program’s funding, 
requirements, program scope, schedule, personnel, and myriad other details. The PM must 
also work closely with the contractor to evaluate alternative technologies and industrial 
processes, monitor contractor spending and adherence to program schedule, evaluate 
progress and quality of workmanship, and provide general oversight to protect the 
government’s equities. Since the end of the Cold War, defense acquisition has undergone 
significant transformation and downsizing, and the government relies more heavily on 
contractors for detailed designs to meet program objectives (Nissen, Snider & Lewis, 2002). 
This has created greater partnering and closer relationships between government program 
teams and their industry counterparts (Jones, 1997). 
The government program manager must be technically competent, able to manage 
technology and system engineering as well as software and information systems, and 
understand manufacturing and industrial processes. He/she must demonstrate key business 
competencies such as financial management, contracting, and cost estimating. The PM 
must exercise management acumen in developing and executing the program strategy, 
managing core processes, and dealing with the day-to-day management challenges of a 
large, complex program. The PM must also exhibit leadership competencies when leading 
blended government-industry teams or engaging in negotiations and advocacy with 
customers and stakeholders. Fox and Miller (2006) summed up the management challenge 
this way:  
Managing [a large complex project] is more than a science; it is a continually 
evolving art… Managers must augment a strong foundation of conventional 
management skills in planning, organizing, and controlling, with knowledge of the 
requirements, resources, and constraints of a specific project as it progresses. (p. 
109)   
Purpose of the Study 
Given that PMs must possess an expansive portfolio of required competencies, it is 
natural to ask whether some competencies may be more important in helping to assure 
program success. For example, research by Bauer (2006) asserted that management 
competence is perceived to be more important for defense and aerospace industry program 
managers than technical skills. One might assume that the same would be true for 
government PMs in the same industry, and this is one key aspect that this study sought to 
examine.  
The purpose of this study, then, was to (a) determine the relative importance of key 
competencies of government PMs and (b) assess PM performance against these 
competencies.  In this way, it would be possible to rank-order competencies according to 
their perceived importance to program success and to compare these to PM performance.  
In this way, a reasonable path forward might be identified to help strengthen PM 
competencies through training and development.   
Most PM competency studies in the literature, however, are either self-studies in 




they are studies in which immediate supervisors of the program managers are surveyed.  
This study took a different approach. Leveraging the close working relationship between the 
government and industry program manager, this study captured opinion data from industry 
managers to provide a more objective peer assessment and to avoid potential “blind spots” 
in the self-assessed competency data contained in the current literature.  
Research Questions 
The research questions for this study were: 
1. Which project management competencies are perceived by industry 
managers as most important in government program managers? 
2. How well are government program managers perceived by their industry 
partners to be meeting those competencies? 
Competency Theory and Program Management Competencies  
The roots of competency theory originate in Frederick Taylor’s studies of scientific 
management, breaking complex tasks into manageable constituents, and assigning 
specialized workers using standardized manufacturing processes to each task to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness (1911). Implicit in Taylor’s study was the assumption that the 
more competent the worker becomes at each specific work task, the more successful the 
overall job will be. These work studies, however, tended to be highly detailed and task-
oriented, rather than focused on the skills and abilities of the individual worker. Indeed, 
optimizing tasks and training individuals to become specialists, as with a manufacturing 
assembly line, may create a workforce with little flexibility or incentive for creativity 
(Womack, Jones & Roos, 1991).  
The search for competence is more closely focused on the individual and attempts to 
identify the ideal attributes of a high-performing worker (McClelland, 1973). Early efforts to 
understand what makes individuals competent focused primarily on human intelligence 
factors. It was reasoned that the more intelligent a person is, the better he or she will learn, 
adapt, and perform on any given job. Research on intelligence testing and improvement 
ensued, but in the end, yielded few real gains for organizations (Berger & Berger, 2003).  
Harvard psychologist David McClelland was one of the first to argue effectively 
against the prevailing intelligence-centric view of job competence. He is considered by many 
to be the pioneer of modern competency theory (Draganidis & Mentzas, 2006; Garman & 
Johnson, 2006; Ruth, 2006). In his seminal work, McClelland (1973) argued that 
competence—work-related knowledge, skills, behaviors, and abilities—was a better practical 
predictor of superior work performance than was intelligence. McClelland further argued that 
intelligence tests were discriminatory and therefore largely invalid, “favoring certain ethnic 
and socioeconomic groups” (Gale, 2007, p. 143). McClelland suggested the more direct 
approach of testing job performance against required skills, which is the approach still used 
in most modern competency methodologies. 
However, universal definitions of competence, competency, and competencies are 
difficult to find in the literature and are not generally agreed upon (Whiddett & Hollyforde, 
2003). Gale (2007) argued that defining competence is difficult because “competence is a 
normative concept rather than a descriptive one” (p. 145). He went on to say that 
competence is being “concerned with the capacity to undertake specific types of actions, 




knowledge, performance, and quality of application” (p. 145). In a similar, but more 
practitioner-focused vein, Parry (1998) defined competency as “a cluster of related 
knowledge, attitudes, and skills that affects a major part of one’s job (i.e., one or more key 
roles or responsibilities); that correlates with performance on the job; that can be measured 
against well-accepted standards; and that can be improved via training and development” 
(p. 60).  
Operationally, managing competence in an organization involves identifying a set of 
highly desirable attributes that can positively influence desired organizational outcomes. 
Researchers and practitioners seek to create competencies and competency models that 
can be used to influence hiring, retention, and training practices to improve the quality of the 
organizational workforce. To meet this desire, the most common working definitions in the 
literature have included some aspects of technical, social or interpersonal, and cognitive or 
problem-solving that, ideally, can be measured and improved over time. In practice, many 
organizations, like the American Society of Training and Development (Bernthal et al., 2004, 
p. xix), and the Project Management Institute (PMI, 2002) have adopted working definitions 
relating individual behaviors with job performance, which they believe can be of value as the 
starting point for identifying specific competency-related attributes and developing effective 
competency models.  
Program Manager Competencies 
Project management is a relatively new field of professional endeavor. Much of the 
research into those things that make projects successful is also relatively recent. Crawford 
(2006) summarized this brief history: 
The first signs of project management as a distinct field of practice were the network 
analysis and planning techniques, like PERT and CPM, that emerged in the 1950s 
for use on major projects in construction, engineering, defense, and aerospace 
industries. Users of these tools and techniques recognized shared interests leading 
to the formation of project management professional associations in the 1960s, 
initially to facilitate knowledge sharing between practitioners. The mid-1990s were a 
crucial point in the development of project management standards and related 
certification programs (p. 75). 
In the United States and many international locations, project manager standards 
and certifications have been developed by the Program Management Institute (PMI). The 
PMI identified the knowledge, skills, abilities, and behaviors needed to be an effective 
project manager through its Project Management Competency Development Framework 
(PMI, 2002). This framework operationalizes Parry’s definition of competencies and 
describes PM competencies along three dimensions: knowledge (what PMs know), 
performance (what PMs do with the knowledge), and personal competency (how PMs 
behave—their attitudes and personality traits) (PMI, 2002). The overall approach and goal of 
the PMI is consistent with Toney’s (2002) view that “application of validated competencies 
assures project customers and stakeholders that the probability of project success is 
improved” (p. xix). Crawford (1997) advanced the idea that there is a causal relationship 
between PMI competencies and job performance, lending a strategic notion to competency 





The Need for Competent Defense Program Managers 
For the past several decades, news reports of $600 toilet seats, poor performance of 
battlefield equipment, and cancelled programs have been all too commonplace (Besselman, 
Arora, & Larkey, 2000; Samuel, 2003). The Defense Acquisition Program Assessment 
(DAPA) Report of 2006 asserted that:  
Both Congress and the Department of Defense senior leadership have lost 
confidence in the capability of the Acquisition System to determine what needs to be 
procured or to predict with any degree of accuracy what things will cost, when they 
will be delivered, or how they will perform. (Kadish, p. 1) 
“Program manager’s expertise” was identified in the report as one of the top five 
issues contributing to the poor performance (Kadish, p. 3).  In 2008, there was sharp 
criticism of both poor performance of the defense acquisition system and the program 
managers who run those acquisition programs. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), an independent research arm of the US Congress, commented recently that the 
DoD needed to “strengthen training and career paths as needed to ensure program 
managers have the right qualifications for running the programs they are assigned to” 
(Sullivan, 2008, p. 16).  
Improving program manager competencies is believed to be essential to improving 
the overall performance of the defense acquisition system. Identifying key competencies 
that drive program performance and specific shortfalls in program manager knowledge, 
skills, and abilities is an important first step and the aim of this study. 
Research Methodology 
The independent variables in this study were the competencies of government PMs. 
These included 20 technical (hard) skills and 15 behavioral (soft) skills, as described below: 
Technical Project Management (Hard Skills) Competencies (C1-20) 
C1.  Determine program goals. The ability to work with program stakeholders in 
order to understand the program's requirements and specifications. 
C2.  Determine program deliverables. The ability to work with program 
stakeholders to generate a scope of work, requirements, and/or specifications 
for the program. 
C3.  Technical ability. The ability to understand and be conversant in the core 
technologies of product/deliverables of the program. 
C4.  Document program constraints. The ability to lead the program team to 
uncover and document possible program constraints that could affect 
program completion. 
C5.  Document program assumptions. The ability to lead the program team to 
determine information that must be validated or situations that must be 
controlled during the program process in order to facilitate program planning. 
C6.  Define program strategy. The ability to evaluate possible strategies or 





C7.  Quality assurance. The ability to identify performance criteria using 
product/service specifications, technical expertise, and standards to ensure 
performance standards are met, customer expectations are met, and 
processes are analyzed for further improvements. 
C8. Identify resources requirements. The ability to identify key resource 
requirements needed to support planning and decision-making. 
C9. Develop a budget. The ability to complete cost estimates and produce a 
program budget to support planning and decision-making. 
C10. Create a work breakdown structure (WBS). The ability to use the scope of 
work and other project documents to develop a work breakdown structure to 
facilitate project planning. 
C11. Develop a schedule. The ability to complete a program schedule that 
supports planning and decision-making. 
C12. Develop a resource management plan. The ability to develop and publish a 
resource management plan (human resources, procurement, etc.) by 
identifying resource requirements and obtaining commitment from internal 
and external assets that enable completion of all program activities. 
C13. Establish program controls. The ability to establish program controls by 
establishing targets and plans, measuring actual performance, comparing 
actual performance against planned performance, and taking necessary 
actions to correct the situation. 
C14. Develop program plan. The ability to develop a formal comprehensive 
program plan documenting deliverables, acceptance criteria, process, 
procedure, and tasks to facilitate program completion. 
C15. Communicate program status. The ability to produce program reports and 
presentations that provide timely and accurate program status and decision-
support information to upper management, customers, and fellow team 
members. 
C16. Measure program performance. The ability to compare actual results to a 
documented baseline in order to identify program trends and variances. 
C17. Implement corrective action. The ability to take timely corrective action by 
addressing the root causes in the problem areas in order to eliminate or 
minimize negative impact to the program. 
C18. Implement change control. The ability to track and document all potential 
improvements and other changes in scope, specifications, cost, or schedule 
and analyze the consequences of these changes in relation to the overall 
project.  
C19. Respond to risk. The ability to respond quickly to risk event triggers in 
accordance with the risk management plan in order to keep the program on 
schedule and within budget. 
C20. Conduct administrative closure. The ability to conduct financial closure and 




Personal (Soft Skill) Competencies (CS1-15) 
CS1. Project leadership. The ability to set a vision, identify the action steps, and 
motivate others to maintain their commitment to program success. The ability 
to influence a team to willingly work toward predetermined program 
objectives. 
CS2. Flexibility. The ability to adapt and deal with situations and manage 
expectations during periods of change and uncertainty during a program. 
CS3. Sound business judgment. The ability to stay focused on the business target. 
The program manager knows the organization's business purpose of 
program and makes decisions within that context. 
CS4. Trustworthiness. The ability to build positive working relationships and 
credibility with team members, upper management and stakeholders. 
CS5. Communication style. The ability to adapt one's communication style to fit the 
situation and the audience. The ability to present information without bias and 
exchange information in a clear and unambiguous manner. 
CS6. Listening Skills. The ability to ensure all team members have a chance to 
provide input to the program. The ability to read body language and perceive 
group dynamics. 
CS7. Setting and managing expectations. The ability to communicate with all 
program stakeholders, especially customers, and address program 
objectives, timelines, budgets, risks, and estimates. The ability to clearly 
communicate program changes and/or adjustments with support rationale to 
the customer in a proactive manner. 
CS8. Negotiations. The ability to develop win-win situations that culminate with 
both parties being satisfied with the final agreement. 
CS9. Issue and conflict resolution. The ability to understand and implement conflict 
resolution models for resolving issues and preventing the conflict from 
affecting the program's outcome. 
CS10. Organizational skills. The ability to arrange program activities in such a way 
that they systematically contribute to the program's goals. 
CS11. Coaching. The ability to provide feedback to team members and stakeholders 
in a positive manner that builds trust and credibility.  
CS12. Facilitation. The ability to facilitate or guide team members through a process 
that helps them discover answers and overcome barriers to successful 
program completion. 
CS13. Decision making. The ability to make the best choice from among many 
alternatives. 
CS14. Problem solving. The ability to identify issues, to conduct accurate 
assessments of the issues, and propose viable solutions to issues. 
CS15. Team building. The ability to encourage and enable people to work together 






An online survey questionnaire was developed for this study that consisted of three 
parts: (a) ratings for technical (hard) skills, (b) ratings for management/leadership (soft) 
skills, and (c) demographic questions about the participant and program. The survey used in 
this study was a modification of one used by Golob (2002) to identify competencies that 
might be useful in hiring or promotion decisions for project managers.  The modified survey 
instrument was subjected to an expert review.  Pilot study data were validated through item 
analysis, and Cronbach’s alpha tests.  
The survey instrument asked industry participants to assess the importance of the 20 
technical and 15 management (soft-skill) competencies to program success, and then to 
assess how well, in his or her judgment, their government counterpart performed in those 
competencies. Each of the responses was based on a 5-point Likert-type scale. Participants 
were asked to assess the importance of each competency to program success with ratings 
from 1 (indicating that competency is unimportant/not needed) to a value of 5 (indicating that 
the competency is extremely important). In assessing performance against each 
competency, the participant rated each from 1 (indicating that the government PM is not 
meeting the competency) to a value of 5 (indicating that the PM is working at an expert 
level). Four additional demographic questions were asked about the study participant and 
his/her program experience. 
Survey Responses 
 Using the 2005 GAO (p. 14) estimate of 729 programs in the Department of 
Defense, an appropriate sample size was calculated. Alreck and Settle (1995) suggest a 
non-probability sample of about 10% of the parent population, or approximately 73 
respondents, based on the estimated population.  Another, more conservative, approach 
was to calculate the number needed for a probability sample.  In this case, assuming a 95% 
confidence level with a ±10% confidence interval, as shown in the calculation below, the 
minimum sample size would be 85 participants.   
To protect the anonymity of participants and their companies, senior executives from 
several defense industry corporations were asked for assistance in referring potential study 
participants in their companies who were managing defense programs.  Since, by some 
estimates, only about a 30% response rate could be expected from Internet surveys (Sue & 
Ritter, 2007), each executive was asked to refer 75 to 100 program managers to the online 
survey to assure a sample size of at least 85 participants.  In all, 146 surveys were 
completed, well exceeding the original 85 target.  An additional 71 were started but 
abandoned, and 83 were started but not completed by the survey closeout date.  
Demographics 
The survey asked four questions to help understand the study participants and the 
programs they managed: 
1. How many years experience do you have as a program/project manager? 
2. What is the Acquisition Category (ACAT) rating of your program? 
3. What is the acquisition phase of your program? 
4. On average, how often do you communicate with the government Program 




Over 78% of participants reported that they had 10 or more years of experience, and 
nearly half (48%) reported that they managed some of the largest, most complex programs 
(ACAT I or II) in the Department of Defense. These responses indicate that the participants 
were highly experienced project managers with significant responsibility for managing 
challenging programs, thus they should be expected to have a good practical understanding 
of the competencies involved in complex program management. 
Almost half the participants indicated that their programs were beyond development 
and into the later, more mature production and deployment phases. When asked to rate the 
frequency of interaction with their government counterparts, over three quarters of 
participants indicated that they communicated with their government counterparts often, 
very often, or daily, indicating that responses were generally well informed. Demographic 
responses are shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Survey Demographics 
Category 
 
Variable N % 
Experience Level in Years 15 or more  64 44.1 
 10-14  50 34.5 
 5-9  19 13.1 
 0-4  
 
12 8.3 
Program Acquisition Category  ACAT I 54 37.2 
ACAT ACAT II 16 11.0 




Program Phase Production & Deployment 71 49.0 
 Sys Design & Development 53 36.6 
 Technology Development 19 13.1 
 Concept Refinement 
 
2 1.4 
Communication Frequency  Daily 43 30.1 
with Government PM Very Often 48 33.6 
 Often 21 14.7 
 Occasional 19 13.3 
 Infrequent 12 8.4 
Research Question 1 
Survey data were analyzed to address the first research question: “Which project 
management competencies are perceived by industry managers as most important in 
government program managers?” Participants responded to a list of 20 technical 
competencies (C1 through C20) and 15 soft skill competencies (CS1 through CS15), rating 
the relative contribution of each to program success. Each competency was listed on the 




Unimportant, or Very Unimportant. Figure 1 shows the average scores for each 
competency.
 




The data show that most of the competencies scored quite high for their 
contributions to program success (mean = 4.33). The high scores affirmed the selection of 
appropriate competencies that most influence program success, but the close rankings limit 
the ability to clearly identify only a few competencies from the list that have the greatest 
impact.  
The highest-rated competencies represented a mix of technical and soft skills. The 
most valued technical skills were the ability to determine program goals and deliverables 
and to develop a program budget. Such results are not surprising. Among others, Pinkerton 
(2003, p. 53) pointed out that the first criterion for project success is to have clearly defined 
goals and objectives. It is important for the government to specify the deliverables from the 
project, and it is equally important for industry, because deliverables define the 
government’s expectations in concrete terms. Similarly, a sound program budget is 
important to match resources to goals and deliverables. Fox and Miller (2006) observed how 
these skills must be related: 
Managing a [large, complex project] is more than a science; it is a continually 
evolving art. …managers must augment a strong foundation of conventional 
management skills in planning, organizing, and controlling, with knowledge of the 
requirements, resources, and constraints of a specific project as it progresses. (p. 
109) 
The most highly rated soft skills included trustworthiness, project leadership, and 
decision-making. The importance of trust to proper organizational and inter-organizational 
functioning has been widely documented in the literature (Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Joseph & 
Winston, 2005; Wells & Kipnis, 2001). Trust may be particularly important in large, complex 
projects in which not every expectation can be instantiated in the government-industry 
contract. Trust and understanding between the government and industry managers are 
essential to minimizing conflict, fostering cooperation, and succeeding.  
In a complex defense project, the government program manager must be the leader 
who sets the vision and goals, motivates the team, and is committed to program success. 
This role cannot be assumed by the industry manager or by any other member or 
stakeholder in the program. Related to this idea, the government PM must be willing and 
capable of making and influencing the myriad daily decisions and choices that shape the 
outcomes of a program. Imparting a good deal of wisdom, Fox and Miller (2006) noted, 
“Skilled project managers focus more on monitoring and influencing decisions, and less on 
giving orders. Clearly, project managers have substantially more responsibility than 
authority” (p. 124).  
In such a complex environment that requires delicate balancing of program goals 
and powerful stakeholder interests, it is unlikely—perhaps impossible—for program manager 
decisions to be entirely based on rational, stepwise decision making aimed at clear-cut 
outcomes.  Rather, it is more likely that program manager decision-making is better 
explained by behavior theory (Cyert & March, 1992).  In this theory, complex decisions are 
the outcome of organizational behavioral factors such as quasi-resolution of conflicting 
program goals and avoidance, when possible, of uncertainties that create program risk.  
Program Complexity and Experience 
One question arising from the data was whether or not the program complexity or the 
experience level of survey participants might affect the ranking of competencies for 




more challenging to manage. Program management teams for more complex programs are 
typically larger, with more stakeholders who have greater influence. Larger programs are 
subjected to higher levels of oversight and scrutiny; they are required to do more formal 
planning and documentation and are subject to more frequent and detailed reports on 
status. Program managers of large, complex programs have a greater scope of 
responsibility and a substantially larger span of control, and, conceivably, these program 
managers require a different set of skills and competencies. 
To determine whether program cost and complexity influenced the ranking of 
competencies for importance, an additional test was performed on the data. A t-test was 
performed on the competency importance means to examine the responses of managers of 
highly complex ACAT I programs in comparison to those of participants in lower acquisition 
category programs. The results showed no significant statistical differences (95% 
confidence level) between the perceptions of these two groupings of industry program 
managers.  
Similarly, the experience level of program manager participants could have 
influenced the judgment used in rating the importance of competencies. A t-test was 
conducted on the dataset by splitting it between participants with more than 10 years of 
experience and those with less. As with the ACAT level, experience level seemed to have 
little effect on perceived competencies, with two exceptions.  
From the t-test, experience seemed to influence the rating of competencies CS5 
(Communication style) and CS13 (Decision-making). Communication style was more highly 
rated by less experienced participants with a 4.39 mean, versus a 4.16 mean for participants 
with greater than 10 years of experience. Conversely, decision-making was rated more 
highly by more experienced participants with a mean score of 4.65. Less experienced 
participants rated this competency 4.39.  
The importance of decision-making skills in a government program manager is 
critical to program success. That this skill is more highly valued by experienced industry 
managers is an insightful finding. Similarly, the ability to exchange information in a 
meaningful way, especially in the collaborative environment of a government-industry 
project, seems to resonate with less experienced managers who may feel a greater need or 
appreciation for the government PM to clearly articulate program direction. It may be 
noteworthy that improving communication between government and industry was 
recognized as a key factor in program success and one of the motivating forces behind the 
Department of Defense acquisition reform initiative of the late 1990s (Jones, 1997). 
Research Question 2 
Survey data were also collected to answer the second research question: “How well 
are government program managers perceived by their industry partners to be meeting those 
competencies?” The questionnaire asked participants to respond to each of the 
competencies with their assessment of how well their government PM counterpart met the 
competency. The Likert scale observations included ratings of Expert, Good, Average, Fair, 










It is noteworthy that the average from all the participants rates government PM 
performance between fair and good, with most nearer average performance. This was 
disappointing, given the high stakes and expectations for managing billions of taxpayer 
dollars to provide critical defense systems to the battlefield.  
Sensitivity to Program Phase and Contact Frequency with 
Government PM 
To help understand whether the performance assessment responses provided by the 
industry participants may have been influenced by the program phase or the frequency of 
contact with government counterparts, additional statistical tests were conducted. It was 
considered possible that the phase of the program could have limited whether participants 
had the opportunity to observe the government PM performing some activities.  
For example, programs in production and deployment may have fewer planning 
activities required, such as developing a work breakdown structure or schedule, and less 
opportunity for these skills to be observed and assessed. Similarly, and perhaps more 
intuitively, the frequency of interaction between the government program manager and the 
industry counterpart could have affected the assessment of competencies. An industry 
manager who rarely worked directly with a counterpart may not have had the exposure to be 
able to formulate accurate assessments. Conversely, a situation providing closer 
observation could result in scores that are more reliable.  
To assess these eventualities, t-test calculations were used to check the competency 
performance against the participants’ program phase and frequency of communication. A t-
test of competency performance means versus program phase was performed first. The 
data set was bifurcated into (a) production and deployment (PD) and (b) data from earlier 
design and development intensive phases. In these two groupings, 67 participants reported 
programs in production and deployment, while 71 reported programs in earlier phases. The 
results showed no significant statistical differences (95% confidence level) between the 
perceptions of these two groupings of industry program managers in these different program 
phases. 
Similarly, a t-test was performed to determine if the performance means differed 
significantly with frequency of communication between industry participant and government 
PM. The data set was bifurcated between those who responded Daily or Very Often and 
those who had less frequent contact with their government counterpart. Here, too, there 
were no significant differences among responses from those who had daily or frequent 
contact with their government counterparts and those who had less contact, with two 
exceptions.  
For competency C14 (the ability to develop a program plan), those participants with 
more frequent contact had a higher average score of 3.30, versus 2.83 for those participants 
who communicated with their government counterpart less frequently. The other 
competency, CS15 (team building), differed, with participants who said they had more 
frequent contact with their government PM counterparts ranking this competency higher, 
with an average of 3.26 versus 2.89 for those participants reporting less frequent contact. 




Competency Performance Shortfall 
To answer the second research question in a manner that could provide insights for 
improving PM competency, the performance shortfall was determined. The most simplistic 
method used was to examine the lowest-rated competencies without regard to perceived 
importance. To do this, the difference was calculated between the best possible rating of 5.0 
and the average reported rating for each competency from the survey. By this measure, the 
top 10 competencies needing improvement are shown in Table 2 below.  




C 18 Implement change control 2.676 2.324 
C 12 Develop a resource mgt plan 2.860 2.140 
C S11 Coaching 2.874 2.126 
C 20 Administrative closure 2.884 2.116 
C 9 Develop a  budget 2.902 2.098 
C S8 Negotiation 2.927 2.073 
C 5 Document assumptions 2.971 2.029 
C S12 Facilitation 2.977 2.023 
C 4 Document program constraints 2.988 2.022 
C S3 Business judgment 2.985 2.015 
The downside to simply choosing the lowest-rated competencies, however, is that 
such a method does not consider the perceived importance of each competency toward 
program success. The competency implement change control, for example, ranked lowest in 
performance but was considered only moderately important. Similarly, while administrative 
closure ranked fourth lowest in performance, it was also last in importance. In identifying 
competencies for possible improvement, not only should performance itself be considered, 
but performance in relation to importance should be heeded as well. This was the aim of the 
next calculation. 
To ensure that the competency importance was considered more heavily when 
ranking competency shortfalls, a more complex computation was used to add more weight 
to competency importance. Employing a weighting model used by Borich (1980), the 
difference between competency importance and competency performance was multiplied by 
the mean competency importance. In other words: 
Step 1: mean competency importance - mean competency performance = 
discrepancy 
Step 2: discrepancy × mean competency importance = weighted discrepancy score 
The top-10 list derived from the Borich model is shown in Table 3. Using this method 
of weighting the shortfalls creates a different ranking of the competencies, favoring those 
with higher importance scores. Note that in this ranking, develop a budget ranked first 











I x (I-P) 
C 
9 Develop a budget 4.616 2.902 7.913 
C 
2 Determine program deliverables 4.753 3.268 7.060 
C 
18 Implement change control 4.308 2.676 7.030 
C 
1 Determine program goals 4.863 3.420 7.016 
C 
4 Document program constraints 4.466 2.978 6.643 
C 
11 Develop a schedule 4.527 3.088 6.519 
C 
13 Establish program controls 4.438 3.000 6.384 
C 
S15 Team building 4.538 3.132 6.378 
C 
S8 Negotiations 4.377 2.927 6.345 
C 
17 Implement corrective action 4.466 3.051 6.316 
In this list, a surprising number of technical skills topped the list, including develop a 
budget, implement change control, document program constraints, and determine program 
deliverables. Of the top 10 items, only two identified shortfalls were soft skills, and even 
these were near the bottom of the list: negotiation and team building.  
Conclusions 
The current study appeared to be the first in the literature to explore the 
competencies of Department of Defense program managers from the perspective of their 
industry counterparts. The data allowed for the ranking of competencies believed to 
contribute most importantly to program success and for an assessment of how well defense 
program managers met those competencies. From these results, a priority-ordered list was 
developed of competencies that could be candidates for improvement through training and 
development. The competencies ranking in the top 10 for importance represented a 
relatively even mix of technical and soft skills, as did the raw rankings of PM performance.  
However, when analysis was done to discover the variance between competency 
importance and performance, the results ranked many of the technical skills at the top of the 
list of candidates for improvement. This appeared contrary to assertions by Bauer (2006) 
and Golob (2002) that soft skills may be the most important to program success, and it 
contradicted Gadeken (2004), who suggested that defense PMs should seek soft-skill 
training. These findings seem to refute the conventional wisdom and may provide a valuable 






The implications of this study are clear for the practitioner. From the data, there 
appears to be a need for greater technical training and development in government program 
managers. The specific competency shortfalls identified in the analysis may be helpful in 
directing program managers and the training establishment toward specific skills that would 
benefit most from remediation.  
By extension, since government program managers depend upon their functional 
staffs for support in many of the technical skill areas, the current study may point toward 
shortfalls within those functional areas. For example, to help remedy the highest ranked 
shortfall, budget development, additional training may be needed in the business and 
financial management career field to provide better support to the program manager in this 
critical area. This may include instruction and practice on developing detailed program cost 
estimates, allocating budget appropriately to critical tasks in the work breakdown structure, 
and finding ways to respond to funding needs for emergent or evolving program changes.  
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Contracting for Complex Products  




The US Federal Government spends just under twenty percent of its budget buying 
everything from paper clips to complex weapons systems.  Effective contracting promises 
win-win exchanges: governments gain efficiency and qualities not available through in-
house production, and vendors win because the price is above their production costs.  
Markets are most likely to produce win-win outcomes when buyers and sellers can easily 
define and verify product cost, quality and quantities. We call these simple products.  
Markets for simple products tend to have large numbers of buyers and sellers who are well 
informed about each others’ offerings, can easily enter and exit the market, and can clearly 
define the terms of exchange.  In such ideal circumstances, contracts are relatively complete 
in that there are few unanticipated circumstances in which the buyers’ and sellers’ roles are 
not clearly defined.  If for some reason a buyer or seller fails to live up to her obligations, the 
transgression is quickly and easily recognized and a richly competitive market provides a 
replacement partner seeking similar terms.   
When markets fail, the win-win outcomes of contracting are replaced by lose-lose or 
win-lose outcomes where the winner’s gains are greater than the loser’s losses.  One 
source of market failure is buyer and seller uncertainty about the product in the exchange, 
what we call complex products.83  Unlike simple products, the cost, quality and quantity 
parameters of complex products can not be easily defined or verified, leaving buyers and 
sellers unable to clearly and completely define exchange terms (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001).84  
The risk is that the government is the only purchaser and once the contract is let, the vendor 
is the only viable supplier, leaving each with no easy exit from the contract, limited 
information about costs and quality, and engaging a partner relatively unconstrained by 
market pressures. The consequence is a collective action problem in which the buyer and 
                                                
83 In other cases, either the buyer or seller may be more uncertain about the product.  In cases where 
the seller has an information advantage, buyers cannot discern between high- and low-quality 
products and consequently pay only the price for low-quality goods less they be caught paying high-
quality prices for low-quality goods.  The result is a lemons market (Akerloff, 1970) in which the 
presence of low-quality products destroys the market for high-quality products.  Cases where the 
buyer has an information advantage are less problematic: the buyer has every incentive to share 
information (stimulating vendor competition) and markets are efficient at distributing information.   
84 There are many sources of market failures, including incomplete property rights, transaction costs, 
information asymmetries, and barriers to market entry and exit (e.g., Mankiw, et al., 2002).  Goods 
may be non-rivalrous or non-excludable so that transferable property rights cannot be established 
and enforced without transaction costs swamping gains from trade (Weimer & Vining, 1999).  
Historical accident may inefficiently lock-in path dependent technologies such as the QWERTY 
keyboard (David, 1985).  A common thread in these cases is that the market failure is caused by the 
transaction costs stemming from limited information among participants, particularly buyers, or from 
goal incongruence between the buyers and sellers.  Complex products can be viewed as just one 




seller have incentives to exploit contract ambiguities for their own gain at the other’s 
expense, risking mutually disadvantageous outcomes.   
In the business arena, the risk of market failure often justifies avoiding the market 
altogether, perhaps through vertically integrating production of the complex product 
(Williamson, 1991).  In the public sphere, legal mandates often require governments to 
provide goods and services where markets are prone to fail and government production is 
impractical.  Achieving public value in complex contracting requires transforming lose-lose 
conflict into win-win cooperation, a challenging though not impossible task, as the 
voluminous collective action literature suggests (e.g., Ostrom, 2000).  
Our theoretical approach suggests that contracting relationships between buyers and 
sellers are more fruitfully specified along several dimensions.  First, what is being 
exchanged in the relationship and how uncertain are the actors about the terms of exchange 
(e.g., are the products simple or complex?).  Second, what aspects of the relationship are 
formally detailed (such as in a contract) and which are left informal (as in a network)?  Third, 
how does the strategic context shape interactions between buyers (principals) and sellers 
(agents)?  Self interest leads to win-win outcomes in contracts for simple products, for 
example, while complex products can become prisoners’ dilemmas, as we show in this 
paper.  Depending on the nature of the strategic context, other forms are possible.   
In this paper, we first lay out the theoretical case for how complex contracting risks a 
collective action problem. Casting complex contracting as a prisoners’ dilemma suggests 
potential avenues for achieving win-win outcomes, but it also reveals how uncertainty 
threatens cooperation and accountability mechanisms. Second, we illustrate the analytic 
value of the complex contracting theory with the case of the Coast Guard’s controversial 
Deepwater project, a major acquisition program to upgrade and integrate its entire fleet of 
air and sea assets.  As we show in this paper, the exchange between the Coast Guard and 
the private consortium which took the lead on producing and delivering Deepwater assets 
occurred in a highly uncertain environment, with an incomplete contract with both formally 
specified and informal elements, and in a prisoners’ dilemma strategic context.   
Complex Products and Complex Contracting 
When making purchases, a buyer may be able to specify the objectives she wants to 
accomplish, but not the products and features which can accomplish them.  In some 
circumstances, a buyer may be able to specify the objectives she wants to accomplish 
through purchasing, but not the products and features which can accomplish them.  While 
complementary products can inform the buyer about product qualities, quantities and prices, 
sometimes the objectives are sufficiently unique that market signals about these products 
provide little guidance.  For complex products, the buyer has value uncertainty–she does not 
know the value of different products’ capabilities, qualities and tradeoffs among them–and 
the seller has cost uncertainty–he does not know the costs of producing the product with 
different capabilities and qualities to meet the buyer’s objectives (Hart & Moore, 2008).   
Incomplete Contracts 
Contracts specify each party’s obligations in an exchange, including the price, 
qualities, and quantities of the product.  The buyer’s obligations can include the payment 
terms and the terms under which the product is to be received (e.g. timing of delivery).  The 




combination of output specifications such as product qualities and quantities and input 
characteristics such as time and materials.85  The contract may also define each party’s 
discretion, perhaps through reference to public law for default rights and obligations (Brown, 
Potoski & Van Slyke 2006).    
Contract completeness is the degree to which the contract defines buyers and 
sellers’ rights and obligations across all future contingencies (Hart & Moore 2008; Tirole, 
1999; Bajari & Tadelis, 2001; Heinrich, 1999; Martin, 2004; O’Looney, 1998).  All contracts 
are incomplete to some degree because the future contains an infinite number of scenarios, 
not all of which can be specified in advance. At some point the costs of writing contract 
terms for all future scenarios exceed the mutual gains from the trade, and no contracting 
would occur. Because of ambiguity about how to design and build a product to meet the 
buyer’s objectives, and the associated costs faced by the seller, the two parties cannot 
specify all contract elements in advance.  Complex products lead to highly incomplete 
contracts.   
Asset Specific Investments  
There are two primary means to reduce complex products’ value and cost 
uncertainty – research and development and producing the product (i.e., learning by doing).  
Buyers can contract for both designing and/or building from sellers.  Negotiating and 
executing a contract for a complex product often requires buyer and seller to make asset 
specific investments.  Expenditures are asset specific to the extent they have no economic 
value outside the product being produced (Williamson, 2005).  For example, some research 
in the US space program produced economic value outside the contract (e.g., Tang), while 
other research produced little value outside the contract (e.g., spacesuits, at least as of 
2008).  Other asset specific investments in complex contracting include the buyer and seller 
customizing production processes to suit each others’ idiosyncrasies.  Asset specific 
investments are lost if the contract is not executed. 
Lock-In Risks 
The consequence of an incomplete contract, asset specific investments and an 
unpredictable future is the classic “lock-in” problem (Williamson, 1996).  A party becomes 
locked into a contract because it cannot redeploy its asset specific investments to other 
profitable endeavors; the other party can exploit unforeseen events and contract 
ambiguities.  For the buyer, the “lock-in” risk is that once a seller has been selected, no 
other potential sellers have made the necessary investments, and the advantaged seller 
may look to opportunistically exploit contract ambiguities perhaps by “gold plating” the 
product with costly features that increase his profits, but for the buyer add little value and 
considerable expense.  Likewise, because the seller has only one buyer for its products, the 
buyer may also opportunistically exploit contract terms for its own favor.  The buyer may 
force a seller, for example, to make changes to a product that raise costs above the 
negotiated price even though it well knows that a cheaper product would meet her needs 
almost as well.  In these circumstances, the exploiter’s gains can be smaller than the 
exploited party’s losses.   
                                                
85 Fixed-price contracts set compensation on the seller’s outputs while cost reimbursement contracts 
set compensation on inputs, such as time and materials.  These terms specify who generally bears 
cost risk: fixed price contracts place more of the cost risk on sellers and cost plus contracts place 




Absent lock-in problems, the buyer can simply replace an opportunistically behaving 
seller with a more suitable one, and a seller can likewise replace an opportunistic buyer.  
Lock-in problems coupled with incomplete contracts weaken the disciplining power of 
market forces.  Within a single complex contract, each party is likely to find itself 
simultaneously advantaged in some areas and vulnerable to exploitation in others.  Lock-in 
problems transform a contract from a market exchange to a political relationship whose 
outcomes are determined less by market forces and more by the strategic relationship 
between the buyer and seller.   
Strategy 
When performing in areas where the contract is vague, the buyer and seller’s 
behavior can be either perfunctory or consummate, using the terminology of Hart and Moore 
(2008) and Williamson (1975, p. 69).  Perfunctory behavior conforms to the bare minimum 
“letter” of the contract as enforceable by a court of law, while consummate behavior goes 
beyond what the bare minimum of the contract requires and towards greater win-win gain.  
Perfunctory behavior means accepting greater individual gain, but an almost certainly 
smaller mutual payoff.  Consummate behavior means forgoing a large unilateral gain in 
exchange for a smaller individual payoff from a potentially larger mutual gain.  For example, 
the complete portion of a contract can specify the number of jokes a hired comedian must 
tell, but it is impractical to specify how funny she should be when she tells them.  A 
consummate comedian would strive for big laughs while a perfunctory comedian would 
settle for mild giggles.  The degree to which the payoffs and penalties from consummate 
and perfunctory behavior affect contract behavior increases the more the contract is 
incomplete and the greater the lock-in problems.  The goal of contract management is to 
develop and foster consummate behavior.  
Complex Contracting as a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
The strategic implications of the lock-in contracting problem resemble a prisoners’ 
dilemma.  While not all contracting relations end up as prisoners’ dilemma problems–buying 
simple products, for example, is likely to produce win-win outcomes–viewing complex 
contracting through the prisoners’ dilemma (PD) lens helps diagnose the problem – why the 
failure risk is so high for these contracts–and identify its solutions–how to manage these 
contracts to transform lose-lose conflict into win-win cooperation.  In a prisoners’ dilemma 
game, two (or more) players choose whether to cooperate or defect, with the payoff of their 
choices jointly determined.  If both choose to cooperate, each receives a moderately high 
payoff and if both choose to defect, each receives a moderately lower payoff.  If one elects 
to cooperate while the other defects, the defector receives a very high payoff and the 
cooperator a very low one.   
The buyer’s and seller’s complex contracting strategy options are analogous to 
prisoners’ dilemma strategies (see Table 1).  Perfunctory performance is analogous to 
defecting: it increases the performer’s payoff but by a smaller amount than the reduction in 
payoff for the other party.   Consummate behavior produces the higher mutual payoff for 
both, but risks the suckers payoff (a payoff of 1 in Table 1) if the other player elects to 
pursue perfunctory performance.  The size of the payoffs in Table 1 increases with the 
degree the contract is incomplete and the degree of asset specific lock-in problems.  For 
example, perfunctory seller behavior causes little harm when buying a simple commodity, 
like flour, and absent lock-in problems, troublesome sellers can easily be replaced with 




practice, one side’s advantages are likely to be greater, although the underlying logic of our 
theory holds so long as each side has some lock-in advantage over the other.    
Table 1. The Complex Contract Dilemma 
   
   
Buyer 
  Consummate Perfunctory 
Consummate 
 
3,  3 
S,  B 
 
1,  4 






4,  1 
S,  B 
 
2,  2 
S,   B 
Achieving win-win complex contracting outcomes requires changing the buyer’s and 
seller’s incentives from perfunctory behavior (defection) to consummate (cooperation) 
performance.  The challenge therefore is to change the payoff structure to another type of 
game (Lichbach, 1996).   First, the buyer and seller can seek credible commitments to 
cooperate, such as by submitting themselves to external supervision.  For example, 
perfunctory behavior may damage a firm’s reputation, making it a less attractive partner for 
future complex contracts.  Second, if both the buyer and seller care about the future and the 
PD game is played over multiple rounds, cooperation can be achieved through a “tit-for-tat 
strategy” in which both sides initially cooperate and then mirror the other party’s behavior 
from the previous round. 
The Impact of Nature 
While changing the payoff structure of the game increases the possibility of 
cooperation for complex contracting, external uncertainty, or ambiguity about the impact of 
future events or states (Heide & Miner, 1992), can undermine the prospects of cooperation, 
particularly in repeated play.  Summarizing the complex contracting game as a decision tree 
illustrates how the parties can achieve cooperation, but also how the uncertainty inherent in 
complex contracting can make cooperation more difficult.  Figure 1 depicts graphically the 
complex contracting game in tree form, with payoffs for cooperation and defection carried 
over from Figure 1, so that the payoffs for mutual cooperation are three each, for mutual 
defection two each, and in case of asymmetric strategies, one for the cooperator and four 




       
Phase I:  
Negotiation 
Phase II:                 
Strategy Selection 
Phase III:  
Nature 
Phase IV:     
Payoffs 
Phase IV:    
Payoffs 
 Buyer Seller  Buyer  Seller Net Gain 
   Positive 3 + 2 = 5 3 + 2 = 5 10 
  Cooperate     
   Negative 3 + 0 = 3 3 + 0 = 3 6 
 Cooperate      
   Positive 1 + 2 = 3 4 + 2 = 6 9 
  Defect     
   Negative 1 + 0 = 1 4 + 0 = 4 5 
Incomplete       
Contract       
   Positive 4 + 2 = 6 1 + 2 = 3 9 
  Cooperate     
   Negative 4 + 0 = 2 1 + 0 = 1 5 
 Defect      
   Positive 2 + 2 = 4 2 + 2 = 4 8 
  Defect     
   Negative 2 + 0 = 2 2 + 0 = 2 4 
Figure 1. The Complex Contracting Game 
The tree form represents complex contracting in stages.  In the first stage, the buyer 
and seller negotiate contract terms, leaving some portion incomplete, and each makes asset 
specific investments.  In the second phase, the players choose whether to cooperate or 
defect.  Next, nature changes circumstances.  As the contract is executed and the product is 
researched, developed and produced, nature reduces cost and value uncertainty by 
producing circumstances that affect the payoffs buyers and sellers receive.  However, 
buyers and sellers do not necessarily know how nature affected them or the other party: 
some portion of these changed circumstances is known to both parties and others are 
known only to one party or the other.  Perhaps the product was happily cheaper to produce 
for the seller and more valuable to the buyer than anticipated.  Or, perhaps the seller’s 
production costs were much higher and the product turned out to be less valuable to the 
buyer.   
Payoffs 
In the last stage, the payoffs are revealed to the buyer and seller, as determined by a 
combination of the parties’ strategies and the effect of nature.  For illustrative purposes, we 
adopt simplifying assumptions about the payoff distribution.  The complex contracting 
decision tree and payoffs can of course be expanded to include asymmetrical effects of 
nature and payoffs for cooperation and defection.  Figure 2 implicitly assumes nature 
equally advantaged and disadvantaged both the buyer and seller, with a plus two in case of 
favorable circumstances and zero in the case of unfavorable circumstances. A central 




receive can depend as much on external circumstances as on their strategic choices about 
cooperation.  In Figure 1, for example, the seller receives the same payoff (three) under 
mutual cooperation with unfavorable circumstances as she receives under a suckers payoff 
(seller cooperates, buyer defects) with favorable circumstances.  If the buyer and seller do 
not know either the other party’s strategy or the whether circumstances were favorable, 
neither will know the extent to which the payoff was due to their strategic choice or the 
vagaries of natural fortune.  Moreover, without credible verification, neither side can reliably 
claim it was cooperating.   
Complex Contracting and the Coast Guard’s Deepwater 
Program 
In this section we present the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program to illustrate the 
challenges inherent in contracting for complex contracts.  The Deepwater program is an 
effort to upgrade and overhaul the Coast Guard’s “deepwater” air and sea vessels and the 
command and control links among them.86  In 1998, the Coast Guard issued a Request for 
Proposal to design a system of interoperable air and sea assets to meet its mission and 
performance goals while lowering total ownership costs.  The Coast Guard evaluated three 
industry proposals and selected a system design from Integrated Coast Guard Systems 
(ICGS, a consortium between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman).87  Under the ICGS 
proposal, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater assets would all be fully integrated in a state-of-the-
art command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance system, commonly referred to as C4ISR.  In June 2002, the Coast Guard 
awarded its first Deepwater contract to ICGS.   
The Deepwater case summary and analysis presented below are based on 
extensive qualitative research.  Our first data source is a thorough review of the vast public 
record on the program.  The General Accounting Office has written over a dozen reports on 
Deepwater (e.g., GAO, 2004, March; 2005, April; 2005, July; 2007, February; 2007, March; 
2007, June; 2008, March; 2008, June) and the Inspector General of the Department of 
Homeland Security reported on a major internal Deepwater investigation (Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2007).  Deepwater has been subject to 
several House and Senate committees hearings,88 Congressional Research Service 
Reports89 and other Deepwater reports from the Defense Acquisition University (2007) and 
Acquisition Solutions (2001).  The Deepwater program has also been reported fairly 
extensively in the news media, although we do not rely much on media reports for our 
primary case data.  
                                                
86 The term “deepwater” refers to Coast Guard assets that operate in literal deepwater, 50 miles off 
shore. 
87 ICGS’ proposal included five new sea vessels, two fixed-wing aircraft, two helicopters, and one 
unmanned aerial vehicle.  The other assets were upgrades.  
88 For examples, see the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and 
Global Terrorism, http://homeland.house.gov/Hearings/index.asp?ID=50 , and the Subcommittee on  
Coast Guard  and Maritime Transportation at 
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/File/Coast%20Guard/20070130/Opening20070130.pdf 





We have also conducted more than one hundred interviews with individuals 
knowledgeable about the case, including former and current Congressional committee staff 
members, current and former Coast Guard officials, officials from ICGS, officials from 
industry not associated with ICGS, officials from the Department of Homeland Security, 
academic experts on federal acquisition, and officials who serve in an advisory capacity to 
members of Congress.  A semi-structured interview protocol was used and all interviews 
were conducted by two, and in some cases three, researchers. The interview participants 
were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity, and participation was completely voluntary 
with the option of withdrawing at any point. The project was approved by the institutional 
review boards at each of the author’s institutions. Interview notes were transcribed and 
coded, and the findings triangulated against other data sources.  
In the remainder of this section, we place the Deepwater contract in the complex 
contracting theoretical perspective.  Deepwater negotiations occurred in an environment of 
high uncertainty and lock-in fears that produced an incomplete contract.  The Coast Guard 
and ICGS both claimed to choose cooperative, consummate contracting strategies, although 
these claims are difficult to verify.  The Coast Guard and ICGS received lower than 
anticipated payoffs, however it is not clear whether this was the result of their contract 
strategies or an unexpectedly difficult contracting environment.  Our conclusions about the 
Deepwater processes and outcomes are drawn from our interviews and systematic analysis 
of the publicly available Deepwater information, and those documents received through the 
Freedom of Information process or provided by the interviewees.   
Background 
In recent history the Coast Guard’s procurement practice has been to separate 
purchases for individual classes of assets–ships, cutters, planes and helicopters; when a 
class of ships was no longer sea worthy, the Coast Guard bought a new one to replace it, 
perhaps with a modified design better suited to the Coast Guard’s evolving mission.  
Because it bought fewer and smaller assets relative to other major naval buyers–notably the 
US Navy–the Coast Guard largely made ad hoc purchases from a handful of small sellers 
(e.g., regional shipyards such as Bollinger).  By the early 1990s, it became clear that the 
Coast Guard needed a more targeted and strategic approach to upgrade its rapidly aging 
assets.90  Many Coast Guard assets were reaching the end of their usable life-span and 
were ill suited to the modern Coast Guard’s missions.  The Coast Guard leadership lobbied 
Congress for a long-term acquisition strategy that would upgrade and modernize a 
significant portion of the Coast Guard fleet with a stable funding stream.  In 1998, Congress 
and the Clinton administration committed to a multi-year procurement at approximately $500 
million a year, significantly more than the Coast Guard’s historical acquisition 
expenditures.91 The result was the Deepwater program or Project Deepwater. 
Deepwater as a Complex Product 
The Deepwater program was a complex product.  The Coast Guard was highly 
uncertain about the value it would receive from Deepwater products.  The Coast Guard 
                                                
90 As of 2001, 86% of the Coast Guard’s water and air assets had reached or were expected to reach 
the end of their planned service life within five years. The Coast Guard’s fleet of assets was widely 
considered to be one of the oldest in the world, ranking 37 out of 39 of the fleets worldwide 





understood its objectives–maritime security (upholding the law), maritime safety (rescuing 
the distressed), protection of natural resources (protecting the environment), maritime 
mobility (ensuring safe marine transportation), and national defense (operating in 
coordination with the US Navy)–but it lacked information about the options for achieving 
them.  The Coast Guard knew the basic components that would ultimately comprise its 
asset fleet–small and large boats, planes, and helicopters, tied together through 
communication and integration technologies.  But the Coast Guard did not know what each 
of their performance specifications would be and how they would operate together in a 
system.  As a result, the Coast Guard was not well positioned to assess alternative system 
portfolios and system components. For example, how many fewer aircraft would be needed 
if the performance of the large cutters were increased twenty percent?  ICGS had cost 
uncertainty.  The Coast Guard had established a hard overall-cost cap ($500 million 
annually), but ICGS did not know how much it would cost to deliver these to meet the Coast 
Guard’s objectives.  Full cost information for each asset would not be available until the 
Coast Guard either specified performance standards with some precision or authorized a 
first-in-class design.92  Any delay in identifying these specifications would compound costs 
as production processes lay idle.   
Asset Specific Investments and Lock-In Risks 
The Deepwater assets vary in the degree to which they required asset specific 
investments.  On the low end of asset specificity are alterations to existing, highly 
marketable assets. For example, ICGS can turn to a variety of subcontractors to provide 
upgrades to helicopter engines. On the high end of asset specificity are new assets for 
which the Coast Guard is one of only a few potential buyers, if not the only buyer.  For 
example, one of the primary assets of the Deepwater program is the National Security 
Cutter (NSC), the largest class of ships in the Coast Guard fleet.  Northrop Grumman–the 
NSC lead contractor–developed a specialized production process for this asset because of 
the Coast Guard’s unique performance needs.  The Coast Guard also made investments 
that were to a degree asset specific, notably the creation of a Deepwater acquisition office, 
separate from its existing procurement infrastructure.  This unit was to design procurement 
practices and systems exclusively for ICGS; the Coast Guard staff needed special clearance 
to work on the Deepwater acquisition. As processes and staff become embedded with a 
single seller, it becomes harder to adapt to others. 
For both parties, these asset specific investments created lock-in risks. For the Coast 
Guard the risk was that ICGS would gain an information advantage as it designed and built 
the assets.  If ICGS elected to abuse its information advantage (e.g., by “gold plating” the 
product), the Coast Guard would have limited options for alternatives.  For example, a highly 
asset specific element of ICGS’ Deepwater system is the logistics and communication 
systems for integrating all the system components, known as C4ISR.93  ICGS has 
                                                
92 First-in-class designs typically encounter cost overruns and schedule delays as the buyer and seller 
work out the precise specifications for the product. Cost-plus contracts are often used for the 
prototype design where the buyer bears greater cost risk.  This puts the burden on the buyer to 
determine what it is exactly that they want to buy.  Once the first-in-class asset is completed, parties 
often switch to fixed-price contracts for subsequent assets.  In this case the seller bears greater cost 
risk. 
93 Lockheed Martin assumed the lead in development and production of this element because of its 




substantial research, development, modification and adaption costs invested in tailoring this 
system to the Coast Guard’s needs.  In order to secure a return on its investment, ICGS has 
a strong incentive to make this system as proprietary as possible. As such, the Coast Guard 
now has to largely rely on ICGS for costly capability enhancements, training, technical 
assistance, and standard operational maintenance and upgrades.  For ICGS, the primary 
lock-in risk is that it may not recoup its investments (i.e. research and development and 
production) if the Coast Guard elects to stop buying those system elements for which ICGS 
has made asset specific investments.  If the Coast Guard elected to buy helicopter engine 
upgrades from an alternative supplier, ICGS can tender its engines to another buyer–the 
market is thick.  The risk is for highly asset-specific elements like the C4ISR system 
developed for the Coast Guard.94  
Incomplete Contracts 
One can imagine that in designing and producing an aerial or sea vessel, let alone 
an interoperable system of such assets, there is an almost infinite set of product 
specifications over which the buyer and seller might negotiate (e.g., the speed and lift of 
helicopters, the time at sea for boats, crew capacity, etc.).  To fully specify many of these 
decisions requires forecasting an array of variable future conditions (i.e., states of nature), 
some of which are highly unpredictable (e.g., weather, terrorists, drug runners). Given the 
value uncertainty faced by the Coast Guard, the cost uncertainty faced by ICGS, and the 
mutual risk of lock-in, the two parties entered into a contract arrangement that specified 
some aspects of the system, but left others unspecified.   
The Coast Guard and ICGS sought to balance their need for specificity against the 
uncertainty inherent in buying a complex product by specifying three contract layers.  The 
top layer was a performance-based indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract.  In 
the simplest terms, an IDIQ does not specify a firm quantity of products or the tasks required 
to produce them, but rather specifies a minimum or maximum number of products and some 
end-point for termination of the agreement.95  The Deepwater IDIQ contract specified that 
the Coast Guard could buy a set of system components without competitively bidding each 
one; instead each purchase was only with ICGS.  In a sense, the IDIQ acts like a menu with 
the base costs for various items, but where the add-ons are neither specified nor priced.  
The middle layer of the contract set the broad terms of exchange.  Each purchase 
under the IDIQ was negotiated through a task order between the Coast Guard and ICGS 
that specified basic terms, such as the number of units to be purchased in a class of assets 
and their delivery schedule, but left many dimensions indeterminate, like the exact design 
and performance specifications, cost schedules, and the evaluation metrics.   
Specifying many of the details of each task order occurred through a final contract 
layer that was intended to facilitate less formalized cooperation through the process of 
designing, testing, and building the asset.  This process occurred through Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs).  The IPTs were designed as collaborative governance mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                                    
is a legacy system which is the first generation predecessor to a more modern Coast Guard C4ISR 
system. 
94 Interestingly, there is significant interest from overseas buyers for the C4ISR system, but because 
of national security concerns ICGS is prohibited from selling comparable systems abroad. 





that brought together ICGS personnel, subcontractors, and Coast Guard officials to decide 
the important details about the asset under their jurisdiction.  However, once production was 
underway, rather than fully renegotiate each task order to reflect some design change or 
refinement, the Coast Guard and ICGS used Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs).   UCAs 
are a legal vehicle that allows production to continue after a design change, even though the 
parties had not formally negotiated the full price and terms of that change.  UCAs require 
that the parties formally resolve the specification and price within 180 days.  UCAs place the 
cost risk on the buyer because the seller has considerable discretion over the price charged 
for each revision.  Once these items become definitized they operate like fixed cost 
contracts.   
These three contractual layers specified the terms of the exchange and established a 
process for the Coast Guard and ICGS to reduce value and cost uncertainty, although they 
still did not fully specify the contract.  The task orders and UCAs could not specify every 
design and performance requirement for each asset and how they would fit together.  Part of 
the specification challenge was the interoperability requirement–and hence 
interconnectedness–of the system.  Any performance specification (e.g., the speed of a 
boat) had implications for other system elements (e.g., the range of helicopters and planes).  
Because the acquisition of the total Deepwater fleet was sequenced over a twenty-five year 
period, the Coast Guard and ICGS were unable to forecast (and specify formally in a task 
order) every detail of the assets early in the acquisition because these would then cement 
performance specifications for all later assets, which had not yet been specified or fully 
designed in some cases. Furthermore, because so much about these assets would not be 
known until the first unit was built, tested and refined in operating conditions, experience 
was perhaps the best guide for specifying much of the performance terms.  Many of these 
elements would need to be resolved either informally by ICGS and the Coast Guard working 
together or by one or the other of the parties deciding unilaterally.  As a result, the 
incompleteness of the contractual arrangements left substantial room for the behavior, or 
strategy, of both the Coast Guard and ICGS to impact outcomes. 
Strategy 
At the outset of the contract, ICGS and Coast Guard pledged to pursue 
consummate, cooperative strategies for how they treated the contract, often invoking 
“partnership” language to describe the relationship they were entering.  Harkening back to 
our theoretical terms, a partnership implies that each party was prepared to forgo an 
advantage for itself in favor of a larger benefit for the other side.  Perfunctory behavior, on 
the other hand, means following the “letter” of the contract and perhaps engaging in 
opportunistic behavior to pursue unilateral gain at the expense of greater mutual gain.  With 
so much of the Deepwater contract incomplete, much of the contract’s payoff would be 
determined by the parties’ behavior.  
Here we focus on one of the first task orders–the delivery of the NSC–to illustrate the 
potential impact of strategy on outcomes.  The NSC presented lock-in risks given the high 
degree of asset specificity described earlier.  The task order was incomplete in that it left 
many performance requirements indeterminate, following the pattern of devolving these 
decisions to an IPT and later definitization.96  In addition, the task order was incomplete in 
                                                
96 The design of the NSC has occurred in two phases. In the Phase 1 RFP, 85% of the design criteria 
and performance standards had been developed by the Coast Guard and the American Bureau of 
Shipping. In the second phase, the contract, ICGS had discretion over what the remaining criteria and 




that it did not identify the decision making rights and obligations of either ICGS or the Coast 
Guard over these unspecified elements. Specifically, the task order did not identify: which 
party had decision making authority over structural design specifications; the conditions 
under which independent third-party assessment of the design would be necessary, or 
which organizations would be qualified to perform this role (e.g., US Navy’s Surface Warfare 
Division); corrective action or sanctions in the event that design specifications were not 
certifiable; criteria and evaluation process for paying award fees; and penalties or 
accommodations for cost overruns or missed delivery dates. This left both parties with a 
wide berth to behave consummately or perfunctorily.  
In these areas, ICGS had discretion to openly discuss and jointly agree with the 
Coast Guard on the remaining unspecified decisions for the final design of the NSC.  Such 
an approach would be consummate behavior because it would produce win-win outcomes 
for the Coast Guard and ICGS.  Alternatively, the contract allowed ICGS to specify design 
standards unilaterally).  Such an approach would be perfunctory behavior because, although 
it was easier for ICGS to decide standards on its own, Coast Guard bore the risk of buying 
assets whose performance abilities did not meet what it needed.  If ICGS chose 
consummate behavior, it would use the IPT to jointly discuss and develop design and 
performance standards that aligned with the Coast Guard’s goals for the cutter (e.g., that it 
be capable of being at sea for 230 days a year with a 30-year service life). ICGS would 
explain to the Coast Guard the value and cost tradeoffs associated with different design and 
performance standard modifications.97 Placing this discussion within the IPT might also 
provide ICGS with the perspectives of both Coast Guard technical and operational experts 
along with third party experts, such as those from the American Bureau of Shipping.   
This cooperative approach through the IPTs would increase ICGS’s costs because 
orchestrating an open conversation with the Coast Guard about the comparative pros and 
cons of alternative design specifications would require significant investment of staff and 
time.98 There would also be no guarantee that the investment would benefits ICGS more 
than these costs, in large part because ICGS would have to keep production processes idle 
while it waited for Coast Guard officials to decide each unspecified item.  However, 
supplying more complete information would provide more value to the Coast Guard than it 
would cost ICGS to perform because the Coast Guard would be more likely to receive an 
asset–the NSC in this case–better aligned with mission requirements. Conversely, ICGS 
could spend little on providing information to the Coast Guard, or simply make decisions 
itself, which would be less costly.  However, because the Coast Guard would receive a 
product that might not meet its performance requirements, it would then be forced to pay 
even more to modify the asset.  Such changes would likely cost more for the Coast Guard 
than they could have cost ICGS (and the Coast Guard) to negotiate in advance through the 
IPTs if ICGS had been pursuing a consummate approach to the contract.    
                                                                                                                                                    
would ensure that the alternative standards would be consistent with the standards developed in the 
Phase 1 RFP. (http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/OIGtm_RLS_051707.pdf). 
97 For example, these discussions might include an explanation on the part of ICGS would clearly 
articulate that an additional investment of X dollars would yield an increase in Y days at sea or 
conversely that accepting some alternative would lead to a Z percent decline in days at sea, but 
potentially lower costs by X dollars or increase the lifespan of the cutter by Y years. 
98 This would require conducting simulations and cost-benefit modeling to determine the relative pros 
and cons associated with each design alternative, coordinating participation from all the IPT 




Just as ICGS could pursue a consummate or perfunctory approach to the contract, 
the Coast Guard faced a similar decision.  The Coast guard could reduce ICGS’ costs by 
inviting ICGS to provide comparative information on alternative performance specifications 
and quickly responding with decisions.  Such an approach would be consummate behavior. 
Alternatively, the Coast Guard could eschew opportunities to collaborate with ICGS to 
determine the design standards in the IPT, and instead unilaterally process UCAs, which 
would be perfunctory behavior.  Choosing consummate behavior would mean the Coast 
Guard would actively participate in the IPT by suggesting ways the proposed assets might 
be designed or modified to fulfill mission requirements before production moved too far 
along.  Such behavior would increase Coast Guard’s costs because it would require 
collecting relevant performance requirements and translating it for ICGS. This action would 
produce less value for the Coast Guard because, in the absence of a contractual 
requirement that ICGS provide comparative information (recall that these obligations were 
not specified in the contract), ICGS may not respond to the request.  However, such efforts 
to specify performance requirements would provide more value for ICGS because it would 
both produce a satisfied customer more inclined to renew existing and process new task 
orders and lower the costs of designing and producing subsequent interoperable assets.99  
Conversely, if the Coast Guard chose perfunctory behavior, it would save the cost of 
acquiring performance requirement information needed to specify incomplete design 
standards.   However, ICGS’s costs would increase by more than the Coast Guard’s saving 
because ICGS would either have to devote its own resources to gather the information 
(which would likely cost more than if the Coast Guard did this itself) or increase the risk of 
the Coast Guard not renewing the contract. 
Taken together, ICGS and Coast Guard found themselves on the horns of a 
collective- action problem in resolving the incomplete terms of the contract.  Both the Coast 
Guard and ICGS would be the best off if each behaved consummately.  The costs of 
cooperation–namely additional resources devoted to reducing the other party’s value or cost 
uncertainty–would be high for each, but these costs would be less than the mutual gain–a 
highly satisfied Coast Guard enjoying a NSC that met its mission requirements and a likely 
continuation of the IDIQ contract and subsequent task orders for ICGS.  However, the 
benefits of mutual cooperation were jeopardized by the risk of the other player’s possible 
defection.  The Coast Guard and ICGS risked losing their investments if the other party 
opted not to reciprocate (i.e., the sucker’s payoff).  If the Coast Guard behaved 
consummately and ICGS perfunctorily, the Coast Guard would receive an NSC that met 
basic contractual requirements (i.e., adhered to the “letter” of the contract) but failed to meet 
expectations in areas not specified in the contract, with the ICGS still receiving its full 
payment.  If ICGS behaved consummately and the Coast Guard perfunctorily, ICGS would 
have spent effort to meet its best guess of the Coast Guard’s mission requirements but may 
have still missed the mark, thereby subjecting itself to the risk of not receiving full payment 
and putting future task orders at risk.  Finally, if both parties behaved perfunctorily by 
avoiding costly collaboration in the IPT, the result would be an NSC that failed to meet 
Coast Guard’s needs and jeopardized future IDIQ and task orders. 
                                                
99 Once ICGS knows all the design specifications for the NSC, it knows many of the specifications for 




Nature and Outcomes 
On May 8, 2008, ICGS delivered the first-in-class NSC–the Bertholf–255 days 
100after the projected delivery date and over double the projected cost baseline.101 
Preliminary testing of the Bertholf revealed 2800 issues (trial cards) to be addressed, but 
only eight issues (starred trial cards) which required addressing before acceptance.102  The 
boat proved sea worthy and met most contractually specified performance requirements; the 
Coast Guard accepted delivery.   
Both sides received less than they anticipated and are generally unhappy with 
contract outcomes.  Performance evaluation of both parties by each other and external 
parties and overseers has questioned a range of leadership actions, decisions, and cast 
blame on each for the cost overruns, quality deficiencies, and schedule delays (GAO, 2008, 
March; 2008, June; 2007, February; 2007, March; 2005, April; 2005, July; 2004; CRS, 2008; 
DHS OIG, 2007; DAU 2007).  The Coast Guard faced program delays, higher costs, and 
was criticized for accepting a flawed asset design. ICGS saw Congressional scrutiny, 
reputational damage, and lost task orders under the initial IDIQ. 
Our framing of the Deepwater contract as a prisoner’s dilemma suggests a possible 
explanation for these outcomes is that both the Coast Guard and ICGS behaved 
perfunctorily.    The Coast Guard has been criticized for not actively participating in the NSC 
IPT, ceding decision authority over many unspecified design elements to ICGS, and 
unilaterally changing some NSC specifications through UCAs and then failing to definitize 
(GAO, 2008, June).  ICGS has been criticized for not providing the Coast Guard sufficient 
information about the NSC’s value-cost tradeoffs, over-billing the Coast Guard for 
modifications and alterations, and in some cases improperly exercising independent 
decision authority in the IPT by specifying design standards without sufficient Coast Guard 
input (DHS OIG, 2007; GAO, 2008, June; 2007, February; 2007, March; 2007, June).  
Recall that one of the implications of our complex contracting theory is that it is 
particularly difficult to sort out the independent impact of strategy and nature on outcomes.  
A negative turn of events outside the control of each party, for example, may make the 
outcomes of even a cooperative contract appear substandard.  In the case of the NSC, 
unpredicted external events may have contributed to outcomes and thus masked what might 
have been cooperative, consummate contracting practices.  First, the terrorist attacks of 9-
11 (which hit in the midst of the NSC’s design and production) spurred the assignment of 
Coast Guard to the newly created Department of Homeland Security and expanded its 
mission responsibilities. Coast Guard’s enhanced mission prompted significant changes to 
the NSC, notably an increase in its size and capabilities. Given the speed of events and 
Coast Guard’s desire not to derail the production of the NSC, Coast Guard made these 
decisions unilaterally.  ICGS, perhaps interpreting the receipt of major changes to an agreed 
                                                
100 “The Deepwater contract originally called for production and deployment work for NSC1 to be 
completed on August 3, 2007 with final delivery to the Coast Guard scheduled for August 27, 2007” 
(page 7 of http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-23_Jan07.pdf ). The Coast Guard 
reports taking delivery of the first NSC on May 8, 2008 
(http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/nsc/default.asp). This represents a 255-day delay. 
101 The original contract estimate for the NSC was valued at $322.2 million. Modifications and 
alterations in the design lead to $291.2 million in increased costs plus $35 million for inflation 





upon design as perfunctory behavior, did not invest in explaining the cost implications of 
these changes to Coast Guard.  A second unforeseen event was Hurricane Katrina, which 
struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, damaging Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in 
Pascagoula, Mississippi where the NSCs were being constructed.  The damage delayed 
delivery and increased production costs.   As ICGS felt that the calamity was not its fault, it 
passed some cost increase to the Coast Guard.   At the time of billing, ICGS submitted a 
Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA), which included modifications to meet the 9-11 
mission changes and costs associated with Hurricane Katrina. 
Although the exact impact of these unforeseen events remains unknown, Coast 
Guard and ICGS believe the other’s perfunctory behavior is largely to blame for the NSC’s 
outcomes.  In the most recent task order contracts, Coast Guard and ICGS clearly adopted 
perfunctory strategies that meet the letter of the contract, without the spirit of cooperation.  
The pretense of collaboration has been abandoned as the Coast Guard has set up its own 
acquisition directorate, assumed an increasing number of the responsibilities delegated to 
ICGS under the original IDIQ contract, is exercising greater authority over decision making 
(in and out of the IPTs), and is seeking to  buy assets outside the IDIQ with ICGS. The 
promise of a win-win “partnership” has deteriorated into a lose-lose transaction as each 
party pursues a perfunctory strategy. 
Conclusion 
The theory of complex contracting and the illustration of the Coast Guard’s Project 
Deepwater presented suggest that complex contracting is risky.  Complex contracts are 
highly uncertain, costly to negotiate and execute, and obfuscate accountability. Under the 
prisoners’ dilemma, lose-lose defection is individually more attractive than win-win 
cooperation, despite cooperation’s higher mutual gains.  Uncertainty about nature’s 
contributions to payoffs mean even the contract parties do not know whether contract 
outcomes stem from misfortune, the other party’s malfeasance, or their own 
mismanagement. In the case of Deepwater, both Coast Guard and ICGS assumed the other 
“defected.”  Overseers, notably Congressional oversight committees, have pushed the 
Coast Guard towards a perfunctory contracting approach.  As our analysis shows, however, 
while some evidence suggests that one or both of the exchange parties are partially at fault, 
nature may have produced negative outcomes and pushed the parties towards a lose-lose 
outcome.  In moving forward, the default response should not necessarily be to position 
Coast Guard and whatever sellers it engages into a rigidly perfunctory posture.   
Because complex contracts are prone to renegotiation, the “shadow of the future” 
opens a wealth of cooperative strategies to foster norms of reciprocity and trust and thus 
allow contract parties to turn lose-lose conflict into win-win cooperation (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; 
Heide & Miner, 1992). Moreover, these cooperative strategies enhance overseer’s ability to 
hold the exchange parties accountable in the contract process.  In the case of Deepwater, 
the multi-stage architecture of the contracting process allows for this kind of renegotiation.  
While the projection is that it will take 25 years to deliver all the component Deepwater 
assets, the Coast Guard, and ICGS did not formally commit to a 25-year agreement.  
Instead the IDIQ contract is structured in five-year increments.  The asset-specific nature of 
the some of the system components means that the Coast Guard faces a thin market of 
alternative suppliers for some assets, but at a minimum the overall contract arrangement 
allows for both exit and renegotiation.   
The shadow of the future shapes whether parties spiral away from partnership 




oversight and involvement in the Deepwater program demonstrate how political actors can 
change the rules of the game.  At present, Congress is pushing the Coast Guard towards a 
non-cooperative approach and away from a cooperative stance.  Congress could instead 
foster cooperation, for example, rather than forcing the Coast Guard to move away from an 
integrated relationship with ICGS to a more differentiated purchasing arrangement, 
Congress could encourage the Coast Guard to build on recent efforts to enhance the Coast 
Guard’s role in the IPTs and rely more extensively on third-party certification of product 
design and delivery.  A primary justification for such an approach is that there are significant 
opportunities to capture knowledge and information from the first round and apply it to 
subsequent rounds of contracting.  The practice of complex contracting need not be so dire.
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Acquisition of a system-of-systems can be an all new acquisition of multiple systems 
that are intended to operate together as a system-of-systems.  Much more common in the 
DoD is acquisition of one or more new systems that are intended to interoperate with 
existing systems as a system-of-systems with new capabilities.  In either case, successful 
acquisition of systems-of-systems (SoS) necessarily depends on effective contracting 
structures and processes for systems-of-systems acquisition.  In this paper, a set of system-
of-systems issues that needs to be addressed in SoS acquisition is identified and the current 
findings in this on-going research are discussed.  The findings suggest sustainment of 
extensive systems engineering efforts within the SoS acquisition and change to the existing 
contracting structures and process and organizational structures to maximize the probability 
of SoS acquisition success.  The resulting changes will be applied to current and future DoD 
SoS acquisitions. 
Introduction 
No universal agreement on a definition of the term “system-of-systems” exists, but 
many definitions have common basic elements. Sage and Cuppan (2001) describe a 
system-of-systems (SoS) as having operational and managerial independence of the 
individual systems as well as of emergent behavior.  Maier and Rechtin (2002) describe 
systems-of-systems as systems with emergent behavior that are operationally independent, 
managerially independent, evolutionarily developed, and geographically distributed.  
Boardman and Sauser (2006) describe one of the differentiating characteristics of an SoS 
as autonomy exercised by the constituent systems in order to fulfill the purpose of the SoS. 
Other definitions include operational and managerial independence and geographical 
separations of the constituent systems. Two characteristics of the types of systems-of-
systems normally considered in the US Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition are that 
the constituent systems of an SoS are not chosen, but rather mandated to belong to the 
SoS and that the SoSs are usually bounded.  An SoS can consist of to-be-developed 
systems, existing systems, or some combinations of new and existing systems.  
SoS acquisition in the US DoD is faced with many challenges.  Some SoS programs 
have faced technical and management challenges, if not failures. The US Army’s Future 
Combat System program (US Army, 2002) has a serious budget overrun (GAO, 2002; 
2007).  The US Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System suffers from the lack of 
collaboration between contractors and the system integrators’ inability to impose decisions 
on them (GAO, 2006).    
With an aim to develop approaches that can prevent such SoS acquisition programs 
from failing,  Ghose and DeLaurentis (2008) look into “types of acquisition management, 
policy insights, and approaches that can increase the success of an acquisition in the SoS 
setting.”  They investigate the impact of SoS attributes, such as “requirement 
interdependency, project risk, and span-of-control of SoS managers and engineers—on the 
completion time of SoS projects.”  Ghose and DeLaurentis (2008; 2009) cite the following: 
the common causes of failure (Rouse 2007) within SoS acquisition processes as: a) 
misalignment of objectives among the systems, b) limited span of control of the SoS 
engineer on the component systems of the SoS, c) evolution of the SoS, d) 
inflexibility of the component system designs, e) emergent behavior revealing hidden 
dependencies within systems, f) perceived complexity of systems and g) the 




In their work, they analyze the effect of requirement dependency, span-of-control and 
risk profiles on, as a success metric, the total time to complete the project.  For example, 
they find that acquisition process completes in 19 time-steps with low span-of-control, as 
compared to 12 time-steps with high span-of-control.  The concept of span-of-control of 
engineers and managers is also addressed in the work in this paper, as it is related to both 
the pre-acquisition and acquisition phases of SoS acquisition.  
Osmundson et al. (2007) address SoS acquisition issues and their resolution by 
modeling simulation, but with a focus on SoS systems engineering.  These issues include 
initial agreement to operate as an SoS, SoS control, organization of the SoS, identifying 
SoS measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measuring effectiveness, staffing, team building 
and training for SoS operation, identifying data requirements, identifying and managing 
interfaces, risk management, SoS testing and managing emergent behavior.  Each of these 
issues is briefly discussed here.   A detailed elaboration of these issues and their resolution 
by modeling and simulation are in (Osmundson et al., 2008). 
The work captured in this paper attempts to answer this question: Can new 
contracting concepts be developed to aid in maximizing the probability of SoS acquisition 
success?  The usual systems acquisition success criteria apply: performance, schedule, and 
budget—systems to be developed within a desired schedule and within a budget and to 
perform according to requirements.  Briefly, contracting refers to the federal government and 
DoD contract management policy and guidance, roles and responsibilities in DoD contract 
management.  A detailed elaboration of these contracting elements can be found in 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
This paper treats a realistic scenario of an SoS acquisition program represented in 
Figures 1 and 2.  It is realistic in the sense that it reflects some current DoD SoS acquisition 
programs.  Figure 1 shows three separate, autonomous, individual systems (System A, 
System B, and System C).  These systems are currently being acquired (researched, 
developed, tested, produced, and deployed).  Each system is managed by a government 
program office and a contractor performing in accordance with the requirements of an 
acquisition contract.  In this scenario, during the course of the acquisition of each individual 
system, a new mission arises and requires an SoS that consists of the three systems to be 
built; the government thus adds a requirement that each individual system become part of 
the SoS acquisition program.  Figure 2 reflects the new SoS acquisition program.  In this 
paper, the discussion of the contracting structures and processes for SoS acquisition 
pertains to this scenario. 
 





Figure 2. Addition of SoS Requirements 
The transition from the acquisition of individual systems to the acquisition of an SoS 
has implications on the relationship between the government and the contractors.  This 
relationship is also determined by the organizational structure used to manage the SoS 
acquisition program.   Will the required SoS systems engineering be performed by a new, 
overarching group, by a collaboration among systems engineering organizations associated 
with existing systems, or by a single systems engineering organization associated with one 
of the component SoS systems?  In addition to contracting, organizational structure is also 
discussed in this paper.   
The goals of this paper are as follows: 
1. To emphasize the span-of-control of engineers on SoS acquisition during the 
SoS pre-acquisition and acquisition phases, 
5. To examine all possible contracting options in conjunction with all possible 
organizing options, 
6. To arrive at the possible combinations of contracting and organizing options 
for resolving the SoS acquisition issues, and 
7. To map resolution of SoS issues to the SoS acquisition success criteria. 
The rest of the paper begins with a discussion of the SoS acquisition issues, follows 
with an examination of some SoS-acquisition-related concepts, and ends with a conclusion. 
Recent System-of-Systems Acquisitions 
Examples of recent SoS acquisitions are the US Army’s Future Combat System, the 
US Coast Guard’s Deepwater System, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and 
Homeland Security’s SBInet, each of which has experienced technical, budget, and 
schedule challenges beyond what is considered the usual norm for single system 
acquisitions. 
Future Combat System. The Future Combat System (FCS), shown in Figure 3, 
was originally to be composed of a networked system of new manned ground vehicles 
(shown on the right-hand side of Figure 3) and unmanned aerial vehicles (shown on the left 
side of Figure 3).  FCS has recently been scaled back to a networked system of unmanned 





Figure 3. Original US Army Future Combat System Architecture 
The initial program cost estimate was $91.4 billion and the first combat brigade 
equipped with FCS was expected to roll out around 2015, followed by full production to 
equip up to 15 brigades by 2030 (Feickert & Lucas, 2009). 
Deepwater.  Deepwater, shown in Figure 4, originally was to include updated 
legacy ships plus new national security cutters, offshore patrol cutters and fast response 
cutters; updated aircraft and new manned and unmanned aircraft; and a new C4ISR system 
that would provide seamless communications between all of the assets, as show in Figure 
5. The Deepwater program was begun in 2002, estimated to cost between $19-24 billion, 
and expected to take 20-25 years to complete. The contract was awarded to Integrated 
Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), a joint venture of Northrup Grumman and Lockheed Martin, 
and ICGS hired subcontractors to design and build new assets. The Deepwater program 
was not only replacing old ships and aircraft, but was offering an integrated approach to 
upgrading other existing assets with improved C4ISR equipment and innovative logistics 





Figure 4. Original Coast Guard Deepwater Vessels and Aerial Vehicles 
 
Figure 5. Networked Deepwater System-of-systems 
The Deepwater program consisted of  updating legacy assets and building new 
classes of cutters, such as the National Security Cutter, the Offshore Patrol Cutter, and the 
Fast Response Cutter; modernizing aircraft and building a comprehensive, long-term 
aviation force, including maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and high-altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles; developing an integrated logistics support system; 
and modernizing the Coast Guard’s command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  (C4ISR) systems to promote seamless 
communications between assets.  C4ISR is fundamental to improving maritime domain 
awareness and is designed to not only ensure seamless interoperability among all Coast 
Guard units but also with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components as well as 




Joint Tactical Radio System.  The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a 
software defined radio (SDR) that allows a single hardware platform to be reconfigurable so 
that it can accommodate multiple radio waveforms. JTRS accommodates legacy and new 
mobile ad hoc networking waveforms and can store and run multiple waveforms (Nathans & 
Stephens, 2007).  JTRS is considered an SoS and consists of airborne-maritime fixed site 
(AMF) radios, ground mobile radios (GMR), handheld man pad small form fit radio (HMS), 
network centric enterprise services (NCES), GIG bandwidth extension (GIG-BE),  and 
legacy networks. A model of the AMF delivery process is shown in Figure 6. Lockheed 

















Figure 6. JTRS Airborne-maritime Fixed (AMF) Delivery Model 
(JTRS, 2009) 
SBInet.  SBInet is a virtual fence designed to detect illegal crossings of the US 
southern border with Mexico. The virtual fence consists of a network of cameras, radars, 
lighting and other sensors—some mounted on elevated towers, as shown in Figure7—and 
networked through a communication system that includes satellite nodes and links. The 
original contract was awarded to Boeing Integrated Defense Systems in 2006 and it was 
intended that the virtual fence would be in place, covering the entire US-Mexican border by 
2011. At the time Boeing was awarded the contract, the cost was estimated to be $2.5 
billion (Montalbano, 2010). 
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Figure 7. SBInet Sensor Tower 
Each of these SoS programs has followed a similar acquisition approach: contract to 
a large system integrator (LSI) who is supposed to have the responsibility and authority to 
manage the overall effort, including those of LSI subcontractors and vendors who number in 
a range from four to 100 or more. In the Lead System Integrator model, all four main tasks 
of building weapons have passed from government to industry. The LSI sets functional 
requirements and system specifications, provides program technical direction, controls 
program management, and controls program technical execution. The key reasons behind 
this shift are the growing complexity and scope of such systems while organic acquisition, 
systems engineering, program management resources within government are getting 
scarcer. 
All of the example SoSs have experienced major challenges: two programs have 
been restructured with the customer organization taking over the LSI role from the private 
sector contractor; one program is in hiatus awaiting further investigation; and the fourth 
program faces almost certain large cost and schedule overruns. 
FCS. There have been significant adjustments to the FCS program since its 
development start in 2003. The program was restructured and 4 of 18 core systems were 
cancelled. After the first four years of development, the Army estimated a total acquisition 
cost growth from $91.4 billion to $160.9 billion, while independent estimates were 
considerably higher—$203.3 billion and $233.9 billion.   The program started with immature 
technologies and only 2 of the program’s 44 technologies were fully matured by late 2006, 
according to the GAO, and it warned that all critical technologies may not be fully mature 
until the Army‘s production decision in February 2013. Requirements for networks and 
software were late, poorly defined or omitted due to the accelerated schedule for FCS 
development (Francis, 2008). 
Deepwater. As an earlier part of the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard initiated 
an effort to modernize its existing 110-foot Island class patrol boats so that they could 
remain in service pending the delivery of replacement Deepwater craft. Among other things, 
the modernization increased the length of the boats to 123 feet. The effort is thus referred to 
variously as the 110-foot modernization program, the 123-foot modernization program, or 
the 110/123-foot modernization program. The initial eight boats in the program began to 




Coast Guard removed the boats from service and canceled the program, having spent close 
to $100 million on it. There were serious problems in the C4ISR system. 
The Coast Guard is now pursuing Deepwater acquisition programs as individual 
programs, rather than as elements of a single, integrated program. The Coast Guard states 
that it is still using a systems approach to optimizing its acquisition programs, including the 
Deepwater acquisition programs, but that the system being optimized is now the Coast 
Guard as a whole, as opposed to the Deepwater subset of programs. 
The Coast Guard announced in April 2007 that it would assume the lead role as 
systems integrator for all Coast Guard Deepwater assets. The Coast Guard is phasing out 
its reliance on ICGS as a LSI for Deepwater acquisition and will terminate the contract with 
ICGS in January 2011.  To support its shift to that of the systems integrator, the Coast 
Guard is increasing its in-house system-integration capabilities. 
JTRS.  Since its initiation in 1997 until restructuring in 2006, the JTRS program 
experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls, due primarily to 
immature technologies, unstable requirements, and aggressive schedules (GAO, 2006). 
More recently, the JTRS held a stakeholders review in December 2009, after several 
postponements of a scheduled CDR. Some of the recently identified issues are as follows: 
the current baseline relies on airborne platform processors to perform many of management 
functions, and while the platform processor will perform rudimentary radio control functions 
necessary to meeting the platform mission, relying on the platform processor for performing 
network management functions is unacceptable; JTRS is having some difficulty meeting 
NSA information assurance requirements; there have been a large number of requirements 
allocated by the LSI from upper levels to lower levels and not accepted by subcontractors at 
the lower levels; there is concern that some waveforms are not ready to be ported to JTRS; 
the current Platform Integration Kit (PIK) design doesn’t integrate onto some platforms and 
some platforms do not want to use a PIK at all; and the software design and architecture is 
not fully defined and the definition would need to  include operationally relevant system 
threads that demonstrate end-to-end capability. The JTRS program has extended its 
schedule and will also likely cost significantly more than current budget estimates.  
SBInet. A GAO report on SBInet released in March 2010 identified a flawed testing 
process, performance issues, and poor management as serious ongoing issues affecting 
the program. The Department of Homeland Security cut off funding for the program, pending 
further review. Test plans were poorly defined and plagued by "numerous and extensive 
last-minute changes to test procedures," according to the GAO report, and even when the 
system was tested, it performed poorly.  Further, those overseeing the project failed to 
prioritize solving problems with the system and failed to conduct further tests. The report 
concluded that if the development and testing of the system were to continue in the same 
fashion, SBInet would not perform as expected and would take longer and cost more than 
necessary to implement.  
The DHS had expected the entire SBInet project to cost $6.7 billion, a readjustment 
from its original projected budget of $8 billion. To date, the DHS has spent about $720 
million on current SBInet deployments since the project began in 2005. The project was 
originally scheduled for completion by 2014, but the technical glitches and delays outlined in 
the GAO report held up the project so that only a prototype of the final solution is currently in 
use on just one part of the border. Funding for the SBInet has recently been suspended, 




Systems-of-Systems Acquisition Issues 
Systems acquisition refers to the disciplined management approach for the 
acquisition of an individual system, such as a weapon system (aircraft, ship, missile, etc.) or 
an information technology system.  The acquisition process involves the various activities 
related to the development, design, integration, testing, production, deployment, operations 
and support, and disposal of the system.  Within the federal government, specifically the 
DoD, systems acquisition uses a program management approach to the management of 
these activities.  This approach involves the use of a project lifecycle, which includes 
phases, gates, and decision-points, a project manager, and a project team (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008).   This approach is envisioned to apply to SoS acquisition, but making use of 
some new concepts, discussed in this paper, as there are significant differences between 
systems and systems-of-systems (SoS) and these differences affect the nature of 
government contracting for the development of systems-of-systems.  Such application 
requires understanding of the issues associated with SoS acquisition. 
The aforementioned SoS acquisition issues raised in Osmundson et al. (2008) are 
now briefly discussed here.   In this paper, the importance of SE endeavor ties to the SoS 
pre-acquisition and acquisition phases and to the contracting process is emphasized; that is, 
the span of control of the engineers is crucial in these SoS pre-acquisition and acquisition 
phases. 
 Initial agreement refers to decision-makers initially getting agreement that an 
SoS meets some desirable objective. It is an issue in particular when the SoS 
involves systems from different organizations or services because establishing 
an initial agreement is contingent on quantifying the benefits and risks of the new 
SoS.  
 SoS control must be established: Who will control the SoS and how it will be 
controlled. Each partner may lose some measure of control over its own systems 
in order to enable overall SoS control. 
 Organizing is a key issue of how to organize for the development and operation 
of an SoS. An example is the systems engineering process: How are processes 
that interface with SoS processes established and monitored?  
 Staffing, team building, and training refer to how an SoS will be staffed and 
operated. SoS operations must be planned for, the skills required for SoS 
operations identified, and personnel with the proper skills acquired and trained in 
SoS operations. 
 Data requirements is an issue concerning sharing of classified and/or proprietary 
design information among the SoS partners, who must recognize and weigh a 
possible loss of their systems’ operational superiority based on the shared 
classified or proprietary design information against the SoS benefits. 
 Interfaces must be identified and managed. Common language, grammar and 
usage must be established (for information SoSs), configuration management 
invoked to assure common agreements are followed, and required information 
security levels identified and provisions made to assure meeting of security 
requirements.   
 Risk management at the SoS level is an issue related to the mitigation of SoS 
risks potentially effected by component systems, which requires detailed 





 SoS testing requires that each SoS partner’s system be tested in a manner that 
resolves any of its concerns about operational behavior and that SoS threads be 
tested. 
 Measures of effectiveness is an issue because their strong dependence on 
individual component systems’ measures of performance requires an 
understanding of the latter, and this issue is related to the issues of data 
requirements and interfaces. 
 Emergent behavior, exhibited by the SoS resulting from unknown interactions 
among the constituent systems or from its interaction with the environment, need 
to be collectively understood, analyzed, and resolved, in particular when an 
emergent behavior may be detrimental to one or more of the partners. 
Some SoS-acquisition-related Concepts 
What contracting and organizing options can be used to aid in resolving the SoS 
issues?  This section discusses these options and the correspondence of their combinations 
and the SoS issues. 
Cross-functional Team Model. As previously stated, government systems 
acquisition management involves the use of project teams.  The project team is a cross-
functional team, consisting of technical specialists from the various functional areas involved 
in the acquisition process.  These functional areas typically include systems engineering, 
contract management, financial management, logistics, and others.  The cross-functional 
team is led by the government program manager.  The program manager has overall 
responsibility for the success of the acquisition project.  Although the program manager has 
overall responsibility, the program manager may not have all of the authority needed to 
manage the program.  For example, the contracting officer may have the specific authority 
to award and make changes to the contract.  Most systems acquisition programs involve 
effort performed by a contractor with the contract managed by the government program 
office.  The contractor will generally have its own program manager and cross-functional 
team managing the contract for the contractor.  Daily communication and coordination 
between government and contractor program managers, system engineers, and contract 
managers is the norm in defense acquisition management (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  This 
paper is focused on systems engineering and contract management of the cross-functional 
team.   
SoS Systems Engineering. In order to support knowledge-based acquisition, 
there is a need for effective global SoS systems engineering before the start of the 
acquisition process. Prior to milestone A, and prior to the Material Solution Analysis phase 
that cumulates in milestone A, an assessment must be made of technology opportunities 
and resources as well as of user needs. Assessment of technology opportunities and 
resources requires a global understanding of the proposed SoS and its operational 
environment. A technology may be considered mature when used in an existing system, but 
may lack required maturity when the existing system is incorporated into the proposed SoS 
and must operate under new conditions. An example is an information systems technology 
that is mature and stable when operating within the boundaries of a single system, but lacks 
the ability to interoperate with other systems.  
Technology maturity assessment can also be considered one aspect of risk 
assessment and in the same way that technology maturity assessment must be made in the 




The SoS must be represented in the pre-milestone A phase clearly, and in enough 
detail, to elucidate SoS technology and risk issues. A clear and complete SoS 
representation also elucidates data requirements and data ownership issues that will impact 
contractual relationships. SoS representation is a system architecting task that drives other 
early SoS systems engineering analyses and requires a very high level of skill. P.C. Lui, 
INCOSE Fellow and retired Singapore Defence Chief Scientist, remarked that while there 
are a limited number of good systems engineers, there is a very small number of systems 
architects. Yet, experienced, successful government and industry systems architects are 
essential at the start of SoS acquisitions. Good systems architecting will not assure program 
success, but lack of good systems architecting will almost always result in program failure. 
One systems architecting approach is to represent SoSs in an object-oriented 
manner, using Systems Modeling Language (SysML), for example Huynh and Osmundson 
(2007) and Osmundson et al. (2004). Since SoSs can be represented in an object oriented 
modeling language, testing SoSs can be considered to be similar to integration testing of 
object-oriented software systems (Binder, 2000). System A is tested first and then a System 
B that interacts with System A is integrated with A and the combination is tested; then, a 
System C that interacts with A is integrated with A and tested; then, if Systems B and C 
interact together, B and C are integrated and tested, and then A, B and C are integrated and 
tested. These integration tests are based on thread of operations analysis, a part of the front 
end systems architecting process. 
Knowledge of the availability of all systems is required early in the acquisition 
process in order to develop accurate test plans and program schedules. If a system is 
unavailable for testing, then a stub or driver is required; stub and driver development require 
complete knowledge about the missing system.  
Thus, prior to milestone A and during the technology opportunities and resources 
assessment, there must be an SoS systems engineering team in place that has the high-
level skills necessary to develop accurate SoS architectural representations, conduct 
technology assessments and risk assessments.  High-level systems engineering expertise  
and systems engineering activities are necessary in order to assure knowledge-based 
acquisition. Without them, the SoS acquisition would begin with incomplete and possibly 
inaccurate technology maturity knowledge and risk knowledge. 
The concept of span of control on the system components is crucial in all phases of 
acquisition.  This means that systems engineering discipline need be enhanced and ever 
present in the SoS pre-acquisition and acquisition phases.  Toward this end, there are two 
possible approaches. One is having a capable SE organization strictly organic to the SoS 
acquisition program office, and the other is using a capable SE organization external to the 
SoS acquisition program office, but the latter has strict ownership of the SE organization 
during the entire SoS acquisition.  The advantages of the first approach are that the span of 
control of the engineers takes hold, direct control or exchanges are facilitated, and 
independence from contractors’ undue influence materializes.  The disadvantages are 
investment in money and people.  The second approach suffers from control and increase in 
budgets for the same service required of the former, and time spent on establishing 
contracts to have an external organization to support. 
Whereas this concept is not new, this paper calls for it to be instituted and for the 





Contracting Options.  The transition from the acquisition of individual systems to 
the acquisition of an SoS has implications on the relationship between the government and 
the contractors.  This relationship is largely determined by the contracting structure and 
processes governing the SoS requirements.  There are three options for incorporating the 
SoS requirements into the individual acquisition programs (Programs A, B, and C in the 
scenario): two separate contracts, replacement of the existing contract, and modification of 
the existing contract.  The discussion of each of them follows. 
The first option is to incorporate the SoS requirements (shaded areas of each system 
in Figure 2) as a contract distinct from the existing contract for each contractor.  Contractors 
A, B, and C would receive an additional contract with the specific SoS requirements for that 
specific system.  In this option, each contractor would be working under two different and 
separate contracts—one for the acquisition of the basic system, and one for the SoS 
requirements related to the basic system. 
The second option is to terminate the original contract for the acquisition of the 
individual system and to negotiate and award a new single contract for both the acquisition 
of the single system and the acquisition of the SoS components of that system.  In this 
option, each contractor remains with only one contract.  
The third option is to negotiate a modification to the existing contract, which 
incorporates the SoS requirements for that system under the existing contract.  In this 
option, the contractor also remains with a single contract, albeit a modified contract, for all 
acquisition requirements. 
This paper suggests that the third contracting option, modifying the existing contract 
to incorporate the SoS requirements, would be preferred over the first option, since having a 
contractor work under two separate contracts may be problematic.  For example, there is a 
risk that the two contracts may be in conflict with each other, such as conflicting 
specifications, statements of work, or schedule priorities.  The resources required for 
administering two separate contracts would be a disadvantage.  Furthermore, managing two 
separate contracts would complicate organizational structures (discussed below).  The third 
option would be preferred over the second option because modifying an existing contract is 
more advantageous than negotiating a termination agreement on the original contract and 
then negotiating a new contract with the contractor.  During these negotiations, it is likely 
that the contractor would need to stop the acquisition effort, thus impacting the project 
schedule and cost. 
Organizational Structure Options.  Different SoS acquisition contracting options 
bear some impact on SoS acquisition program organizational structures.  As previously 
stated, the transition from the acquisition of individual systems to the acquisition of an SoS 
has implications on the relationship between the government and the contractors.  This 
relationship is also determined by the organizational structure used to manage the SoS 
acquisition program.   
In structuring the organization, three options can be used for the SoS acquisition 
program.  The first option is to designate one of the individual programs as the lead program 
and make that government program office responsible for managing the entire SoS 
acquisition program, which includes the other two systems.  For example, the government 
program office managing System A could be designated the lead program and made 
responsible for ensuring systems (A, B, and C) meet the SoS requirements.  Thus, the 
government program manager for System A will also have SoS acquisition responsibility and 




The second option is to establish a separate government program office responsible 
for the SoS acquisition program.  This separate government program office would have SoS 
acquisition responsibility and authority over the three individual government program offices 
managing their individual acquisition programs (System A, System, B, and System C.)  In 
this option, the SoS acquisition management would be performed by in-house government 
acquisition and contracting workforce.  
In the third option, a contractor is selected to manage the acquisition of the SoS 
program.  This contractor, typically referred to as a Lead Systems Integrator, would oversee 
the SoS requirements within the three individual systems (A, B, and C). This option entails 
awarding a contract to a company to perform the SoS acquisition management. 
This paper suggests that the second organizing option, establishing a separate 
government program office responsible for the SoS acquisition program, would be preferred 
over the first organizing option, since having one of the individual programs as the lead 
program and making that government program office responsible for managing the entire 
SoS acquisition program would result in potential conflicts of interest.  The government 
program manager for the individual program may be biased and improperly influenced in the 
management of the overall SoS acquisition program.  In this position, the government 
program manager may favor the individual program over the needs of the SoS.  
The second organizing option would be preferred over the third organizing option 
because having a contractor manage the SoS acquisition program may involve the 
contractor performing some of the critical requirements determination and acquisition 
decision-making of the SoS program.  The third contracting option may result in the out-
sourcing of inherently government functions related to the acquisition of the SoS program.  It 
may also result in the government’s loss of a systems engineering core competency and 
capability for managing SoS programs.  
Integrating Acquisition Management Processes.  In addition to the contracting 
options discussed above, another SoS issue relates to the integration of the SoS contract 
requirements among individual contracts.  SoS acquisition programs involve a high level of 
uncertainty, and thus, a high level of risk.  Since many of the individual systems have 
evolving requirements, and these requirements are required to interface with other individual 
systems in the SoS, the level of integration needed in the acquisition process of each 
individual system, as well as the SoS, is very high.  Additionally, in SoS acquisition 
programs, the use of Lead Systems Integrators (LSIs) or prime systems contractors 
overseeing subcontractors performing the majority of the acquisition effort, also adds to the 
high need of integration within the acquisition process.  In these SoS acquisition programs, 
one of the critical challenges is integrating the cost, schedule, and performance elements 
within the individual contracts (which now include the SoS requirements). 
Many agencies respond to the increased uncertainty and risk of systems-of-systems 
acquisition programs by trying to increase the specificity of the contract elements such as 
performance requirements, contract type, incentive, delivery schedule, and other terms and 
conditions.  Other agencies attempt to increase the flexibility of the contract elements to 
reflect the high uncertainty and risk.  This flexibility would be reflected not in the detailed 
product or performance specifications of the contract, but more in the processes established 
for development of the specifications, testing and acceptance criteria, and cost allowability 
(Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2008).  A preferred approach is to strike a proper balance 
between contract element specificity and flexibility.  This can be done through the 




In integrating the major elements of the SoS acquisition cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives, a best practice is to establish an integrated management system 
that integrates the planning, monitoring and control, and feedback elements of the SoS 
acquisition program.  
The planning elements include the requirement specification, work breakdown 
structure, statement of work, and the integrated master plan.  The integrated master plan 
(IMP) reflects all program activity, expands on the statement of work tasks, and defines the 
milestones.  The IMP also specifies the program events, significant accomplishments, 
accomplishment criteria, and detailed tasks.  The IMP is incorporated in the contract, along 
with the specifications, WBS, and SOW.  However, it should be noted that the IMP is an 
event-driven plan and does not specify any calendar schedule.   The JTRS AMF contract 
includes an IMP along with a Statement of Objectives, WBS, Performance Requirements 
Document, and other specifications. 
The monitoring and control elements include the integrated master schedule (IMS), 
technical performance measures, and the earned value management system.  Although not 
part of the contract, the integrated master schedule provides the detailed calendar schedule 
for tracking schedule progress; the earned value management systems tracks cost and 
schedule performance; and the technical performance measurement system tracks the 
technical risk.  The JTRS AMF program includes an IMS as well as technical performance 
measures and an earned value management system. 
The feedback elements include the contract award fee, if any, and contractor 
performance assessment reviews.  The contract award fee allows the contractor to earn 
additional profit, based on over and above required levels of performance.  The contractor’s 
performance and any award fee decisions are based on a subjective evaluation of the 
government.  The contractor performance assessment review is separate from the award 
fee and applies to all government contracts exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold.  
The JTRS AMF contract includes an award fee for the design, development, delivery, and 
testing of the Engineering Development Models. 
This integrated management system would be developed and used for each 
individual system acquisition program, as well as developed and used at the SoS level by 
the government program office responsible for the SoS acquisition program, as discussed in 
the previous organizational structure options.   
Linkages between Contracting Options and Organizational Structure 
Options.  A logical linkage appears to exist between the preferred contracting and 
organizing options for transitioning from the acquisition of individual systems to the 
acquisition of an SoS.  The preferred contracting option of modifying the existing contracts 
to incorporate the SoS requirements and the preferred organizing option of establishing a 
separate government program office responsible for the SoS acquisition program can be 
effectively implemented together.  The government program office responsible for the 
acquisition of the SoS would be the requirements agency for the SoS program.  In this 
capacity, the SoS government program office could communicate the SoS requirements to 
each system program office.  The system program office would then incorporate these 
requirements into the individual system contract modification.  The systems engineering and 
contract management personnel from the SoS government program office would 
communicate and collaborate with the systems engineering and contract management 





One potential drawback to the linkage of the two preferred contracting and 
organizing options would be the conflict potential between the SoS government program 
manager and the individual system government program manager (such as between the 
SoS government program manager and System A government program manager).  This 
would occur in situations dealing with cost, schedule, and performance priorities between 
the two aspects of the system (individual and SoS). The understanding of and adherence to 
roles and responsibilities between the SoS government program manager and the individual 
system program manager, as well as an order of precedence clause in the contract, would 
help deter these potential conflict situations.  
Table 1 shows a number of possible combinations of contracting and organizing 
options, which  (marked with “√”) potentially result in the resolution of the SoS issues, which, 
in turn, enable satisfaction of  the SoS acquisition success criteria (marked with “X”).  As 
discussed above, the preferred contracting option for the scenario of interest is the 
replacement of the existing contract.  It can be combined with either the separate 
government program option, which is, as discussed above, the preferred option or the lead 
systems integrator option.  For example, given that the existing contract is replaced by a 
new one, either the separate government program option or the lead systems integrator 
option, the SoS interfaces issue should be resolved.  The resolution of such an issue would 
enable the satisfaction of the SoS acquisition criteria.  
Table 1. Resolution of SoS Issues by Option Combinations and Satisfaction of 



















Initial agreement . √ √ √ X
SoS control √ √ X
Organizing √ √ √ X X X
Staffing, team building, and training √ √ X
Data requirements √ √ X X
Interfaces √ √ √ X X X
Risk management √ √ √ X X X
SoS testing √ √ √ X X X
Measures of effectiveness √ √ √ X X X
Emergent behavior √ √ √ X
Acquisition Success CriteriaContracting Option Organizing Option
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this on-going research is to determine contracting and organizational 
options to enable successful SoS acquisition and to apply them to current and future DoD 
SoS acquisitions.  
At this point in this research, the following is suggested: 
 A sustainable systems engineering effort with an extensive span of control by 





 Among the possible contracting options, replacing the contract is the preferred 
option.  But that’s not sufficient.  Organizing options must be considered, for an 
organizing option must be  coupled directly with a contracting option and, 
together, they would enable resolution of the SoS acquisition issues, which, in 
turn, could improve the probability of SoS acquisition success, thereby facilitating 
and effectively managing the SoS acquisition effort. 
These findings will be applied to a case study, whose results will be published in a 
future paper.  Furthermore, a separate paper will invoke a collaboration theory and 
incorporate it in the organizing options in particular and in SoS acquisition in general (Huynh 
et al., 2010). 
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Abstract 
As OSD seeks to field new capabilities while working to reduce cost and risk, it 
becomes imperative that systems engineering tools evolve. Traditionally, cost/schedule 
monitoring, technology assessment, and performance analyses have been conducted as 
independent activities focused on systems. However, as systems become more complex 
and entwined into operating as components of System of Systems (SoS), the need for more 




methodology for SoSs that allows for fully integrated analysis and trade-offs of the technical, 
cost, and schedule design spaces. 
The US Navy (PMS 420, SSC Pacific), Northrop Grumman, and the Stevens Institute 
of Technology are collaborating to develop such a comprehensive financial and portfolio 
management methodology for SoSs. The concept leverages the System Readiness Level 
(SRL) as a measure of SoS development and coalesces a system performance monitoring 
approach that provides insight into both current and anticipated performance. Additionally, a 
methodology for understanding the impact of technical trades within a SoS is introduced. 
Together, these tools allow for a true trade-off analysis capability that can be used to 
examine the extent to which a set of technology options either meet budget constraints or 
maximize performance.  
The Challenges of System of Systems Management  
The Department of Defense (DoD) has seen a growth in the acquisition of SoSs over 
the last few decades. This trend is expected to continue as the DoD increases focus on 
capabilities without changing its system oriented acquisition organization.  While providing 
significant opportunities for extending mission capabilities through the integration of existing 
and new capabilities into a synergistic SoS, there exists significant systems engineering 
challenges related to the integration and management of SoS. These engineering 
challenges are discussed in the Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems 
(ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008).  
One example of the challenge presently facing SoS Program Managers (PMs) is the 
understanding of the SoS technical maturity. Historically, the Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) methodology has been a key gauge of the technical maturity for individual systems 
within the DoD for the better part of two decades. However, when TRL is applied to 
components within a SoS, the model of using individual technology maturity as a measure of 
readiness for SoS development quickly breaks down. TRLs simply do not account for 
integration maturity or the complexity of bringing together any number of independent 
technologies to function as a SoS.  
Similar problems also become apparent with many other systems engineering and 
program management tools when applied in a SoS context, including Technical 
Performance Measures (TPMs) as used to track progress toward achieving Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Earned Value (EV) Management (to track 
cost/schedule). Existing tools simply do not provide sufficient insight into SoS development, 
contributing to a rash of complex development and acquisition projects that have gone 
astray. In a 2006 study (GAO, 2006, September 14) the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) noted that a lack of insight into the technical maturity of complex systems during 
development has contributed to an environment of significant cost overruns, schedules slips 
leading to program delays, canceled acquisition efforts, and reduced system performance at 
fielding.  In case after case, failure is most commonly not found at the technology 
development level, but rather at the point of a combination of two or more elements.  
This paper provides insight to the methodologies and tools being developed and 
used by the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Modules Program Office (PMS 420) to 




The Mission Modules Program—An Acknowledged SoS 
Example 
Acknowledged System of Systems Definition 
The DoD System of Systems Engineering Guide defines an acknowledged SoS as a 
set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are 
integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities. An acknowledged SoS has 
recognized objectives, a designated manager, and resources. Within an acknowledged SoS, 
the constituent Mission Systems (MS) retain their independent ownership, objectives, 
funding, development and sustainment approaches. Changes in the MSs are based on 
collaboration between the SoS PM and the MS PM. This complicates the task of a SoS PM 
and system engineer who must navigate the evolving plans and development priorities of 
the SoS constituent systems, along with their asynchronous development schedules, to plan 
and orchestrate evolution of the SoS toward SoS objectives.  
The LCS Mission Modules Program as an Acknowledged System of Systems 
The LCS Mission Modules Program Office (PMS 420) was established by the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A) 
on October 1, 2003 within the Program Executive Office–Littoral and Mine Warfare (PEO 
LMW) for the development, acquisition, and sustainment of the modular Mission Packages 
(MPs). The initial focus of PMS 420 was to take existing independent capabilities in the 
fields of surface warfare (SUW), mine countermeasure (MCM), and anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) and to integrate and modularize those capabilities to provide deployable and 
swappable warfighting capabilities for the LCS. Thus, the LCS MPs meet the definition of 
being a SoS as they are made up of individual MSs, including vehicle, communication, 
sensor, or weapon systems; support equipment, including support containers, or vehicle 
cradles; software; mission crew detachments; and aviation systems; these are then 
integrated into a larger system to deliver unique capability. As the charter of PMS 420 is to 
acquire, integrate, modularize, and sustain focused warfighting capabilities from existing 
program lines, PMS 420 primarily serves as a Ships Acquisition Program Manager (SHAPM) 
with a focus on acquiring the individual mission systems from Participating Acquisition 
Resource Managers (PARMS) who manage existing product lines and programs of records. 
This lack of direct management responsibility for the individual mission systems means that 
the SoSs comprising the MPs are an acknowledged SoS. 
Mission Package Explained 
The hierarchal MP concept, illustrated in Figure 1, is best described in three layers. 
These layers are:  
 Mission System (MS) = a single Vehicle, Communication, Sensor, or Weapon 
System  
 Mission Module (MM) = a combination of mission systems + Support Equipment 
+ Software that provide a unique mission capability 
 Mission Package (MP) = the collection of MMs + Mission Crew Detachments + 
Support Aircraft that provides the required ability to conduct a focused 





A MP consists of MSs integrated into warfighting responsive MMs, mission crew 
detachment and mission configured aircraft with their composite aviation crew detachment. 
MMs combine MSs (vehicles, sensors, weapons) and support equipment that install into the 
Seaframe via standard interfaces. 
 
 
Figure 1. Mission Package Defined 
MSs are sized to fit inside standard ten- or twenty-foot International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) support containers (SCs), or on ISO compliant flat racks and vehicle 
cradles. Using ISO SCs simplifies shipping, storage, availability of correct handling 
equipment, and container movement from shore to ship and ship to shore as the Navy is 
able to leverage the intermodal transportation resources used for shipping commercial cargo 
worldwide. MP reconfiguration will occur in homeport or overseas, using pre-positioned MPs 
or MPs that have been transported into theater by air or sea and staged near the LCS 
operating area. 
MPs can be swapped in order to reconfigure the ship for a different mission in a short 
period of time, giving a Combatant Commander a uniquely flexible response to changing 
warfighting requirements. To achieve this flexibility, the Navy is developing and procuring 
specific numbers of MPs to meet the Fleet’s warfighting requirements. The quantity of each 
MP type differs based on analysis of projected operational needs. 
Mission Package Status 
The first two LCS ships, USS Freedom (LCS-1) and USS Independence (LCS-2), 
have been delivered to the Navy along with prototype MPs to the Navy for use in testing the 
designs and the concept of modular warfighting capability.  The LCS MM Program (hereafter 
referred to as “the program”) is presently proceeding to a Milestone B acquisition decision. 
The first three MPs (1 each of SUW, ASW, and MCM) have completed Design Readiness 
Review (DRR) and are engaged in further developmental testing of their capabilities either 
independently in End-to-End (E2E) testing and/or by being integrated onto the LCS and 




MCM MP was on September 14, 2007. Phases 1 and 2 of E2E testing for MCM MP 1 were 
completed September 25, 2008, and August 19, 2009, respectively. Phase 3 of E2E testing 
for MCM MP 1 is scheduled for Summer 2010. The first ASW MP was rolled out on 
September 19, 2008. E2E testing for ASW MP 1 was completed April 3, 2009. ASW MP 1 
Developmental Test (DT) is scheduled for Summer 2010. The first SUW MP was rolled out 
on July 11, 2008. E2E testing for SUW MP 1 was completed in July 2009. The first SUW MP 
was recently called on for an early deployment mission. In February 2010, LCS 1 deployed 
with the first SUW MP augmented with a prototype Maritime Security Module (MSM) to 
provide Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) capability to the Southern Command. 
PMS 420 Progress on Addressing the Management Challenges for SoS 
Programs 
PMS 420, since its founding, has recognized the challenge of leading an 
acknowledged SoS development and quickly began development of novel system 
engineering tools and methodologies, designed to ultimately reduce risk and provide 
enhanced management (technical, cost, schedule) insight into the SoS problem. Four initial 
areas of traditional programmatic concern have been developed to date. Lessons learned by 
PMS 420, approaches used and their benefits will briefly be discussed within this paper. 
These tools/processes include the areas outlined below. 
1. SRL Used to Determine SoS Maturity Analysis: The System Maturity Model 
(SMM), developed by the Stevens Institute of Technology (SIT) and Northrop 
Grumman under funding provided by PMS 420. The SMM has been applied 
for the purpose of monitoring the maturity and integration status of individual 
technologies within the MP SoSs for PMS 420 and will be discussed in 
Section 3.1.  
2. Requirements Management & the Drive towards Commonality in a SoS 
World: Requirements management is a significant challenge within an 
individual system development effort. This becomes even more challenging 
within the interrelated development environment of the three SoSs that PMS 
420 faced. As an acquiring PM, PMS 420 has limited ability to impact Life 
Cycle Cost (LCC) of acquired capabilities. However, through implementation 
of an effective centralized and consolidated requirements management 
capability, PMS 420 is using commonality as a means to drive down cost. 
This approach will be expanded upon in Section 3.2. 
3. Expanding Financial Management past EV:  Financial and task management 
within a SoS is a complex task. PMS 420 required new processes and tools 
that could improve the PM’s ability to monitor and review task execution and 
earned value, support multi-year pre-planning of research, development, 
procurement, and sustainment efforts at warfare centers and contractors.  In 
addition, there was a need for greater insight into the cost of risk 
management activities and a desire to reduce funding document touch-time 
and rejections rates.  PMS 420 has developed such a tool, and a description 
of the tool and approach used by PMS 420 to accomplish this will be 
expanded upon in Section 3.3 
4. Understanding and Influencing SoS Reliability: Traditionally, system reliability 
has been determined through the calculation of independent critical 
component reliability in the system and defined by the value of Operational 




may no longer be the best metric for use. PMS 420 has been evaluating an 
approach based on mission completion and the use of reliability block 
diagrams developed to represent mission strings, which will be expanded 
upon in Section 3.4. 
In addition to the tools that have been developed to date, two additional areas will be 
presented that PMS 420 is presently investigating that are designed to further enhance the 
PM’s ability to gain insight into understanding the status and risks associated with SoS 
development. These tools, while still under development and evaluation by PMS 420, are 
designed to assist the SoS PM in the areas of conducting capability tradeoffs and in the 
understanding of the ability to achieve required performance. Specifically, these tools are 
designed to provide insight into areas listed below. 
1. Evaluating the Impact of Technology Insertion: One of the strengths 
envisioned from the MP SoS is their perceived ability to adapt to and rapidly 
and effectively incorporate new technologies that can provide increased 
warfighting capabilities. If the integration and maturation risks are not fully 
understood, a perceived improvement could actually lead to a decreased 
capability or significantly increased programmatic costs. To avoid these 
negative effects, PMS 420 has been developing a methodology to assess the 
impact of technology insertions in support of conducting tradeoff analysis. 
This proposed approach will be expanded upon in section 4.1. 
2. Predicting SoS Performance: One of the challenges of an acknowledged 
SoS, is that the SoS PM may have little ability to monitor performance 
development of the individual systems. This issue is further complicated by 
the fact that individual system performance, when integrated into a SoS, may 
be different. How, then, can the SoS PM determine if they are on track to 
satisfy the KPPs for the SoS?  PMS 420 has been developing a Performance 
Level Monitoring Model that seeks to provide the PM with this form of insight. 
The proposed approach will be expanded upon in section 4.3. 
Systems Engineering Management and Insight in SoS 
Programs 
As discussed in the previous sections of this paper, a SoS usually does not directly 
control the development of the majority of the technologies comprising the acknowledged 
SoS. This is a common situation and poses significant challenges to management in 
understanding where the end capability of a System stands with respect to providing the 
required level of performance as specified in the KPPs and the TPMs and in understanding 
the level of developmental and integration risk of the individual technologies composing the 
SoS. To resolve this area of engineering management concern, PMS 420 started the 
development of a portfolio of SoS Management tools. This section of the paper discusses 
some of these tools and lays the foundation for the later discussion of future efforts. 
SRL Used to Determine SoS Maturity Analysis 
LCS MPs will deliver required capability via the fielding of a series of incremental 
MPs until full capability that satisfies the LCS CDD is reached. For example, Increment 1 of 
the MCM MP provides capability for the detection and neutralization of volume and bottom 
mines. Increment 2 of the MCM MP introduces inshore detection capability via the Coastal 




additional MCM capability to the Fleet, including a magnetic and acoustic sweep capability 
to address the bottom/buried mines threat using the AN/ALQ-220 Organic Airborne and 
Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS) system. The full MCM baseline capability will be achieved 
by Increment 4 in FY17, which introduces the AN/AWS-2 Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance 
System (RAMICS), that neutralizes near surface and floating mines.  
As presented to this symposium last year, in order to gain insight and manage the 
development maturity of these incremental deliveries, PMS 420 has implemented an 
emerging concept known as the SRL (Forbes, Volkert, Gentile & Michaud, 2009). By pairing 
the traditional TRL scale with a new series of criteria known as the Integration Readiness 
Level (IRL), a more complete look at true system maturity can be obtained (Sauser, 
Ramirez-Marquez, Magnaye & Tan, 2008).  Under this methodology, the readiness of each 
technology is still considered, but instead of being a stand-alone metric for determining 
readiness for incorporation, it is analyzed in concert with both its integration requirements 
and the maturity of other technologies with which it interfaces. The calculation of SRL is 
described in the above-referenced papers. The SRL methodology has been highly 
successful on the program and has paid dividends in terms of both increasing decision-
maker visibility into true system status and allowing for pre-emptive actions to be taken to 
mitigate potential developmental issues. 
An example of the use of this approach by PMS 420 in understanding the impact to 
the program of technology options is shown in Figure 2, where the SRL for the initial 
configuration (on the left side of the figure) of the MCM MP number 1 is calculated as 0.57. 
In this configuration, one system component, the Multi-Vehicle Communications System for 
the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (MVCS (RMMV)), is early in its maturity and is lagging 
most other components, both in its technology and its integration readiness. This 
configuration resulted in a lower than acceptable overall SRL of 0.57, beyond the risk 
threshold of the program. 
The program evaluated the replacement of this lagging component with the 
combination of a Data Link System (DLS) both on-board and on the RMMV, each of which 
have both better TRLs and IRLs. This is shown on the right side of Figure 2. In this manner, 
the overall SRL of the MCM MP 1 increased to 0.67, now within the range acceptable to the 
established risk threshold of the program. 
The program has used this methodology to monitor developmental status by 
incorporating it into a continuing quarterly evaluation of the SRL level for each of the mission 
packages. This consistent evaluation allows the PMS 420 PM to better understand 
maturation of the individual MP SoS and of each increment within the SoS. In turn, this 
provides him with a greater understanding of the program’s technical status, enabling the 
PM to better maintain and manage the development risk of the MPs as they progress 






Figure 2. Initial and Enhanced Readiness of MCM MP 1 
An example of the progress of the SRL level for two increments of the SUW MPs is 
illustrated in Figure 3 for the SUW MP.  The graph demonstrates how the SRL value of 
different increments can be affected by both similar and [different] systems that make up the 
increments.  The main dip in the graph (4-5) indicates a problem that was identified with a 
shared system between the increments discovered during interface testing, while the rise in 
the graph (5-6) demonstrates the results of correcting that identified problem. The lower 
overall SRL of the SUW Increment 2 is associated with the lower maturity level of one its 
component technologies, which is being consistently monitored by PMS 420.  
 
Figure 3. SRL Values Over Time 
Since the initial presentation of the SRL method, the program has developed and 
documented a comprehensive process for System Maturity Assessments (SMA) and 
described its application to generic SoSs. The SMA process is iterative with a structured set 
of well-developed tasks that are described in detail in the System Maturity Assessment 
Guide (PMS 420, 2009) and illustrated in Figure 4. The first three steps of this process need 
only be conducted during initial system architecture development. Once the system 
architecture and subsequent system designs have been placed under configuration control, 
successive assessment iterations need only review the previous TRL and IRL criteria for any 
updates due to development progress and then recalculate the SRL with updates to 




the proper creation of an assessment framework to include technologies, integrations, and 
their resulting architecture. It is also imperative that buy-in from all stakeholders be obtained 
in order to ensure common understanding among all participants with regard to both what 
will be evaluated and in what manner. 
 
Figure 4. SMA Development Process Flow 
Requirements Management & the Drive Towards Commonality in a SoS World  
One of the more challenging of the SoS systems engineering tasks is the 
management of requirements. This is particularly acute in acknowledged SoS, where the 
PM does not have complete control of many of the constituent systems that are integrated 
into the SoS.  For the program, this issue was made more acute by the initialization of the 
program on a “come as you are basis” based on the desire to explore the concept of 
modular MPs supporting a Seaframe using defined interfaces before fully investing in a full 
up acquisition program. This resulted in technologies being selected to satisfy the original 
performance requirements on a package-by-package basis. As the entire LCS program 
(Seaframes and MMs) developed, this concept of an experimental development morphed 
into a traditional acquisition program. The legacy of the initiation was a set of MPs with 
minimal commonality between the packages, as indicated on the left side of Figure 5.  This 
approach, if continued, would result in increased LCCs for the support of the three MPs. 
While the way this issue was initiated for the LCS is slightly unique, the challenge of seeking 
to reduce LCC for a SoS in which the PM may not have direct control over the individual 
MSs and their designs is not. 
The program is addressing this problem through the implementation of a structured 
and controlled process designed to introduce increasing levels of commonality across the 
various mission packages. The objective is to achieve a more flexible and controlled 
requirements and specification environment throughout the lifecycle development of MPs. 
To do this, the PMS 420 Systems Engineering Integrated Product Team (SE-IPT) 




the right-hand side of Figure 5.  This structure is designed to provide a migration path over 
time towards common capabilities.  Initially, each package defined its separate capabilities 
with a package-level performance specification. Due to the initial compressed 
developmental schedule and the drive to use existing Program of Record solutions, 
duplicative or near duplicative common capabilities were often observed across the other 
MPs, as illustrated on the left-hand side of the figure. 
 
Figure 5. Modularizing the Structure of the Documentation Database 
PMS 420, through the SE-IPT, has established a process to define commonality and 
modularize capabilities to support consistent re-use across MPs. In the first iteration of this 
process, several common MP components were isolated and established as a common set 
of requirements at the next level of specification below the governing requirements 
documentation. This adds a common layer that spans capabilities across individual MS 
boundaries, as illustrated on the right side of Figure 5, modularizing the designs and 
fostering re-use of capability. This objective was implemented early in package 
development, even while the three MPs were being developed under an accelerated 
schedule. While the limitations in technology and time prevented the implementation of 
desired common capabilities such as a common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) between 
the MCM and ASW MPs, some commonality was achieved and implemented, including the 
design and use of a common USV cradle, common aviation support container designs, and 
other components. 
In other areas, while the need for commonality across all three MPs was defined 
early, the ability to reach a common capability took time.  These common capabilities 
included a modularized Mission Package Computing Environment (MPCE), and a common 
off-board unmanned vehicle communications capability, the Multi-Vehicle Control System 
(MVCS). Each of these common capabilities, i.e., MPCE has its own System/Subsystem 
Specification (SSS) and lower-level documentation.  While PMS 420 designated these as 
common cross package capabilities to fulfill the identified needs of the three MPs, they have 
matured into requirements constraints on the existing packages. PMS 420 uses the 
development of a common set of interface requirements for defining the trade space for 
evaluating the value of incorporating new technologies within existing MPs. 
This methodology, used for developing and transitioning MPCE and MVCS is now, 




extended to extracted common requirements and supporting capabilities in such areas as 
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), Safety, Shock and Vibration, and others.  As this method 
continues to mature, it will provide the basis for defining the totality of the interface 
requirements that a new mission package would need to met to be effectively and efficiently 
integrated into the LCS MP SoSs. The next phase beyond that will be to extend the push for 
commonality down to the MM and MS levels to include the identification, development, and 
specification of common MSs across the MPs, including shared capabilities such as remote 
unmanned vehicles. It is anticipated that this will allow for increased modularity and re-use 
of other Commercial Off The Shelf/Government Off The Shelf (COTS/GOTS) technology. 
Steady progress has been made in reaching this planned requirements structure of 
the DOORS database. The requirements allocation analyses for the Flight 0 CDD, Flight 0+ 
CDD and the LCS Interface Control Document (ICD) have been completed and the Level 2 
MPCE and MVCS SSS documents and the Level 3 MP SSS documents are in the final 
stages of PMS 420 Configuration Control Board (CCB) approval.  Formal configuration 
management (CM) process are used in updating and tracing the SSS documents to the 
CDD and ICD allocated requirements, which provides impact and traceability analysis 
capability to the MP level. 
Cost Prediction and Monitoring of SoS  
PMS 420 has been developing a SoS Online PM Tool that significantly improves the 
ability to manage the program.  Its advantages are numerous, including: 
a.  Earned Value Management at all SoS levels, including the ability to examine 
the data across various cross-sections of the program, and forecast cost and 
schedule overruns at an early stage; 
b.  Support of multi-year planning of research, development, procurement, and 
sustainment efforts; 
c.  Risk management that associates risk with cost and impact;  
d.  Integrates a formal program change management process across all levels of 
the program; 
e.  Allows senior program management the ability to conduct what-if financial 
impact analysis without changing the baseline [what's the impact if system 
(A) is replaced with system (B)];   
f.  Links the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) to task planning and task 
execution both at the system level and the SoS level; 
g.  Links the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) to execution data.  This gives 
the program manager critical insight into how lower-level system performance 
will impact the overall success of the SoS; and  
h.  Integration of the System Maturity Model into the Earned Value Management 
System (EVMS). 
PMS 420 uses this tool in its monthly drumbeat process, shown in Figure 6. The 
web-accessible, CAC-enabled Online PM Tool integrates program planning and execution 
data (cost, schedule, and performance), ensuring proper visibility into who is doing what, 
how well it is being done and what has to be done next.  Detailed task planning and 
execution data, coupled with clever organizational and reporting capabilities, have allowed 




forecasting.  The Online PM Tool provides the framework and business rules to establish 
and maintain process discipline.  PMS 420, executing activities, and cross-functional 
stakeholders all have a “seat at the table.” The real-time data availability promotes two-way 
communication and concurrence, enabling a successful egalitarian approach that would not 
be possible without the open web-based tool environment.  This provides the PM with 
insight into potential challenges and has helped avoid and/or minimize program errors. 
 
Figure 6. Monthly Drumbeat Process, Work Performance Insight and Reporting 
The Online PM Tool has been developed using a process that incorporates key 
stakeholder requirements. Processes are mapped to distinct decision points and controls 
implemented to ensure results are achievable.  The development team used an incremental 
build methodology to develop the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), record processes, 
review tool development and obtain user feedback.  The PMS 420 WBS is used as the 
unifying element for program information and all information in the Online PM Tool is 
associated with a specific WBS element.  Individual task statements are assigned a specific 
WBS element and funding is then allocated to executing activities associated with the 
specific task statements. Execution data (earned value data and variance analyses) is 
reported against specific WBS elements, which are then displayed in EV reports. The 
detailed use of EV and detailed work plans identifies areas that require closer scrutiny, and 
have provided the PM with increased insight into work performance, as shown in Figure 7.  
Areas with excess or un-executable funds are also more easily identifiable, allowing those 





Figure 7. Work Performance Insight 
PMS 420 uses the Online PM Tool to display, discuss and digest data during 
monthly drumbeat meetings.  This has enabled the monthly drumbeat to evolve from a tool-
centric execution status meeting to a more generalized program management meeting 
where Cost, Schedule, Risk and Performance are reviewed. This meeting has come to 
replace other routine meetings, concentrating PM efforts into a single day and freeing 
program office staff to do other work.  Snapshot documents, i.e., program Cost Performance 
Report and Integrated Master Schedule, are created using the tool to summarize and 
synthesize data into information, record this information for historical purposes, and provide 
senior management with real-time status of program health. 
PEO-level reporting is accomplished through a PEO Dashboard, which provides 
senior executive-level insight into all programs in the PEO.  Senior management has the 
ability to view planning and execution performance data across program offices, executing 
and performing activities, contractors, enterprise mission capabilities, lifecycle stages, and 
across SoS and Families of Systems.  PEO Quarterly Execution Reviews (QER), previously 
an arduous process of data collection and validation, are accomplished through the use of 
the PEO Dashboard and Online PM Tool.  The PM can generate a PEO-level summary of 
the same data used to manage the program, and the PEO can request deep-dives into 
areas of interest or concern. 
Understanding and Influencing SoS Reliability  
Availability is a more complex problem for the SoS than in traditional systems. This 
arises primarily out of two attributes of many SoSs; the use of modular systems design, and 
the ability of the SoS to accomplish multiple mission capabilities using various components 




analysis approaches and the development of tailored methods linked to the planned 
operational concepts of the MP SoSs.  
The use of traditional availability and reliability tools, such as reliability block 
diagrams (RBDs), Failure Mode Evaluation and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), and others are 
well understood and there is much experience in industry with their application. However, in 
a SoS, these methods are faced with two added demands. First, the introduction of 
modularity, open system design, and remote operations produce increasing number of 
components and, therefore, more opportunity for component to component failures. Some of 
the impacts on operational availability in such extended systems are indicated in the list 
below: 
 The mission component string is inherently less reliable because we increase the 
number of serial components in the mission/operational function; 
 Extended Unmanned systems require set up time and the potential for damage is 
increased because of the increased handling, in addition  the deployment  and 
recovery environment and handling systems design introduce opportunities for 
damage;  
 Infrastructure Over-head can be over whelming in the particular adaptation of 
modular Plug and Play (P&P) design approach (weight, extra services, handling 
operations, software and hardware overhead); and 
 Deployment of remote systems have security challenges (physical and data 
related). 
The second added demand is that of multiple mission capabilities and flexibility in 
configurations to achieve them. Simply stated, we typically have more capabilities provided 
by the SoS, and can execute the capability with several combinations of components. Some 
of the challenges introduced by this flexibility are described in the list below: 
 Operational use is constrained during a specified time period; 
 Operational use may use a small percentage of the mission suite, depending on 
the mission, e.g., for MCM, mapping, identification, clearing; and 
 Operational environment may call for a different subset of equipment to be used 
in a deployment. 
In the case of the program, we have the following specific issues that we must 
address: 
 The majority of the elements of a MP are different and widely distributed 
interfaces will affect the availability; 
 The organic off board vehicles can be utilized differently each mission; 
 The utilization of mission equipment per mission will vary—alternative mission 
equipment may be substituted; 
 The deployment and utility times will vary based on operational mission goals; 
 Ship Availability is a component of the MP architecture; and 
 Software reliability in MPCE and MVCS needs to be considered. 
An additional issue for the program (and becoming prevalent in other SoS) is that the 
requirement for MP availability is defined in terms of a Materiel Availability KPP. Materiel 




0.712. There is no specified separate requirement for the traditional Ao, since the LCS CDD 
indicates that “it is embedded in the Materiel Availability KPP.” A novel methodology has 
been applied to analyze and decompose Am, resulting in an approach that separates Am into 
two components. The first, called Active Availability (Aa), is a factor that is a function of fleet-
level support design, including such components as depot-level repair requirements, 
fielding, deployment, and support strategies. The second is the traditional Ao, defined at the 
fleet level and computed as the average of squadron or unit level Ao. 
In this fashion, a clear definition of Am for the program is developed and represented 
by Am = Aa * Ao. Monte Carlo simulations and support parameter investigations are being 
used to determine the impact on MP Am. Initial results indicate that target parameters for Aa 
and Ao with their impact on Am could be established as given in the example in Table 1. 
Table 1. Example LCS MP Am Composition 
CDD Requirement Target Aa Target Ao Target Am 
Threshold .64 0.887 0.738 0.655 
Objective .712 0.887 0.809 0.718 
Using this Am decomposition and simulation method, it is possible to establish 
requirements for both Aa and Ao that can be allocated to the MPs and further decomposed to 
their individual MM and MS components. The primary use of the Am decomposition method 
is to establish support concepts and strategies that will establish a defined level of Aa. After 
Aa is clearly established, Ao can be determined using the equation Ao = Am / Aa. This 
provides target Ao requirements that can be allocated to the MPs and their components. To 
address the above issues, Operational component strings for the various mission functions 
are defined. An example of this is shown in Figure 8 below. 
 
 




The following steps are then performed on the individual mission strings: 
 Operational strings were analyzed to identify the components required to execute 
independent mission functions of the system; 
 An assessment of the string to achieve a Mission Ao contribution is performed; 
 Common components (nodes) that form a critical function in more than one 
mission function are identified, and operational time is calculated for each 
mission it touches over the deployment cycle; and 
 Allocation of the Mission Ao decomposes to an Ao requirement at the component, 
Line Replaceable Unit (LRU), level. 
Currently, the program is evaluating the use of the mission function strings, 
decomposition of the Ao for the mission to individual components, and a Monte Carlo 
simulation for mission Ao analysis. The goal is to determine individual component Ao 
requirement targets and determine the impact of these on MP Ao and, therefore, on the Am 
threshold and objective requirements. 
Expanding the Tool Set—Technology Trades & SoS 
Performance Predictions 
The existing tool set has been invaluable to enabling the PM to gain increased 
insights into the developmental status and risks associated within a complex SoS. PMS 420 
has now begun working to expand upon the foundation of those tools and the system 
readiness monitoring capabilities provided by implementation of the SMM methodology and 
is seeking to expand the technical and programmatic tools and methodologies available for 
the PM. Specifically, there exists the need for tools to assist the PM in understanding the 
impacts of technology insertion options and to gain insight into predicted SoS performance, 
enabling the more effective conduct of tradeoff analysis.  This analysis would assess SoS 
performance and capability objectives and provide recommendations enabling the PM to 
make choices that optimize the SoS on the basis of cost, technical risk, or anticipated 
performance. 
Technology Insertion & SoS Analysis 
One of the primary benefits of the modular approach to SoS development is that new 
technologies capabilities can be rapidly incorporated to improve reliability, performance, or 
reduce LCCs. However, comparable technologies when integrated may result in significantly 
different integration risks, performance impacts across the SoS, and reliability or cost 
impacts. How to decide on what technologies to change and which technologies to select is 
an area of critical interest to PMS 420 as the MPs mature from development and enter their 
operational lifecycles.  
As the SoS technologies reach their designed or actual limits (of cost, performance, 
etc.), they should be reviewed for replacement by newer or more robust technologies that 
would provide improvement to the SoS optimization, performance, and capabilities.  The 
existing methodologies and incorporation of tools developed to date by PMS 420 have 
provided the program with an unprecedented view into the details of the status of the SoSs.  
The difficulty lies with combining the various details to provide the PM with a current 
composite view into the SoS to support analysis and impacts related to changing 
technologies within the existing SoS.  A composite view would enable the PM to determine if 




would have a budget that is proportional to established values—that is, reaching the end of 
its lifecycle— would bring too much risk to the SoS, would be within the physical constraints 
(size, mass, etc.) of the SoS, and more. 
The question is how to review several technologies that could be added to the SoS 
and determine the best candidate based upon the desires of the PM. To make this decision 
consistently and without bias, a modified version of the Analytical Hierarchical Process 
(AHP) will be utilized.  With AHP, PMS 420 can assign several categories and sub-
categories that the various technologies will be rated against, such as Cost, Physical 
Constraints, SRL, Reliability, etc.  The scores from the categorical comparison of the 
technology ratings will then be weighted by the needs and desires of the PM (e.g., 
budgetary constraints).  The result will be a list of the current and potential technologies 
ranked in order of recommended choice.  A basic example of this hierarchical calculation is 
shown in Figure 9. 
Technology Analysis and Insertion Tool Development 
The difficulty with utilizing the technology analysis and insertion calculation is its 
complexity and the need to allow for easy modification to the weighting parameters and 
ratings of technologies.  In the complex world of program acquisition, there are times that 
this calculation will need to be finished in a relatively short period of time, demanding an 
implementation that is prompt, dependable, unbiased, and accurate.  Much of the data that 
is needed for the calculation is spread out in many tools and locations and would need to be 
accessed for the calculation to produce meaningful results. 
 
Figure 9. Technology Analysis Hierarchy 
The solution to these issues is to maximize the usage of the current tools while 
minimizing the footprint of a new one.  We have been working with the SIT to develop and 
test a SRL calculation plug-in for an architecture tool, as a distributable example.  Building 
off of this starting point, we have designed this trade-off tool to act as a substantial plug-in to 
the program’s already established architecture modeling tool.  By leveraging the SoS 
architecture that is already developed and being maintained and by adding small changes to 
the architecture tool’s data model, the new trade-off tool will function with the established 
architecture tool, greatly reducing the learning curve. 
The small modifications to the architecture tool data model will not impact any of the 




architecture review cycles.  (As the data model can easily be expanded to incorporate the 
new fields, it can be designed to fit into DODAF 1.x and 2.0 versions.)  The modified fields 
will capture the ranking data that relates to the Technology Analysis and Insertion 
calculation in the configuration controlled environment of the Architecture Model.  The 
information for technologies that are not currently part of the SoS would be populated into 
the architecture tool.  A small modification to SIT’s existing SRL calculation plug-in, will 
enable it to work in this design (different architecture tool’s commands).  The weighting 
values for the criteria will be entered by the PM and securely stored. The outcome of the 
calculation will be a ranked list of choices for the position within the SoS.  A basic 
representation of the tool is shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Technology Analysis and Insertion Tool 
Prediction of Performance Using a Performance Level Monitoring 
Methodology 
Through system development, PMs are expected to quantifiably justify that their 
program will result in the delivery of a system with the required performance.  The traditional 
PM has several technical and program management tools at their disposal, including TPMs, 
Modeling and Simulation, etc., that provide insight and predictive capability in system 
performance. When the program matures to a point at which actual test data can be 
gathered, it is compared against expected system performance.   Due to the complex nature 
of SoS interdependencies, PMs are especially challenged when asked to quantifiably justify 
the investment in time, personnel, financial, and material resources in the program during 
SoS development.   
Traditional program and technical management tools must be extended to provide 
the necessary insight to the acknowledged SoS environment.  Given that the performance of 
a SoS is directly dependent upon the performance levels of the individual systems 
composing the SoS, as these capabilities are being independently developed by PARMS 
(over which he has limited directional authority and who may be developing the capabilities 
to fulfill a different set of performance metrics or may be unwilling to share detailed technical 
status with external organizations).  Even where the individual MS performance may directly 
translate to a SoS KPP area, the nature of MP SoS and its Concept of Operations does not 
mean that it provides the total answer. In various scenarios, the individual MP KPPs can be 
achieved through using various combinations of the systems within the SoS. For example, 
the LCS may decide to engage Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) with either the LCS’s core 




the SUW MP), or eventually the missiles of the Surface to Surface Missile MM (of the SUW 
MP). All of which can in full or in combination satisfy individual KPPs for the SUW MP. This 
estimation of performance difficulty is further complicated when the SoS is being developed 
in an incremental manner. Again using the SUW MP as an example, the first SUW MP is 
currently installed onboard LCS-1 and includes two 30-mm Gun Mission Modules, an 
Aviation (MH-60R armed helicopter) MM, and a prototype MSM. The first SUW MP does not 
include the Surface-to-Surface Missile MM (based on the NLOS-LS), which will be added in 
Increment 2. Understanding the capability provided by MP increments and ultimately 
whether the baseline (full capability) MP will satisfy the full set of performance requirements 
is of interest to the PM. A final complication is that when conducting SoS and incremental 
acquisition of this nature, complete E2E test and evaluation (T&E) may not be feasible and 
computer intensive modeling and simulation may not be practical in a schedule driven 
environment or where the SoS PM may not have the full technical models of the individual 
systems. So within these limitations, how can the PM gain insight into, and predictive 
capability for, determining the ability of the SoS to achieve required performance?  
To answer these questions, PMS 420, in conjunction with SSC-Pacific, Northrop 
Grumman, and the SIT, has been expanding the SMM to incorporate a Performance Level 
Monitoring (PLM) methodology. The PLM is being developed to understand if the 
performance will satisfy the KPPs and to understand the deltas in performance between the 
initial MPs and later MP increments, which will provide the full-up MP capability. Ultimately, 
this tool will also support the analysis of mission threads using different MP configurations, 
i.e., providing insight in performance capability of the MCM MP if one of its USVs is down for 
maintenance and/or as a tool for evaluating the impact of incorporating new capabilities or 
changing existing capabilities within a MP. 
Performance Level Monitoring Explained 
The PLM strives to apply a modified TPM type approach to a SoS construct. 
However, instead of focusing on a measurable technical value that can be monitored during 
development within a individual system, the PML links the SoS KPPs to individual 
component capabilities, their maturity, and their potential usage. The SMM, Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS), and usage rate variance analyses are all considered in the PLM 
calculation. 
To implement this process, significant up-front evaluation will be required by the SoS 
program office. The first step of the methodology is to define the SoS MP in terms of it 
component MSs and to map those systems and their capabilities to their projected impact 
on satisfying the MP KPPs. The individual MS capabilities are then adjudicated by the SoS 
PM in terms of their maturity and inclusion within an individual MP, breaking them into three 
generic categories of Advanced Developmental Models (ADM), Engineering Development 
Modules (EDM), and Production Models (PROD) that are mapped to their expected 
maturation points over the analysis timeline. This adjudication of systems is represented 
through the use of a weighting function to represent the individual capability’s maturity (real 
or anticipated) for each level of development.  While this method works well for MS that are 
not integrated with others to deliver required capability, such as the GMM, this becomes 
more complex when two or more systems must come together to provide a level of 
capability such as a MM, for example the combination of the ASW USV MS and the USV 
Towed Array System (UTAS) to provide a passive search capability.   Fortunately, the 
ongoing development of the SMM concept allows for a potential approach by using the 
value calculated for the MM SRL. The individual technologies can then be weighted in terms 




capabilities or MM values. The integrated MM capabilities can be expressed as a single 
value where the level of capability that the module comprised of capabilities (x, y, and ..) that 
can contribute towards the satisfaction of the MP KPP requirement given the level of 
maturity of the capability in the MP. 
The next stage of the PLM is to define the impact of various CONOPS on the ability 
of the SoS to satisfy the KPP requirements. As one of the strengths of a SoS is its inherent 
flexibility where component systems can be organized to solve the capability problem, this 
can often be translated to where the individual capabilities may be used in varying ways to 
accomplish the same mission. These varying CONOPS result in increased complexity for 
the analyst in trying to predict what level of performance is being achieved. While modeling 
and simulation tools can be used to conduct this type of analysis, the variations would make 
this an expensive and time-consuming process for the program and would not provide the 
PM with the rapid insight into options that maybe required. To address this issue, the PLM 
seeks to develop a set of scenarios for each of the MP SoS that represent the range of 
potential operational usage concepts for the individual capabilities (or modules) within the 
SoS as applicable to each KPP and incremental MP. This enables the derivation of a set of 
equations relating the KPPs to their component technologies and to a specific CONOP. The 
set of CONOPS, each reflecting an anticipated level of performance and technical 
maturity/integration of a specific capability (x) at a specific point (for this example as 
represented by a specific mission package) in time (n) are then matrixed together to enable 
a calculation of the overall predicated performance of the SoS across a range of scenarios. 
When conducting the analysis, the exact usage rate for each of the MS/MM may be 
unknown. In this case, running the analysis for each CONOPS using a minimum, maximum, 
and average anticipated usage rate for each capability/module can be used to develop a set 
of error bars in performance predictions. As a tool for the management of risk and for 
predicting when performance will be achieved or to understand the potential impact of 
changes, a graphic similar to the traditional TPM graphic can then be constructed by 






Figure 11. Performance Level Assessment Methodology 
The intent behind the PLM is to provide the PM necessary insight into incremental 
capability compared with CDD performance requirements. As with all predictive models, the 
analysis will need to be compared against measured test data as it becomes available to 
verify predictions and identify if the program is on course to meet CDD performance 
requirements. Figure 11 provides a graphical flow of the methodology described above and 
a more detailed description of this methodology can be found in Notional Assessment 
Methodology for KPP Accomplishment in a SoS: Proposed Methodology for Measuring 
Performance Progress within a System of Systems (SoS) (Volkert, 2009). This methodology 
has been further expanded upon by SIT at this symposium (Tan, Sauser, Ramirez-Marquez, 
Magnaye, Nowicki & Deshmukh, 2010). A projected further expansion of this methodology 
will be to allow for the evaluation of new capabilities prior to their being incorporated into a 
planned upgrade or replacement of an existing capability. 
Conclusion 
The increasing use of the System of Systems (SoS) model for the fielding of new and 
improved warfighting capabilities poses new management challenges for the DoD. To 
support the Program Manager, the US Navy (PMS 420, SSC Pacific), Northrop Grumman, 
and the Stevens Institute of Technology have been collaborating on the  development and 
verification of a set of comprehensive financial and portfolio management methodologies for 
acknowledged SoSs. The tools and capabilities that are being developed, discussed, and 
expanded by PMS 420 reflect the real-world challenges facing a SoS PM and reflect 
valuable lessons learned to date within the LCS Mission Modules program.  Starting with the 
field of technology maturation, the team has developed the standard TRL methodology into 
a concept that develops a System Readiness Level (SRL) measurement as a measure of 
SoS integration and maturity. This methodology has been demonstrated and has been used 
as the developmental springboard into an approach for determining and predicting the 




option trades. Financial tools have been developed and implemented that allow the PM to 
gain insight beyond that afforded by traditional EV reporting and that can provide 
management assistance in resource allocation in dynamic programs. The maturation of the 
requirements management process for a SoS was discussed and the capabilities of using it 
as a tool for reducing Life Cycle Cost presented. The process described  dictates the need 
for a methodology for SoSs that allows for fully integrated analysis and trade-offs of the 
technical, cost, and schedule design spaces. While SoS show great promise for providing 
flexible and cost-effective provisioning of capabilities to the DoD, the evolution of 
management tools will need to continue to advance in order to allow for the more efficient 
application of scarce resources from the conception of program initiation. Otherwise, SoS 
Program managers may be forced to continue to face many of the challenges PMS 420 has 
been through and will need to expend resources in solving those management challenges 
vice applying the resources to product development. 
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